State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1109

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Pariss Demond Wright,
Appellant.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-21-3685

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Victoria Wanta, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, arguing that his
jury-trial waiver was invalid. We affirm.
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FACTS
In December 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Pariss Demond
Wright with third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d)
(2020). Wright was appointed a public defender. His omnibus hearing was scheduled for
just under one month later. Before the omnibus hearing, Wright requested that the public
defender be discharged. At the omnibus hearing, the district court discharged the public
defender and Wright proceeded pro se. When asked whether he was “asking . . . for . . .
advisory counsel,” Wright responded, “Not at this time, no.”
Wright then argued to dismiss the charge. T he district court understood Wright as
arguing that he “didn’t do this” and that the victim was “making this up.” The district court
denied Wright’s motion, explaining that those were trial issues. Afterward, Wright
mentioned “bring[ing] his own subpoenas” and acknowledged that the “[j]ury trial [was]
coming up.”
At the next pretrial hearing, the parties and court discussed the jury questionnaire
and trial procedures. Wright then reiterated his motion to dismiss, stating that a trial was
unnecessary because he filed affidavits that should be enough for dismissal. The court
informed Wright that it would reconsider his motion by the next hearing.
The prosecutor noted that Wright had asked about advisory counsel. Wright stated
that he did not “mind the assistance” but would decline advisory counsel to avoid delaying
trial. The prosecutor also noted that Wright had questioned the difference between a court
trial and a jury trial. The district court explained to Wright that he had the right to a jury
trial “with 12 people” deciding his “guilt or innocence.” The district court stated that the
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jury’s verdict must be unanimous, explained why some defendants prefer a jury trial, and
stated that Wright could alternatively choose to have a judge decide his guilt or innocence.
When asked if he wanted a jury trial or “a judge trial,” Wright stated that he
“want[ed] to go with” his “affidavit” and that “the jury trial would be fine.” The district
court told Wright that he could wait to decide until the morning of trial if he “want[ed] a
judge trial or a jury trial.” Wright replied that he was “just trying to make it more . . .
convenient for the courts to find [him] innocent” rather than going through a jury trial.
At the next pretrial hearing, the district court and the parties discussed the results of
the jury questionnaire and the jury-selection process. Wright expressed concern about the
number of prospective jurors who had been victims of sexual abuse, knew someone who
had been a victim, or who had been accused of sexual misconduct. Wright asked the district
court to dismiss those prospective jurors. The district court explained that the prospective
jurors at issue would be questioned individually about whether they could remain impartial.
Wright then inquired about what questions he could ask the prospective jurors. After that,
the prosecutor and Wright discussed which witnesses would testify. Wright stated that he
planned on “cross-examining” the state’s witnesses.
Returning to his motion to dismiss, Wright argued for dismissal based on witness
credibility. The district court denied Wright’s motion, explaining that whether a witness
was credible would be up to the jury. Wright protested that the district court was
improperly denying his motion by relying on the jury rather than its own judgment. The
district court replied that if Wright “want[ed] a court trial—that is, with a judge,” then
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Wright could waive his jury-trial right and the court trial would begin the next day. Wright
replied, “Right.”
The district court reiterated that a jury would consist of 12 people whose guilty
verdict must be unanimous and beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright replied that the victim’s
accusations were “not a reasonable doubt.” The court replied, “I agree . . . . [A]s I look at
you, I presume innocence. And I would tell the jury that as well[.]” Wright responded,
“You presume me innocent right now . . . . That means . . . we don’t need any further
hearings, motions, or any of that.” The district court attempted to clarify Wright’s
confusion, stating, “I presume you’re innocent, just as a jury would. But then we have to
hear the evidence.” The court explained that no trial evidence had yet been offered.
The district court asked if Wright wanted “a judge trial or jury trial.” Wright
protested that witnesses were un necessary and that he did not understand why the district
court would hear testimony from an untruthful witness. The district court asked again: “Do
you want a jury trial or do you want to start tomorrow with just me?” Wright responded,
“Yes, Your Honor, . . . you can start tomorrow.” Wright then began speaking in apparent
frustration, stating that he asked for a jury trial but did not want any jurors who had or
knew someone with experience related to sexual misconduct. The district court took a
break to give Wright a “chance to cool down.”
After returning from the break, the district court again explained to Wright that the
presumption of innocence “just says that every person is innocent until they’re proven
guilty,” and that “whether it’s a jury or a court trial,” the state would be required to prove
Wright’s guilt at trial. Wright insisted that the district court already had the evidence to
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decide the case. The court again explained that witnesses, documents, and other sources
of evidence would need to be presented at trial before deciding the case.
The district court provided Wright a written jury-trial waiver. But Wright returned
to his motion to dismiss, asking the district court, “[W]hy would you even ask me why it
should be dismissed if it’s not your call?” The court answered, “The motion to dismiss
was my call.” Wright continued expressing frustration at already having argued his case
without a decision.
The district court stated that it would assume Wright wanted a jury trial. Wright
stated, “I’m choosing a judge trial then,” asserting that al though the court stated that it
would review the case, it nonetheless denied his motion to dismiss because of the jury’s
absence. Wright then stated that he “would like a judge trial” before finally signing the
waiver. Wright read aloud from the waiver: “If I waive a jury, the judge will determine
my guilt or innocence.” The district court explained that this meant the court would decide
whether the state had proven its case, including the credibility of witnesses. The waiver
also stated, “I have had an opportunity to consult with counsel, and I waive my right to a
trial by jury on the issue of guilt.”
A bench trial started the next day. The district court found Wright guilty as charged
and sentenced him to 117 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Jury-trial waiver
Wright challenges the validity of his jury-trial waiver. Criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, §§ 4, 6. But
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“with the approval of the court,” a defendant “may waive a jury trial on the issue of guilt”
if, among other conditions: “the defendant does so personally, in writing or on the record
. . . after having . . . an opportunity to consult with counsel”; and the waiver is “knowing”
and “intelligent.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01 subd. 1(2)(a); State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878,
882 (Minn. 2014). “[S]trict compliance” with these elements is required. State v. Tlapa,
642 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. June 18, 2002). We review de
novo whether a defendant validly waived a jury trial. State v. Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844,
848-49 (Minn. 2011).
Opportunity to consult with counsel
Wright first argues that his jury-trial waiver was invalid because “it is unclear when
[he] would have had the opportunity to consult with counsel” given that he previously
discharged the public defender, the district court “never clarified” whether he had such an
opportunity, and Wright did not have advisory counsel. Wright’s argument is addressed
by State v. Johnson, 354 N.W.2d 541 (Minn. App. 1984).
In Johnson, this court held that a pro se defendant had sufficient opportunity to
consult with counsel even though he never actually consulted with counsel. 354 N.W.2d
at 543. Although we observed that the defendant “was eligible for the public defender,”
the record did not show that he applied for one before sentencing. Id. This court noted
that the defendant’s jury-trial right was explained to him off the record by the prosecutor
and again on the record by the district court. Id. At trial, the district court gave the
defendant another opportunity to request a jury. Id. Under those facts, we held that the
defendant “could have consulted with counsel at any time before trial.” Id. That the
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defendant “was acting pro se did not deprive him of the opportunity to consult with counsel
before waiver of jury trial.” Id.
Under Johnson, Wright had sufficient opportunity to consult with counsel. Wright
was appointed a public defender at his first appearance. He had opportunity to consult with
that counsel for almost a month before discharging counsel and proceeding pro se. The
district court asked Wright whether he wanted advisory counsel— once at the omnibus
hearing and once at a pretrial hearing. Further, the district court repeatedly asked Wright
whether he wanted a jury trial and told him he could request one up until trial began.
Wright cites no caselaw requiring district courts to ask pro se defendants whether
they had an opportunity to consult with counsel to comply with the rule. No such inquiry
is evident in Johnson . “And district courts are discouraged from the sort of inquiry that
could determine whether a defendant actually discussed the waiver with counsel.” State v.
Rewitzer, No. A18- 1921, 2019 WL 4746151, at *3 (Minn. App. Sept. 30, 2019) (citing
State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn. 1991) (stating that courts should avoid inquiry
into attorney-client communications when evaluating validity of jury-trial waiver)); Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding . . . but
may be cited . . . as persuasive authority”). In any event, by his written and personal
waiver, Wright stated that he had an opportunity to consult with counsel. We conclude
that Wright had sufficient opportunity to consult with counsel regarding his jury-trial
waiver.
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Knowing and intelligent waiver
Wright also argues that his jury-trial waiver was invalid because it was not knowing
and intelligent. “Whether a waiver of a constitutional right was knowing [and] intelligent
. . . depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused.” Little, 851 N.W.2d at 882. “The focus of the
inquiry is on whether the defendant understands the basic elements of a jury trial.” Ross,
472 N.W.2d at 654. To ensure that jury-trial waivers are knowing and intelligent,
defendants should be informed “that a jury trial is composed of 12 members of the
community, that the defendant may participate in the selection of the jurors, that the verdict
of the jury must be unanimous, and that, if the defendant waives a jury, the judge alone
will decide guilt or innocence.” Id.; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a)
(allowing defendant to waive jury “ in writing . . . after being advised by the court of the
right to trial by jury”).
Here, Wright’s written waiver informed him of these elements. The district court
also informed Wright of these elements in detail on the record. Beyond the basic elements,
the district court explained why some people prefer jury trials and discussed jury selection
at length, including the jury questionnaire, its results, and each side’s ability to question
prospective jurors for bias. Wright participated in this and other discussion about the jury,
inquiring about what he could ask prospective jurors and even requesting the court to strike
all prospective jurors who had or knew someone with experience related to sexual
misconduct. State v. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. 1979) (per curiam)
9
(holding that defendant validly waived jury in part because district court “commented on
his ability to express himself and participate in the proceedings”).
Moreover, the district court told Wright twice that a jury consists of 12 people whose
guilty verdict must be unanimous. The district court also explicitly told Wright twice that
a court trial, or “judge trial,” is with the judge “as the only factfinder” deciding guilt. On
the record, Wright read aloud the part of his written waiver stating that the judge alone
would decide guilt. Wright is also “not unfamiliar with the judicial system,” as his
sentencing worksheet shows three prior felony convictions and five prior misdemeanor or
gross-misdemeanor convictions. See Ross, 472 N.W.2d at 654 (noting defendant’s prior
convictions as indicating that he understood jury-trial right).
Wright nonetheless argues that his waiver was not knowing or intelligent because
the record reflects his belief that “if he waived . . . a jury trial, the district court would be
free to believe his affidavits and grant his motion to dismiss.” The record does not support
this assertion. It seems clear that Wright did not fully appreciate the difference between
deciding a pretrial motion to dismiss and a trial deciding guilt. But the record shows his
understanding that a trial would require the jury or the district court to consider “all the
evidence,” including the victim’s testimony, before deciding guilt. Indeed, Wright
demonstrated at least some knowledge of subpoenas and cross-examining witnesses.
The record suggests that Wright attempted and failed to persuade the district court
to acquit him based on his affidavit. Apparently, when Wright had to decide on a jury trial
or bench trial, he chose a bench trial due to concern about prospective jurors who had or
knew someone with experience related to sexual misconduct. This supports the validity of
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his jury-trial waiver. Pietraszewski, 283 N.W.2d at 890; State v. Hansen, No. A11-2260,
2013 WL 599139, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 19, 2013) (concluding that defendant had
sufficient knowledge of basic jury-trial elements in part because he “gave valid reasons for
preferring a bench trial to a jury trial”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 30, 2013). We conclude
that Wright’s jury-trial waiver was valid. Any misunderstanding about deciding a pretrial
motion to dismiss versus a trial deciding guilt did not invalidate the waiver.
Pro se brief
In a pro se supplemental brief, Wright seems to dispute the weight of the trial
evidence. This contention fails because t he district court was “the exclusive judge of
witness credibility and . . . the weight of the evidence.” See State v. Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d
15, 23 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007).
Similarly, Wright seems to argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the
victim was “physically helpless” when Wright committed the offense. When reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we “carefully examine the record to determine whether the
facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the [fact -finder] to
reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty” of the charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). We view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict” and assume
that the fact-finder disbelieved any contradictory evidence. Id. (quotation omitted).
“A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of”
third-degree criminal sexual conduct if “the actor knows or has reason to know that the
complainant is . . . physically helpless.” Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(d) (2020)
. A
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person who is “[p]hysically helpless” includes a person who is “asleep.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.341, subd. 9 (2020).
Here, the victim testified that she “woke up t o” Wright with his “fingers in [her]
vagina.” And when rendering its verdict, the district court expressly found the victim “very
credible.” Thus, the evidence of physical helplessness was sufficient. See State v. Miles,
585 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1998) (stating that “a conviction may rest on the testimony
of a single credible witness”).
Wright’s additional pro se claims are “unsupported by either arguments or citation
to legal authority.” See State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2021) (quotation
omitted). We generally do not consider such claims unless “prejudicial error is obvious on
mere inspection.” Id. at 650-51. On mere inspection of the record, no prejudicial error is
obvious. Therefore, Wright has forfeited his claims.
Affirmed.