In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. D. T. and A. S. M., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1095

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. D. T. and A. S. M., Parents.

Filed January 23, 2023
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Itasca County District Court
File No. 31-JV-22-852

Bill L. Thompson, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant father C.D.T.)

Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Michael J. Haig, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent Itasca County Human Services)

Megan Dyan Bond, International Falls, Minnesota (for mother A.S.M.)

Rachel Weis, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (for stepmother Cr.D.T.)

Kim Allen, Grand Rapids, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
*
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant-father C.D.T. (father) challenges the district court’s order adjudicating
his minor child in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Father also challenges whether

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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Itasca County Health and Human Services (human services) made reasonable efforts to
avoid and prevent an out -of-home placement for the child. We affirm.
FACTS
This appeal concerns the minor child (the child), of father and A.S.M. (mother) .
After father and mother ended their relationship, father married Cr.D.T. (stepmother). The
child resided with father and stepmother who were both responsible for the child’s care.
And often, due to father’s work schedule, stepmother acted as the child’s sole caregiver.
In July 2021, human services initiated a CHIPS investigation related to allegations
made by stepmother’s teenage daughter. As a result, father and stepmother both agreed to
a safety plan. Amongst other requirements, the safety plan stated: (1) “[father and
stepmother] wil l use no physical discipline in their homes” and (2) “[c]onsequences for
[the] children[’s] actions should be given in the form of a timeout, privilege’s taken
away[,] . . . and added chores/responsibilities.” Despite the safety plan, the child reported
that father and stepmother gave the child the choice to be physically disciplined or have
privileges taken away. The child reported that this was a family secret.
On March 30, 2022, stepmother dropped the child off at school. The child’s teacher
(teacher) testified that she observed that the child had a swollen and bloody lip. She also
noticed that the child had a “withdrawn” demeanor and “a visible marking on his face.”
When she asked the child what happened, the child replied: “My mom did it.” 1 Teacher
reported this information to the school’s principal (principal), and teacher and princi pal

1 The child later identified stepmother as “mom.”
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interviewed the child. The child told teacher and principal that his stepmother was mad at
him so she “hooked her finger in [his] mouth . . . [with] this long fingernail.” Principal
testified that the child “was having a hard time with his lip,” and described the child’s lip
as “puffy,” “bloody,” and “looked like a fat lip.”
Teacher and principal reported the incident to law enforcement. Upon receiving the
report, the Itasca County Sheriff’s Department sent an investigator along with a human-
services investigator to the school to interview the child. The child told the investigators
that, earlier that morning, stepmother grabbed his li p and cut his lip with her fingernail.
Investigators then asked the child when stepmother injured his lip, and the child responded
that it happened “[t]oday” at “my house” while father was “at work.” The child t old
investigators that he was “very sad” when stepmother made his lip bleed. The child also
informed the investigators that he only felt safe at home when he has “a good day” at
school. Investigators put the child in a 72-hour police hold. The state criminally charged
stepmother, and the district court issued a domestic abuse no contact order (DANCO)
prohibiting stepmother from interacting with the child.
On April 4, 2022, human services filed a CHIPS petition regarding the child and
placed the child with a nonrelative foster -care placement. In May 2022, human services
created a placement plan, detailing the efforts made or attempted to prevent the child’s out-
of-home placement. At the end of the school year, human services placed the child with
mother, who lived in a different school district .
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The district court held an evidentiary hearing. The district court received several
pieces of evidence and heard witness testimony , including testimony from stepmother,
teacher, principal, and the investigators.
The district court heard testimony regarding the child’s documented behavioral
issues at school. Stepmother testified that the child’s behavior frustrates her. Stepmother
testified that on March 30, 2022, she drove the child to school in the morning. Before the
drop off , she scolded the child because he had a behavioral issue at school the prior day.
She admitted that she “pulled [the child] by the ear,” and “cupped his chin with the palm
of [her] hand,” but denied grabbing the child ’s lip.
On July 25, 2022, the district court adjudicated the child CHIPS. The district court
determined that human services made reasonable efforts to avoid and prevent out -of-home
placement. But because the district court concluded the placement was necessary and in
the child’s best interests, the district court ordered the placement to continue.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Father challenges the district court’s decision that the child meets the statutory
criteria for a CHIPS adjudication under Minn. Stat. § 260C .007, subd. 6 (2020). Father
also argues that the district court incorrectly determined that human services made
reasonable efforts to avoid and prevent the child’s out -of-home placement under Minn.
Stat. § 260.012 (2020).2 We address each argument in turn b elow.

2 Although father did not cite section 260.012, or any other statutory authority, we interpret
his argument to rely on section 260.012.
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We review a district court’s CHIPS determination using “a very deferential standard
of review.” In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 734 (Minn. App. 2009).
We review the district court’s “factual findings for clear error .” In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Minn. App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015). “In
applying the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings.”
In re Com mitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) . We
“will not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation
omitted). We will not reverse a district court’s decision to adjudicate CHIPS absent “a
clear abuse of discretion.” S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 734 (quotation omitted). “A district
court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence,
misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.”
Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quoting Bender v. Bernhard, 971
N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022)) ; In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6
(Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a juvenile-protection appeal), rev. denied (Minn.
Dec. 6, 2021).
I.
Father first argues the district c ourt abused its discretion when it adjudicated the
child CHIPS under Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8), (9). As relevant to this appeal,
section 260C.007, subdivision 6, defines “a [c]hild in need of protection or services” to
include a child who:
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(8) is without proper parental care because of the emotional,
mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the
child’s parent, guardian, or other custodian;

(9) is one whose behavior, condition, or environment is such
as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others. An
injurious or dangerous environment may include, but is not
limited to, the exposure of a child to criminal activity in the
child’s home.

Human services bears the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that a child
meets the CHIPS definition. See S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 730.
A. Subdivision 6(8)
Father argues the district court abused its discretion when it concluded human
services presented clear and convincing evidence that the child is without proper parental
care pursuant to section 260C.007, subdivision 6(8). We are not persuaded.
The district court concluded the child lacked proper parental care under
subdivision 6(8) and supported that decision with the following findings. Although this is
the first child-protection case regarding the child, father and stepmother had a preexisting
safety plan in place with human services. In the safety plan, father and ste pmother
expressly agreed that they would “use no physical discipline.” Despite the safety plan,
when the child misbehaved, the child was given “a choice of physical discipline, the use of
a paddle[ ,] or taking away the privilege of electronics.” Further, stepmother physically
disciplined the child on March 30, 2022. Stepmother “grabbed [the child] and cut his lip
with her fingernail because she was mad . . . he had a bad day at school the day prior.” The
district court’s findings are supported by clea r and convincing evidence in the record,
including the testimony of teacher, principal, and investigators. We conclude that both
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parents’ willingness to use physical discipline despite the existing safety plan and
stepmother’s inability to restrain her impulse to use physical discipline show that the child
lacked proper parental care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8).
Father contends this record is insufficient to show a lack of proper parental care as
to father. According to father, human services presented no evidence suggesting that he
could not properly care for the child. We are not persuaded. First, father cites no legal
authority for the contention that the district court must separately analyze father’s behavior.
See Brodsky v. Brodsky , 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) ( noting we do not
address inadequately briefed arguments); Horodenski v. Lyndale Green Townhome Ass’n,
804 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[E]rror is not presumed on appeal, and the
burden of showing error rests on the party asserting it .”). Second, this record supports the
district court’s decision to analyze this father’s and this stepmother’s abilities to parent the
child jointly . See, e.g., In re Welfare of T.P., 747 N.W.2d 356, 361 (Minn. 2008)
(explaining district courts may terminate parental rights on the basis that a child suffered
egregious harm while in the parent’s care even when the parent did not personally inflict
the harm or was not physically present when the harm occurred ); In re Welfare of S.A.V.,
392 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. App. 1986) (“Abuse by a parent, or knowledge of abuse by
another without taking corrective action is clear evidence of emotional disability or
immaturity of a parent.”). The record shows that father and stepmother live together in the
same home with the child. Both father and stepmother are responsible for the child’s care.
And often, due to father’s work schedule, stepmother is the child’s sole caregiver. Further,
and particularly important in this case, the re cord contains evidence that father is willing
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to use physical discipline despite the safety plan ; i.e., that father apparently approves of
stepmother’s use of physical discipline and deems compliance with the safety plan
optional. Thus, father’s characterization that there is no evidence as to his conduct is not
supported by the record.
For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that the child “is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental, or physical
disability, or state of immaturity of the child’s parent, guardian, or other custodian.” Minn.
Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(8); see S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 735.
B. Subdivision 6(9)
Father argues the district court abused its discretion when it concluded human
services presented clear and convincing evidence to meet the standard in section 260C.007,
subdivision 6(9). Father argues the district court abused its discretion because the child’s
swollen and bloody lip alone, does not meet the subdivision 6(9) standard to show a
behavior, condition, or environment” that is “injurious or dangerous to the child.” See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6(9).
We disagree with father’s characterization that the district court relied solely on the
child’s lip injury to support its decision that the home may be dangerous to the child. To
support its conclusion that the child met the subdivision 6(9) standard, the district court
made the following findings. The child reported that he received t he lip injury from his
stepmother because he had bad behavior at school the prior day. The child then stated that
he only felt safe at home when he has “a good day” at school. The district court found that
the child often had behavioral issues at school and that stepmother admitted that the child’s
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behavior at school frustrates her and triggered her conduct on March 30, 2022. And the
district court found both father and stepmother are willing to use physical discipline when
the child acts out. We discern no clear error in the district court’s findings, and its findings
are supported by the record, including the testimony of teacher, principal, investigators,
and stepmother.
The district court found the child reasonably feared being at home with fa ther and
stepmother—especially on days where he ha d behavioral issues at school. Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that immediately reunifying
the child with father and stepmother could expose the child to a dangerous or injurious
environment under subdivision 6(9). S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 735.
II.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that
human services made reasonable efforts to prevent the child’s removal. Pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(a), when the district court adjudicates a child CHIPS, it must:
ensure that reasonable efforts, . . . by the social services agency
are made to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for
removal and to reunite the child with the child’s family at the
earliest possible time . . . . In determining reasonable efforts to
be made with respect to a child and in making those reasonable
efforts, the child’s best interests, health, and safety must be of
paramount concern.

Human services makes a reasonable effort to prevent placement of a child when it “work[s]
with the family to develop and implement a safety plan that is individualized to the needs
of the child and the child’s family”; or when “the agency has demonstrated to the [district]
court that, given the particular circumstances of the child an d family at the time of the
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child’s removal, there are no services or efforts available that could allow the child to safely
remain in the home.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(d). Here, t he district court determined that
human services made reasonable efforts to avoid and prevent the out -of-home placement
of the child. The district court’s determination is not against logic or the facts in the record.
Human services initially removed the child on March 30, 2022, using a 72- hour
peace officer hold, based on huma n services’ previous interactions with the family, 3 and
the child’s lip injury and report. The previous interactions included father and stepmother’s
explicit agreement in the July 2021 safety plan not to use physical discipline. At the time
of the init ial removal, the district court issued a DANCO , prohibiting stepmother from
having contact with the child.
At trial, the state presented evidence that i n April 2022, human services placed the
child in a nonrelative foster placement. Human services made t his placement after the
child’s lip injury and the child’s report that he did not always feel safe at home. At the
time, the DANCO was still in place, the CHIPS petition had not yet been adjudicated, and
there were pending criminal charges against stepmot her. During the same month, as part
of the out-of-home-placement plan, human services prepared a proposed update to the July
2021 safety plan that included steps for father and stepmother to take for a potential

3 The district court noted that human services had received over 20 intake reports regarding
father and his family and that human services had made at least one prior maltreatment
determination for the pending CH IPS matter related to mother’s teenage daughter. The
district court acknowledged that this was the first CHIPS action regarding the child, but
that interventions short of a CHIPS petition had been attempted prior to the July 2021 safety
plan that were not successful. The district court further found that “[father] has not been
receptive to the suggestions of [human services] to engage in services in prior cases opened
by [human services].”
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reunification with the child . At the time the district court issued its order, father had not
signed the update d safety plan. But the proposed update included “therapy, diagnostic
assessments, parenting capacity assessments, medication management services if
applicable, visitation services, and in- home family services.” The district court noted that
the proposed services were “intended to build skills for safe and healthy parenting, healthy
growth and development of the child, and to promote a safe and stable home for the parents,
child, and the entire family.”4
Based on the evidence presented at the time of the hearing, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it determined that human services had made reasonable efforts to
prevent the child’s removal pursuant to section 260.012. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 323.
Human services had previously worked “with the family to develop and implement a safety
plan,” but the family had failed to follow the safety plan. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(d)(1).
Further, the evidence presented at trial sufficiently demonstrated that at the time of
immediate removal, there were no services or efforts availabl e—short of the child’s
removal—to ensure the child was safe at home . See id., (d)(2).
Affirmed.

4 Notably, since the district court’s decision, human services has continued reunification
efforts. According to a report filed in August 2022, these efforts included the following:
meeting “with [father and stepmother] in person and by phone to implement an appropriate
safety plan,” and “working with the family to addr ess the needs, concerns, and issues in
the home in order to support reunification.”