Jeremy Michael Kilde, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1138

Jeremy Michael Kilde,
Appellant,

vs.

Coon Rapids Chief of Police John Stahnke,
Respondent.

Filed May 15, 2023
Reversed; writ of mandamus issued
Bjorkman, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-21-5800

Justin J. Duffy, John J. Leunig, The Law Office of John J. Leunig, Bloomington, Minnesota
(for appellant)

David Brodie, Coon Rapids City Attorney, Blair Buccicone, Assistant City Attorney, Coon
Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s partial denial of his petition for a writ of
mandamus to require respondent to issue him a transferee permit to purchase a firearm.
Because neither Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 3(e) (2020), nor Minn. Stat. § 624 .713,
2
subd. 1(12) (2020), prohibit appellant from possessing a firearm, we reverse the district
court and grant appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
FACTS
In June 2012, appellant Jeremy Kilde was convicted of domestic assault ( harm)
following an altercation with his brother. Seventeen months later, Kilde was convicted of
domestic assault (fear) stemming from an incident involving his girlfriend. Both of Kilde’s
convictions were misdemeanors under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1 (2020). In
November 2021—eight years after his second domestic-assault conviction—Kilde applied
for a transferee permit. Respondent Coon Rapids Police Chief (the chief) denied his
application, reasoning that Kilde is ineligible under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2018) because
he has been convicted of domestic assault.
Kilde petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus requiring the chief to issue
him a transferee permit. He argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) does not apply when the
victim is a sibling and does not apply to fear-based domestic-assault convictions. The chief
opposed the petition, citing Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 3(e), which renders ineligible a
person convicted of domestic assault “unless three years have elapsed since the date of
conviction and, during that time, the person has not been convicted of” another domestic
assault. The chief argued that, because Kilde was convicted of two domestic-assault
offenses within three years, he is ineligible to possess a firearm for the rest of his life. Kilde
responded that the Minnesota statute only rendered him ineligible for the three years
following his latest conviction.
3
The district court granted Kilde’s petition in part and denied it in part. It agreed
with Kilde that the federal prohibition does not apply to him under the circumstances of
his two domestic-assault convictions. And it noted that because Kilde’s convictions
occurred after August 1, 1992, and before August 1, 20 14, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 3(e), could only make him ineligible to possess a pistol—not any other firearm. But
the district court concluded the statute did just that because Kilde had two domestic-assault
convictions within three years.
Kilde appeals.
DECISION
Kilde is entitled to mandamus relief only if the chief had a duty clearly imposed by
law to issue a transferee permit. See, e.g., Spann v. Minneapolis City Council, 979 N.W.2d
66, 78 (Minn. 2022). Whether the chief had such a duty turns on Kilde’s eligibility to
possess a firearm 1—a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Tapia
v. Leslie, 950 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Minn. 2020). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to “ascertain
and effectuate” the legislature’s intent. State. v. Bowen, 921 NW.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted). The first step is to determine whether the language of the statute is
ambiguous. State v. Townsend, 941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020). When determining
whether statutory language is ambiguous, we construe words and phrases “according to
their common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2022). W e consider the

1 Although we acknowledge that Kilde could only be ineligible to possess a pistol under
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 3(e), because Minn. Stat. § 624.713 (2020) addresses
eligibility for any firearm, we use the term “firearm” throughout for ease of reference.
4
whole statute, not simply the disputed language, giving effect to all its provisions and
avoiding conflicting interpretations and absurd results . Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl,
616 N.W.2d 273, 277-78 (Minn. 2000). If the statute is susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation, it is unambiguous, and its plain language controls. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781
N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010). But if a statute is subject to two reasonable interpretations,
the next step is to “look to other tools to interpret its meaning.” City of Circle Pines v.
County of Anoka, 977 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Minn. 2022).
We begin our analysis with an overview of the relevant statutory provisions.
Minnesotans may apply for a transferee permit by submitting a written application to the
“chief of police of an organized full time police department of the municipality” in which
the applicant resides. Minn. Stat. § 624.7131 , subd. 1 (2020). A police chief may only
deny such an application if the applicant is ineligible under section 624.713. Id., subd. 4
(2020).
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1, provides 13 categories of persons who are ineligible
to possess a firearm. One of these categories is
a person who has been convicted of a violation of section
609.224 [fifth-degree assault] if the court determined that the
assault was against a family or household member in
accordance with section 609.2242, subdivision 3 (domestic
assault), unless three years have elapsed since the date of
conviction and, during that time, the person has not been
convicted of another violation of section 609.224 or a violation
of [other sections not at issue here].

Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(12). The referenced domestic-assault statute contains
almost identical language:
5
Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (c), a person
is not entitled to possess a pistol if the person has been
convicted after August 1, 1992, or a firearm if a person has
been convicted on or after August 1, 2014, of domestic assault
under this section or assault in the fifth degree under section
609.224 and the assault victim was a family or household
member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, unless
three years have elapsed from the date of conviction and,
during that time, the person has not been convicted of any other
violation of this section or section 609.224.

Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 3(e).
These statutes also designate which categories of persons are subject to lifetime or
indeterminate periods of ineligibility. One such category is persons who are convicted of
assaulting a family or household member while using a firearm. Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 3(c) (2020). A court may, at its discretion, prohibit such persons “from possessing
any type of firearm for any period longer than three years or for the remainder of the
person’s life.” Id. Another category is persons “convicted of, or adjudicated delinquent or
convicted as an extended jurisdiction juvenile for committing, in this state or elsewhere, a
crime of violence.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2).
2 These persons are automatically
subject to a “lifetime prohibition on possessing, receiving, shipping, or transporting
firearms and ammunition.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1.

2 A “crime of violence” is defined as a felony conviction for enumerated offenses and
attempts to commit those felony offenses. Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2020). It is
undisputed that Kilde’s conviction offenses are not crimes of violence as defined in this
statute.
6
Kilde argues that the district court erred by interpreting Minn. Stat. § 609.2242,
subd. 3(e), to create another category of persons who are subject to lifetime ineligibility:
persons who are convicted of two or more misdemeanor domestic assaults within three
years.3 Kilde contends that this statute and companion statute Minn. Stat. § 624.713,
subd. 1(12), impose a three-year ineligibility period that runs from the date of the last
conviction. Under Kilde’s proposed interpretation, his three-year ineligibility period
“started over” when he was convicted of his second domestic-assault offense in 2013 and
expired long before he applied for a transferee permit. Kilde asserts that when the
legislature intends either an automatic or discretionary lifetime prohibition it explicitly
authorizes one, and when the legislature did not, it cannot be read into the statute. See State
v. C.W.N., 906 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. App. 2018) (declining to read a lifetime
prohibition into an expungement statute when the legislature did not use such “restrictive
language”).

3 Kilde also asserts that the district court erred by denying his application under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 3(e), because Minn. Stat. § 624.713 is the only valid basis for a police
chief to deny a transferee permit. The express terms of section 624.713 defeat this
argument. Subdivision 1 includes in its 13 categories of ineligible persons “a person who
has been convicted of a violation of section 609.224 if the court determined that the assault
was against a family or household member in accordance with section 609.2242,
subdivision 3 (domestic assault).” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(12). Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 3 (2020), is incorporated into Minn. Stat. § 624.713, just as is 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2018).
7
The chief contends that Kilde’s eligibility to possess a pistol is governed by Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, under which he is subject to a lifetime prohibition because he had two
domestic-assault convictions within three years. He argues that all ineligible persons
identified in subdivision 1 are subject to lifetime or indeterminate ineligibility “unless there
is an enumerated mechanism to regain the ability to possess firearms.” He specifically
points to subdivision 1(10) as creating lifetime ineligibility without expressly stating the
intent to do so.
We note that the proper focus of our analysis is section 624.713, which provides the
sole basis on which a transferee permit may be denied. Minn. Stat. § 624.7131, subd. 4.
Section 624.713’s relevant provision, subdivision 1(12), mirrors the relevant language of
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 3(e). Construing the terms of subdivision 1(12) according
to their common meaning supports Kilde’s interpretation. And reading subdivision 1(12)
in the context of section 624.713 as a whole further persuades us that only Kilde’s
interpretation—under which the three- year ineligibi lity period runs from his last
conviction—is reasonable and effectuates the legislature’s intent for two reasons.
First, the language of subdivision 1(12) itself does not support a lifetime prohibition.
A person is ineligible to possess a firearm “unless three years have elapsed since the date
of conviction and, during that time, the person has not been convicted of another violation.”
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(12). This language does not distinguish between a first,
second, or subsequent domestic-assault conviction. Rather, it establishes a three-year
ineligibility period that begins when a conviction is entered. Adopting the chief’s assertion
that a person who reoffends within three years of a conviction may never again be eligible
8
requires us to add words to the statute. We cannot add to a statute what “the legislature
purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks.” State v. Christensen, 901 N.W.2d 648, 653
(Minn. App. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Second, reading the provisions of subdivision 1 as a whole supports Kilde’s
interpretation. As noted above, only one of the 13 provisions creating categories of
ineligible persons imposes—by its terms—a n automatic lifetime period of ineligibility :
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2). The legislature expressly stated that this category of
persons (those who committed a crime of violence) are subject to a “lifetime prohibition.”
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1. Eleven of the remaining provisions, including the provision
at issue here, limit the person’s ineligibility to a particular period of time or until a
particular set of circumstances occur. 4 In other words, the legislature knew how to make
a person ineligible to possess a firearm for the rest of their life but chose not to do so with
respect to persons in Kilde’s position.
The chief’s attempts to convince us otherwise are unavailing. Adopting the chief’s
interpretation would require us to ignore that the legislature knew how to authorize a

4 See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(1) (imposing conditions on eligibility until a person
reaches the age of 18), 1(3) (providing for restoration of eligibility under subdivision 4),
1(4) (providing for restoration of eligibility after three years have elapsed, or under
subdivision 4), 1(5) (providing for restoration of eligibility upon completion of treatment
or under subdivision 4), 1(6) (providing for restoration of eligibility upon discharge or
provisional discharge from treatment), 1(7) (providing for restoration of eligibility upon
completion of diversion program and the dismissal of charges), 1(8) (providing for
restoration of eligibility after three years have elapsed), 1(9) (providing for restoration of
eligibility after a period determined by the sentencing court), 1(11) (providing for
restoration of eligibility after three years have elapsed), 1(13) (providing for restoration of
eligibility after an order for protection expires).
9
lifetime prohibition and did not do so in the context of persons who commit misdemeanor
domestic assault without a firearm. The chief cites subdivision 1(10) for the proposition
that silence as to the duration of ineligibility means the legislature intended a lifetime
prohibition. But the clauses in subdivision 1(10) simply incorporate 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
which the legislature had no authority to change. And it is undisputed that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g), when it applies, imposes a lifetime prohibition.5
In sum, we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(12), is unambiguous and
provides that a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault is ineligible to possess
a firearm until three years has passed since their last conviction. It does not create a lifetime
prohibition for a person who is convicted of two misdemeanor domestic assaults within a
three-year period. Because Kilde did not have any such convictions after 2013, he was
eligible for a transferee permit when he applied for it in 2021.
6 Accordingly, we reverse

5 We note also that the chief’s interpretation appears inconsistent with the ability of persons
convicted of a felony crime of violence to seek relief upon restoration of their civil rights.
Under the chief’s interpretation, persons convicted of two misdemeanor domestic assaults
within a three-year period would have no recourse by which to ever regain their eligibility
to possess a firearm while persons convicted of felony crimes of violence—including first-
degree murder— may petition a court to restore their eligibility under Minn. Stat. § 609.165,
subd. 1d (2020).

6 The chief contends that the district court erred by concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
does not prohibit Kilde from possessing a firearm. We disagree. Because Kilde’s 2013
domestic-assault (fear) conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1), did not involve
the use of physical force, the federal prohibition does not apply. See United States v.
Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 168-71 (2014) (holding that a conviction qualifies as a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) when the use of
physical force is an element of the conviction); see also United States v. Larson, 13
F. App’x 439, 439-40 (8th Cir. 2001) (“It is undisputed that only [domestic-assault (harm)
under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2)] satisfies ‘the use or attempted use of physical
force’ element required . . . under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).”).
10
the district court’s partial denial and grant Kilde’s petition for a writ of mandamus ordering
the chief to issue him a transferee permit. See Tapia, 950 N.W.2d at 63-65 (granting
petition for writ of mandamus to issue a permit to carry where petitioner was not ineligible).
Reversed; writ of mandamus issued.