Kimberly Anne Bachman, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1039

Kimberly Anne Bachman, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed March 6, 2023
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Pine County District Court
File No. 58-CV-21-519

Rodd Tschida, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nicholas R. Moen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Appellant Kimberly Anne Bachman challenges the district court’s order sustaining
the revocation of her driving privileges. Because the district court did not err in determining
that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion, we affirm.
FACTS
On the night of August 21, 2022, a trooper pulled a vehicle over for an investigatory
stop after the vehicle turned without signaling. Bachman was driving the car. She was
subsequently arrested for driving while impaired and her driving privileges were revoked.
Bachman petitioned for judicial review and the district court held an
implied-consent hearing. At the hearing, Bachman argued that the stop was not supported
by reasonable, articulable suspicion, and the trooper testified to the circumstances that led
to and supported the stop.
Following the hearing, the district court sustained the revocation of Bachman’s
driving privileges, determining that the stop was sup ported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion.
Bachman appeals.
DECISION
Bachman argues that the district court erred by denying her petition to reinstate her
driver's license because the stop was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.
This is a question of law we review de novo. Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 777 N.W.2d
239, 242-43 (Minn. App. 2010).
3
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. However, a law enforcement
officer is permitted to conduct an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle if the officer has a
“particularized and objective basis” for suspecting the motorist of criminal activity. Berge
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). This reasonable-articulable-suspicion standard is
not high but requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.
State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 755-56, 758 (Minn. 2021).
If an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how insignificant, that
observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting a traffic
stop. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). The investigatory traffic stop
here was based on Bachman’s failure to signal a turn in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.19,
subd. 7 (2020), which provides:
The signals herein required shall be given either by
means of the hand and arm or by a signal lamp or signal device
of a type approved by the commissioner of public safety, but
when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded that a hand and arm
signal would not be visible in normal sunlight, and at night both
to the front and rear of such vehicle, then the signals must be
given by such a lamp or device.

A review of the record indicates that the trooper had an objectively reasonable and
articulable basis for the stop. The district court found that the trooper testified credibly
about the stop, and we defer to the district court’s credibility determination. See State v.
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). The trooper’s
testimony established that he had an objectively reasonable belief that Bachman committed
4
a traffic violation by failing to signal her turn. The trooper consistently testified that the
reason for the stop was that the driver failed to signal her turn, as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 169.19, subd. 7. The dashcam footage confirms that Bachman used no signal. Because
the threshold for reasonable suspicion is low, Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 758, the trooper’s
testimony sufficiently supports that he observed a violation of a traffic law which formed
the requisite and objective basis for a traffic stop. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. As such,
we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that respondent met its burden
of establishing the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Relying on Pogalz v. Miller, Bachman asserts that, because the trooper did not
articulate the absence of both a lamp signal and a hand signal, he did not have reasonable
suspicion that a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 7 occurred. 188 N.W.2d 877, 878
(Minn. 1971) (reasoning that Minn. Stat. § 169.19 does not prohibit the use of a hand signal
at night). We are unpersuaded.
First, Bachman mischaracterizes the trooper’s testimony by citing only those
portions of the testimony where he refers to her failure to use the illuminated turn signal
on her vehicle. In other portions of the transcript, the trooper states that he did not observe
a hand signal or any other signal. The trooper specifically stated that he “didn’t observe
anything indicating that the vehicle was turning” and he “didn’t physically see the driver
at all until [he] had gotten to the window.” Therefore, Bachman’s argument that the trooper
did not sufficiently articulate a traffic violation is unsupported by the record. 1

1 Bachman also argues that the district court erred in finding that the stop was not the result
of an impermissible mistake of law. See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Minn.
5
Second, Bachman’s argument fails on the merits. The proposition that the trooper’s
asserted failure to state outright that Bachman did not signal with her hand would negate
his reasonable suspicion is not supported by the caselaw. It has been consistently
recognized that the bar for reasonable suspicion is low. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S.
385, 394 (1997); Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 758; State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393
(Minn. 2008). Moreover, the traffic violation “need not be detectable” and suspicion of a
violation is sufficient. State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn. 1996).
In sum, because the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion based
on the trooper’s observation of a traffic violation, the district court did not err by denying
Bachman’s petition to reinstate her driver’s license.
Affirmed.

2004) (“A police officer’s mistaken interpretation of a statute may not establish the
‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity that is necessary to
justify a stop.’”). Bachman asserts that the trooper mistakenly believed that failing to signal
with the vehicle’s illuminated light, alone, constitutes a violation of the traffic law. She
contends that belief is a mistake of law because Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd 7, allows drivers
to signal a with their vehicle or their arm. But, as explained above, Bachman’s argument
fails because it relies on a mischaracterization of the trooper’s testimony. No mistake of
law occurred.