John Robinson, et al., Appellants,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1033

John Robinson, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

USAA,
Respondent.

Filed March 13, 2023
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-17-3046

William L. French, French Law Office, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellants)

Timothy K. Masterson, Alexandra L. Zabinski, McCollum Crowley P.A., Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this appeal arising from an insurance-coverage dispute, appellants challenge the
district court’s entry of judgment on an appraisal award, arguing that the district court erred
by (1) treating the appraisal award as an arbitration award; (2) ignoring the scheduling
order; and (3) ignoring factual assertions made in a pro se “declaration.” We affirm.
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FACTS
A house owned by appellants John and Marguerite Robinson sustained hail damage.
Later, appellants’ garage and its contents were damaged by a fire. The damage to
appellants’ house, garage, and personal property was covered by a homeowner’s insurance
policy that appellants purchased from respondent USAA. But after the parties failed to
reach an agreement regarding the value of appellants’ loss, appellants sued respondent to
recover the full amount of their alleged loss.
Respondent’s insurance policy contains a binding appraisal process for making
valuation determinations. 1 In accordance with this provision, the parties stipulated to
proceed with the appraisal process. The district court then entered a corresponding order
on September 1, 2017, stating that
within 30 days of the appraisal award being issued, the parties
shall advise the Court of the outcome of the appraisal process
and request a scheduling conference to identify the remaining
issues in the case and determine whether said issues can be
resolved by motion or if it will be necessary to set the matter
on for trial.

The appraisers inspected appellants’ property and issued a unanimous written award
totaling $82,142.41. Respondent subsequently moved to confirm the appraisal award

1 Insurers providing fire-insurance policies in Minnesota are required to provide a
minimum level of insurance coverage and include required provisions. See Minn. Stat.
§ 65A.01 (2022). The Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy provides an appraisal
process as an avenue to resolve disputes between an insured and an insurer regarding the
amount of loss from a fire. See id. Under this process, each party appoints an appraiser
when there is a disagreement over the amount of the loss. See id. The appraisers then
select a neutral umpire, who resolves any differences between the two appraisers. See id.
The two appraisers and the umpire constitute the appraisal panel. See id. And the written
appraisal award determines “the amount of actual value and loss.” Id.
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under the Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act (Act) and to enter judgment on the award,
“minus deductibles and amounts already paid.” Counsel for appellants did not respond to
respondent’s motion; instead, John Robinson filed a pro se brief claiming that (1) the
appraisal process violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and (2) appellants were not “given an adequate opportunity to bring their amended contract
and non-contract claims as per the order dated September 1, 2017.” Marguerite Robinson
did not sign the brief.
At the hearing on respondent’s motion, respondent objected to consideration of John
Robinson’s pro se brief on that basis that it was filed while he was represented by counsel.
The district court acknowledged that the pro se brief was not properly before the court but
declined to strike it because the court had already read it, and because the arguments made
therein had “no legal basis.” Counsel for appellants then requested a one- week
continuance, claiming that the September 1, 2017 “scheduling order [was] not . . .
followed.” Counsel for appellants argued that a hearing was necessary under the
September 1, 2017 order to identify the remaining issues in the case. The district court
declined the request for a continuance, granted respondent’s motion, and entered judgment
on the appraisal award. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Appellants challenge the district court’s confirmation of the appraisal award,
arguing that under Oliver v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 939 N.W.2d 749 (Minn.
2020), an “appraisal is not an ‘agreement to arbitrate’ governed by the Uniform Arbitration
4
Act.” In Oliver, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the Act “does not apply to the
appraisal process under the Minnesota Standard Fire I nsurance Policy, Minn. Stat.
§ 65A.01.” 939 N.W.2d at 754 (footnote omitted). Appellants contend that because
“Oliver is fundamental law and controlling precedent” the district court’s “decision to
confirm the appraisal award [is] an error of law requiring an automatic reversal.”
We need not address appellants’ argument because it is well settled that reviewing
courts generally consider only issues presented to and considered by the district court.
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Here, a review of the record
demonstrates that counsel for appellants never made any argument, orally or in writing,
related to appraisal awards and the Act. There is also no mention of this argument in John
Robinson’s improper pro se brief that he filed in district court. In fact, appellants cite
Oliver for the first time in their appellate brief. Therefore, appellants’ argument is not
properly before us.
II.
Appellants challenge the district court’s decision not to order a scheduling
conference. District courts have considerable discretion in scheduling matters, and we will
not reverse its decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Mercer v. Andersen, 715 N.W.2d
114, 123 (Minn. App. 2006).
The district court’s September 1, 2017 order stated that “within 30 days of the
appraisal award being issued, the parties shall advise the Court of the outcome . . . and
request a scheduling conference to identify the remaining issues in the case.” Appellants
claim that the district court “ignor[ed]” this order by failing to order a scheduling
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conference. Specifically, appellants contend that, “[a]s shown in his declaration, John
Robinson set forth the factual basis for additional claims that had arisen outside of the
insurance policy that needed to be brought.” Appellants argue that, “[b]y failing to
timetable a ‘scheduling conference’ at which the [district] court would have been advised
of Appellants’ additional unresolved issues and then set motion and/or trial dates, the
[district] court clearly abused its discretion.”
We disagree. The record reflects that appellants never requested a scheduling order.
Rather, they did nothing until respondent moved to confirm the appraisal award, at which
time John Robinson filed his improper pro se opposition to respondent’s motion.
Appellants could have moved at any time, after the appraisal award and before the hearing
on respondent’s motion, to request a scheduling conference to address any unresolved
issues and move to amend their complaint to assert new claims. Appellants not only failed
to file such a motion, but they also failed to move to amend their complaint. Therefore,
the record refutes appellants’ claim that the district court “ignored” the scheduling order.
Moreover, appellants cite no authority to support their position that the district court
abused its discretion by declining to order a scheduling conference under circumstances
similar to those presented here. And the supreme court has stated that
it is well-established that courts have the authority “to control
the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants” and that
“how this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment,
which must weigh competing interest and maintain an even
balance.”

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Weitzel v. State, 883 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299
U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 (1936)). The district court here was aware of the September 1, 2017
order, recognized that any argument with respect to the scheduling order was not “brought
before the Court ,” and that the only motion before the court was respondent’s motion to
confirm the appraisal award to which appellants failed to properly respond. The district
court then declined to schedule further hearings because appellants failed to comply with
the rules. Appellants are unable to establish that the district court abused its discretion.
III.
Finally, appellants argue that the district court abused its discretion when it declined
to consider John Robinson’s pro se arguments in opposition to respondent’s motion to
confirm the appraisal award. But appellants cite no caselaw that supports this argument.
Moreover, the rules of civil procedure provide that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and
other similar document shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s
individual name, or, if the party is self-represented, shall be signed by the party.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 11.01. It is undisputed that appellants were represented by counsel at the time
John Robinson filed his pro se document. It is also undisputed that John Robinson’s pro
se brief was not signed by appellants’ attorney. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in its treatment of John Robinson’s pro se brief.
Affirmed.