State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1115

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andrew Allen Schell,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CR-21-485

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin Peralta, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Chad M. Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Grant S. Gibeau, Special Assistant Public Defender, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and
Halbrooks, Judge.*
SYLLABUS
When law enforcement lawfully impounds a motor vehicle after a search for
firearms under the automobile exception reveals controlled substances, law enforcement

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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retains the authority to further search the vehicle and any containers in it that may contain
firearms or controlled substances while the vehicle remains in the custody and control of
law enforcement and no facts or circumstances suggest that the search has become less
reasonable in the six days following the vehicle’s impoundment.
OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress
evidence recovered from a lockbox that was removed from appellant’s impounded vehicle
in the presence of law enforcement six days after appellant’s arrest and the vehicle’s
impoundment. Because law enforcement retained the authority to search the vehicle and
containers in the vehicle under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures during the six days the vehicle
remained impounded, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are taken from the evidence introduced at the contested omnibus
hearing. On March 13, 2021, a Douglas County deputy sheriff stopped the vehicle
appellant Andrew Allen Schell was driving for brake-light and license-plate violations.
The deputy noticed a gun in the vehicle, and neither Schell nor his passenger, Brooke
Edwards, had a permit to carry a firearm. The deputy then searched the vehicle for weapons
and found drug paraphernalia and substances that later tested positive for heroin and
methamphetamine. He arrested Schell and Edwards and impounded the vehicle. The
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record does not indicate that the sheriff’s department conducted an inventory search of the
vehicle.
Edwards posted bail on March 19, 2021, and asked the sheriff’s office for
permission to remove personal items from the impounded vehicle. A second deputy
accompanied Edwards and another individual, A.W., to the impound lot, and a sergeant
met them there. The sergeant testified at the omnibus hearing that Edwards’s behavior was
“odd in the fact that she was moving back and forth between the passenger compartment
and the engine compartment, and it looked like there was a lot of busy work but there was
nothing being done.” He added that when people arrive at the impound lot to recover
property, they typically “grab stuff” from the passenger compartment and load it into
another vehicle. Instead, Edwards stayed outside the vehicle and removed her jacket
despite it being a cold day. She then “began to place [the jacket] into the engine
compartment and stuff it down into—down near the engine.”
The sergeant learned that another deputy had found a gun and controlled substances
inside the vehicle during the search on March 13. He determined that Edwards’s
“suspicious behavior” in the impound lot might indicate that she was attempting to remove
an as-yet-undiscovered weapon from the vehicle. At that point, the sergeant got out of his
car, approached Edwards, and asked what she was doing. He testified that Edwards was
holding the jacket close to her body and that he grabbed her arm and asked her what was
in her hands. The sergeant asked Edwards multiple times to give him the jacket as she
attempted to give it to A.W., but A.W. refused to take it.
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The sergeant then took Edwards’s jacket, which was wrapped around a “hard
object,” and the deputy handcuffed Edwards. The sergeant unwrapped the jacket and found
a black plastic lockbox. He testified that he suspected the box contained contraband and
possibly a weapon. The sergeant opened the box, which was later determined to contain
more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The box also contained substances suspected
to be 1.1 grams of cocaine, 17 Adderall pills, and 27 alprazolam pills, but these substances
were not confirmed with lab testing. Jail staff also obtained text messages Schell and
Edwards exchanged during the time Edwards was at the impound lot, which appear to
discuss the location of an item concealed within the vehicle:
Edwards: What part of the front?!
Schell: Passager [sic] front fender move that rag
Schell: It’s tucked in there nice babe you will see it god I hope
you get it out safe

Based on the additional contraband found in the lockbox, the state charged Schell
with one count of first -degree possession of a controlled substance in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), one count of aiding and abetting a first-degree
controlled-substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1), 609.05,
subd. 1 (2020), and three counts of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2020). Schell moved to suppress the
evidence discovered in the lockbox, arguing that “[t]he forceful taking, opening, and search
of the locked box was an unlawful search and seizure of property without a warrant.” The
district court found that the search of the lockbox was supported by probable cause under
the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and denied the
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motion to dismiss. Schell thereafter stipulated to the state’s evidence and preserved for
appeal the issue of whether the search and seizure of the lockbox was constitutional. The
district court found Schell guilty of the first-degree controlled-substance offenses and
sentenced him to 110 months in prison.
Schell appeals.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence?

ANALYSIS
“When reviewing a pretrial motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d
32, 36 (Minn. 2021) (quoting State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 2020)).
Schell argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence
found in the lockbox that Edwards removed from his vehicle because the sergeant did not
have probable cause to search it pursuant to the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement. We are not persuaded.
“Unreasonable searches and seizures” are prohibited by the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “The
touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in
all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”
State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)).
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A warrantless search is “per se unreasonable.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496,
502 (Minn. 2008). “A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless it
satisfies one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Lester,
874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). One recognized exception is the
“automobile exception,” which allows a warrantless search of a vehicle if officers “have
probable cause to believe the search will result in a discovery of evidence or contraband.”
State v. Search, 472 N.W.2d 850, 852 (Minn. 1991) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982)). Individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle than they
would in a home or office, and the warrant requirements are accordingly less stringent. See
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). The mobile nature of vehicles can
create situations in which “an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to
secure the illicit substance.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999) (quoting
Ross, 456 U.S. at 806-07).
Schell does not contest the validity of the initial search and seizure of his vehicle,
and we observe that law enforcement was authorized to search the vehicle “and its contents,
including all containers and packages” that may have concealed firearms or controlled
substances, at the time of his arrest on March 13 pursuant to the automobile exception.
Ross, 456 U.S. at 799; see also State v. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d 682, 688 (Minn. 2023)
(holding that, pursuant to Ross and its progeny, law enforcement may search “closed
containers” in a vehicle if there is probable cause to search that vehicle for contraband).
As there is also no dispute that Edwards had removed the lockbox from the vehicle
immediately prior to its discovery and search, the state’s principal argument is that the
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search was justified by the automobile exception because law enforcement had probable
cause to search the vehicle and its contents, which included the lockbox, when the lockbox
was still inside of it. 1 Schell argues that the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement did not apply because probable cause to believe the lockbox contained
contraband did not arise until after the lockbox had already been removed from the vehicle.
We conclude that the district court did not err by denying Schell’s motion to
suppress evidence because (1) the initial search and impoundment of the vehicle was
lawful, (2) the vehicle remained impounded at the time Edwards removed the lockbox from
the engine area of the vehicle, (3) the delay between the vehicle’s impoundment and the
search of the lockbox did not otherwise implicate Fourth Amendment concerns, and (4) the
lockbox constituted a container in the vehicle such that the original probable cause
supported law enforcement’s search of the lockbox.
Delay in Search of Schell’s Vehicle and Its Contents
Probable cause to search Schell’s vehicle continued to exist after law enforcement
impounded it. The United States Supreme Court has determined that probable cause to
search a vehicle does not expire when it is impounded: “[O]fficers may conduct a
warrantless search of the vehicle even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.”
Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970)). And in United States v. Johns, the Court held that a lawful warrantless search can

1 The state argues in the alternative that the search of the lockbox was authorized by
additional exceptions to the warrant requirement. Because we conclude that the automobile
exception justified the search of the lockbox, we do not address the state’s alternative
arguments.
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remain reasonable when an impounded vehicle or its contents are not searched immediately
and that “[t]here is no requirement that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur
contemporaneously with its lawful seizure.” 469 U.S. 478, 484, 487-88 (1985).
In Johns, U.S. Customs officials seized two pickup trucks pursuant to a
drug-smuggling investigation. Id. at 481. They removed packages from the trucks and
placed them in a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) warehouse, and government
agents did not inspect those packages until three days later. Id. The Court held that the
agents had probable cause and that “the warrantless search three days after the packages
were placed in the DEA warehouse was reasonable.” Id. at 487. The Johns Court noted
that there is no specific temporal limitation on a warrantless search that is justified by
probable cause, id. at 484-85, and cited a footnote in Ross that states that “if an immediate
search on the street is permissible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter at the police
station is permissible if the vehicle is impounded,” 456 U.S. at 807 n.9. The Court said the
delay cannot be indefinite and cited, with approval, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,
61-62 (1967), which held that a search of an automobile occurring a week after it was
seized pending forfeiture was reasonable. Johns, 469 U.S. at 487-88.
Here, the time between the original impoundment of Schell’s vehicle and the
discovery of the lockbox was six days . The parties do not dispute that the impoundment
of the vehicle was lawful or that it remained in the exclusive care and custody of law
enforcement prior to the removal of the lockbox. And there is no reason apparent from the
record to suspect that the warrantless search of the vehicle became less reasonable during
that time. See id. at 487 (noting that there was no evidence in that case that the delay
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“adversely affected legitimate [privacy or possessory] interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment”). We therefore reach a similar conclusion. Because law enforcement had
probable cause to search Schell’s vehicle for weapons and controlled substances at the time
it was impounded, the vehicle remained in the exclusive custody and control of law
enforcement following impoundment, and no facts or circumstances suggest that probable
cause to believe the vehicle contained additional contraband was dispelled during
impoundment, we hold that law enforcement was authorized under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement to search Schell’s vehicle—as well as any containers
within it that could conceal weapons or controlled substances—at the time Edwards arrived
at the impound lot to remove property from the vehicle.
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Search of the Lockbox
Having concluded that a search of Schell’s vehicle was lawful under the automobile
exception because it was based on probable cause that continued to exist at the time
Edwards visited the impound lot, we next determine whether this authorization extended
to the search of the lockbox that Edwards removed from the engine compartment.
Schell argues that the search authorized by the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement could not include the lockbox because the lockbox was seized and searched
outside of the vehicle “after it had been fully removed and wrapped in [Edwards’s] jacket.”
Schell asserts that “once a closed container is removed from the vehicle by its owner, the

2 Even assuming, without deciding, that fresh probable cause was needed to support an
additional search of the vehicle, we observe that the totality of circumstances supports the
conclusion that law enforcement had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained
additional contraband or evidence of a crime.
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automobile exception no longer applies and the police again require a warrant to search
that container.” Schell is incorrect.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held that police are permitted to search any
container that was inside a vehicle at a time when there was probable cause to search that
vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d at 688. In Barrow,
police stopped a car for a lane-change violation and, upon smelling the odor of marijuana
inside, ordered the driver and passenger out of the car in order to search it. Id . at 684.
Upon exiting the car, the passenger—Barrow —attempted to take her purse with her. Id.
An officer returned Barrow’s purse to the inside of the car and searched it along with the
interior of the car. Id. Inside the purse, the officer found a controlled substance for which
Barrow did not have a prescription. Id. Barrow moved to suppress the evidence obtained
from the search of her purse, arguing that the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement did not apply because the purse was an extension of her person rather than a
container within the car. Id.
The supreme court rejected Barrow’s claim that her purse was legally
distinguishable from any other container within a vehicle and affirmed the search of the
purse: “Because Barrow’s purse is a container that was inside the car at the time probable
cause arose, and her purse could contain marijuana, the officer was permitted to search the
purse under the automobile exception.” Id. at 688. Although Barrow did not specifically
argue that her removal of her purse from the car exempted it from a search pursuant to the
automobile exception, the court’s articulation of the applicable law nevertheless wholly
resolves the question here. Because the parties do not assert, and there is no reason to
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believe, that the lockbox had not been inside the vehicle continuously since the time it was
impounded, the lockbox—like the purse in Barrow— is a container that was inside the
vehicle at the time when probable cause to search the vehicle arose and that could contain
a firearm or controlled substances. Thus, like the police in Barrow, the sergeant here was
permitted to search the lockbox under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
That Edwards had removed this container from the vehicle immediately prior to the
sergeant seizing and searching it is irrelevant to this analysis. 3 Indeed, adopting Schell’s
position would lead to the absurd result of permitting an occupant of a vehicle to prevent
law enforcement from searching a container that would otherwise be subject to search
under the automobile exception merely by successfully removing it from the vehicle.
Accordingly, we reject it.
Similarly irrelevant is whether the sergeant needed independent probable cause to
believe the lockbox itself contained contraband after it was removed from the vehicle.
Schell provides no authority for the proposition that additional probable cause
particularized to a given container is required before that container may be searched outside
of the vehicle in which it was located. Rather, precedent makes clear that authorization to
search a container within a vehicle is derived from there being probable cause to believe

3 In support of his argument in this regard, Schell cites two nonprecedential opinions of
this court in which we concluded that the warrantless search of a container that had been
removed from a vehicle was not permitted under the automobile exception. State v.
Khampanyavong, No. A12-0449 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2012); State v. Millers,
No. C6-02-1016 (Minn. App. Dec. 10, 2002). These cases are inapposite, however,
because in neither case did law enforcement have probable cause to search the vehicle at
the time the container was inside of that vehicle.
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that the vehicle contains evidence or contraband and that the container “could” contain the
items for which probable cause to search exists. Barrow, 989 N.W.2d at 688. Because
both of these elements are satisfied here, the warrantless search of the lockbox was
permissible.
DECISION
The district court properly denied Schell’s motion to suppress evidence. Because
law enforcement had probable cause to believe that Schell’s vehicle contained firearms or
controlled substances at the time it was impounded, because the vehicle remained in the
exclusive custody and control of law enforcement following impoundment, and because
no facts or circumstances suggest that probable cause had been dispelled or that the search
had otherwise become less reasonable in the six days following the vehicle’s seizure, the
sergeant was permitted to search the lockbox that Edwards removed from the vehicle
pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Affirmed.