State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1002

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Corey Allen Wuori,
Appellant.

Filed May 30, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-21-212

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from convictions of criminal vehicular homicide and criminal
vehicular operation, appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence from a blood sample obtained pursuant to a search warrant. Because the
2
information in the search-warrant application established probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime would be found in appellant’s blood, we affirm.
FACTS
On February 1, 2021, law enforcement received a 911 call reporting a motor vehicle
crash in Cass County, Minnesota. A state trooper responded to the call. When the trooper
arrived at the scene, she observed multiple injured persons, various emergency vehicles
and personnel, and two damaged vehicles— a grey truck and a white SUV. The trooper
learned that there were two people in the grey truck at the time of the crash—a male driver
and a female passenger. The trooper observed the male driver being extricated from the
truck and the female passenger, who had been ejected from the truck, being tended to by
medical personnel. The driver of the white SUV was deceased.
Other law-enforcement officers at the scene identified the male driver as appellant
Corey Allen Wuori. A paramedic told the trooper that Wuori smelled of alcohol. The
trooper smelled alcohol inside the truck, as did a police officer on the scene . And the
trooper learned that a family member of Wuori had allegedly stopped at the accident site
and poured out a bottle of alcohol from the truck before law enforcement arrived.
Wuori left the scene by ambulance. The trooper sent an officer to meet Wuori at
the hospital to obtain more information about the accident. When the officer arrived at the
hospital, Wuori was yelling in pain while medical personnel tended to his injuries. The
officer smelled alcohol on Wuori and asked Wuori how much he had to drink. Wuori did
not respond and refused to take a preliminary breath test (PBT).
3
Meanwhile, the trooper sought a search warrant for a blood sample from Wuori. In
the search-warrant application, the trooper stated that “[p]eace officers believed [Wuori]
was driving, operating, or controlling a motor vehicle” at the accident site based on the
“smell of alcohol from vehicle and person, alcohol dumped out at scene by family, smell
of alcohol from person at hospital, PBT refusal.” The trooper also stated that, “[f]rom the
investigation, peace officers concluded that at the time [Wuori] was driving, operating, or
controlling the motor vehicle, [Wuori] was under the influence of a combination of alcohol
and controlled substance(s)” based on the following information:
Male suspect was involved in a two vehicle fatal crash.
Male suspect was identified as Corey Allen Wuori, DOB
2/25/81.

According to witness, Wuori was traveling east on
[Minnesota Highway] 200 in a grey Chevy truck. The witness,
also traveling east on [Minnesota Highway] 200, stated that she
saw the grey truck driving up behind her vehicle at a high rate
of speed. The witness feared that the grey truck would rear end
her. As the truck approached closer, it veered out into the
oncoming lane to pass her vehicle. In the opposing lane,
traveling west was a white SUV. The grey truck hit the SUV
in a head on collision, causing both vehicles to slide north into
the ditch. The female driver of the white SUV was killed on
impact. The female passenger of the grey truck was thrown
from the vehicle and possibly run over by the white SUV. She
had head trauma and internal trauma.

Ambulance personnel [were] able to tell [the trooper]
they smelled the smell of an alcoholic beverage coming from
Wuori. There was a bottle of alcohol on the ground in the
wreckage. A family member of Wuori had poured the bottle
out on scene before police arrived.

At the hospital, [the officer] met with Wuori. [The
officer] could smell an overwhelming smell of an alcoholic
beverage coming from Wuori. Wuori would not admit to
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drinking. [The officer] asked for Wuori to submit to a PBT.
Wuori refused. No other tests could be do ne as he was on a
gurney and strapped to a backboard.

Based on this information, the trooper requested “a search warrant to obtain [a] blood
sample [from Wuori] as evidence of the crime(s) of driving, operating or being in physical
control of a motor vehicle while impaired, and criminal vehicular operation/homicide.”
The trooper sent the warrant application to a district court judge, who issued a search
warrant for the blood sample.
After the trooper notified the officer that the search warrant had been issued, the
officer obtained a blood sample from Wuori. Testing later revealed that Wuori had an
alcohol concentration of 0.089 at the time the sample was taken. Wuori’s blood also tested
positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Wuori with three counts of criminal
vehicular homicide, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(1), (4), (6) (2020),
and three counts of criminal vehicular operation, in violation of Minn. Stat.§ 609.2113,
subd. 3(1), (4), (6) (2020).
Wuori moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the blood sample, arguing that
the search warrant authorizing the blood sample was not supported by probable cause.
1

1 Wuori also moved to suppress certain medical records and all evidence obtained during
the search of his vehicle. The district court determined that only medical records pertaining
to Wuori’s blood sample would be admissible at trial, and it denied his motion to suppress
the evidence obtained during the vehicle search. Wuori does not challenge either of these
decisions on appeal.
5
The state opposed the motion. Following a hearing, the district court denied Wuori’s
motion based on its conclusion that the search warrant was supported by probable cause.
Wuori waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the state’s evidence pursuant
to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to preserve his right to appeal the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress. The district court found Wuori guilty and convicted him of one
count of criminal vehicular homicide, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(6),
and one count of criminal vehicular operation, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2113,
subd. 3(6). The district court sentenced Wuori to 84 months in prison for criminal
vehicular homicide and one year in prison for criminal vehicular operation, with credit for
time served.
Wuori appeals.
DECISION
Wuori challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from his blood sample, arguing that the search warrant authorizing the blood draw
was not supported by probable cause.
2
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures and provide that a search warrant must be supported by probable cause. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. A blood draw is a search subject to these

2 Wuori also argues that the blood sample was not justified by the exigent-circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement. Because we conclude that the search-warrant
application authorizing the blood draw was supported by probable cause, we do not
consider whether exigent circumstances provide an alternative basis to support the
authorization of the blood draw.
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constitutional requirements. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013);
State v. Stavish, 868 N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. 2015). “Probable cause exists if the judge
issuing a warrant determines that ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found’” in the place to be searched. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619,
622 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). An issuing judge’s
probable-cause determination is “a practical, common-sense decision.” Id. In rendering
this decision, an issuing judge “is entitled to draw common-sense and reasonable inferences
from the facts and circumstances given.” State v. Eggler, 372 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Minn.
App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 1985).
When reviewing a challenge to a search warrant, “our only consideration is whether
the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. ”
State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 384 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). “Our review is
limited to the information presented in the warrant application” and any supporting
affidavit. Id. at 384-85. To determine whether there was a substantial basis, we “consider
the totality of the circumstances” and are “careful not to review each component of the
affidavit in isolation.” Id. at 385 (quotation omitted). We also acknowledge that affidavits
“are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of criminal investigation” and
therefore do not require “elaborate specificity.” State v. Anderson, 439 N.W.2d 422, 425
(Minn. App. 1989) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235), rev. denied (Minn. June 21, 1989).
“We defer to the issuing magistrate, recognizing that doubtful or marginal cases should be
largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at
385 (quotation omitted).
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Here, law enforcement sought a blood sample from Wuori “as evidence of the
crime(s) of driving , operating, or being in physical control of a motor vehicle while
impaired, and criminal vehicular operation/homicide.” A person is guilty of driving while
impaired if they “drive, operate, or [are] in physical control of any motor vehicle” while
under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 1(1)-(2) (2020). A person is guilty of criminal vehicular homicide if they cause the
death of another while negligently operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol
or while any amount of a controlled substance is present in the person’s body. Minn.
Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(2)(i), (6) (2020). And a person is guilty of criminal vehicular
operation if they cause great bodily harm to another while negligently operating a motor
vehicle under the influence of alcohol or while any amount of a controlled substance is
present in the person’s body. Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 1(2), (6) (2020). By executing
the search warrant, the issuing judge determined that there was probable cause to believe
that a sample of Wuori’s blood would provide evidence of one or more of these crimes.
Wuori acknowledges that the search-warrant application alleged sufficient facts for
the issuing judge to have a substantial basis to conclude that Wuori was involved in the
accident, that Wuori was under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance at the
time of the accident, that the accident resulted in death and bodily injury, and that the
accident was caused by negligent driving. Wuori nevertheless argues that the
search-warrant application did not allege sufficient facts for the issuing judge to conclude
that Wuori was the driver of the grey truck. We disagree.
8
Taken as a whole, the factual allegations in the search- warrant application are
sufficient to support the issuing judge’s probable-cause determination. The search-warrant
application was drafted by the trooper who responded to the scene of the accident. The
search-warrant application alleged that a witness saw Wuori “traveling” in a grey truck,
that the truck drove up behind the witness “at a high rate of speed,” and that the witness
feared that the truck would rear-end her vehicle. The search- warrant application also
alleged that the witness saw the truck swerve into the opposing lane of traffic to pass her
vehicle and collide head-on with the white SUV. And the search-warrant application
identified only three people involved in the two-vehicle crash: “the female driver of the
white SUV,” “the female passenger of the grey truck [who] was thrown from the vehicle”
and Wuori. Given that Wuori and the female passenger were the sole occupants of the grey
truck identified in the search-warrant application, these allegations are sufficient to support
a reasonable inference that Wuori was the driver. See Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622;
Eggler, 372 N.W.2d at 15. This inference is reinforced by another allegation in the
search-warrant application: Wuori’s refusal to take a PBT at the hospital. In sum, the
totality of the circumstances alleged in the search-warrant application and their logical
inferences provided the issuing judge with “a substantial basis for concluding that [there
was] probable cause” to believe that Wuori was the driver of the grey truck and that
evidence of a crime would be found in a sample of Wuori’s blood. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d
at 384 (quotation omitted).
We are not persuaded otherwise by Wuori’s argument that the search warrant’s
reference to Wuori “traveling” in the grey truck supports an inference that Wuori was
9
present in the truck at the time of the crash but not an inference that he was driving the
truck. As discussed above, the search-warrant application provided, in relevant part, that: a
witness saw Wuori “traveling” behind her in a grey truck “at a high rate of speed,” the grey
truck veered into oncoming traffic to pass her vehicle, and the grey truck hit the oncoming
white SUV. Given this description, it is reasonable to infer that the trooper used the word
“traveling” to connote “driving.” See Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36 (explaining that many
search warrants are properly issued “on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense
judgments of laymen”); Eggler, 372 N.W.2d at 15 (providing that an issuing judge is
“entitled to draw common-sense and reasonable inferences from the facts and
circumstances given”). It is also reasonable to infer that the witness was focused on the
driver of the grey truck, not the passenger, because the driver posed an immediate threat to
her safety. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that the witness identified Wuori as the
driver of the truck, even though the search -warrant application referred to Wuori as
“traveling” in the truck. Wuori’s argument is also unpersuasive because it considers the
word “traveling” in isolation rather than considering “the totality of the circumstances”
alleged in the search-warrant application. See Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d at 385 (providing that
courts “consider the totality of the circumstances” and do not review each component of a
search-warrant application in isolation). For the reasons explained above, the factual
allegations in the search warrant, taken as a whole, were sufficient for the issuing judge to
infer that Wuori was driving the truck at the time of the crash.
In sum, we discern no error in the district court’s determination that the
search-warrant application provided the issuing judge with probable cause to believe “that
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there [was] a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime [would] be found” in Wuori’s
blood. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that
the district court did not err by denying Wuori’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained
from the blood sample.
Affirmed.