State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1092

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Allen Mrozek,
Appellant.

Filed May 8, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Benton County District Court
File No. 05-CR-19-2075

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Karl Schmidt, Benton County Attorney, Foley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his sentences for first -degree possession of a controlled
substance and driving while impaired (DWI), arguing that the district court abused its
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discretion by denying his requests for (1) funding to obtain a transcript from a separate
sentencing proceeding and (2) a downward dispositional departure. We affirm.
FACTS
During the afternoon of October 31, 2019, appellant Robert Mrozek lost control of
the vehicle he was driving in Benton County and crashed. The responding officers noticed
that Mrozek appeared impaired and discovered that he was under the influence of heroin .
He also had more than 25 grams of heroin in his possession. The state charged Mrozek
with first-degree possession of a controlled substance and third-degree DWI (enhanced
based on a prior DWI). He was released on bail.
The following April, while those charges were pending, Mrozek sold heroin to a
friend in Stearns County. The friend died of an overdose, and Mrozek was charged with
third-degree murder. He pleaded guilty in April 2021 and received a probationary
sentence, a downward dispositional departure.
Mrozek later pleaded guilty to the Benton County charges. He moved the district
court for a downward dispositional departure, noting his family’s history of chemical
dependency, the injury that paralyzed him from the chest down at the age of 17 and the
role it played in his own chemical dependency, his remorse over contributing to his friend’s
death, and his progress since entering chemical-dependency treatment in September 2021.
He also pointed to the departure he had recently received in the Stearns County case and
sought funds under Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (2022) to obtain the transcript from that sentencing
hearing, arguing that the transcript was necessary to show that court’s reasons for
departing. The district court denied both requests and imposed the presumptive 73-month
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prison sentence for the controlled-substance offense, with a concurrent jail term for the
DWI.
Mrozek appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mrozek’s request for
transcript funds.

Counsel for an indigent defendant may request funds from the district court for
investigative, expert, or “other services necessary to an adequate defense in the case.”
Minn. Stat. § 611.21(a). The defen se must present “specific evidence” that the requested
service is “necessary.” State v. Volker, 477 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Minn. App. 1991). We
review an order denying funding under Minn. Stat. § 611.21 for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Cruz Montanez, 926 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. granted (Minn.
Apr. 8, 2019) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Mar. 11, 2020).
The district court denied Mrozek’s request for transcript funds because it found the
Stearns County transcript neither “necessary” nor “relevant” to the Benton County
sentencing. In challenging that decision, Mrozek argues that he needed the transcript to
fully access the evidence that supported a departure in the Stearns County case. 1 This
argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, he did not present it to the district court; his
sole argument was that the transcript was necessary because it reflec ted the other court’s

1 Mrozek notes that an indigent defendant is entitled to a transcript for purposes of appeal.
State v. Pederson, 600 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Minn. 1999); Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 5.
But neither Pederson nor rule 28.02 applies here because Mrozek sought a transcript for
purposes of sentencing, not an appeal.
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reasoning in granting the departure. As such, he has not preserved the alternative argument
that the transcript was necessary to identify the evidence that was presented or referenced
at that sentencing. See State v. Bauer, 776 N.W.2d 462, 471 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating
that appellate courts “ordinarily will not decide issues that were not presented to the district
court”), aff’d, 792 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. 2011).
Second, the record defeats Mrozek’s contention that he needed the transcript to
access relevant evidence in the Stearns County case. While he may have been unable to
access the sentencing transcript, he was able to access all documents filed in that case. In
fact, he used several of those documents in support of his departure motion in this case,
including: a favorable memorandum from a “Dispositional Advisor” in the public
defender’s office, the sentencing order, and the district court’s departure report, which
listed particular amenability to chemical -dependency treatment and remorse as factors
justifying the probationary sentence.
Mrozek also asserts that the Stearns County sentencing transcript was necessary
because it involved the same “factual determination” as in this case. We are not persuaded.
The ultimate issue that each district court decided was the same —whether Mrozek was
particularly amenable to probation. See State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2014).
But each court’s analysis of the issue was necessarily distinct. Each court looked to distinct
evidence because the factors it was required to consider were, at least partially, unique to
the case at hand—Mrozek’s remorse for the offense to be sentenced, his cooperation in the
instant proceeding, and his attitude before that court. State v. Trog , 323 N.W.2d 28, 31
(Minn. 1982). And even with respect to sentencing factors common to both cases, such as
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his age or community support, see id., Mrozek acknowledges that the Stearns County
District Court’s decision did not bind the Benton County District Court. Rather, each
district court was empowered to exercise its broad discretion in assessing Mrozek’s
amenability to probation. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. This means they could make
different yet equally valid decisions. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988)
(“Other district courts might have reached differing or opposite conclusions with equal
justification, but that does not mean that one conclusion was ‘right’ and the other
‘wrong.’”); Marquardt v. Schaffhausen, 941 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Minn. 2020) (“[T]he fact
that other district courts might have made a different decision . . . does not make the district
court’s decision an abuse of discretion.”).
On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in denying the
funding request because Mrozek did not need the Stearns County sentencing transcript.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a downward
dispositional departure.

The Minnesota Sentencing guidelines prescribe a range of sentences that are
presumptively appropriate. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308. But a district court may grant a
downward dispositional departure based on a defendant’s “particular amenability to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. The
defendant must be “particularly” amenable, not “merely . . . amenable to probation ,” to
establish the substantial and compelling circumstances that distinguish him from others
and justify a departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309. When determining whether the
defendant reaches this high bar, a court should consider “the defendant’s age, his prior
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record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends
and/or family.” Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 31. But a district court is not required to depart, even
if there are substantial and compelling circumstances. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7
(Minn. 1981).
We review denial of a downward dispositional departure for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011). Reversal is rare because even
when circumstances are present that favor departure, “departure is not mandatory.” State
v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). We will affirm a presumptive
sentence if the record shows that “the sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony
and information presented before making a determination.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d
917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
The record shows that the district court evaluated the mixed evidence before it.
During the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that Mrozek had begun treatment
and expressed remorse for his actions, which are favorable factors. But it observed that
Mrozek’s remorse was slow in coming and largely attributable to the later offense of
causing his friend’s death. The district court noted that the presentence-investigation report
(PSI) contains substantial information that weighed against a finding of particular
amenability to probation. In particular, the PSI expresses concern that Mrozek “has faced
multiple probation violations for on-going chemical use, poor contact with probation, and
obtaining new charges.” And the PSI states that Mrozek lacks sober support; he misused
prescription drugs (provided by his mother) while in his current treatment program and lied
about that usage; and treatment staff believe that Mrozek “is just going through the motions
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of treatment and isn’t invested.” Based on these circumstances, the PSI opines that Mrozek
is “a danger to the community” and recommends imprisonment. The district court elected
to “follow th[at] recommendation” and imposed the presumptive sentence.
Mrozek argues that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by
(1) misapplying the remorse factor, (2) excluding relevant evidence from the Stearns
County sentencing, and (3) inappropriately deferring to the opinion of the probation agent
who wrote the PSI. This argument is unavailing in all respects.
First, Mrozek suggests that the district court, having credited his expression of
remorse, abused its discretion by apparently not weighing this factor in favor of departure.
But Mrozek cites no authority requiring a district court to simply find a defendant
remorseful or not, nor any that requires it to depart dispositionally if it finds a defendant
remorseful. To the contrary, a district court must decide not only whether a defendant
exhibits “genuine remorse” but also “how much weight to give to that remorse.” State v.
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Minn. 2016) . The district court’s nuanced evaluation of
Mrozek’s remorse addressed both requirements. Mrozek has not demonstrated any abuse
of discretion in the determination that his lately realized remorse does not outweigh the
numerous other factors disfavoring probation.
Second, the district court did not exclude relevant evidence from the Stearns County
sentencing. It denied Mrozek’s request for funds to obtain the sentencing transcript— a
decision that, as discussed above, was well within its discretion. But it received and
considered the dispositional memorandum, sentencing order, and departure report from
that sentencing.
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Third, Mrozek has not demonstrated any error in the district court’s use of the PSI.
He contends the PSI was inaccurate or misleading. But he acknowledges the accuracy of
the relevant facts therein: he has violated probation numerous times before, he caused his
friend’s death while released on bail in this case, his family is unable to provide him sober
support, and he took his mother’s prescription medication and lied about it to treatment
staff. And the district court’s sentencing remarks reflect that it did not simply “defer[]” to
the PSI’s prison recommendation, as Mrozek contends, but appropriately considered the
PSI as relevant but not determinative. See State v. Park, 305 N.W.2d 775, 776 (Minn.
1981) (explaining that PSI may inform but does not determine departure analysis).
In sum, the district court considered the evidence that Mrozek urged in favor of
departure, including the Stearns County sentencing materials, and evidence disfavoring
departure and acted within its discretion in imposing the presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.