In re the Marriage of: Amanda Leigh Davis Floyd, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1148

In re the Marriage of:
Amanda Leigh Davis Floyd, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Michael Scott Floyd,
Respondent.

Filed May 15, 2023
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-18-4494

Michael D. Dittberner, Linder, Dittberner & McSweeney, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Michael P. Boulette, Seungwon R. Chung, O. Joseph Balthazor, Jr., Taft Stettinius &
Hollister LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order terminating her spousal
maintenance award upon her remarriage. Cross-appellant-father challenges the district
court’s above-guidelines child-support order and award of need-based attorney fees to
2
mother. Because the parties did not expressly waive the right to terminate spousal
maintenance upon remarriage, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
child support and attorney fees, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2000, appellant-mother Amanda Leigh Davis and cross-appellant-father
Michael Scott Floyd married.1 They had three children during their marriage. In 2018, the
parties petitioned for dissolution of the marriage. In June 2019, mother and father engaged
in a moderated settlement conference. At the end of the settlement conference, the parties
read stipulated terms into the record. In November 2019, the district court entered a
stipulated judgment and decree. The stipulated judgment and decree provided that father
would pay mother spousal maintenance of $9,000 per month from July 1, 2019 through
June 30, 2025, and $7,000 per month from July 1, 2025 t hrough June 30, 2034. In July
2021, mother remarried. In December, father stopped paying maintenance.
In January 2022, mother served father with notice of a cost-of-living adjustment
(COLA). Father moved to deny the COLA because spousal maintenance terminated upon
mother’s remarriage. Father also moved for reimbursement of spousal-maintenance
overpayment. Mother moved to modify child support if spousal maintenance was
terminated and later moved for attorney fees. The district court denied mother’s request

1 We refer to appellant-mother by the name used in her brief: Amanda Leigh Davis. We
also note that the issues on appeal concern the parties in their capacities as husband and
wife and mother and father. We refer to appellant as “mother” and respondent as “father.”
3
for a COLA, terminated spousal maintenance, increased father’s child-support obligation,
and awarded mother need-based attorney fees.
Mother appealed and father filed a notice of related appeal.
DECISION
Mother argues that the district court erred by terminating spousal maintenance
because the parties waived rights to modify the duration or amount of spousal maintenance.
Alternatively, mother argues that the district court erred by declining to modify the
judgment and decree as a clerical error under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01. In his related appeal,
father argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering above-guidelines child
support in an amount greater than the needs of the children and in awarding mother need-
based attorney fees. We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not err by terminating spousal maintenance.
Mother argues that the district court erred by terminating spousal maintenance
because the parties agreed in the judgment and decree or otherwise in writing to waive the
statutory right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage. Alternatively, mother
argues that the district court could modify the judgment and decree as a correction of a
clerical error pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01. We address each argument in turn.
A. The parties did not expressly waive the right to terminate spousal
maintenance upon remarriage.

Minnesota law provides for the termination of spousal maintenance upon remarriage
of the party receiving maintenance . “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly
provided in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the
4
death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 3 (2022). As provided in the statute, this right may be waived. A waiver
of the right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage must be made by a clear
written expression appearing affirmatively in the judgment and decree or otherwise in
writing. See Gunderson v. Gunderson, 408 N.W.2d 852, 853-54 (Minn. 1987) (reasoning
that the statutory predecessor to Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3, which contained the same
language as the current statute, unambiguously required an affirmative expression of a
waiver of the right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage). This requirement
may be met by “clear written expressions of the parties’ intention in this regard as
ascertained from their agreement as a whole.” Telma v. Telma, 474 N.W.2d 322, 323
(Minn. 1991) (reasoning that an unequivocal waiver and other language in the judgment
and decree accounting for the termination of spousal maintenance upon events other than
the remarriage of a spouse showed that the agreement included a waiver of the right to
terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage). But a waiver of a statutory right must be
clear and may not be inferred. See Keating v. Keating, 444 N.W.2d 605, 607 -08 (Minn.
App. 1989) (stating that it is “not appropriate to infer waiver in the absence of a clear intent
to waive a statutorily conferred right”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 1989).
We consider a stipulated judgment and decree dissolving a marriage to be similar to
a contract for purposes of construction. Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn.
App. 2011). Whether a stipulated judgment and decree is ambiguous is a question of law
that we review de novo. Id. If the language of the stipulated jud gment and decree is
ambiguous, its meaning is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Tarlan v.
5
Sorenson, 702 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Minn. App. 2005). We give the language in the stipulated
judgment and decree its plain and ordinary meaning. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d at 872. And we
read contract provisions in the context of the entire contract, deriving the parties’ intent
from the whole document rather than the individual clauses. Country Club Oil Co. v. Lee,
58 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Minn. 1953).
The judgment and decree contains the following language:
Pursuant to the provisions of Minnesota Statutes section
518.552, subdivision 5, and consistent with the “Karon waiver”
provisions of Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989),
both parties hereby waive their right to bring spousal
maintenance modification motions to modify the amount or
duration of spousal maintenance as set forth herein.

(Emphasis added.) Such language is often referenced as a Karon waiver. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 518A.39, subd. 1 (granting a court authority to modify an order for maintenance),
518.552, subd. 5 (setting forth the requirements to waive the right to modification of
maintenance) (2022); Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Minn. 1989) (holding
such waivers to be valid); Grachek v. Grachek, 750 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn. App. 2008)
(noting that “[s]uch a waiver agreement is frequently referred to as a Karon waiver”), rev.
denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008). A Karon waiver does not necessarily include a waiver of
the right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage—a clear written expression
waiving the right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage is still required. See
Telma, 474 N.W.2d at 323 (reasoning that there was a clear expression of the waiver of the
right to terminate spousal maintenance where the waiver precluded the obligor from
seeking “modification of his obligation to pay maintenance, either as to amount or duration
6
or termination” and contained other language showing an intent to waive the termination
right (emphasis added)); see also Lewis v. Frane, No. A16-1517, 2017 WL 4341886, at *4
(Minn. App. Oct. 2, 2017) (recognizing that “the statutory right to maintenance termination
upon remarriage is separate and independent from the statutory right to modification based
on changed circumstances” and that “a Karon waiver generally is a waiver of the right to
maintenance modification”); Phillips v. LaPlante, No. A12- 1382, 2013 WL 2149906, at
*7 (Minn. App. May 20, 2013) (terminating spousal maintenance upon remarriage where
the judgment and decree included a Karon waiver), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013).2
The language in the judgment and decree is unambiguous. By its express terms,
the parties waived their right to bring a specific motion seeking specific relief, namely
“spousal maintenance modification motions” to “modify the amount or duration of spousal
maintenance.” There is no expression of any intent to waive the right to bring a spousal
maintenance termination motion or give up any other statutorily conferred right either party
may have upon the remarriage of the other party. In other words, the language in the
judgment and decree does not specifically and affirmatively waive the right to terminate
spousal maintenance upon remarriage, nor does it broadly or generally waive statutory
rights. See Telma, 474 N.W.2d at 323 (obligor waived “any right he may have under Minn.
Stat. § 518 (sic) and applicable case law to petition this Court for modification of his
obligation to pay maintenance, either as to amount or duration or termination” (emphasis
added)).

2 These nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority but cited for their persuasive
value. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
7
Mother generally asserts that the termination of maintenance is a modification to
the duration of maintenance and thus was expressly waived. The Minnesota Legislature
has categorized modification and termination of maintenance upon remarriage of the
receiving spouse as two separate and distinct things. Compare Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2 (2022) (setting forth the statutory requirements governing the modification of a
maintenance award), and Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5 (setting forth the requirements for
an effective waiver of the right to seek modification of a maintenance award), with Minn.
Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3 (stating that maintenance terminates upon remarriage of the
recipient and identifying requirements—separate from those in Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2 and Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 5 —for maintenance to continue beyond the
recipient’s remarriage). But even if we accept the idea that a termination of maintenance
is a type of modification of the maintenance award’s duration, and therefore is arguably
covered by the waiver of the right to seek to modify maintenance, we cannot avoid the fact
that (a) continuing maintenance beyond the recipient’s remarriage requires satisfaction of
Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3; and (b) this waiver in this judgment and decree does not
satisfy the express-statement requirement of Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3. Further, we
will not infer that the waiver of one statutory right under one provision—here, the right to
move to modify the duration of maintenance under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 1—
constitutes a waiver of another statutory right —here, the right to terminate maintenance
upon the recipient’s remarriage under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3. See Grachek, 750
N.W.2d at 333.
8
Mother also points to other language in the judgment and decree that (1) divested
the district court of jurisdiction over modification; (2) acknowledged that mother would be
self-supporting once mother was paid the “full” maintenance award; and (3) obligated
father to carry life insurance to secure his maintenance obligation. 3 Taken together, we
still are not persuaded that the judgment and decree as a whole includes a clear expression
of a waiver of the statutory right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage.
Mother contends that distinctions between the waiver in Lewis and the waiver here
are inconsequential. In Lewis, we reasoned that the parties’ agreement as a whole
constituted a clear written expression to waive the right to terminate support upon
remarriage of the receiving spouse. 2017 WL 4341886, at *3-5. In contrast to the waiver
here, Lewis involved broad language divesting the district court of jurisdiction. For
example, the parties in Lewis agreed that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
modify maintenance “regardless of any change in the parties[’] circumstances” and that
“the District Court will have no authority or power to consider any matter relating to
spousal maintenance between the parties.” Id. at *3. And the parties contemplated
termination of the spousal-maintenance award on a specific date. Id. at *3-5. Here, by
contrast, the parties agreed to divest the district court of jurisdiction to “ever modify” the
maintenance award and that the district court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the award.

3 Mother also points to the fact that father continued to pay spousal maintenance for a five-
month period after she remarried. We note that father’s decision to continue payments
could have been motivated by reasons other than that he waived his statutory right to
terminate spousal maintenance upon mother’s remarriage, such as avoiding potential
consequences for nonpayment. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.72, subd. 1 (2022) (setting forth
grounds for punishing a spouse in arrears in maintenance payments for contempt).
9
The language in the judgment and decree that mother would be considered self-supporting
once the temporary spousal payments were made establish only the temporary nature of
the award, not that maintenance would continue regardless of the statutory right of
termination upon remarriage. And the life-insurance language does not indicate that the
parties intended to waive the right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage and
instead shows only an intent to secure the spousal-maintenance award. We also note that
father was permitted to periodically decreas e the life-insurance benefit to reflect the
“present value of payable spousal maintenance.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, on the whole,
we do not discern that the judgment and decree sets forth an unambiguous, clear expression
of intent to waive the statutory right to terminate maintenance upon remarriage.
Finally, mother argues that a transcript of the parties’ June 2019 settlement
conference constitutes a clear expression waiving the termination right “otherwise . . . in
writing” under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 3. Assuming without deciding that such a
transcript could constitute a “writing” under the statute, we reject this argument for two
reasons.
First, the district court entered a judgment and decree based on the parties’
stipulation. And caselaw is clear that (a) a stipulation and any resulting judgment are
separate instruments; (b) to the extent a district court adopts and enters a judgment on a
stipulation of the spouses, the stipulation is “merged” into the resulting judgment; and
(c) as a result of that merger, the stipulation can no longer be a basis for seeking relief from
the judgment. See Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 -22 (Minn. 1997) (holding that
“when a judgment and decree is entered based upon a stipulation, we hold that the
10
stipulation is merged into the judgment and decree and the stipulation cannot thereafter be
the target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree”); see also
Toughill v. Toughill, 609 N.W.2d 634, 638 n.1 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that the district
court “has the authority to refuse to accept the terms of a stipulation in part or in toto”
(quotation omitted) ). Once the judgment and decree is entered, “the need for finality
becomes of central importance.” Shirk, 561 N.W.2d at 522. To grant relief from the
judgment now based on the stipulation would be contrary to this caselaw.
4
Second, the substance of the transcript does not contain a clear expression of a
waiver of the statutory right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage. The June
2019 transcript contains a recitation by mother’s attorney of the terms of the parties’
agreement. The attorney stated, “There will be a Karon waiver with respect to duration
and the amount; as a part of that, [mother] is allowed to remarry or cohabitate, that doesn’t
change the duration or the amount.” When questioned about his understanding of the
waiver by his attorney, father agreed that if mother won the lottery or he were hit by a bus,
he would still have to pay maintenance under the stipulated terms. Although mother’s
counsel mentioned remarriage or cohabitation, father did not expressly agree that he would
still be obligated to pay maintenance upon mother’s remarriage. Thus, we decline to say
that this transcript is a clear expression “otherwise . . . in writing.”

4 We are also hesitant to rely on a stipulation made prior to the entry of a stipulated
judgment and decree, particularly where, as here, the judgment and decree was entered five
months after the oral stipulation and contained terms other than those in the oral stipulation.
11
Neither the express terms of the waiver, nor the judgment and decree as a whole,
nor the June 2019 transcript contain a clear expression by the parties to waive the statutory
right to terminate spousal maintenance upon remarriage. This conclusion is consistent with
caselaw. The waiver of such a right must be clear, whether contained in waiver language
in the judgment and decree, the judgment and decree as a whole, or otherwise in writing.
See Telma, 474 N.W.2d at 323. And we will not infer the waiver of one statutory right
from the waiver of a distinct statutory right. See Grachek, 750 N.W.2d at 333. “Courts
encourage stipulations and enforce them with ‘the sanctity of binding contracts,’ ‘as a
means of simplifying and expediting litigation’ and ‘bring[ing] resolution’ to an
‘acrimonious relationship.’” Phillips, 2013 WL 2149906, at *2 (quoting Shirk, 561
N.W.2d at 521). But “[i]f courts ignored the specific language of a stipulated judgment
and decree in order to infer a broader waiver of rights, parties may be less willing to engage
in such stipulations in order to avoid the preclusion of rights for which they had not
bargained.” Id. at *8. We decline to infer that the parties waived the right to terminate
spousal maintenance upon remarriage where the plain, unambiguous language of the
decree or other writing contains no clear expression of such a waiver.
B. Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 does not apply to mother’s proposed modification
to the judgment and decree because there is no clerical error.

Mother alternatively argues that the district court could have employed Minn. R.
Civ. P. 60.01 to remedy “the omission of [father’s] obligation to pay spousal maintenance
regardless of [mother’s] remarriage” as a clerical error, and that the district court erred by
determining that Rule 60.01 does not apply to marital dissolution actions. We need not
12
address the applicability of Rule 60.01 because, even assuming the rule applies, mother’s
proposed modification would not correct a clerical error.
Rule 60.01 allows a district court to correct “[c]lerical mistakes in judgments,
orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission.”
A clerical error is distinguishable from a mistake by the parties, such as an error expressing
the parties’ intent. See Egge v. Egge, 361 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. App. 1985) (reasoning
there was no clerical error when an error “in division of the sale proceeds [was] not
arithmetic but rather formulaic, an error of the parties in expressing their basic intent”) .
Assuming that “the omission of [father’s] obligation to pay spousal maintenance regardless
of [mother’s] remarriage” is an error, that error is an error in the expression of the intent of
the parties. Because the requested relief was not available pursuant to Rule 60.01, the
district court did not err by declining to modify the judgment and decree on this basis.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering child support.
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering father to pay
child support in an amount exceeding the presumptively appropriate guidelines child-
support amount. He asserts that the district court’s findings were not supported by the
record, that the district court impermissibly ordered child support as a substitute for spousal
maintenance, and that the findings did not justify the upward deviation in his support
obligation.
5

5 The district court found that the parties agreed that if spousal maintenance were
terminated, father’s child-support obligation should meet the guidelines, and deemed that
one of the parties’ children was still eligible for support despite reaching age 18. See Minn.
Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 5 (2022) (defining “[c]hild” as “an individual under 18 years of age,
13
In determining whether to deviate from the guidelines support amount calculated
under Minn. Stat. § 518A.34 (2022), a district court must consider that presumptively
appropriate amount and calculation factors and certain other factors regarding the financial
circumstances of the parties and the financial needs of the child. Minn. Stat. § 518A.43,
subd. 1 (2022) (addressing the setting of a support obligation in an amount deviating from
the presumptively appropriate guidelines amount). These deviation factors include, among
other things, “all earnings, income, circumstances, and resources of each parent, including
real and personal property” and “the standard of living the child would enjoy if the parents
were currently living together, but recognizing that the parents now have separate
households.” Id., subd. 1(1), (3). If a district court sets a support obligation at an amount
deviating from the guidelines amount, the district court’s findings must include, in part,
“the reasons for the deviation.” Haefele v. Haefele, 837 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. 2013)
(quoting Minn. Stat. § 518A.37, subd. 2(4) -(5)). We review a district court order
modifying child support for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 708. “A district court abuses its
discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying
the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.
Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Mother moved the district court to order child support “equal to the guidelines
amount plus an additional $9,000 per month if maintenance is deemed terminated” so that

an individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary school, or an individual who,
by reason of physical or mental condition, is incapable of self-support”). The district court
calculated the child-support amount based on support for two children. Father appeals only
the district court’s order to pay child support above the guidelines amount.
14
the children would “not [be] negatively impacted by a reduced standard of living” in her
household. The district court found that mother’s gross monthly income was $4,899 and
father’s gross monthly income was $46,824. It found that mother alleged “current
reasonable monthly expenses of over $14,000,” including expenses attributable to the
children, and that several aspects of the children’s lives—housing, extracurricular
activities, mobility, homework, and leisure time—would be “adversely affected” without
an upward deviation in child support. The district court found that monthly expenses
attributable to the children totaled $5,184.63.6 The district court also found that $2,000 of
the expenses mother attributed to the children that were related to the home—where
mother, the children, and mother’s current husband live —and should be allocated to
mother’s new husband. The district court determined that father’s net guidelines child-
support obligation was $2,377 per month and that a $2,000 upward deviation was
appropriate, making father’s total child-support obligation $4,377 per month. The district
court reasoned that an upward deviation was justified by “the standard of living the parties’
would have had if they had remained married; the disparity in the parents’ earnings; and
the financial resources of the parties.” On this record, we cannot say that these findings
are clearly erroneous. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating that findings of fact are not set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous); In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d
214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (discussing the clear-error standard of review, and stating,

6 The sum of the expenses attributable to the children listed in the table provided in the
district court’s order is $5,534.36. Mother’s affidavit states that the expenses for each child
are at least $2,500.
15
among other things that “an appellate court need not go into an extended discussion of the
evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the [district] court”
(quotation omitted)); Bayer v. Bayer , 979 N.W.2d 507, 513 (Minn. App. 2022) (citing
Kenney in a family-law appeal).
We are not persuaded that the district court substituted child support for spousal
maintenance or that its findings otherwise fail to sufficiently justify the amount of support
awarded. Father correctly notes that child-support awards should not be used “to upgrade
[a spouse’s] standard of living,” State v. Hall, 418 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn. App. 1988),
rev. denied (Minn. May 4, 1988), and that considerations of “[d]isparity in income must be
related to the needs of the children,” Hortis v. Hortis, 367 N.W.2d 6 33, 636 (Minn. App.
1985).7 The district court’s reasoning was properly tied to the needs of the children and
the statutory factors that must be considered when a district court addresses whether to
deviate from the presumptively appropriate guidelines support obligation that are relevant
to this case: the financial resources of the parties and the standard of living the children
would have enjoyed if mother and father were living together. Minn. Stat. § 518A.43,
subd. 1(1), (3). The district court concluded that “Mother’s affidavit and the expenses she
attributes to the children demonstrate that a Guidelines award of child support will not
sufficiently cover the children’s expenses.” The district court then repeated, “Considering
the standard of living that the parties’ would have had if they had remained married, the

7 We note that these cases predate revisions to the method for calculation of child-support
payments. See 6 Steven J. Kirsch, Minnesota Practice § 35.8 (3d ed. Supp. 2022) (“The
2005 Legislature substantially revised the child support payment calculation process.”).
16
earnings and the financial resources of the parties, the Court will order an upward deviation
from Guidelines child support. . . . [A] $2,000 upward deviation from Guidelines child
support is appropriate.”
Even if the district court implicitly found that the children’s expenses could not be
more than $3,184.63, as father asserts it did by attributing $2,000 of expenses to mother’s
new husband, and still ordered a $4,377 child-support obligation, we are unaware of
authority compelling a conclusion that any award above a finding of need is necessarily an
abuse of discretion requiring reversal. We recognize that absent certain findings, it may
be unclear if certain expenses relate to a child or are “improperly supplementing [a
spouse’s] standard of living.” See Kahn v. Tronnier, 547 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Minn. App.
1996) (reasoning that father’s support obligation could be supplementing mother’s
standard of living because it was unclear what expenses related to the child’s special
needs), rev. denied (Minn. July 10, 1996). “Findings should assure that the relevant
statutory factors have been addressed, satisfy the litigants that their case was fairly
resolved, and permit reasoned appellate review.” Hesse v. Hesse, 778 N.W.2d 98, 104
(Minn. App. 2009). The district court here specifically tied the child-support award to the
necessity of maintaining the children’s standard of living. The district court noted that
absent an upward deviation from the guidelines, the children’s lifestyle would be adversely
affected because mother would not be able to continue living in her home; the children’s
extracurricular activities would be at risk; the children’s transportation would be
compromised; mother would be unable to pay for certain insurance or utilities needed by
the children; and the children would be unable to participate in certain lifestyle activities.
17
These are proper and relevant statutory considerations under Minn. Stat. § 518A.43,
subd. 1, these findings enable meaningful appellate review, and they are not clearly
erroneous.
To the extent father seeks a remand to compel the district court to specifically
itemize to the dollar every basis for the upward deviation, we are not persuaded that
remanding for further findings explaining any potential gap between the children’s
expenses and the child -support order would change the result here. See Grein v. Grein ,
364 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1985) (declining to remand a case for specific findings
mandated by caselaw because “it seems clear from reading the files, the record, and the
court’s findings, on remand the trial court would undoubtedly make findings that comport
with the [law]”). Even if the district court abused its discretion by not itemizing each dollar
of its award, we decline to remand for such findings because we are persuaded that the
district court’s award would remain the same.
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding mother need-based
attorney fees.

Father argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order mother
to repay father approximately $37,000 in overpayment of spousal maintenance and instead
awarding mother approximately $37,000 in attorney fees because the district court lacked
discretion to deny repayment of overpayment of spousal maintenance as a matter of law
and the district court’s reasons for awarding mother need-based attorney fees were not
supported by the record.
18
In a marriage-dissolution action, a district court “shall award attorney fees, costs,
and disbursements in an amount necessary to enable a party to carry on or contest the
proceeding,” provided that the district court finds:
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good faith
assertion of the party’s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2022). “Conclusory findings on the statutory factors do not
adequately support a fee award.” Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. App.
2001). But a lack of specific findings on the statutory factors “is not fatal to an award
where review of the order ‘reasonably implies’ that the district court considered the
relevant factors and where the district court ‘was familiar with the history of the case’ and
‘had access to the parties’ financial records.” Id. (quoting Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814,
825-26 (Minn. 1999)). “The standard of review for an appellate court examining an award
of attorney fees is whether the district court abused its discretion.” Gully, 599 N.W.2d at
825. “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported
by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the
facts on record.” Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (quotation omitted).
First, father incorrectly characterizes the district court’s order by asserting that he
was simply denied repayment of overpaid spousal maintenance. “[W]hen a retroactive
reduction or termination of maintenance results in an overpayment, the obligor has a right
19
to recover the overpayment.” Sinda v. Sinda , 949 N.W.2d 170, 181 (Minn. App. 2020)
(quotation omitted). In its order, the district court acknowledged that father was entitled
to repayment for amounts he paid after he was no longer obligated to pay spousal
maintenance. But because the district court also determined that mother was entitled to
need-based attorney fees, it decided that it would not “require [mother] to reimburse
[father] for overpaid maintenance.” Thus, the district court properly recognized that father
had a right to repayment and we see no abuse of discretion by the district court in that
regard.
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother was
entitled to need-based attorney fees. The district court’s order reflects a consideration of
the relevant factors, and the record shows that the court was apprised of the parties’
financial circumstances. The district court found that mother’s attorney fees totaled
$71,271.50. It concluded that some of those fees should not be father’s responsibility
because they were attributable to mother changing counsel “fairly late in the proceedings.”
The district court made findings with respect to the financial circumstances of both parties.
As noted above, in determining the child-support order, the district court found that
mother’s gross monthly income was $4,899 and father’s gross monthly income was
$46,824. The district court concluded, “Considering [mother’s] financial resources,
including the property settlement received in the divorce, . . . [mother] has the ability to
pay some of the fees.” (Emphasis omitted.) The district court awarded mother $37,386 in
need-based attorney fees. The district court did not make specific findings about the
amount of fees that were not father’s responsibility, father’s means to pay, or the amount
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that mother had the means to pay. But these findings are implicit in the district court’s
ultimate award. Cf. Prahl v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that
“[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”);
Neilan v. Braun, 354 N.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Minn. App. 1984) (affirming an actual damages
determination that included implicit finding of expected yield of crop in “an amount within
the mathematical limitations established by the evidence” because the finding was
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole). It is clear that the district court was
aware of the law, and we will not assume that it erred. See Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d
278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (citing Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949)).
The record also shows that the district court was apprised of the parties’ financial
circumstances, and the record supports the district court’s conclusion. The district court
had access to the judgment and decree, which set forth division of certain property, as well
as a 2019 asset and liability spreadsheet, mother’s employment contract, paystubs, and a
tax return, and father’s paystubs and a tax return. The district court also received an
affidavit by mother in which she asserted that “the liquid assets [she] had as a result of the
property settlement have dwindled to less than $110,000 in checking and savings,” that she
had to refinance her home since father’s spousal-maintenance payments ceased, and that
she had to “dip into [her] savings every month to make ends meet.”
Father asserts that the district court improperly relied on the disparity between
mother’s and father’s income as a basis for determining mother’s need because the fact that
mother possessed $110,000 in liquid cash shows that she had means to pay her attorney
fees. But this fact, of which the district court was aware, does not necessitate the
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conclusion that mother had the means to pay attorney fees. Father’s reliance on cases
where we held that it is not an abuse of discretion to deny an award of attorney fees where
the record showed that a party had the means to pay them is not persuasive. See Schallinger
v. Schallinger, 699 N.W.2d 15, 24 (Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005);
Burns v. Burns, 466 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. App. 1991). Just as in those cases, the district
court’s determination with respect to attorney fees was supported by the record. Based on
the order and the record, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding mother approximately $37,000 in need-based attorney fees.
Affirmed.