State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1058

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Malique Isiah Shaqur Hanson,
Appellant.

Filed June 12, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Larson, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-21-881

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Karl Schmidt, Benton County Attorney, Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Malique Isiah Shaqur Hanson appeals from final judgment, challenging
his convictions for second -degree assault and threats of violence, and his sentences for
2
threats of violence and obstructing legal process. We affirm in part, reverse in part , and
remand.
FACTS
On May 21, 2021, a St. Cloud police officer (first officer) responded to a call
reporting a heated argument between a male and female on the street. As the first officer
approached the reported location, he observed a man walking away from the location, who
he thought might be involved. But the first officer proceeded to the reported location.
There, the first officer interviewed A .L.,1 who reported that she argued with her then -
boyfriend, appellant, because she sought to end their relationship. A.L. told the first officer
that appellant responded by slashing two tires on A.L.’s vehicle and smash ing its
windshield. A.L. then described appellant’s appearance, at which time the first officer
realized appellant matched the description of the man the first officer observed walking
away from the scene. The first officer radioed for other police officers to search for
appellant.
A second St. Cloud police officer (second officer) located appellant. The second
officer turned on his squad car’s emergency lights and siren. Appellant fled from the
second officer , and the second officer pursued appellant in his squad car . The second
officer called for back-up and radioed that appellant appeared to have something inside his

1 A.L. later suffered a stroke and no longer recalled the events from May 21, 2021. At trial,
the state called A.L. only to establish that she lost her memory due to the stroke. The state
then relied on the testimony from the responding police officers and body-camera footage
to prove the events that occurred on that date.
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backpack. The first officer replied that appellant may have the knife he used to slash the
tires on A.L.’s vehicle.
After the second officer observed pe destrians in the vicinity, the second officer
decided to pursue appellant on foot. The second officer told appellant to stop and informed
appellant that he was under arrest. After chasing appellant a short distance, appellant
turned toward the second off icer and brandished a hatchet 2 in an aggressive posture.
Appellant then resumed fleeing from the second officer. The second officer maintained
his distance with his gun drawn, continually instructing appellant to stop and put down the
weapon and telling appellant he was under arrest. Appellant repeatedly swore at the second
officer, told him to “[s]top coming up on me[,]” and raised the hatchet above his head.
Appellant eventually jumped a fence , and several police officers intercepted him
shortly ther eafter. A ppellant then engaged in an intense , roughly 10-minute altercation
with police officers. During that time, appellant raised the hatchet over his head and
stepped aggressively toward the police officers, as if prepar ing to throw the hatchet .
Appellant repeatedly swore at the police officers and taunted them to shoot him. One police
officer testified she heard appellant say “‘I will kill you.’” Appellant also threatened self -
harm, holding the hatchet up to his own neck. During this lengthy i nteraction, police
officers had their guns drawn and kept roughly 20 feet of distance.
Later in the altercation, a second group of police officers arrived with a canine unit
and approached appellant. The canine’s barking distracted appellant, at which po int an

2 Police found multiple items they described as “ edged weapons” on appellant after his
arrest.
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officer tased appellant and he fell to the ground. Appellant continued to resist arrest,
causing the police officers to place appellant in a full-body restraint.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with one count of second-degree
assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2020) ; one count of making threats of violence ,
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2020) ; one count of misdemeanor fourth- degree criminal
damage to property, Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 3 (2020) ;3 and one count of gross-
misdemeanor obstructing legal process or arrest with force or violence , Minn. Stat.
§ 609.50, subd. 2(2) (2020). The case proceeded to a jury trial where the state called
several police officers to testify to the facts described above and admitted body -camera
footage into evidence. The police officers testified that throughout their interaction with
appellant, appellant acted erratically, appeared agitated and aggressive, and did not comply
with the police officers’ instructions. The police officers further testified that they were
afraid appellant would cause them imminent bodily harm or injury with the hatchet.
Appellant did not testify. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. The district
court convicted appellant on all four counts and sentenced appellant to the following
concurrent periods of confinement : 45 months for second -degree assault; 27 months for
threats of violence; 90 days for misdemeanor fourth- degree criminal damage to property;
and 365 days for obstructing legal process or arrest.
This appeal follows.

3 The state initially charged appellant with first -degree criminal damage to property but
reduced this count to fourth-degree criminal damage to property in an amended complaint.
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DECISION
Appellant challenges his second -degree-assault and threats-of-violence convictions
on the ground that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the
requisite intent. Appellant also argues tha t, if his second- degree-assault conviction is not
reversed, then his threats -of-violence and obstructing- legal-process sentences must be
vacated, because they arose from the same behavioral incident as the second -degree
assault. We address appellant’s arguments in turn below.
I.
Appellant argues the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had the
requisite intent to support his second -degree-assault and threats -of-violence convictions.
Appellant asserts that the state’s evidence only established that he was having a mental -
health crisis and intended to flee or have the officers harm him. We are not persuaded.
A person commits second-degree assault when the person “assaults another with a
dangerous weapon.” Minn. Stat. § 609.222, s ubd. 1. As relevant here, “‘[a]ssault’ is an
act done with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10 (2020) (emphasis added). “‘With intent to’ . . . means that the
actor either has a purpose to d o the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the
act, if successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2020). A victim
does not need to actually fear bodily harm or death to support a conviction for second -
degree as sault, but such evidence can provide circumstantial evidence of intent. In re
Welfare of T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d 765, 769-70 (Minn. App. 2001).
6
A person commits threats of violence when the person “threatens, directly or
indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another.” 4 Minn.
Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (emphasis added). In this context, “purpose” means “ aim,
objective, or intention,” and “terrorize” means “cause extreme fear by use of violence or
threats.” State v. Smith , 825 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Minn. App. 2012) (quoting State v.
Schweppe, 273 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975)) , rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013) . A
victim’s reaction to threats of violence can supply circumstantial evidence of intent. Sykes
v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).
When evaluating a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we view the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and it must be assumed that the fact -finder disbelieved
any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin , 887 N.W.2d 257, 263
(Minn. 2016). But the level of scrutiny we apply depends on whether the elements of an
offense are supported by direct or circumstantial evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013). “[D]irect evidence is evidence that is based on personal
knowledge or observation.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation
omitted). When the st ate supports an element with direct evidence, we painstakingly

4 A person can also commit threats of violence when a person “threatens, direc tly or
indirectly, to commit any crime of violence . . . in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing
such terror.” Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. Appellant’s brief notes this alternative theory
but does not separately argue any difference exists between the levels of mens rea required.
See State v. Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d 233, 239-40 (Minn. 2022) (distinguishing the requisite
mens rea for “purpose to terrorize” and “reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror ”).
Because we conclude the direct and circumstantial evidence proved a purpose to terrorize,
we do not separately analyze whether the conduct would also meet the standard for reckless
disregard.
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review “t he record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which
they did.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted). We apply a height ened two -step standard when reviewing the sufficiency of
circumstantial evidence. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). First, we
identify the circumstances proved. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. In this step, we defer
to “the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances” and “assume that the jury
believed the State’ s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. at 598-99
(quotations omitted). Second, we determine if the circumstances are “consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt, not simply whether the
inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” Id. at 599 (quotation omitted). During this
step, we do not defer to the factfinder ’s choice between reasonable inferen ces. State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329- 30 (Minn. 2010).
Here, the state used a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence to prove
that appellant possessed the requisite intent to support his second -degree-assault and
threats-of-violence convi ctions. The supreme court has held that a stated threat to kill is
direct evidence of intent, because it does not require the jury “to draw any inferences about
the purposes of [the defendant’s] actions.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40; see also State v.
Olson, 887 N.W.2d 692, 697- 98 n.2 (Minn. App. 2016) ( applying Horst to a threats -of-
violence conviction for the proposition that a stated threat constitutes direct evidence of
8
intent). In this case, the state presented direct evidence from the testimony from one police
officer who heard appellant state “‘I will kill you.’”
In addition to direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence also proved that appellant
had the requisite intent to support his second -degree-assault and threats -of-violence
convictions. The state proved the following circumstances. After A.L. ended her
relationship with appellant , appellant slashed her vehicle’s tires and smashed its
windshield. When the second officer approached appellant on foot, the second officer told
appellant to s top and informed appellant that he was under arrest. Appellant stopped,
turned around, and raised a hatchet above his head “in an aggressive manner.” Appellant
made the same gestures toward other police officers shortly thereafter, including appellant
raising the hatchet over his head and stepping aggressively toward the police officers, as if
preparing to throw the hatchet. Appellant repeatedly swore at the police officers and
taunted them to shoot him. Appellant also threatened self -harm, holding the hatchet up to
his own neck. Throughout this interaction, appellant acted erratically, appeared agitated
and aggressive, and did not comply with police officers’ instructions. The police officers
were afraid appellant would cause them bodily harm or injur y with the hatchet.
It can be reasonably inferred from these circums tances that appellant intended his
threatening words and gestures to cause the police officers extreme fear of bodily harm.
And the police officers testified that these actions caused the m to fear bodily harm. Thus,
the circumstances proved are consistent with appellant having the requisite intent to
commit both second -degree assault and threats of violence.
9
Appellant argue s that the circumstances proved do not exclude the reasonable
inference that appellant “was having angry and frustrated outbursts caused by an extreme,
apparently suicidal, mental health crisis.” Appellant asserts that the facts, therefore,
support a rational hypothesis that appellant “was not acting with intent to a ssault or
terrorize the officers,” but an intent to flee or have the officers harm him . But even
assuming these were appellant’s purpose s, the direct and circumstantial evidence proves
that appellant intended to accomplish these purposes by causing the police officers extreme
fear of bodily harm. Therefore, the circumstances proved exclude any reasonable inference
inconsistent with guilt. See Smith , 825 N.W.2d at 137.
Because the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that appellant intended
to cause the police officers extreme fear of bodily harm, there was sufficient evidence to
establish his guilt for second -degree assault and threats of violence.
II.
Appellant next argues, and the state agrees, that the district court erred when it
sentenced appellant to concurrent sentences for second-degree assault, threats of violence,
and obstructing legal process. Appellant asserts that the three convictions arose from the
same behavioral incident, requiring the district court to vacate the threats -of-violence and
obstructing-legal-process sentences. We agree.
Under Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2020), “if a person’s conduct constitutes more
than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of
the offenses.” Therefore, a district court may impose only one sentence when multiple
offenses are part of a single behavioral incident. State v. Schmidt , 612 N.W.2d 871, 876
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(Minn. 2000). This prohibition extends to multiple concurrent sentences. State v.
Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 293- 94 (Minn. 1995).
“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question
of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its
application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Bakken , 883 N.W.2d 264, 270
(Minn. 2016). “Whether a defendant’s multiple offenses occurred during a single course
of conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d
528, 533 (Minn. 2014). We use several factors to determine whether tw o or more offenses
arose from a single behavioral incident , including “time, place, and whether the offenses
were motivated by a desire to obtain a single criminal objective.” State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d
299, 304 (Minn. 1997).
Here, the state argued to t he jury that the same actions supported convictions for
second-degree assault, threats of violence, and obstruction of legal process. And the
district court acknowledged the offenses all arose from the same behavioral incident. The
state, which bears the burden to prove separate incidents to support multiple sentences,
State v. Degroot, 946 N.W.2d 354, 365 (Minn. 2020), never argued to the district court that
the counts were separate incidents, and the district court never made such a finding.
Further, t he record shows that all three offenses were an escalation of behavior.
Appellant’s conduct began with a failure to comply with an officer’s instructions, escalated
to assaultive gestures and threats of violence, and concluded with appellant obstructing
legal process after his arrest.
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Because the district court convicted and sentenced appellant for multiple offenses
arising from the same behavioral incident and second -degree assault is the most severe
offense, the sentences for threats of violence and obstructing legal process must be vacated.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.035; State v . Steward, 950 N.W.2d 750, 758 (Minn. 2020) . We
therefore reverse appellant’s sentences on the threats of violence and obstructing legal
process convictions and remand for the district court to vacate those sentences. See State
v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 812 (Minn. App. 2018).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.