State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1025

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Brent Richmond Perdue,
Appellant.

Filed February 6, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-CR-18-327, 73-CR-18-812

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentence following his convictions for violation and
attempted violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order, arguing that the district court
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should have awarded custody credit for time he spent in custody in Illinois on an offense
unrelated to his Minnesota offenses. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Brent Richmond Perdue pleaded guilty to charges in two separate files
for felony violation and felony attempted violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order.
The district court released Perdue without bail pending sentencing but required him to
reside in Stearns County and comply with additional conditions.
Stearns County probation filed a conditional- release violation report shortly after
Perdue’s release, alleging that he failed to report his whereabouts and maintain contact with
probation and that he failed to report a law-enforcement contact to probation. The district
court issued a warrant ordering law enforcement to apprehend Perdue and Perdue to appear
before the court.
Over three years had passed when Perdue was arrested in Winnebago County,
Illinois. Authorities in Illinois held Perdue pending trial on new offenses committed in
Illinois and on the Stearns County warrant. An Illinois court convicted Perdue of reckless
driving and sentenced him to jail in Illinois. After Perdue completed his Illinois sentence,
Minnesota extradited Perdue to Stearns County pursuant to the warrant.
The district court held a sentencing hearing, at which Perdue argued that he was
entitled to custody credit for the 148 days he served in Illinois on his reckless-driving
conviction as well as for the 15 days he was held in Illinois awaiting extradition. Perdue
argued that this credit should be added to any custody credit he had accumulated in
Minnesota, both prior to his release pending sentencing and since his extradition from
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Illinois while awaiting sentencing.1 The state opposed Perdue’s request for custody credit
for the 148 days he served in Illinois on his convictions there.
The district court pronounced concurrent executed sentences of a year and a day
with 200 days of custody credit in the first file and 21 months with 195 days of custody
credit in the second file. The district court included credit for the 15 days Perdue spent in
custody in Illinois awaiting extradition to Minnesota and the days Perdue was in custody
in Minnesota on both Minnesota files, but it did not include the 148 days Perdue served in
Illinois on his Illinois sentence.
Perdue appeals.
DECISION
When pronouncing a sentence, the district court must state the number of days spent
in custody in connection with the offense and must deduct that time from the sentence.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B); see State v. Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d 678, 687 (Minn.
2012) (“A criminal defendant is entitled to jail credit for time spent in custody in
connection with the offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” (quotation omitted)).
The defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to jail credit for any specific
period of time. Clarkin, 817 N.W.2d at 687.

1 In support of his argument to the district court, Perdue cited to a case that was before the
Minnesota Supreme Court at the time —State v. Kurtenbach, No. A21-0526, 2021WL
4259152 (Minn. App. Sept. 20, 2021), rev. granted (Minn. Nov. 24, 2021) and ord.
granting rev. vacated (Minn. June 9, 2022). In his petition for review to the supreme court,
Kurtenbach raised the issue of whether the existing rule governing the application of
interjurisdictional custody credit established by caselaw should be overruled. On June 9,
2022, the supreme court vacated the order granting review in Kurtenbach, and the appeal
was dismissed on the basis that the petition for further review was improvidently granted.
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“The decision to award custody credit is not discretionary with the district court.”
State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Minn. 2008). “The district court’s decision
whether to award custody credit is a mixed question of fact and law; the court must
determine the circumstances of the custody the defendant seeks credit for, and then apply
the rules to those circumstances.” State v. Roy, 928 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but we
review questions of law de novo. Id.
When determining whether custody credit applies, Minnesota courts “distinguish
between intrajurisdictional custody (custody within Minnesota) and interjurisdictional
custody (custody outside of Minnesota).” Id. at 345. Custody credit applies to
intrajurisdictional custody. Id. The purpose of awarding credit for time in custody within
Minnesota is to avoid the following concerns: de facto conversion of a concurrent sentence
into a consecutive sentence, indigent persons serving longer sentences due to the inability
to post bail, irrelevant factors affecting the length of incarceration, and prosecutors
manipulating charging dates to increase the length of incarceration. Id. When determining
credit for custody outside of Minnesota’s jurisdiction, we “apply a different test” and
examine whether the defendant’s Minnesota offense is “the sole reason” for the
interjurisdictional custody. Id. (quotation omitted).
To determine whether a defendant can receive custody credit for interjurisdictional
custody, Minnesota courts apply the “solely- in-connection-with” test—“a defendant can
only receive credit for time spent in the custody of another jurisdiction if the time was
served solely in connection with the Minnesota offense.” Id.; accord State v. Willis,
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376 N.W.2d 427, 427 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a defendant charged with a crime in
Minnesota and detained in another state at the request of Minnesota authorities is not
entitled to credit against a Minnesota sentence for time in custody in the other state unless
the Minnesota charge was the sole reason the defendant was held by the other state).
Perdue asserts that the district court should have granted his request for custody
credit for the 148 days he served on his Illinois sentence. 2 He first argues that Minn. Stat.
§ 609.145, subd. 2 (2016), and Minn. R. Crim P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), support granting him
credit for all his time in custody in Illinois. Second, he argues that fairness and equity
principles underlying Minnesota’s jail-credit jurisprudence support granting this credit.
We disagree that the district court erred.
Perdue cites to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), which requires the sentencing
court to deduct credit for “the number of days spent in custody in connection with the
offense or behavioral incident being sentenced.” He argues that his time in custody in
Illinois was “undeniably in connection with” his Minnesota offense because he had a
Minnesota warrant with a body-only hold while in custody in Illinois. Perdue then argues
that because his time in custody in Illinois occurred after the district court accepted his
guilty pleas on his Minnesota offenses but before it committed him to the commissioner of

2 Perdue’s brief asserts that Perdue spent 128 days in custody in Illinois and requests credit
for that time; however, the brief also notes that the district court denied his request for 148
days’ credit and consistently refers to September 8, 2021, to February 2, 2022, as the period
for which Perdue should be entitled to further custody credit, which totals 148 days.
Therefore, it appears the assertion in Perdue’s brief that he spent 128 days in custody in
Illinois is an error, and we interpret Perdue’s request to be for 148 days of additional
custody credit.
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corrections, he is entitled to jail credit for the time he was incarcerated in Illinois because
it was a “period of confinement” following conviction and preceding commitment pursuant
to Minn. Stat. § 609.145, subd. 2. That statute provides that “[a] sentence of imprisonment
upon conviction of a felony is reduced by the period of confinement of the defendant
following the conviction and before the defendant’s commitment to the commissioner of
corrections for execution of sentence unless the court otherwise directs.” Id.
Perdue’s Minnesota offense was not the sole reason for his custody in Illinois,
however; the record shows Perdue was arrested in Illinois on new charges, was convicted,
and served a 148-day sentence on his Illinois offense. Perdue concedes as much when he
acknowledges in his brief that his Minnesota warrant was “part of the reason” for his
Illinois arrest.
Despite Perdue’s reliance on Minn. Stat. § 609.145, subd. 2, and Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), to argue that he should have received custody credit for time in
custody in Illinois, Minnesota caselaw is clear that the solely-in-connection- with test
governs the application of interjurisdictional custody credit. See Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 345;
Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 428; State v. Mattson, 376 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. 1985). The
district court applied the correct legal standard by denying Perdue’s request for custody
credit for the time he served on his Illinois conviction and granting Perdue credit for the 15
days spent in Illinois custody that was solely in connection with his Minnesota offense —
specifically, the 15 days he spent in custody in Illinois awaiting extradition on the
Minnesota warrant.
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Perdue next argues that principles of fairness and equity guiding Minnesota’s
jail-credit jurisprudence support granting credit for all the time he was in custody in Illinois.
Perdue points to Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 379, to highlight the concerns that support
granting intrajurisdictional custody credit, including de facto conversion of a concurrent
sentence into a consecutive sentence, and expresses disagreement with the supreme court’s
decision in Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 345, in which it declined to apply the same policy concerns
to requests for interjurisdictional custody credit. Perdue argues that if we apply the policy
concerns upon which intrajurisdictional custody credit is based to his case, fairness and
equity favor granting his request to prevent a de facto conversion of his Illinois and
Minnesota sentences from concurrent to consecutive.
As the supreme court reaffirmed in Roy, however, the policy concerns underlying
intrajurisdictional custody credit are not applicable to interjurisdictional custody.
928 N.W.2d at 345; see Willis, 376 N.W.2d at 428; Mattson, 376 N.W.2d at 416. Appellate
courts have declined to apply factors from the intrajurisdictional custody-credit test to cases
involving interjurisdictional custody credit. Roy, 928 N.W.2d at 346 (citing State ex rel.
Linehan v. Wood, 397 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Minn. 1986)). De facto consecutive- sentence
conversion is a factor considered when applying the intrajurisdictional custody-credit rule,
not the interjurisdictional rule. Id.
Perdue’s arguments notwithstanding, we are bound to follow the supreme court’s
precedent requiring that Perdue’s Minnesota offense be the sole reason for his custody in
Illinois for Perdue to receive interjurisdictional custody credit. See State v. Curtis ,
921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018) (recognizing our repeated acknowledgement that the
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court of appeals “is bound by supreme court precedent”). And “[t]he function of the court
of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow,
427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). We conclude that the district court did not err in
declining to grant Perdue’s request for custody credit for the additional 148 days he was
incarcerated in Illinois on an Illinois conviction.
Affirmed.