James Paul Aery, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1123

James Paul Aery,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 27, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Chief Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CV-22-2009

James Paul Aery, Bemidji, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

David Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
SYLLABUS
A petition for an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration
under Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (202 2)1 is a postconviction proceeding for which no filing fee
or order granting in forma pauperis status is required.

1 We use the current 2022 version of the statutes throughout because the statutes have not
been modified during the pendency of this matter.
2
OPINION
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his application for in forma
pauperis (IFP) status to bring a civil action seeking an order declaring him eligible for
compensation based on exoneration under Minn. Stat. § 590.11. Because a petition for an
order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration is a postconviction
proceeding for which no filing fee or order granting IFP status is required, we reverse the
district court’s denial of appellant’s IFP application and remand this matter to the district
court.
FACTS
Appellant James Aery was convicted of fifth-degree controlled -substance crime.
This court reversed the conviction, concluding that the search of Aery was unlawful and
that the evidence of the methamphetamine found on Aery’s person during the search should
have been suppressed. State v. Aery, No. A19-1845, 2020 WL 7134872 (Minn. App. Dec.
7, 2020). Respondent State of Minnesota did not seek further review.
Aery later filed a document with the district court using a judicial branch form titled
“Civil Complaint.”
2 Aery stated that he is seeking compensation under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, which governs determinations of eligibility for compensation based on

2 Before Aery filed the Civil Complaint, he submitted to the district court a motion in the
criminal file titled a “motion for compensation under MIERA [the Minnesota Incarceration
and Exoneration Remedies Act],” referencing Minn. Stat. § 590.11. Aery asked the district
court administrator to serve counsel for the state via the district court’s electronic service
system. The district court administrator returned Aery’s correspondence for failure to serve
counsel for the state. No further action has been taken on that submission.
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exoneration. Aery alleged in the complaint that he was wrongfully arrested in the
controlled-substance case, that his conviction was only reversed after he had served his full
21-month sentence, an d that he is seeking $100,000 for the time he was incarcerated,
$100,000 for “mental emotional physical dental damages,” and $100,000 for “occupational
education[al], societal, familial damages.” The district court administrator opened a new
district court file for the Civil Complaint, separate from the criminal file in the controlled-
substance case.
Along with the Civil Complaint , Aery filed a signed affidavit to proceed IFP, in
which he indicated that he is represented by a public defender in a separate matter, he has
no income, and he is an “incarcerated indigent.” The district court denied Aery’s
application for IFP status on the ground that the action was frivolous because Aery was in
custody on an unrelated criminal case at the same time he was in custody for the controlled-
substance case. Aery appeals the denial of his IFP application.
ISSUE
Does a petition for an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on
exoneration under Minn. Stat. § 590.11 require a filing fee or an order granting IFP status?
ANALYSIS
Aery argues that the district court erred when it denied his IFP application because
“[a] good faith claim based on law does exist” under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 7, and the
district court dismissed his IFP application “ without a thorough review of the files and
records.” The state responds that the district court properly denied Aery’s IFP application
because the underlying claim for relief is frivolous. We do not reach the issue of whether
4
Aery’s action is frivolous, however, because we determine that Aery’s claim is properly
construed as a postconviction proceeding for which no filing fee or order to proceed IFP is
required.3
A district court may authorize commencement of a civil action without payment of
fees and costs upon a finding that the plaintiff is eligible for IFP status, which requires a
determination that the action is not frivolous, and that the plaintiff is financially unable to
pay fees and costs. Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 3(a), (b) (2022). This court reviews a
district court’s decision to deny IFP status for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scheffler,
932 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Minn. App. 2019). Whether a filing fee or order granting IFP status

3 We note that, while neither party addressed the issue of whether a filing fee is required in
a proceeding under section 590.11, this is one of those rare cases where we nevertheless
deem it appropriate to address this question in the interests of justice. See Minn. R. Civ.
App. P. 103.04; 3 Erica A. Holzer & Katherine S. Barrett Wiik, Minnesota Practice
§ 103.16 (2022 ed. 2022) (“In exceptional circumstances, the appellate court may also
decide a case based on a legal issue even though the district court did not base its decision
on that theory, and the issue was not even briefed by the parties.”). We address this issue
because it involves a threshold question that is purely legal in nature and does not cause
prejudice to either party. On remand, Aery can pursue his arguments that he is eligible for
exoneration compensation and the state will have full opportunity to contest Aery’s claim.
In addition, the issue involves a straightforward interpretation of a statute recently
construed by the supreme court in Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 2022). See
also State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 n.5 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that even though
neither party sought review of an issue, “[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in
criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice
errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise
seriously affect the fitness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”
(quotation omitted)); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (stating
“it is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that
responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel’s oversights, lack of research, failure to
specify issues or to cite relevant authorities” (quotation omitted)); Jerry Mathison Constr.,
Inc. v. Binsfield, 615 N.W.2d 378, 381-82 (Minn. App. 2000) (applying a legal theory not
briefed or argued on appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000).
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is required, however, is a legal question we review de novo. See Smith v. State, 615 N.W.2d
849, 851 (Minn. App. 2000) (“Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to
de novo review.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).
In addressing that legal question, we begin our analysis with the premise that n o
filing fee is required for postconviction proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 590.02, subd. 2 (2022)
(“The filing of the petition and any document subsequent thereto and all proceedings
thereon shall be without costs or any fees charged to the petitioner.”). Thus, if Aery’s Civil
Complaint should have been construed as a postconviction proceeding, Aery would not be
required to pay a filing fee or obtain an IFP order. The denial of his IFP application would
therefore need to be reversed and this matter remanded for consideration as a
postconviction proceeding in the criminal file.
“The exoneration- compensation statute . . . establishes a framework for
compensating individuals who have served time in prison after a wrongful conviction.”
Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 2017). A petition seeking an order declaring
eligibility for compensation based on exoneration “must be brought before the district court
where the original conviction was obtained” and “the state must be represented by the
office of the prosecutor that obtained the conviction.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2. The
statute sets out grounds for obtaining a declaration of eligibility for exoneration, including
whether the petitioner’s judgment of conviction was vacated, reversed, or set aside on
grounds consistent with factual innocence. Id., subds. 1, 3. If found eligible, a claim for
compensation arises so long as several conditions are met, including that the petitioner
“was not serving a term of incarceration for another crime at the same time,” unless the
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petitioner served additional time in confinement as a consequence of the offense for which
he was exonerated. Id., subd. 5.
The supreme court recently interpreted section 590.11 in Kingbird. There, the
supreme court addressed the question of whether the two-year time bar for bringing a
petition for exoneration compensation under “Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2, is a
jurisdictional bar to review if a petition is not timely filed, or if that deadline is subject to
waiver.” Kingbird, 973 N.W.2d at 637. To answer that question, the supreme court looked
to the two-year time bar applicable to petitions for postconviction relief set out in Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2022), for challenging a judgment of conviction or sentence. Id. at
640. The court noted that subdivision 3(b) of section 590.11 expressly incorporates the
procedures for postconviction hearings set out in Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2022). The
supreme court thus reasoned that the two-year time bar for exoneration-compensation
claims is not jurisdictional and can be waived by the state the same as the two- year time
bar for bringing postconviction petitions can be waived under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4.
Id. at 640-41.
We observe that section 590.11 also incorporates other procedures in chapter 590,
the chapter governing postconviction relief. For example, the section incorporates by
reference the burden of proof and procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3.
Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3(b). And like a postconviction petitioner, an exoneration -
compensation petitioner is entitled to a hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and
records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is not eligible for
compensation.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 6; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022)
7
(stating that “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the court shall promptly set an early hearing
on the petition”). As another example, section 590.11 references Minn. Stat. § 590.06
(2022) as providing the authority for a petitioner to appeal an order under Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 3(b). Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 8.
Because section 590.11 is not only in the chapter govern ing postconviction
proceedings, but also expressly references postconviction procedures as applying to the
determination of eligibility for exoneration compensation, we conclude that a petition for
an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration is a type of
postconviction petition. The district court is, therefore, required to “liberally construe” the
petition—as it must do in postconviction proceedings —and to “look to the substance
thereof and waive any irregularities or defects in form.” Minn. Stat. § 590.03 (202 2).
Although Aery submitted a document titled “Civil Complaint” to the district court, his
submissions indicate he is seeking an order for a declaration of eligibility under section
590.11, for which no filing fee is required. The district court thus erred by construing his
filing as a civil matter and by denying the application for IFP status.
We reverse and remand with directions to consider Aery’s Civil Complaint seeking
a declaration of eligibility for exoneration compensation as a postconviction proceeding in
the criminal file. Under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 3(b), the district court must then
determine, as a threshold issue, whether Aery was “exonerated.” See Kingbird, 973
N.W.2d at 641. We express no opinion on the merits of that question.

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DECISION
The district court erred in denying Aery’s application for IFP status because a
petition for an order declaring eligibility for compensation based on exoneration under
section 590.11 is a postconviction proceeding for which no filing fee or order granting IFP
status is required. On remand, the district court shall direct the district court administrator
to transfer the Civil Complaint filed on June 22, 2022, to the criminal file where it shall be
treated as a timely postconviction petition seeking an order declaring eligibility for
compensation based on exoneration under section 590.11.
Reversed and remanded.