In the Matter of the Application of Jim Goodpaster and Sherry Timmermann Goodpaster for a Conditional Use Permit.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0982

In the Matter of the Application of
Jim Goodpaster and Sherry Timmermann Goodpaster
for a Conditional Use Permit.

Filed April 10, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Chisago County Board of Commissioners
File No. PID 03.01189.00

Peter J. Frank, Christopher L. Olson, GDO Law, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for relators
Jim and Sherry Goodpaster)

Jason J. Kuboushek, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent Chisago
County Board of Commissioners)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Relators challenge the denial of a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a winery
on their agriculturally zoned property. Because respondent failed to provide legally
sufficient reasons with a factual basis in the record for its stated reasons to deny the CUP,
denial of the CUP was not reasonable. Therefore, we reverse with instructions to issue the
CUP with the recommended conditions.
2
FACTS
Relators Jim Goodpaster and Sherry Timmermann Goodpaster (the Goodpasters)
own, through a limited liability company, real property in Shafer Township, located within
Chisago County. The property consists of 5.66 acres zoned for agricultural use and is
currently planted with 400 grape vines and 25 apple and cherry trees. The northern
property line is planted with evergreen saplings, and there are established trees along the
eastern and southern property lines. The western edge of the property abuts Upland Road.
In April 2022, the Goodpasters applied for a CUP from Chisago County, which they
must obtain to operate the proposed winery as a “Rural Retail Tourism Business” in an
agriculturally zoned district. See Chisago County Zoning Ordinance (CCZO) § 4.15(B)
(2020). The township board considered the application and recommended approval.
The Chisago County Planning Commission held a public hearing on the CUP
application. County staff provided proposed findings of fact and recommended granting a
CUP with 14 conditions. At the hearing, the Goodpasters presented their application and
answered the planning commission’s questions about the potential volume of music at the
winery, the layout of the buildings, and whether the lot was large enough to accommodate
their planned use. The planning commission then accepted public comments.
Four members of the public offered oral comments, all of whom opposed the CUP
application. Three neighbors also submitted written comments opposing the CUP
application.
3
After hearing the comments from the public, the planning commission added three
conditions and modified several of the proposed conditions. The planning commission
adopted the recomm ended findings and recommended that respondent Chisago County
Board of Commissioners grant the CUP with the 17 conditions. The recommended
conditions include d limiting the hours of operation to Wednesday through Sunday,
12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; requiring all music to be indoors and all noise to comply with local
noise ordinances; requiring all parking to be on the property; limiting the number of guests
on the property at any one time; requiring the winery to comply with all local building and
zoning ordinances; and requiring a double row of screening pine trees on the three sides of
the property not facing the road.
The county board considered the CUP application with no additional public
comment or information. 1 Before any discussion, a commissioner moved to deny the
application because “[i]t’s too small of a lot,” they “were having problems with” another
winery on a 20-acre lot, there were “too many neighbors in close proximity,” and because
of “concern[s] about blocking vegetation.” The board unanimously denied the CUP
application.
After the meeting, the county sent the Goodpasters an “official notification” that the
county board had denied their application for a CUP. The letter identified three “findings”
as a basis for the denial: (1) the lot was “too small” to accommodate the winery without
causing “impactful disruption,” (2) the winery was “not sufficiently compatible with” the

1 The zoning code requires a public hearing only at the planning-commission stage. See
CCZO § 8.04(B), (F) (2020).
4
residential nature of the area and “not sufficiently separated by distance from those
residentially developed properties,” and (3) the “appearance and intensity of the site
development and site development activities ” would adversely impact the neighborhood
“and screening is unlikely to mitigate such adverse impacts.” The Goodpasters appeal by
writ of certiorari.
DECISION
“A county board’s decision regarding a CUP is quasi-judicial and reviewable by
writ of certiorari.” August v. Chisago County Bd. of Comm’rs, 868 N.W.2d 741, 744
(Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 15, 2015); see also Big Lake Ass’n v. Saint
Louis County Plan. Comm’n, 761 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 2009). Out of respect for the
separation of powers, our review is limited and deferential, see Big Lake, 761 N.W.2d at
491, and a relator bears the burden of persuading a reviewing court that the reasons for
denial of a CUP were “legally insufficient or had no factual basis in the record.” Yang v.
County of Carver, 660 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing Hubbard Broad., Inc.
v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1982)) . But, “[s]ince zoning laws are a
restriction on the use of private property, a landowner whose application for a conditional
use permit has been denied has a lighter burden than one who challenges approval of a
permit.” RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 n.4 (Minn. 2015) (citing
Bd. of Supervisors of Benton Twp. v. Carver County Bd. of Comm’rs, 225 N.W.2d 815,
819 (Minn. 1975)).
The basic standard of review for all zoning matters is the same: “whether the zoning
authority’s action was reasonable.” Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 417
5
(Minn. 1981). Caselaw has expressed the standard in various ways, including whether the
decision is “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Id.; see also RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at
75-76 (applying the unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious standard to a CUP appeal). We
independently review the county board’s decision “to see whether there was a reasonable
basis for the decision, or whether the county acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously.” Schwardt v. County of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Minn. 2003).
To determine if a county board’s decision was contrary to reason, we consider
whether it articulated legally sufficient reasons with a factual basis in the record. See
RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75-76. In determining what constitutes a legally sufficient reason
for denying a CUP, we look to the applicable zoning ordinance as an expression of the
county board’s policy determinations regarding what uses will promote the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. See Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 394.301, subd. 1 (2022) (“Conditional uses may be approved upon a showing by an
applicant that standards and criteria stated in the ordinance will be satisfied.”). The county
board’s decision must be supported by substantial evidence, Graham v. Itasca County Plan.
Comm’n, 601 N.W.2d 461, 467 (Minn. App. 1999), and we will not overturn a county
board’s decision simply because we may have come to a different conclusion. See
VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights, 336 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. 1983).
Denial of a CUP is not reasonable if the evidence establishes “that all of the
standards specified by the ordinance as a condition to granting the permit have been met.”
See Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. 1969) (stating that denial of a
special-use permit which meets the requirements set by ordinance would be arbitrary); see
6
also In re Livingood, 594 N.W.2d 889, 895 (Minn. 1999) (reaffirming that denying a permit
with insufficient evidence is arbitrary or capricious). Although a county board is not
required to prepare formal findings of fact, it must, at a minimum, “have the reasons for its
decision recorded or reduced to writing and in more than just a conclusory fashion.”
Earthburners, Inc. v. County of Carlton, 513 N.W.2d 460, 462 (Minn. 1994) (quotation
omitted).
The county board articulated three reasons for denying the Goodpasters a CUP:
(1) the lot was “too small to accommodate the intensive development proposal,” (2) the
proposed use would be incompatible with the neighborhood and was insufficiently
separated from it by distance, and (3) the incompatible “appearance and intensity” of the
proposed use was “unlikely” to be effectively screened from the neighborhood. The
Goodpasters argue that these reasons are legally insufficient and lack support in the record
and, thus, denial of the CUP was not reasonable.
The Chisago County Zoning Ordinance allows “Rural Retail Tourism Businesses”
on lots zoned agricultural if the business has a demonstrable relationship to the region, is
“small-scale” and “low-impact,” and obtains a CUP.
2 CCZO § 4.15(B), (C) (2020). The
sole issue before us is denial of the CUP . The zoning ordinance provides eight
nonexclusive factors to consider before granting or denying a CUP:
1. The Comprehensive Plan and development policies of the
County;

2 We note that the definition of “small- scale” and “low -impact” mirrors the factors to
consider when granting or denying a CUP. Compare CCZO § 4.15(D) (2020), with CCZO
§ 8.04(C) (2020).
7
2. The use shall not create an excessive demand on existing
parks, schools, streets and other public facilities and utilities
which serve or are proposed to serve the area;
3. The use shall be sufficiently compatible or separated by
distance or screening from adjacent development or land so
that existing development does not suffer undue negative
impact and there will be no significant deterrence to future
development;
4. The structure and site shall have an appearance that will not
have an adverse effect upon adjacent properties;
5. The use in the opinion of the County is reasonably related to
the overall land use goals of the County and to the existing land
use;
6. The use is consistent with the purposes of the Zoning
Ordinance and the purposes of the zoning district in which the
applicant intends to locate the proposed use;
7. The use shall not cause traffic hazard or congestion; and
8. Existing nearby properties shall not be adversely affected by
intrusion of noise, glare or general unsightliness.

CCZO § 8.04(C).
Although the county board did not reference the zoning ordinance during its meeting
or cite it in the reasons it gave for denying the CUP, the planning commission’s
recommended findings referenced the zoning ordinance and addressed the eight listed
factors.
The county board’s first finding is that the lot is “too small to accommodate the
intensive development proposal.” The minimum lot size in an agricultural district is five
acres, which the Goodpasters’ 5.66-acre lot exceeds. See CCZO § 5.15 (2020). The county
board did not indicate how this finding connected to the zoning ordinance, and we see no
connection between the size of the lot and the factors for the county board to consider. This
finding therefore lacks a legal basis.
8
The county board’s second finding is that the proposed use is incompatible with the
existing residential neighborhood and is “not sufficiently separated by distance from those
residential properties.” This finding has a legal basis in the zoning-ordinance requirement
that a proposed conditional use be sufficiently compatible with existing uses or separated
from them by distance or screening to prevent “undue negative impact.” CCZO
§ 8.04(C)(3). But this finding must also have a factual basis and, if the zoning authority
does not give its reasons for denying a CUP in “more than just a conclusory fashion,” it
“runs the risk of not having its decision sustained.” Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 416.
During oral argument to this court, the county board’s attorney identified one
neighbor’s concern that remained unaddressed by the recommended 17 conditions . The
neighbor was concerned about increased traffic because “neighbors walk or ride [Upland
R]oad for exercise, [and] use it to visit neighbors on foot.” However, there is no indication
from the oral comments of commissioners during the county board meeting or in the
notice-of-denial sent to the Goodpasters that traffic was a basis for the county board’s
denial of the CUP. And, based on our independent review of the record, we can see no
factual basis for the county board’s conclusion which was not addressed by the
recommended 17 conditions.
The county board’s third finding is that the neighboring residential properties “will
be adversely impacted by the appearance and intensity of the site development and site
development activities and screening is unlikely to mitigate such adverse impacts.” This
finding has a legal basis in the zoning-ordinance requirements that incompatible uses be
adequately screened, and that the “appearance” of the proposed project “will not have an
9
adverse effect upon adjacent properties.” CCZO § 8.04(C)(3), (4). But again, there must
be a factual basis for the county board’s finding, and the board did not point to any factual
basis to support its determination. See Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 416.
The one objection related to appearance expressed to the planning commission was
the possible use of portable toilets. The only indication that the proposed project may
include portable toilets is the statement in the Goodpasters’ proposal that they “will comply
[with] all requirements of the County Sanitarian,” including “satellite toilets as stipulated
by the County Sanitarian.” There is no indication that “satellite toilets” will be required
and, if they are, that they will not be adequately screened. In addition to established trees
on two sides of the property, the recommended conditions require that “Landscape
screening shall be included consisting of staggered rows of 4ft. to 6ft. tall pine trees” on
the three sides of the property not abutting Upland Road. The planning commission added
this requirement to address concerns expressed about screening. Therefore, this finding
lacks factual support.
In sum, though we give great deference to the county board’s zoning decisions, this
appeal represents the unique circumstance where the county board failed to articulate any
facts to explain why the CUP, with its 17 conditions which appear to address the public
concerns, was denied. Therefore, the denial of the CUP lacks a reasonable basis. See
RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 75-76; see also Zylka, 167 N.W.2d at 50.
The usual remedy for wrongful denial of a CUP is remand to the zoning authority
with instructions to issue the requested permit. Livingood, 594 N.W.2d at 895; In re
Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332-33 (Minn. 2008). Because the only CUP considered by
10
the county board included the 17 recommended conditions, which address neighborhood
concerns, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the CUP with the recommended
conditions.
Reversed and remanded.