Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1059

Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

PinPoint Homes, LLC,
Appellant,
Community Resource Bank, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed February 27, 2023
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-20-1236

Scott A. Peitzer, Ryan R. Dreyer, Morrison Sund, P.L.L.C., Minnetonka, Minnesota (for
respondents)

James Hurd Anderson, Stern & Anderson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant PinPoint Homes, LLC (PinPoint) challenges the district court’s factual
finding that respondent Accredited Electrical Solutions, LLC (Accredited) properly
2
completed contracted-for electrical work and the district court’s award of attorney fees.
We affirm.
FACTS
In December 2018, PinPoint purchased a six -unit residential building located in
St. Paul, Minnesota, that required extensive rehabilitation (the property). Accredited
entered an oral agreement with PinPoint to perform electrical work at the property.
Accredited agreed to perform the electrical work for $7,439.12. PinPoint agreed to pay
Accredited half of that amount when Accredited finished the rough-in work1 and the other
half when Accredited completed the project.
Accredited received the first half of the agreed-upon amount from PinPoint after
finishing the rough-in work. But Accredited did not receive the second $3,719.56 payment
after completing the project. About two months after sending PinPoint an invoice for the
second half of the work, Accredited served PinPoint with a mechanic’s lien statement and
otherwise complied with the prerequisites to a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action.
Accredited then sued PinPoint for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien. Accredited sought the remaining $3,719.56 for its work
on the property. PinPoint counterclaimed against Accredited for slander of title. PinPoint
also filed a third-party claim against respondent Day Construction, LLC, a contractor that
worked on the property. Relevant to this appeal, the same attorney represented Accredited
and Day Construction throughout these proceedings.

1 The district court defined “rough-in work” as “work performed before the plumbing
fixtures, cabinetry and drywall ha[s] been installed.”
3
The district court held a bench trial and heard testimony from Accredited’s owner,
PinPoint’s chief manager, Day Construction’s owner, and a former PinPoint employee.
Accredited’s owner testified that Accredited properly completed the agreed-upon work at
the property. In contrast, PinPoint’s chief manager testified that PinPoint had to hire other
contractors to complete Accredited ’s work and to fix Accredited’s defective work.
PinPoint presented invoices from those other contractors to the district court.
After receiving written closing arguments, the district court issued its order. The
district court found Accredited’s owner credible, PinPoint’s chief manager’s relevant
testimony not credible, and PinPoint’s invoices from other contractors “too general” to
prove the contractors completed or fixed Accredited’s work. The district court determined
that (1) Accredited proved its claims against PinPoint ; (2) PinPoint failed to prove its
counterclaim against Accredited; and (3) PinPoint failed to prove its third-party claim
against Day Construction. The district court decided Accredited was entitled to the
$3,719.56 PinPoint owed, plus costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees. The
district court set a timeline for the parties to submit motions about the specific amount
owed.
Accredited submitted a request for $22,887.61 in attorney fees. Accredited attached
a spreadsheet detailing its attorney’s billed hours, an affidavit from the attorney, and an
expert witness’s affidavit
2 supporting the claimed fees. The billing spreadsheet reflected
the attorney, and his colleagues, spent “71.80” hours on this case. The billing spreadsheet

2 Accredited submitted an affidavit from an attorney who has practiced law for 18 years,
with 75% of his practice devoted to real-estate litigation.
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did not delineate the work the attorney performed on behalf of Accredited from the work
performed on behalf of Day Construction. PinPoint submitted a memorandum opposing
Accredited’s attorney fees request. PinPoint also moved the district court to amend its
order, or in the alternative to hold a new trial.
The district court denied PinPoint’s motions. In denying PinPoint’s motions, the
district court reasoned that PinPoint did not present newly discovered evidence or
demonstrate a procedural flaw.
The district court also granted, in part, Accredited’s request for attorney fees. The
district court found “[t]he hours expended in securing the recovery and the hourly rate
claimed are reasonable.” The district court explained it “strongly suspect[ed] PinPoint
Homes’ attorney necessarily invested a similar amount of time and bills at a similar hourly
rate.” However, the district court decided Accredited was not entitled the full $22,887.61
request because the attorney had “offered no evidence demonstrating either that
[he] . . . separately billed Day [Construction] for certain work or that [he] . . . discounted
the fee attributable to Accredited for work jointly benefitting Accredited and Day
[Construction].” The district court noted that despite Day Construction prevailing, Day
Construction was not entitled to attorney fees. The district court expressed that it “must
exercise caution in determining that fees expended in representin[g] Day [Construction’s]
interest are not shifted onto Accredited’s fee claim.” Therefore, the district court reduced
Accredited’s request by 25% “in fairness,” awarding $17,165 in attorney fees.
This appeal follows.
5
DECISION
I.
PinPoint first argues that the district court clearly erred when it found Accredited
properly completed PinPoint’s electrical work and, therefore, was entitled to $3,719.56.
We are not persuaded.
A district court’s findings of fact are given great deference and reviewed only for
clear error. Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999); see also
Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. “We will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, ‘on
the entire evidence,’ we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021)
(quoting N. States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 229 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn.
1975)). We will “neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide issues of witness
credibility, which are exclusively the province of the factfinder.” Gada v. Dedefo, 684
N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004); Gellert v. Eginton, 770 N.W.2d 190, 196 (Minn.
App. 2009) (“A district court, as finder of fact, is not required to believe even
uncontradicted testimony if there are reasonable grounds to doubt its credibility.”), rev.
denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009). If there is reasonable evidence to support the district court’s
findings, we will not disturb them. See Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d at 102.
PinPoint claims that Accredited’s owner had “questionable memory” and seemed
“unsure” about what work Accredited completed after rough -in. The record , however,
shows Accredited’s owner testified he was “[m]ore than 100 percent” sure that Accredited
completed the agreed- upon work. Accredited’s owner testified he routinely visited the
6
property during the project and that he constantly communicated with his on- site
technicians. Accredited’s owner also testified that PinPoint never told Accredited about
any defects, and that, despite providing PinPoint an invoice, Accredited never received
final payment for its work on the property. The district court found this testimony “credible
and corroborated by [Accredited]’s offered trial exhibits.”
PinPoint also argues the district court ignored PinPoint’s chief manager’s testimony.
But Pinpoint misstates the district court’s findings. The district court specifically found
the relevant parts of PinPoint’s chief manager’s testimony not credible, including that the
invoices PinPoint presented were “too general” to support PinPoint’s claims, and that
“[PinPoint’s chief manager’s] testimony that Accredited’s work was substandard or
defective [was] pure speculation.”
There is reasonable evidence to support the district court’s findings. Additionally,
the district court made explicit credibility determinations, and we do not “decide issues of
witness credibility.” Gada, 684 N.W.2d at 514. Plainly put, the district court believed
Accredited’s owner and did not believe PinPoint’s chief manager.
Nothing in this record leaves us “with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). Thus, the district
court did not clearly err when it found Accredited properly completed the billed electrical
work and, therefore, was entitled to $3,719. 56 from PinPoint. Fletcher, 589 N.W.2d at
102.
7
II.
PinPoint also argues the district court abused its discretion when it awarded
Accredited $17,165 in attorney fees. Under Minn. Stat. § 514.14 (2022), the district court
has the discretion to award “reasonable attorney[] fees” to a lienholder as part of a
mechanic’s lien foreclosure action. Larson-Roberts Elec. Co. v. Burdick, 127 N.W.2d 163,
164 (Minn. 1964). We review the a mount of awarded attorney fees for an abuse of
discretion. Automated Bldg. Components, Inc. v. New Horizon Homes, Inc., 514 N.W.2d
826, 831 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 1994). “A district court abuses
its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971 N.W.2d
257, 262 (Minn. 2022)). “The reasonableness of the hours expended and the fees imposed
raise questions of fact,” which we review for clear error. Kaeding v. Auleciems , 886
N.W.2d 658, 668 (Minn. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
PinPoint contends that the district court erred when it found $17,165 in attorney fees
was reasonable because: (1) the attorney representing Accredited spent too much time on
a simple case; (2) the fee award was disproportionate to the $3,719.56 at issue in the case;
and (3) the fees should have been more dramatically discounted for the attorney’s co -
representation of Accredited and Day Construction. We address each argument in turn.
A. Time Spent on Representation
We first address PinPoint’s argument that the attorney representing Accredited did
not reasonably expend 71.80 hours on this case. “The starting point for determining
8
reasonable attorney fees is the number of hours reasonably expended working on the case
. . . .” Musicland Group, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 508 N.W.2d 524, 535 (Minn. App. 1993),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 1994). When a party challenges the number of hours an
attorney spent working on a case , “the district court must provide a concise but clear
explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d
608, 621 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).
PinPoint argues that the attorney spent “excessive amount [s] of time” on various
tasks. To support its argument, PinPoint highlights several entries from the billing
spreadsheet. For example, PinPoint states that the attorney charged “3.2 hours for
analyzing the mediator’s letter, which said nothing more than the parties should settle and
presented some numbers to consider.” But the full entry provides that the attorney:
“[r]eview[ed]/analyze[d] mediator’s proposal; draft[ed]/revise[d] correspondence to client;
draft[ed]/revise[d] correspondence to mediator; draft[ed]/revise[d] Witness List and
Exhibit Lists; review[ed]/analyze[d] scheduling and pretrial orders.” After reviewing
PinPoint’s examples to support its claim that the attorney representing Accredited spent
too many hours on this case, we conclude the record does not support PinPoint’s
arguments.
Here, Accredited submitted material, including the billing spreadsheet, and the
district court “provide[d] a concise but clear explanation of its reasons” why it found the
billed hours reasonable. Milner, 748 N.W.2d at 621. Nothing in this record leaves us “with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” regarding the hours
9
spent. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err when
it found 71.80 hours reasonable. Kaeding, 886 N.W.2d at 668.
B. Proportionality of Attorney Fees
PinPoint next argues the district court’s $17,165 attorney-fees award was not
reasonable because it was disproportionate to the $3,719.56 at issue in the case. When
awarding attorney fees in a mechanics’ lien foreclosure action, the “award must bear a
reasonable relation to the amount of the judgment secured.” Lyman Lumber Co. v.
Cornerstone Constr., Inc., 487 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 1992) (quotation omitted),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 4, 1992). But attorney fees are not excessive merely because they
exceed the amount of the lien. Kirkwold Constr. Co. v. M.G.A. Constr. Inc., 498 N.W.2d
465, 470 (Minn. App. 1993), aff’d on other grounds, 513 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Mar. 11,
1994). “Limiting fees in such a manner would discourage small lienholders from pursuing
valid claims through the legal system.” Id.
PinPoint cites Asp v. O’Brien and its progeny to argue that the attorney fees awarded
here are disproportionate to the contested lien amount. 277 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1979).
In Asp, the lienholder obtained a $4,427 judgment and the district court awarded $2,400 in
attorney fees. Id. at 383. On appeal, the supreme court reduced the attorney fees to $1,000,
stating, “we are not inclined to allow the award of the full amount, particularly where the
amount of the lien recovered is small in comparison to the attorney[] fees assessed.” Id. at
385. The Asp court found this reduction necessary “especially [] in a case . . . where the
property owner was successful in partially limiting the amount of recovery.” Id. This case
is distinguishable because PinPoint was not “successful in partially limiting the amount of
10
recovery.” Id.; see also C. Kowalski, Inc. v. Davis, 472 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Minn. App.
1991) (determining Asp did not control because plaintiff “prevailed in all respects on its
mechanics’ lien claims”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 13, 1991). Instead, Accredited prevailed
on all its claims, and PinPoint failed to prove its counterclaim or its third-party claim.
Further, we observe that proportionality is just one factor among many that the
district court must consider when evaluating the proper attorney fees to award in a
mechanics’ lien foreclosure action. Jadwin v. Kasal, 318 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. 1982)
(listing nine relevant factors, including “the value of the interest involved”). And we have
affirmed similar disparities between awarded attorney fees and the contested lien amount
in nonprecedential decisions where the district court appropriately weighed the relevant
factors. See Installed Bldg. Sols., LLC v. Allenburg, No. A09-298, 2009 WL 5090337, at
*7 (Minn. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (affirming an award of $25,947.50 in attorney fees on a
total lien recovery of $9,527.50), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 2010); K & S Heating, Air
Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC v. Kramer, No. A16-1505, 2017 WL 2224390, at *7
(Minn. App. May 22, 2017) (affirming an award of $18,000 in attorney fees on a total lien
recovery of $3,600).
3
Here, the district court appropriately w eighed the proportionality of attorney fees.
Its findings are not “against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506.
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees

3 Installed Bldg. Sols., LLC and K & S Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing, LLC are
nonprecedential opinions, but they are cited for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
11
exceeding the disputed lien amount. Automated Bldg. Components, Inc., 514 N.W.2d at
831; Kirkwold Constr. Co., 498 N.W.2d at 470.
C. Reduction Based on Day Construction Representation
We finally reach PinPoint’s argument that the attorney fees should have been more
dramatically discounted for the attorney’s co-representation of Accredited and Day
Construction. Attorney fees are generally not recoverable absent a statutory or contractual
basis for awarding them. Dunn v. Nat’l Beverage Corp., 745 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Minn.
2008). As a lienholder, Minn. Stat. § 514.14 authorizes Accredited to recover attorney fees
incurred in foreclosing its mechanic’s lien. Larson-Roberts Elec. Co., 127 N.W.2d at 164
(holding that attorney fees are recoverable costs under the mechanics’ lien statute). Unlike
Accredited, Day Construction undisputedly lacks a legal basis to recover attorney fees.
Our caselaw does not provide direct guidance on how a district court should adjust
attorney fees when the same law firm represents two parties in the same suit and only one
is entitled to attorney fees. However, we are guided by cases addressing how a district
court adjusts attorney fees when a plaintiff only succeeds on some claims. Musicland Grp.,
Inc., 508 N.W.2d at 535; 650 N. Main Ass’n v. Frauenshuh, Inc., 885 N.W.2d 478, 497
(Minn. App. 2016), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 23, 2016). In those cases, like co-
representation, the issue presented is that an attorney’s time is largely “devoted generally
to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide [the] hours expended.” Musicland
Grp., Inc., 508 N.W.2d at 535 (quotation omitted). In such circumstances, we have noted
that “when there is a common core of facts” and “related legal theories” then “the fee award
should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention
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raised in the lawsuit.” Id. Yet, the district court has discretion, through its equitable power,
to reduce the amount of awarded attorney fees to account for unsuccessful claims. County
of Dakota v. Cameron, 839 N.W.2d 700, 712 (Minn. 2013) (holding that “‘[t]here is no
precise rule or formula ’ for applying the results-obtained factor, and a district c ourt may
either ‘attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated’ or ‘simply reduce the
award to account for the limited success’ ” (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
436–37 (1983))).
Here, the attorney did not clearly delineate the hours spent representing Accredited,
the client entitled to attorney fees, from the hours it spent representing Day Construction,
the client not entitled to attorney fees. The district court noted it “must exercise caution in
determining that fees expended in representin[g] Day [Construction’s] interest are not
shifted onto Accredited’s fee claim.” Thus, the district court decided to reduce
Accredited’s claimed attorney fees by 25% “in fairness” since “Accredited did not produce
evidence allowing for a more precise calculation.” But the district court “suspect[ed] that
such reduction, if anything, overstate[d] the time expended in joint representation.”
PinPoint argues the district court should have further reduced Accredited’s awarded
attorney fees because it relied on invoices that bundled the attorney’s co-representation.
At oral arguments, PinPoint suggested that the district court should have reduced the
awarded attorney fees by at least 50% because only one of the two parties was entitled to
attorney fees. But “[t]here is no precise rule or formula” a district court must apply.
Cameron, 839 N.W.2d at 712 (quotation omitted). Although it is best practice to clearly
delineate billed hours between clients, the attorney’s representation of Day Construction
13
involved a “common core of facts” and “related legal theories.” 650 N. Main Ass’n, 885
N.W.2d at 497 (quotation omitted). The investigation, discovery, litigation, and trial all
related to the issues important to both Accredited and Day Construction—who paid whom,
who hired whom, and whether there were construction defects. The district court
appropriately recognized this overlap in representation but chose to invoke its equitable
power to reduce the amount of attorney fees by 25% “in fairness.” See Cameron, 839
N.W.2d at 712. This decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 650 N. Main
Ass’n, 885 N.W.2d at 497.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded
Accredited $17,165 in attorney fees.
Affirmed.