State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1044

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Douglas Nelson,
Appellant.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-21-253

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
An Isanti County jury found Steven Douglas Nelson guilty of second-degree arson.
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, that the district court
did not err by admitting evidence of location data derived from Nelson’s ankle monitor,
2
and that the district court did not commit reversible error by admitting evidence of Nelson’s
prior conviction of arson. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In November 2020, a fire destroyed a rural house on a 47-acre lot near the city of
Cambridge. The house was owned by D.M., who was living elsewhere while remodeling
the house with the assistance of two employees, one of whom was Nelson.
In April 2021, after a five-month-long investigation, the state charged Nelson with
second-degree arson, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.562 (2020). The case was tried to a
jury on three days in November 2021. The state called 11 witnesses and introduced 28
exhibits. The evidence introduced at trial may be summarized as follows.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 20, 2020, two persons placed calls to 911
to report the fire. When a deputy sheriff and the fire chief arrived on the scene a few
minutes later, the house was engulfed in flames, and the fire had progressed to the point
that the house could not be saved. The fire chief estimated that the house was “90 percent
consumed” when he arrived at 2:09 a.m. Two diesel fuel containers and a gasoline
container were found on the concrete floor of the garage. The fire chief interviewed D.M.
later that day. D.M. expressed concern that Nelson may have set the fire. D.M. said that
he did not have any suspicions concerning his other employee.
D.M. testified at trial that, a few days before the fire, Nelson said that he could “get
away with burning people’s houses for them and making money.” D.M. also testified that,
while they worked together, Nelson said that he was “hearing voices.” On the day after
the fire, when Nelson visited D.M. in his office to pick up a paycheck, Nelson said that he
3
was hearing noises that D.M. knew did not exist. D.M., Nelson, a nd Nelson’s mother
agreed that he needed help, so D.M. drove him to a hospital. Because of Nelson’s strange
behavior and statements, D.M. “had a feeling” that Nelson had set the fire and “felt pretty
confident that it was him.”
The sheriff’s office’s investigator—who had 26 years of experience as a volunteer
firefighter and was a member of a statewide arson task force—testified at trial that, in his
estimation, the fire started approximately one to two hours before the first deputy arrived
on the scene and took photographs. Because the house was completely destroyed, it was
impossible to determine the fire’s place of origin. The investigator made a preliminary
determination that the cause of the fire was suspicious.
The investigator was familiar with Nelson because of a prior investigation of an
arson in Pine County, for which Nelson was convicted. The investigator interviewed
Nelson later on the same day as the fire. Nelson told the investigator that he was not present
at D.M.’s house during the night of the fire and that he saw the burned-down house when
he showed up for work the following morning. The investigator described Nelson as
“nervous” and “fidgety” during the interview.
The investigator contacted Nelson’s probation agent to request information
generated by an ankle monitor that Nelson was required to wear as a condition of his
probation. The probation agent reviewed the ankle monitor’s location data and informed
the investigator that Nelson was present at the scene of the fire during the middle of the
night, shortly before the fire was first reported. The probation agent testified at trial about
the ankle monitor that Nelson wears, the data that it generates, and the software that allows
4
him to determine a probationer’s location, either in real time or at a prior time. The
probation agent testified that, based on the data received from Nelson’s ankle monitor,
Nelson was at D.M.’s house and the property surrounding the house from 10:26 p.m. to
12:18 a. m. on the night of the fire. During the probation agent’ s testimony, the state
introduced exhibits consisting of aerial photographs with green dots marking Nelson’s
specific location on or near D.M.’s property at particular times during the relevant time
frame.
Nelson did not testify at trial and did not call any witnesses or introduce any exhibits.
The jury found him guilty. The district court imposed a sentence of 51 months of
imprisonment.
Nelson appeals. The state has not filed a responsive brief. Nonetheless, we will
resolve the appeal on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Nelson first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
A person is guilty of second-degree arson if he or she “unlawfully by means of fire
or explosives, intentionally destroys or damages any building” that is not being used as a
dwelling. Minn. Stat. § 609.562 (2020); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.561 (2020). Nelson
argues that the evidence is insufficient for two reasons: first, the state did not prove that
he—as opposed to some other person —set fire to the house, and, second, if the state proved
that he started the fire, the state did not prove that he did so intentionally.
5
In analyzing an argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction,
this court ordinarily undertakes “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether
the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient.”
State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). We assume that
“the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State
v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We will not overturn
a verdict if the jury, “acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
The above- described standard of review applies so long as a conviction is
adequately supported by direct evidence. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016).
Direct evidence is “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592,
599 (Minn. 2017) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence, on
the other hand, is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute
existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). A conviction depends on circumstantial
evidence if proof of the offense, “or a single element of the criminal offense, is based solely
on circumstantial evidence.” State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014).
If a conviction depends on circumstantial evidence, we apply a heightened standard
of review with a two-step analysis. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014). “The
first step is to identify the circumstances proved.” Id. “In identifying the circumstances
proved, we assume that the jury resolved any factual disputes in a manner that is consistent
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with the . . . verdict.” Id. The second step is to “examine independently the reasonableness
of [the] inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved” and “determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
At the second step, we do not give deference to the jury ’s verdict. Loving v. State, 891
N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
Nelson’s conviction is supported by circumstantial evidence. In his appellate brief,
Nelson identifies the following circumstances proved:
(1) before the fire, Nelson told [D.M.] he was hearing voices
and believed he could make money by burning people’s houses
for them; (2) Nelson was at [D.M. ]’s property from about
10:30 p.m. to 12:15 a.m.; (3) the fire started sometime between
midnight and 1:00 a.m.; [and] (4) Nelson lied about being at
[D.M.]’s house the night of the fire . . . .[1]

We adopt Nelson’s identification of these four circumstances proved and add a few more:
Nelson was familiar with the house because he had worked there on a remodeling project.
On the day before the fire, the house was mostly empty, with only a few electronic
appliances that might have spontaneously caused a fire. Firefighters and sheriff’s deputies
found gasoline and diesel fuel containers on the floor of the garage.

1Nelson also purports to identif y another circumstance proved: that “investigators
were unable to determine the origin or cause of the fire.” The record shows that, because
the house was completely destroyed, it was impossible for investigators to determine the
place of origin of the fire. On the day of the fire, the investigator did not make a conclusive
determination about the cause of the fire ; he made only a preliminary determination that
the cause of the fire was suspicious.
7
At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we initially seek to
“determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt.” See M oore, 846
N.W.2d at 88 (quotations omitted). Several circumstances proved strongly suggest that
Nelson is guilty. He was familiar with the house. He had made statements about burning
down other people’s houses. The data derived from his ankle monitor shows that he was
present at the house late at night when the fire likely started. In addition, the presence of
gasoline and diesel fuel containers in the garage indicates that two different types of fuel
were available for use as an accelerant. Furthermore, there were very few electr ical
appliances in the house that could have spontaneously caused a fire. Thus, one reasonable
inference from the circumstances proved is that Nelson intentionally set fire to D.M.’s
house.
At the second step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis, we also seek to
determine whether the circumstances proved are “inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.” See id. Nelson contends that the circumstances proved are consistent
with the hypothesis that he “went to [D.M.]’s property not to set fire to [D.M.]’s house but
for some other purpose, i.e., to pilfer equipment or materials, and that the fire started
sometime after he left the property. ” He also contends that the circumstances proved “do
not exclude the possibility that the fire, whether it started while Nelson was there or after
he left, was accidental. ” The circumstances proved, however, conflict with both of these
contentions. Only a few days before the fire, Nelson had talked about burning down other
people’s houses. In addition, it is mere speculation that any other person also was present
at the house at approximately the same time on the night of the fire. Furthermore, Nelson
8
does not explain how he could have started the fire unintentionally. Consequently, it would
not be rational for the jury to adopt any of Nelson’s alternative hypotheses.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
II. Ankle-Monitor Location Evidence
Nelson also argues that the district court erred by admitting the state’s evidence of
location data derived from his ankle monitor. Specifically, Nelson argues that the district
court erred by admitting the exhibits produced by Nelson’s probation agent and by
admitting the probation agent’s testimony about the exhibits. He contends that “the state
failed to establish that the . . . monitor and associated software were operating properly and
accurately reporting Nelson’s location.”
A.
This issue first arose during a pre-trial conference one day before trial began.
Nelson’s attorney expressed concerns about a lack of foundation for the probation agent’s
testimony concerning the ankle monitor’s location data. The district court reserved ruling
on the issue until the probation agent’s testimony.
The issue arose again during a recess on the second day of trial, shortly before the
probation agent’s testimony. After the prosecutor explained the nature of the evidence, the
district court stated that the admissibility of the evidence should be determined by rule
901(b)(9) of the rules of evidence. Nelson’s attorney did not dispute the applicability of
that rule. Rather, Nelson’s attorney stated that he had concerns about the “calibration” and
“accuracy” of the monitoring system used by the probation agent and questioned whether
9
the probation agent “is equipped to testify to ” that subject. The district court reserved
ruling on Nelson’s objection until the probation agent testified.
The state then called the probation agent, who is employed by the state department
of corrections. He testified about his work experience, his caseload, and his means of
ensuring probationers’ compliance with the conditions of their probation, which includes
location monitoring. At the time of trial, he was supervising four probationers who were
required to wear ankle monitors. He testified that the state contracts with a company known
as BI Monitoring, which owns the ankle monitors and provides software that allows
probation agents to monitor the location of a probationer. He testified that, once an ankle
monitor is installed, he typically checks on a probationer every morning and every
afternoon by using his computer to access a website, which is updated every 15 minutes.
If a probationer’s ankle monitor loses contact with a cell tower, the ankle monitor continues
to track the individual’s location and later can be “backtrack[ed]” so that all location data
is available. The probation agent can access information about a probationer ’s prior
locations, as far back as the date on which the ankle monitor was installed. The ankle-
monitor software allows the probation agent to view an aerial map with green dots
indicating the probationer’s location at a particular time. The probation agent can click on
each green dot to see the address, speed, and direction of the probationer’s movement at a
particular date and time. Nelson’s probation agent testified that, in his experience, the
ankle-monitor system is “extremely accurate.”
When the prosecutor offered exhibits 14 through 20, which reflected location data
derived from Nelson’s ankle monitor during the time period when the fire likely started,
10
Nelson’s attorney asserted an objection based on lack of foundation. The district court
initially said “overruled” and then said “noted and reserved.” Nelson’s attorney did not
renew the objection, and the district court did not make any additional ruling with respect
to exhibits 14 through 20. The district court’ s exhibit log states that exhibits 14 through
20 were “received over objection.” The exhibits show that Nelson approached D.M.’s
property in a southerly direction at 10:26 p.m. at a speed of nine miles per hour, was at or
very close to D.M.’s house shortly after arriving and at numerous other times, and departed
D.M.’s property in a northerly direction at 12:17 a.m. at a speed of 14 miles per hour.
B.
Nelson contends that the ankle-monitor location evidence is inadmissible under rule
901 of the rules of evidence. That rule provides that “authentication or identification” is a
“condition precedent to admissibility.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). The requirement “is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). The requirement may be satisfied in multiple
ways, ten of which are illustrated by the rule itself. See Minn. R. Evid. 901(b).
One way to satisfy the authentication or identification requirement is to introduce
“[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result. ” Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(9); see also In re
Welfare of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d 162, 164- 67 (Minn. App. 1997) (affirming admission of
surveillance video-recording). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review
to a district court’s ruling that the requirement of rule 901(b)(9) is satisfied. Id. at 164.
11
As described above, the probation agent provided detailed testimony concerning the
ankle-monitor system and the process by which he extracts information from it. The
probation agent testified unequivocally that the information produced by the system is
“extremely accurate. ” The probation agent’s testimony is sufficient to “describ[e] a
process or system used to produce a result and show[] that the process or system produces
an accurate result.” See Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(9).
Nelson challenges the district court’s ruling by making a single, narrow argument:
that the state did not ask the probation agent “whether the monitors needed calibration and
regular maintenance to produce accurate information and, if so, whether the required
calibration and maintenance had been performed on Nelson’s monitor.” Nelson’ s trial
attorney questioned the probation agent about those issues during cross-examination.
When asked whether he “calibrates” ankle monitors, the probation agent stated, “No, I’m
not sure if it needs calibration.” When asked whether he performs maintenance on ankle
monitors, the probation agent testified that BI Monitoring does so, unless a probationer
needs a replacement battery or charger, which the probation agent can provide. When
asked whether he fixes damaged ankle monitors, the probation agent testified that if an
ankle monitor is damaged, he calls BI Monitoring, which will fix or replace it.
The probation agent’s testimony is a sufficient foundation with respect to the repair
and maintenance of BI Monitoring’s ankle-monitor system. Nelson does not explain why
an ankle-monitor system requires “calibration” or why foundational testimony on that topic
should be required. We are aware that radar speed -meters require calibration to ensure
their accuracy. See State v. McDonough, 225 N.W.2d 259, 260 (Minn. 1975); State v.
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Gerdes, 191 N.W.2d 428, 431-33 (Minn. 1971); State v. Dow, 352 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn.
App. 1984). That requirement was imposed by caselaw decades ago because calibration
was required by a manufacturer of radar speed-meters. See Gerdes, 191 N.W.2d at 429 &
n.1, 431, 432-33. But there is neither legal authority nor record evidence that “calibration”
is required to ensure the accuracy of BI Monitoring’s ankle monitors. Accordingly, the
foundation laid by the probation agent is n ot inadequate for lack of testimony about
calibration.
Thus, the district court did not err by overruling Nelson’s objection to the state’s
evidence of location data derived from his ankle monitor.
III. Evidence of Prior Arson Conviction
Nelson last argues that the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce
evidence that he had a prior arson conviction.
A.
One week before trial, the state gave notice of its intent to offer Spreigl evidence of
Nelson’s prior arson conviction for “proof of intent, preparation and plan, proof of
knowledge, proof of absence of mistake or accident.” The matter was discussed at a pre-
trial conference on the day before trial began. Nelson’s trial attorney objected to the state’s
Spreigl evidence.
After listening to the arguments of counsel, the district court stated that “the
evidence of a prior arson conviction is, by its nature, highly prejudicial.” But the district
court also stated that the evidence is relevant to the extent that “the prior offense led to the
investigation in this case.” The district court concluded that, if the evidence was limited to
13
the purpose for which the district court deemed it relevant, the probative value of the
evidence would outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice. Specifically, the district court
ruled that the investigator could “testify that he knew that [ Nelson] was on probation for
arson in Pine County,” that he conducted his investigation with that information in mind,
and that he learned that there was “GPS information,” which the state intended to introduce
at trial. The district court reasoned that such evidence was relevant to “explain why the
investigation in this case went the way it did. ” But the district court ruled that the state’s
witnesses could not testify about the details of the prior arson case or any statements made
by Nelson about the prior arson case.
During trial, the investigator testified on direct examination that he was familiar
with Nelson. When asked why, the investigator stated, “I’m familiar with his previous
contacts with law enforcement.” In response to the prosecutor’s additional questions, the
investigator testified that he “was aware of a conviction out of Pine County that was very
similar to this investigation” and, on follow- up, that Nelson “was convicted of arson in
Pine County.” The investigator later testified that he contacted the probation agent who
supervises Nelson, who shared information derived from Nelson’s ankle monitor, which
showed that Nelson was at D.M.’s property during the time frame that the fire likely started.
B.
Nelson’s argument is based on a rule of evidence that provides, “Evidence of
another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith,” though it may be admissible “for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
14
absence of mistake or accident.” Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Evidence of other crimes or
bad acts is known in Minnesota as “Spreigl evidence.” State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385,
389 (Minn. 1998) (citing State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965)). Such evidence
generally is inadmissible unless
(a) the proffered evidence is relevant to an identified material
issue other than conduct conforming with a character trait ;
(b) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by
a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence;
and (c) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed
by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
a district court ’s admission of Spreigl evidence. State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 261
(Minn. 2016).
Nelson acknowledges that, as a general matter, background information about an
investigation by law enforcement is relevant and admissible. See, e.g., State v. Griller, 583
N.W.2d 736, 742 -43 (Minn. 1998). But he contends that the evidence of his prior arson
conviction should not have been admitted because its probative value was outweighed by
its potential for unfair prejudice. See Minn. R. Evid . 404(b)(2). He asserts that the
investigator could have testified about the course of his investigation without any reference
to the prior arson conviction.
The district court’s ruling appropriately recognized the state’s interest in introducing
evidence of location data derived from Nelson’s ankle monitor. To introduce evidence
about the location data naturally would raise questions in juror’s minds about why Nelson
was wearing an ankle monitor. But the state’s witnesses could have explained their
15
discovery of the ankle monitor and its location data without specifically referring to a prior
conviction, let alone a prior conviction of arson—the same offense with which Nelson was
charged in this case. The district court could have—and should have —limited the state’s
evidence to what was minimally necessary to present its evidence of location data derived
from Nelson’s ankle monitor. To inform the jury that Nelson previously had been
convicted of arson allowed the jury to consider that fact as evidence of his propensity to
commit arson. See State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2006); State v. Gassler, 505
N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993); State v. Ford, 322 N.W.2d 611, 614-15 (Minn. 1982). The
district court noted at the pre-trial conference that “the evidence of a prior arson conviction
is, by its nature, highly prejudicial.” In the circumstances of this case, the unfairly
prejudicial nature of the evidence of Nelson’s prior arson conviction outweighed its
probative value.
Thus, the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce evidence that Nelson
had a prior arson conviction.
C.
“When the district court has erroneously admitted other-acts evidence, this court
must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence significantly affected the verdict.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 691. “A defendant who
claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence bears the burden of showing an error
occurred and any resulting prejudice.” Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 261.
To determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that inadmissible evidence of
a prior conviction significantly affected a verdict, it is appropriate to consider three factors:
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“whether the district court instructed the jury to limit the use of the other crime evidence,”
“whether the State dwelled on the evidence in closing argument ,” and “whether the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming.” State v. Thao, 875 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted).
In this case, the third factor identified in Thao—whether there is overwhelming
evidence of guilt —is the most significant factor relevant to whether the inadmissible
evidence significantly affected the verdict. The state’s evidence in this case was
overwhelming. Nelson worked on D.M.’s house and, thus, was familiar with the house.
Only a couple days before the fire, Nelson had said aloud that he could burn down other
people’s houses. Most importantly, the state’s ankle-monitor evidence shows that Nelson
was at D.M.’s house in the middle of the night during the time frame when the fire likely
started. Nelson denied being present at the site at the critical time, in an interview in which
he was visibly nervous and fidgety. The state’s evidence was unusually strong, which
indicates that the jury would have found Nelson guilty with or without the inadmissible
evidence of his prior arson conviction.
The second factor identified in Thao—whether the prosecutor dwel t on the evidence
in closing argument—also supports the conclusion that there is not a reasonable possibility
that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict. Nelson does not
contend that the prosecutor dwelt on the inadmissible evidence in closing argument; rather,
Nelson contends merely that there was “no need for the prosecutor to dwell on” his prior
conviction. It is notable that the district court proactively limited the prosecutor’s reference
to Nelson’s prior arson conviction in his closing argument. During a recess shortly before
17
closing arguments, the district court warned the prosecutor that he could mention the prior
arson conviction only to describe the course of the investigation, and the prosecutor
complied with that limitation. Accordingly, the second factor does not support reversal.
The first factor identified in Thao— whether the district court gave the jury a
cautionary instruction—further supports the conclusion that there is not a reasonable
possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict. The
district court gave the jury a cautionary instruction concerning Nelson’s prior conviction,
both before the investigator testified about Nelson’s prior arson conviction and again
during its final jury instructions . The district court’s cautionary instruction has been
approved by supreme court caselaw and is recommended by well- accepted model jury
instructions. See Thao, 875 N.W.2d at 839-40; State v. Broulik, 606 N.W.2d 64, 68-72
(Minn. 2000); State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998); Minn. Dist. Judges
Ass’n, Minnesota Practice: Jury Instruction Guides— Criminal, § 2.01, at 18- 21 (2015).
The supreme court repeatedly has held that this cautionary instruction tends to reduce the
probability of undue prejudice arising from inadmissible Spreigl evidence. Thao, 875
N.W.2d at 840; Griffin, 887 N.W.2d at 262; State v. Campbell, 861 N.W.2d 95, 103 (Minn.
2015); State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 261 (Minn. 2008). Accordingly, the first factor
also does not support reversal.
Thus, although the district court erred by allowing the state to introduce evidence
that Nelson had a prior arson conviction, Nelson has not satisfied his burden of showing
18
that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence significantly
affected the verdict.
Affirmed.