State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-0984

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Penny Lane Arredondo,
Appellant.

Filed June 20, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Wheelock, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File Nos. 64-CR-21-267, 64-CR-21-268

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jenna Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, William C. Lundy, Special Assistant County Attorneys, Slayton,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Ross , Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction for causing contraband to be introduced into a
jail and her sentences for the contraband conviction and two fifth-degree drug possession
convictions. We affirm the contraband conviction because the state provided sufficient
evidence to prove that appellant caused controlled substances to be introduced into the
Redwood County Jail. Because the contraband conviction and both drug-possession
convictions arose from the same behavioral incident, we reverse the sentences for the
contraband conviction and one of the possession convictions and remand to the district
court to amend the warrant of commitment.
FACTS
On April 22, 2021, a Redwood County Sheriff’s sergeant pulled appellant Penny
Lane Arredondo over for driving with a cancelled license. 1 The following facts are taken
from testimony and exhibits admitted at trial.
After verifying that Arredondo’s license was cancelled, Sergeant K.T. asked her to
call someone to get the car, intending to arrest Arredondo and impound the car’s license
plates. A second police officer soon arrived and assisted in the arrest.
After she was seated in the back of the police car, Arredondo attempted to get the
attention of her daughter, who had been a passenger in her car. When officers asked what

1 The state charged Arredondo in a separate complaint with two additional offenses related
to the same incident— obstruction of legal process in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50,
subd. 1(2) (2020), and driving with a cancelled license in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24,
subd. 5 (2020). Neither of these charges are at issue on appeal.
3
she needed, Arredondo responded that she needed her medication, and the medication was
in her purse. One of the officers said, “OK, I will have [your daughter] grab your whole
purse and you can bring it with. Does that work?” Arredondo responded, “I just want to
take my dose.” Sergeant K.T. placed the purse in the front seat of the squad car. Arredondo
asked why her purse was in the front seat, and the sergeant replied, “I can’t have it with
you. You’re under arrest. Just for safety purposes. You can’t have it.”
Arredondo then complained of a headache, and the officers observed that she was
bleeding from her mouth. Sergeant K.T. took Arredondo to Redwood Hospital before
driving her to the jail; they remained at the hospital for less than 30 minutes, and hospital
staff did not prescribe Arredondo any medication. Sergeant K.T. then drove Arredondo to
the jail and, at the jail entrance, asked Arredondo if she had any items that would “cause
an issue in the jail, such as drugs, or any other kind of contraband.” Arredondo replied that
she did not, and Sergeant K.T. turned Arredondo and her personal property, including her
purse, over to Officer B.K., the corrections officer at the jail, to complete the booking
process.
During the inventory process, which occurred in the booking area of the jail, Officer
B.K. found a prescription bottle with a label that identified its contents as alprazolam
(Xanax) in Arredondo’s purse; it contained four pills that did not match the prescription.
The Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension tested the pills and identified two of the
pills as methylphenidate hydrochloride (Ritalin), a Schedule II drug, and the other two as
4
lorazepam (Ativan), a Schedule IV drug. 2 These medications are available only by
prescription, and Arredondo did not have a prescription for either of them.
At trial, Arredondo testified that she did not touch the purse from before she entered
the police car to the time the jail staff inventoried the purse’s contents, and Officer B.K.
testified that Arredondo would not have had access to her purse while she was at the jail.
Arredondo also testified that she did not ask Sergeant K.T. to take her medicine out of her
purse or give her purse back to her family.
The jury found Arredondo guilty of both counts of fifth-degree possession of a
controlled substance for possessing the Ativan and Ritalin pills and the single count of
introduction of contraband into a jail for bringing the four pills into the Redwood County
Jail. On May 9, 2022, the district court sentenced Arredondo to stays of imposition of
felony sentences on the possession convictions and 365 days in jail on the contraband
conviction, with 335 days stayed for two years.
Arredondo appeals.

2 Minnesota established five schedules of controlled substances based on the 1970 federal
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 1-6 (2020); State v. Vail,
274 N.W.2d 127, 135 (Minn. 1979). Both Schedule II and Schedule IV controlled
substances have an accepted medical use, but Schedule II drugs have a high potential for
abuse and a risk of severe dependence, while Schedule IV drugs have a low potential for
abuse and a risk of limited dependence. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(2), (4) (2018).
5
DECISION
I. The evidence is sufficient to support Arredondo’s conviction for causing
contraband to be introduced into a jail.

Arredondo argues that the state did not provide sufficient evidence to support her
conviction for causing controlled substances to be brought into the Redwood County Jail.
Although Arredondo does not contest that the four pills the jail staff found in her purse
were controlled substances or that she did not have permission to bring those pills into the
jail, she disputes whether the pills were brought “into” the jail. Arredondo specifically
argues that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the evidence is insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that she introduced contraband into a jail, lockup, or
correctional facility in violation of Minn. Stat. § 641.165 (2020) because she did not
introduce controlled substances into the “residential portion” of the jail.
A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence requires appellate courts to conduct a
close examination of the record. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). “The
verdict will not be overturned if the fact-finder, upon application of the presumption of
innocence and the State’s burden of proving an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the charged offense.” Id. This court applies
this “traditional” standard of review when there is direct evidence to support the jury’s
verdict. State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016). Direct evidence is “evidence
that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without
inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted).
6
“Because the meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether
the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute, it is
often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.” State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017);
see also State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 360 (Minn. 2020). If a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim requires statutory interpretation, the appellate court
reviews the issue de novo. State v. Pakhnyuk, 926 N.W.2d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019). Thus,
we first review de novo the statute’s meaning on the element of whether Arredondo caused
contraband to be introduced “into the jail,”3 followed by a review of the record to determine
if the state provided sufficient evidence to prove Arredondo violated Minn. Stat. § 641.165.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether the statute’s
language is unambiguous. State v. Jama, 923 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2019). “A statute
is ambiguous only if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). But when the
language of a statute is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguous,
and we apply its plain meaning. State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 2020).

3 This court has not addressed the question of whether the statute refers to specific areas of
a jail. The supreme court determined police may conduct an inventory search of a person’s
property after they are arrested and before they are incarcerated, but it does not specify
which areas of the building are implicated by the phrase “into” the jail. State v. Rodewald,
376 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Minn. 1985).
7
“In determining whether the language of a statute is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation, we consider the canons of interpretation listed in Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08.” Degroot, 946 N.W.2d at 360 (quotation omitted); State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d
679, 682 (Minn. 2015). One of the canons provides that “words and phrases are construed
according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.08(1) (2022). And “in the absence of statutory definitions, we may consider
dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term.” State v. Alarcon,
932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019). Both parties assert that the statute’s language is
unambiguous and supports their reading of it.
The statute under which the jury found Arredondo guilty provides, in relevant part:
Whoever introduces or in any manner causes the introduction
of contraband . . . into any jail, lockup, or correctional
facility . . . without the consent of the person in charge, or is
found in possession of contraband while within the facility or
upon the grounds thereof, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

Minn. Stat. § 641.165, subd. 2(a). This portion of the statute contains four elements: (1) the
property in question is categorized as contraband by law; (2) the contraband was introduced
into a jail, lockup, or correctional facility; (3) the defendant was responsible for that
introduction; and (4) the defendant did not have consent to introduce the property. The
parties offer competing interpretations of the second element.
Arredondo argues that the plain language of the statute forbids the introduction of
contraband “into any jail, lockup, or correctional facility” but does not specify an area of
the jail, lockup, or correctional facility , and thus, the state must prove that she introduced
contraband into the residential portion of the jail and not only the booking area.
8
Arredondo’s argument refers to language in two separate statutes. First, she relies on the
definition of “correctional facility” in the statute that concerns licensing and supervision of
facilities and defines a correctional facility as “any facility, including a group home, having
a residential component, the primary purpose of which is to serve persons placed therein
by a court, court services department, parole authority, or other correctional agency.”
Minn. Stat. § 241.021, subd. 1 (2020). Using this definition, Arredondo reasons that “a
correctional facility has two parts: it must have a residential component and its primary
purpose must be to serve persons placed in facilities by certain adjudicatory authorities.”
Arredondo further argues that, because the statute that permits counties to construct
and maintain a jail mentions the jail and the residential area in separate clauses, “into” as
used in section 641.165, subdivision 2(a), refers to the residential area. Minn. Stat.
§ 641.01 (2020) (stating that a county is authorized to maintain a jail with a residence
“adjoining and connected” to that jail). She asserts that the language of section 641.165,
subdivision 2(a), regarding the introduction of contraband refers to the residential part of
the jail because that clause uses the preposition “into,” as compared with the clause that
forbids possession of contraband, which uses the prepositions “within” and “upon.” This,
Arredondo argues, suggests that the use of “into” implies a narrower definition of a jail
than “within” or “upon.”
The state argues that the plain language of the statute prohibits the introduction, or
causing the introduction, of contraband to the inside or interior of one of the listed facilities,
including the jail, and that Arredondo’s interpretation violates the canon against surplusage
by adding the word “residential” to the statute. The state further asserts that the legislature
9
has provided a comprehensive statutory scheme to ensure that contraband does not make
its way into jails.
Section 641.165 does not define the term “into,” and thus we turn to dictionary
definitions to determine the plain meaning of the term. See Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d at 646.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “into” as “a function word to indicate
entry, introduction, insertion, superposition, or inclusion.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 656 (11th ed. 2020). “Within” is defined as “in or into the interior.” Id. at
1439. Neither preposition suggests a specific place inside a building or other enclosure.
The statute limits the introduction of contraband “into” the facility and separates possession
“within the facility” and “upon the grounds thereof.” Minn. St at. § 641.165, subd. 2(a).
However, it does not follow that “into” or “within” refers specifically to a residential
section of the jail that is not mentioned in the statute as a whole or that these prepositions
refer to two different areas of the jail.
Applying the common and approved usage of the word “into,” we conclude that the
only reasonable interpretation of the phrase “into the jail” is that a person violates Minn.
Stat. § 641.165 if they directly or indirectly cause contraband to enter any part of a jail .
The purpose of the statute is to keep contraband out of the jail, not to subdivide the jail.
And appellate courts “are not permitted to rewrite a statute or add additional statutory
language.” State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803, 812 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). We
decline to read the term “residential portion” into the statute where it does not exist.
Therefore, the state is required to prove only that Arredondo caused the contraband pills to
be introduced into the jail, not into a specific area of the jail.
10
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
This court evaluates the sufficiency of evidence through a careful review of the
record. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 263. Appellate courts must consider the facts and
“legitimate inferences” drawn from those facts and determine if “a jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d
656, 661 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted). This court must review the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the evidence the state presented at trial shows that, during her arrest,
Arredondo asked for her medications in her purse and saw the officer place her purse in
the front seat of the squad car. When asked if she had contraband that would cause an issue
at the jail, Arredondo stated she did not have any such contraband. The evidence shows
that Arredondo’s actions caused controlled substances to enter the Redwood County Jail.
It shows that Arredondo and her property were brought into the booking area of the jail.
The corrections officer found the four pills while taking inventory of Arredondo’s
possessions in the booking area of the jail, and Arredondo did not have permission to bring
the pills into the jail.
We conclude that the state provided sufficient evidence to sustain Arredondo’s
conviction for causing contraband to be introduced into a jail, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 641.165, subd. 2(a), and the jury could reasonably find that Arredondo was guilty of this
charge.
11
II. The district court erred by imposing multiple sentences for the contraband
conviction and both fifth -degree-possession convictions because all three
offenses arose from the same behavioral incident.

“[I]f a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this
state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1 (2020). The district court may issue multiple convictions from a single behavioral
incident but may not impose multiple sentences. State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 358
(Minn. App. 2002). Although Arredondo did not object to the imposition of multiple
sentences at sentencing, courts may make corrections to unlawful sentences “at any time,”
and “an appellant does not waive claims of multiple convictions or sentences by failing to
raise the issue at the time of sentencing.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9; Spann v. State,
740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007).
Whether two or more offenses arise from a single behavioral incident is “a mixed
question of law and fact.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014). This
analysis “is not a mechanical test, but involves an examination of all the facts and
circumstances.” State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted); see
also Degroot, 946 N.W.2d at 365 (“Whether a defendant’s multiple offenses were part of
a single behavioral incident depends on the facts and circumstances of the case . . . .”). It
is the state’s burden to prove that the offenses in question were not part of a single
behavioral incident. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d at 365.
First, t he state concedes that one of Arredondo’s two sentences for possession
should be reversed. We agree. “Possession of two controlled substances at the same time
and place, for personal use, constitutes a single behavioral incident.” State v. Barnes,
12
618 N.W.2d 805, 813 (Minn. App. 2000) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16,
2001). The Minnesota Supreme Court instructs that an offender will be punished for the
most serious of the offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident because the
punishment for the most serious offense includes punishment for all offenses. State v.
Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2006). The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines do
not provide different presumptive sentence ranges for fifth-degree possession of Schedule
II drugs and Schedule IV drugs, see Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 4.C (2020), and the district
court imposed an identical sentence for each count. The primary distinction between the
offenses here is that Ritalin is a Schedule II drug and Ativan is a Schedule IV drug. Minn.
Stat. § 152.02, subds. 3, 5. We therefore reverse the sentence for possession of the
Schedule IV substance—Ativan.
Second, the parties disagree as to whether the contraband offense and the
drug-possession offenses were part of a single behavioral incident. To determine whether
multiple offenses are part of a single behavioral incident, we consider (1) whether the
offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place and (2) whether the conduct was
motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d at 365;
State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016). The state argues that Arredondo’s
introduction of contraband into a jail occurred at a different time and place than her
possession of the substances and that the offenses did not have the same criminal objective.
We start by considering the time and place of the offenses. According to the state,
the possession offenses were complete before Arredondo entered the jail because “she no
longer possessed them once [Sergeant K.T.] took custody of her purse” at the traffic stop,
13
but the contraband offense occurred when the pills, which she no longer possessed, entered
the jail, and thus the offenses were separated in terms of time and place. However, the
state also acknowledges that at the scene of the traffic stop, Arredondo, with knowledge
that the purse contained controlled substances, asked Sergeant K.T. for her purse during
her arrest and was aware that her purse was in the front seat of the police vehicle and was
transported to the hospital and jail with her. In its brief, the state ass erts that Arredondo,
“by asking for her purse and by lying to [Sergeant K.T.] about its contents, caused the pills
to be brought into the jail” and that “the pills would not have entered the jail but for her
conduct.”
The state’s understanding about Arredondo’s conduct—that it was the act of asking
for her purse that caused the pills to come into the jail —undercuts its position on the time
and place of the contraband offense. Arredondo asked for her purse at the scene of the
traffic stop, not when she was entering the jail. Indeed, Arredondo’s request for her purse
was the same act that deprived her of possession of the pills. Any difference in time and
place between the offenses was not substantial. But cf. State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825,
826 (Minn. 2011) (holding that two different crimes relat ing to the same controlled
substance were not part of the same behavioral incident). Thus, the state failed to establish
that the offenses occurred at a substantially different time and place.
Next, we consider whether the state established that Arredondo’s conduct was not
motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective. In doing so, we “examine the
relationship of the offenses to one another [and] consider whether all of the acts performed
were necessary to or incidental to the commission of a single crime and motived by an
14
intent to commit that crime.” Bakken , 883 N.W.2d at 270 (quotation omitted); Bauer,
792 N.W.2d at 829. The parties agree that Arredondo’s decision to ask for the purse—and
thereby cause the contraband pills to be introduced into the jail—was an attempt to retain
possession of the pills, either to conceal them from law enforcement or to ingest them.
Thus, both offenses were motivated by Arredondo’s intent to maintain possession of the
pills. The offenses share a single criminal objective, and therefore, the state did not meet
its burden to prove that these offenses arose from separate behavioral incidents.
We conclude that the offenses in question were part of a single behavioral incident.
Because a person may be punished for only one of the offenses from a single behavioral
incident, the district court may not impose multiple sentences. Minn. Stat. § 609.035,
subd. 1. Arredondo’s fifth-degree-possession convictions are felonies, and the contraband
conviction is a gross misdemeanor. We therefore reverse the sentence for the contraband
conviction. See Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d at 322 (instructing that punishment for the most
serious offense includes punishment for all offenses).
In sum, beca use the state provided sufficient evidence to show that Arredondo
caused contraband to be introduced into a jail, we affirm that conviction. But because the
contraband offense and the possession offenses arose from the same behavioral incident,
and the district court may sentence Arredondo on only one of these three convictions, we
reverse Arredondo’s sentence for fifth-degree possession of Ativan and her sentence for
introduction of contraband into a jail. Finally, we remand to the district court to amend the
warrant of commitment consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.