Jordan Lee Wachter, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1037

Jordan Lee Wachter, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed July 3, 2023
Affirmed
Segal, Chief Judge

Big Stone County District Court
File Nos. 06-CR-19-137, 06-CR-19-179

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Maggie Kluver, Big Stone County Attorney, Ortonville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Segal , Chief Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of postconviction relief, arguing that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to adequately
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assess whether a competency evaluation should be requested before allowing appellant to
enter guilty pleas. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Jordan Lee Wachter pleaded guilty to domestic assault in July 2019 and
to violation of a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) in November 2019. He was
placed on probation in both cases. In June 2021, at a hearing on alleged probation
violations in the two cases, the district court ordered an evaluation of Wachter’s
competency to proceed. The evaluator opined that Wachter was not competent. Wachter
then petitioned for postconviction relief in both cases, the denial of which is at issue on this
appeal.
As noted by the competency evaluator, Wachter has “long held a diagnosis . . . [of]
schizophrenia” as his “primary treating condition.” Following an earlier competency
evaluation conducted in 2015, Wachter was found competent to proceed in a prior criminal
case. The evaluator noted in the 2015 report, however, that Wachter’s “symptoms seem to
wax and wane somewhat rapidly.” The evaluator cautioned that “[s]hould his symptoms
increase, he could be rendered incompetent” and that “[h]is competency should therefore
be considered somewhat tenuous.”
The same defense counsel (DC) represented Wachter in both of the 2019 criminal
cases. DC knew Wachter had been hospitalized in the past for mental illness and had a
psychiatric condition for which he received treatment. During the plea colloquies in the
2019 cases, DC elicited testimony related to Wachter’s history of having a mental illness.
In the plea colloquy in the DANCO-violation case, Wachter acknowledged that he had
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been “a patient in [a] mental hospital, . . . talked with counselors and psychiatrists, and
[was] taking some pills or medications per [his] prescription.” In the domestic-assault case,
DC elicited testimony that Wachter sees a psychiatrist, gets an “[intra]muscular injection
every two weeks,” and “take[s] other pills” to treat his mental illness. DC then asked
Wachter in both cases whether Wachter nevertheless believed he was making a rational
decision in pleading guilty. Wachter answered in the affirmative.
Wachter appealed his conviction in the domestic-assault case, arguing that the guilty
plea was not constitutionally valid because it was not accurate, intelligent, or voluntary. 1
As relevant here, Wachter maintained “that his guilty plea could not have been intelligent
or voluntary if he was not competent, and that his history of mental illness along with his
behavior at the [plea] hearing ‘triggered the district court’s responsibility’ to inquire into
his competency before accepting his plea.” State v. Wachter, No. A19-2011, 2021 WL
318018, at *4 (Minn. App. Feb. 1, 2021), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2021). This court
affirmed Wachter’s conviction, reasoning that the transcript of the plea colloquy, “taken
together with the plea petition, demonstrates that [Wachter] was capable of understanding
the proceedings and participating in his defense.” Id. at *5. We concluded that Wachter’s
plea was therefore intelligent and voluntary and that, “under the circumstances presented
by this case, the district court was not required to inquire further into Wachter’s
competence.” Id. at *6.

1 Wachter did not pursue a direct appeal of his conviction in the DANCO-violation case.
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In May 2021, Wachter’s probation officer filed probation-violation r eports in both
2019 cases, alleging that Wachter failed to stay in contact as required by his probation
conditions. Based on Wachter’s behavior during an initial hearing in June 2021 on the
probation violations, the district court ordered a rule 20 competency evaluation. See Minn.
R. Crim. P. 20.01, subds. 2, 3 (requiring the court, prosecutor, or defense counsel to seek
an evaluation of a defendant’s mental condition if the defendant’s “ability to: (a) rationally
consult with counsel; or (b) understand the proceedings or participate in the defense” is
doubtful at any time).
Dr. Krislea Wegner conducted the 2021 competency evaluation of Wachter .
Dr. Wegner’s report noted Wachter’s long held diagnosis of schizophrenia and stated that
he also has attention- deficit/hyperactivity and alcohol-use disorders. She opined that,
“based upon current information,” Wachter was not competent “to aid in his defense and
requires additional mental health treatment to restore competen cy.” Dr. Wegner
commented that “[a]ssisting with his defense and complying with court proceedings do not
appear within [Wachter’s] capabilities, at present time, given his mental illness and
severely agitated state.”
In the subsequent petitions for postconviction relief at issue here, Wachter asserted
that he was “denied due process when the [c] ourt accepted his guilty plea[s] without first
ordering a competency evaluation when there was reason to doubt [Wachter’s]
competency,” and was “denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to
investigate [Wachter’s] history of mental illness . . . or bring a motion for a competency
evaluation before presenting [his] guilty plea[s].” At the evidentiary hearing on the
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petitions, the district court heard testimony from Dr. Wegner, Wachter’s mental-health case
manager with Big Stone County, and DC.
Dr. Wegner reviewed the results of her examination of Wachter and testified that
Wachter’s schizophrenia diagnosis and associated symptoms are “the most debilitating of
his diagnoses.” Dr. Wegner provided information about the symptomatology of
schizophrenia generally, as well as Wachter’s specific presentation. She opined that
Wachter’s symptoms wax and wane rapidly, even during a two-hour clinical interview.
She also explained that Wachter engages in “yea-saying” due to his difficulty with
comprehension, which she described as:
if he wants to get something over quickly or he just wants to
move on, he’ll be like “yeah, yeah, yeah, I get it.” And then
someone thinks he understood it and then he gets upset then in
the later conversation when he says no wait, I don’t understand
that. . . . So, that has happened numerous times for him and so
an individual needs to ask him to explain it back to make sure
that he has understood, comprehends the information, and can
literally teach it back so that it’s sure that he has comprehended
it.

On cross-examination, Dr. Wegner agreed it was “possible” that Wachter could be
found competent on a less-symptomatic day and that a lay person would not necessarily be
able to pick up on Wachter’s symptoms of internal preoccupation which interfere with his
comprehension.
Wachter’s mental-health case manager testified that she began working with
Wachter in May 2016. She agreed that Wachter “has days or moments that are better than
others” and that his symptoms “can turn very quickly.” She testified that Wachter is well-
known in the community as living with mental illness as he often walks around talking to
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himself and consistently has trouble engaging in conversation. She also stated that “there’s
not very often when . . . if you know him, you don’t notice some of those symptoms [of his
mental illness] going on.”
DC testified that he first worked with Wachter in 2016. At that time, DC considered
moving for a competency evaluation based on Wachter’s behaviors. DC stated that he
asked another attorney —either a former county attorney or another defense attorney —
about Wachter. The attorney told DC that Wachter was evaluated “within the past year or
so,” and the evaluator concluded that Wachter was competent. Based on that information,
DC decided not to pursue another competency evaluation; he also did not seek to obtain or
read the 2015 evaluation.
DC testified that Wachter exhibited behaviors in 2019 that were “[c]ertainly
consistent with mental illness,” including being “very focused on . . . particular things that
he wanted to talk about,” “hav[ing] trouble focusing on the things that [DC] wanted to and
needed to talk with him about,” “rais[ing] his voice . . . in a way that wasn’t really
appropriate for the situation,” and leaving “close to incoherent” voicemails. DC did not,
however, believe that Wachter’s presenting symptoms were such that he should request a
competency evaluation, reasoning:
I knew that he had been found competent in that 2015
evaluation. And, in 2019 . . . he was exhibiting the same
behaviors that I observed in 2016 . . . to a little bit lesser degree.
And so, I would say . . . that I made an assumption that the
behaviors that I saw in 2016 were similar to the behaviors that
the competency evaluator would have been . . . seeing during
the evaluation in 2015 [in which he was found competent].

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DC added that he did not doubt Wachter’s competency in 2019 based on his
interactions and phone conversations with him at the time. DC also acknowledged that,
having heard Dr. Wegner’s testimony and knowing what was in the 2015 competency
evaluation, he now believes, based on an objective standard, that there might have been
reason to doubt Wachter’s competency in 2019.
Following the hearing, the district court denied Wachter’s petition for
postconviction relief in both cases. The district court rejected Wachter’s argument that the
court’s acceptance of his guilty pleas without ordering a competency evaluation violated
his due-process rights and rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As to the
ineffective-assistance claim—the ground at issue on this appeal—the district court found
that DC’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
DECISION
On appeal, Wachter challenges the district court’s denial of his petitions for
postconviction relief. He maintains that DC’s failure to investigate his mental health as it
relates to competency fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and deprived him
of his right to effective assistance of counsel. This court “review[s] the denial of a petition
for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590,
596 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based
on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record, or exercises
its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Crow v. State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). This court reviews the “postconviction court’s legal
determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.” Brown v. State, 895
8
N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). A postconviction court’s evaluation
of a petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim involves a mixed question of law
and fact that is reviewed de novo. State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019).
The right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to all criminal defendants
by the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 6. To prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must satisfy the
two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under this
test, a defendant must show (1) counsel was deficient and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “If a claim fails to satisfy one of the
Strickland requirements, [an appellate court] need not consider the other requirement.”
State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017).
Under the first prong of Strickland, a counsel’s performance will be considered
deficient if it falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 687-88.
This standard requires defense counsel to represent a client “exercising the customary skills
and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under the
circumstances.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).
A petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the “strong
presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable assistance.”
Gail v. State, 732 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Minn. 2007).
Having set out the general standard of performance required of defense counsel, we
now must apply that standard in the context of a client’s competency to proceed. “A
defendant has a due process right not to be tried or convicted of a criminal charge if he or
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she is legally incompetent.” Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011) (citing
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975), and Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966)) (other citations omitted). To that end, rule 20.01 provides that “[a] defendant is
incompetent and must not plead . . . if the defendant due to mental illness or cognitive
impairment lacks ability to: (a) rationally consult with counsel; or (b) understand the
proceedings or participate in the defense.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2; see also
Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 718 (stating that “a defendant is competent to stand trial in a criminal
matter if he or she has sufficient present ability to consult with [the defendant’s] lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and ‘has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him’” (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402 (1960)).
Rule 20.01 further provides that “[i]f the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the court,
at any time, doubts the defendant’s competency, the prosecutor or defense counsel must
make a motion challenging competency, or the court on its initiative must raise the issue.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3. “Evidence of the defendant’ s irrational behavior,
demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are relevant
in determining whether there is reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.” State v.
Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 172 (Minn. 1997).
Wachter argues that DC’s representation of Wachter was deficient because DC
essentially performed no investigation into Wachter’s mental health even though he knew
Wachter had a mental illness for which he had been hospitalized, was seeing a psychiatrist,
and was on psychiatric medications when Wachter pleaded guilty in the two 2019 cases.
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Wachter notes that DC inquired about the outcome of the 2015 competency evaluation —
that Wachter was found competent to proceed. But he faults DC for failing to seek out and
read the evaluation. Wachter maintains that the 2015 evaluation, which stated that
Wachter’s “symptoms seem to wax and wane somewhat rapidly” and that “[h]is
competency should therefore be considered somewhat tenuous,” offered good reason to
continuously question Wachter’s competence.
While we may be sympathetic to Wachter’s argument given his diagnosis of
schizophrenia, we are not persuaded that DC’s performance was constitutionally deficient.
DC was familiar with Wachter and had represented him previously in 2016. DC testified
that Wachter’s symptoms of mental illness were exhibited “to a little bit lesser degree” in
2019 than in 2016, which was closer in time to Wachter having been found competent. DC
also testified that Wachter, at least in DC’s subjective opinion, was able to rationally
consult with him and understood the proceedings. DC thus testified at the postconviction
hearing that he did not, at the time of the 2019 guilty- plea proceedings, doubt Wachter’s
competence.
The transcripts of the guilty-plea colloquies in the two 2019 cases support DC’s
postconviction testimony. For example, in the domestic-assault case, when questioned by
DC, Wachter was able to provide a description of the offense, including a statement
demonstrating that he understood the elements of the offense of assault:
Q: Now are you pleading guilty just to get out of jail?
A: No.

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Q: Okay, you feel you are guilty?
A: No, ‘cause I do remember at least pulling [the victim’s]
hand and trying to drag her out of the house.

Q: Okay.
A: Which is you know that’s assault too.

Q: Okay.
A: I guess so that’s why I—I just well plead guilty to it.

Wachter also testified that he “told [the victim] to leave the house and . . . was trying to
pull her out the door by her hair.”
In the DANCO-violation case, Wachter was also able to describe in his own words
what occurred. He testified: “I ran into her on the sidewalk I think and—and we did some
talking and she asked me if I’d like to take a walk.” He further testified, “I had told her,
you know, I can’t talk to you, but you know, she said ‘why’ and I don’t know.” The court
then asked, “And then you continued to walk with her for a ways . . . on the sidewalk?”
Wachter replied, “Yeah . . . well there is no sidewalk on 1st Street.”
In addition, the transcript shows that Wachter was also able to answer questions
about the number of prior assault cases he had. He testified:
I was convicted of an assault, yes, I was. . . . I had—I had two
cases; actually three, but the third was, you know, I guess the
judge must of realized, you know, it was family and that, you
know, I’m telling the truth and they just kind of just decided he
just said we’re just going to continue with everything that’s
been put upon you.

He was also able to provide information to the district court about the years of his
convictions. For example, in the domestic- assault case, the district court asked, “[You]
were also convicted of Fourth Degree Assault sometime around 2015 or 2016, is that
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correct?” Wachter answered, “Ah, yeah, I believe I got the first charge in ’15 and the
second charge in ’16.”
This testimony demonstrates that, at least at the time of the plea colloquies in the
two cases, that Wachter could answer questions rationally, had some understanding of the
proceedings, and could provide a summary of his memory of the offenses.
The above-quoted testimony also demonstrates that Wachter did not just engage in
“yea-saying,” which was one of the risks identified by Dr. Wegner in her testimony at the
postconviction hearing. Wachter answered these questions in his own words and not just
in “yes” or “no” responses. This further supports DC’s testimony that, based on his
subjective opinion of Wachter’s condition, that he did not doubt Wachter’s competence at
that time.
Wachter argues that counsel for a defendant has a greater duty than the state or the
court in identifying possible competency issues in clients with mental illness. He cites the
American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Standards as support:
Attorneys who represent defendants with mental
disorders should explore all mental state questions that might
be raised, including whether the client’s capacities at the time
of police interrogation bear on the admissibility or reliability
of any incriminating statements that were made, whether the
client is competent to proceed at any stage of the adjudication,
and whether the defendant’s mental state at the time of the
offense might support a defense to the charge, a claim in
mitigation of sentence, or a negotiated disposition.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Criminal Justice Standards on Mental Health 7- 1.4
(2016); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in
[ABA] standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they
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are only guides.”). This citation, however, offers little value to the specific issue involved
in this case. Moreover, while defense counsel has greater opportunity to identify
competency issues of their clients given the meetings and discussions that defense counsel
would be expected to have with their clients, this does not necessarily lead us to conclude
that DC’s representation of Wachter was constitutionally deficient under the circumstances
presented here.
To support his argument that DC’s representation was deficient, Wachter primarily
relies on our nonprecedential decision in Trevino v. State, No. A19-0901, 2020 WL 610590
(Minn. App. Feb. 10, 2020) (Trevino II).
2 In the case, Trevino had alleged in his
postconviction petition that, prior to the entry of his guilty plea, he had been civilly
committed three times; his probation officer had informed his attorney that Trevino had a
long history of mental illness, had been civilly committed, had been placed in a group
home, and would benefit from adult foster care; his probation officer offered to provide the
attorney Trevino’s mental-health records, but the attorney declined the offer; and Trevino
had exhibited symptoms of mental illness to his attorney. Trevino I, 2018 WL 3340077, at
*1. Moreover, the plea petition prepared by Trevino’s counsel inaccurately stated that
Trevino had not been treated by a psychiatrist for a mental condition, had not been recently
ill, and did not take medication. Id. This court reversed the district court’s denial of

2 Our opinion in this case was preceded by our opinion in Trevino v. State, No. A17-1911,
2018 WL 3340077 (Minn. App. July 9, 2018) (Trevino I), in which we held that the district
court erred by denying Trevino’s postconviction petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing and remanded the case to the district court to hold such a hearing. Under Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), nonprecedential opinions may be cited for their persuasive
value.
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Trevino’s postconviction petition, concluding in part that Trevino’s counsel’s performance
was deficient. Trevino II, 2020 WL 610590, at *3. Specifically, this court reasoned:
[T]he hearing clearly revealed that [Trevino’s attorney] R.L.
(1) was aware of Trevino’s very recent civil commitment
following a finding of incompetence; (2) was advised from the
outset that Trevino was not just ambiguously mentally ill, but
“very” mentally ill; and (3) provided erroneous information on
the plea petition when she had plenty of information to reveal
its erroneousness. Any one of these considerations might well
be insufficient to support a finding of unreasonable
performance, but it is the combination of them—in tandem
with the fact that R.L. not only elected to refrain from even a
cursory investigation of Trevino’ s competency, but
affirmatively declined [Trevino’s probation officer’s] offer to
hand-deliver everything she would need to conduct a thorough
one—that leads us to conclude that a reasonable attorney in
R.L.’s position would have acted more prudently.

Id.
Wachter argues that his case is like Trevino II and that we should reach the same
conclusion—that his counsel’s assistance was deficient. But in contrast to the facts in
Trevino II, information about Wachter’s mental-health history was included in both the
plea petition and in the guilty-plea colloquy. Further, Wachter had not recently been civilly
committed and DC at least inquired about the 2015 competency evaluation and learned that
Wachter was assessed as competent at that time. DC had also represented Wachter in 2016
and believed that Wachter was in better condition in 2019 than in 2016 and relied on that
fact in assessing whether a competency evaluation should be requested. In addition, DC
did not engage in the proactive negligence of turning down an offer from a probation officer
to review Wachter’s mental-health records as did the defense counsel in Trevino II. The
circumstances here are thus distinguishable.
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In sum, given the “strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within a wide
range of reasonable assistance,” we affirm the district court’s conclusion that DC’s
representation of Wachter was not constitutionally deficient. Gail, 732 N.W.2d at 248.
Consequently, we need not review the second prong of the Strickland analysis—whether
Wachter suffered prejudice. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d at 591.
Affirmed.