State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1149

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

William Joseph Young,
Appellant.

Filed July 3, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-21-513

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Ottertail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defende r, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross , Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
In this direct appeal from a conviction of second -degree assault, appellant argues
that (1) the district court abused its discretion by denying his request to instruct the jury on
self-defense and defense -of-dwelling; (2) the district court plainly erred b y admitting a
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witness’s hearsay statement as a present-sense impression; (3) the prosecution engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct by misleading the jury about the law in closing argument; and
(4) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived appellant of a fair trial. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant William Joseph Young and victim Z.S. were close friends. They had
known each other since approximately 2010 and played music in a band together. Z.S.
officiated at appellant’s wedding, and they regularly showed up at each other’s house
uninvited. On the afternoon and evening of February 25, 2021, the two men played music
and drank alcohol at Z.S.’s house. At some point, appellant became upset with Z.S. and
accused Z.S. of “not doing enough” for him as a friend. When appellant became verbally
aggressive, Z.S. asked him to leave, and appellant shoved Z.S. before he l eft.
After leaving Z.S.’s house, appellant called and texted Z.S. about a laptop that he
had left at Z.S.’s house. Z.S. did not respond, so appella nt asked A.J., appellant’s half -
sister, to get the laptop for him. A.J. went to Z.S.’s house and told him that he and appellant
“should talk about it instead of fighting.” At A.J.’s request, Z.S. brought the laptop and
went with her to appellant’s house in Fergus Falls.
When they arrived at appellant’s house, A.J. walked in first , and Z.S. followed her.
Neither A.J. nor Z.S. could recall whether they knocked on the door. Appellant was sitting
in the living room, which was right next to the front d oor. Z.S. said “hey” or “what’s up”
to appellant. Appellant immediately attacked Z.S. near the entryway. Z.S did not hit back
or attack appellant. Instead, Z.S. stepped back outside as A.J. tried to break them up. Z.S.
did not sustain any injury from this altercation. After Z.S. went outside, A.J. followed
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appellant as he ran upstairs. Appellant kicked A.J. i n her chest, which caused her to fall
down the stairs. At this point, Z.S. went back inside the house. Appellant hit Z.S.’s side,
hand, and head with a baseball bat. Z.S. left the house again and collapsed on the snow in
the yard. He tried to crawl to a neighbor’s house for help but could not reach the door.
Fergus Falls Police Officers A.R. and R.F. responded to a hang- up 911 call from
near appellant’s home at 3:57 a.m. on February 26, 2021. Officer A.R. arrived first and
asked appellant about the 911 call. Appellant responded that he did not make the call.
Appellant claimed that Z.S. “had forced his way into his house and assaulted him.” Officer
A.R. observed a big depression in the snow, which looked like someone had fallen there.
Shortly after, Officer R.F. arrived and found Z.S. lying in the front yard of a home across
the street from appellant’s house while bleeding from a large hematoma on the left side of
his forehead. Officer A.R. went over and observed Z.S.’s condition. Both officers thought
that Z.S. was dead and started rubbing his sternum. Officer R.F. called an ambulance and
followed Z.S. to Lake Region Hospital, where Z.S. rec eived treatment and was able to
describe what had happened. Z.S. told Officer R.F. that appellant struck him with a
baseball bat in his side. Appellant tried to strike him a second time, but Z.S. managed to
get a hold of the bat and threw it on the ground.
While Officer R.F. accompanied Z.S. to the hospital, Officer A.R. took a recorded
statement from appellant. Appellant maintained that Z.S. attacked him. Officer A.R. saw
two baseball bats while talking to appellant: an aluminum t -ball bat on the floor in the
entryway and a wooden bat in the living room. Appellant stated that he had only “punched”
Z.S. but did not “remember hitting [Z.S.] with a bat.” Officer A.R. also noticed that
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appellant wore two large rings on his right hand, had “something red” on his ring that might
have been blood, and had bruising on his right pinky finger.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with second -degree assault with
a dangerous weapon against Z.S., Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2020); second -degree
assault with a dangerous weapon against A.J., Id.; and two misdemeanor counts of
domestic assault against A.J ., Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1)-(2) (2020). Prior to trial,
appellant provided notice that he intended to assert the defenses of self-defense and defense
of dwelling, and proposed jury instructions regarding them to the district court. The district
court declined to instruct the jury on either defense.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The state introduced into evidence four cellphone
recordings Z.S. made while standing outside appellant’s house without objection. In one
of the recordings, al though the screen was dark, appellant can be heard yelling “Come in
my f —king door again. Come in. Come in the f —king door motherf —ker.” Z.S.
responded “Jesus Christ . . . . I’m your friend.” Appellant responded “I’m going to f —
king kill you. I’m going to f—king kill you.” Z.S. asked appellant to “stop it,” after which
two loud metallic clangs can be heard. Officer R.F. viewed all the cellphone recordings
and opined that appellant’s version of the events appeared inconsistent with the recordings.
The state also introduced into evidence pictures of Z.S.’s bruises taken at the
hospital. One picture shows a “long and oval” bruise on Z.S.’s head. Based on Officer
R.F.’s training and experience, he opined that the bruise on Z.S.’s head likely resulted from
being struck with a baseball bat rather than being punched by hand. Another picture
showed that Z.S. had a small bruise forming at the base of his hand, consistent with Z.S.’s
5
description of him trying to catch the baseball bat when appellant swung the bat at him
again. Z.S. was diagnosed with a closed-head injury, a concussion,1 a forehead hematoma,
a left-hand soft -tissue contusion, and a lef t lateral pelvis soft -tissue contusion. The jury
found appellant guilty of second -degree assault with a da ngerous weapon against Z.S. but
not guilty of the three charges in relation to A.J. The district court sentenced appellant to
51 months in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request
to instruct the jury on self -defense and defense-of-dwelling.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request
to instruct the jury on self -defense and defense -of-dwelling. We are not persuaded.
We review a distr ict court’s determination of whether a jury instruction should be
given for an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006). A
district court abuses its discretion by refusing to give an instruction on a defendant’s theory
of a case when the evidence provides a rational basis to support the de fendant’s theory. Id.
at 625. If, however, the defense was not prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to give a
specific instruction, “there is no reversible error.” Id. at 629. We view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. State v. Jama, 908 N.W.2d
372, 378 (Minn. 2018), aff’d, 923 N.W.2d 632 (Minn. 2019).

1 Z.S.’s diagnosis noted that, although the CT scan did not show any evidence of brain
bleed or fracture to the skull, it was still “quite probable” that Z.S. had experienced a
concussion.
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A. Self-defense
To obtain a self -defense instruction, a defendant must provide evidence to show:
“(1) an absence of aggression or provocation; (2) an actual and honest belief that imminent
death or great bodily harm would result; (3) a reasonable basis existed for this belief; and
(4) an absence of reasonable means to retreat or otherwi se avoid the physical
conflict.” State v. Soukup, 656 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn.
Apr. 29, 2003). When a defendant acts in self -defense within their home, there is no duty
to retreat. State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 903 (Mi nn. 1999). “ Once the defendant
has met that burden [of production], the state has the burden of disproving one or more of
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson, 719 N.W.2d at 629 (quotation
omitted). A defendant may establish a self -defense claim by circumstantial evidence
without testifying at trial. Id. at 630.
In the present case, the state introduced into evi dence appellant’s statement to
Officer A.R. that “[Z.S.] forced his way into [appellant’s] home and assaulted him” as a
statement by a party-opponent. Minn. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2). Appellant did not testify at trial
but argues that this statement alone supported a self -defense instruction. Appellant claims
that he reasonably feared for his safety when Z.S. showed up at his house intoxicated and
that Z.S.’s bruises on one hand evidenced that Z.S. was the first aggressor. Moreover,
appellant maintains that he had no duty to retreat in his own house.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, he still fails to establish
a rational basis for the first and third prongs of the self -defense claim. To satisfy the first
prong, it is not enough t hat appellant show that he was not the first aggressor, rather, he
7
must not have acted in aggression or provocation throughout the incident. See Soukup, 656
N.W.2d at 428. Here, the cellphone recording captured appellant’s words of provocation
when he yelled “come in the f —ing door mother —ker.” Even after Z.S. tried to calm
appellant down by assuring him that he was appellant’s friend, appellant continued to claim
that he was going to “f—king kill” Z.S. Appellant therefore cannot satisfy the first prong.
As for the third prong, appellant did not have a reasonable fear of imminent death
or great bodily harm. The uncontroverted e vidence in the record establishes that Z.S. and
appellant were long-term friends and frequently went to each other’s house uninvited, that
Z.S. came to appellant’s house on the night of the incident with appellant’s sister; that Z.S.
stepped outside the house after their initial altercation, and that Z.S. had his hands in his
pockets and did not hit appellant when he re -entered the house after hearing A.J. falling
down the stairs. Even were we to accept as true that appellant subjectively feared for his
safety, that fear was not reasonable and so appellant cannot satisfy the third prong of the
self-defense claim. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to instruct the jury on self -defense.
B. Defense of dwelling2
To obtain an instruction on defense of dwelling, a defendant must provide evidence
to show that (1) they reasonably believed that they were resisting an interference with their

2 At trial, appellant requested an instruction on defense of property, which the district court
rejected. Appellant rephrased the claim on appeal as defense of dwelling, which is a
defense based on property rights. See State v. Glowacki , 630 N.W.2d 392, 401 (Minn.
2001). Despite the difference in phrasing, we consider them to be the same issue.
8
lawfully held property and (2) they used reasonable force to defend their property. State
v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1997); see also Minn. Stat. § 609.06 (2020).
It was undisputed that appellant owned the house. However, appellant failed to
come forward with evidence to show that he defended his house with rea sonable force
under the circumstances. To the contrary, the record shows that appellant used an
unreasonable amount of for ce against Z.S. Appellant could have requested that Z.S. leave
his house; instead, he incited Z.S. to enter. See State v. Zimmer , 478 N.W.2d 764, 765
(Minn. App. 1991) (holding that c onviction for misdemeanor trespass requires proof that
trespasser refuses to depart after demand by lawful possessor at time of trespass), aff’d,
487 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1992). Because appellant failed to show that he used reasonable
force to defend his property, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to
instruct the jury on defense of dwelling.
II. The district court did not plainly err by failing to exclude sua sponte a
statement from Officer A.R.’s testimony.

Appellant claims that the district court plainly erred by failing to exclude a statement
from Officer A.R.’s testimony. We disagree.
At trial, A.J. testified that she did not recall getting hit with a bat herself or seeing
appellant hitting Z.S. with a bat. Subsequently during Officer A.R.’s testimony, the state
asked: “Did [A.J.] tell you whether or not she observed that incident?” Officer A.R.
responded: “Yes, so I had asked her what [] happened, and the first thing out of her mouth
–.” Appellant objected on hearsay grounds before Officer A.R. could finish the sentence.
The district court overruled the objection and allowed Officer A.R. to finish his sentence.
9
Officer A.R. then continued: “The first thing that [A.J.] sa id to me was, and I quote, ‘I got
my butt beat.’” Based on the content of Officer A.R.’s statement, the district court admitted
it as a present -sense impression. Minn. R. Evid. 801 (d)(1)(D). In doing so, the district
court expressly stated that this ruling “pertain[ed] to that particular statement” by Officer
A.R.
The state then continued to ask Officer A.R. about his conversation with A.J. from
the day of the incident, and the following exchange occurred:
Q: Now, you had a -- we were talking about this
conversation that you w ere having with [A.J.], correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Based on that conversation, what was your
understanding about whether or not a bat was used in
the incident?
A. That one was used.

(Emphasis added.) Appellant did not object either before or after Officer A.R. answered.
Appellant argues that the district court erred by admitting Officer A.R.’s statement “that
one was used” as a present-sense impression. However, the record does not show that the
district court made such a ruling, given that its prior ruling was specifically limited to
Officer A.R.’s prior statement that A.J. told him that she got her “butt beat.” Because
appellant did not object to this later statement at trial, we review it for plain error. State v.
Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). “In order to meet the plain error standard, [an
appellant] must show that (1) there was an error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error
affected [appellant]’s substantial rights.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, appellant f ails to show error. Officer A.R.’s statement “that one was used”
does not fit the definition of hearsay because it is not an out -of-court statement. Minn. R.
10
Evid. 801 (c). (“ Hearsay is a statement, othe r than one made by the declarant while
testifying a t the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.”) Because appellant fails to establish error, we need not address the other two
elements of the plain -error analysis. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court di d
not plainly err by failing to exclude sua sponte this statement from Officer A.R.’s
testimony.
III. The state did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct by misstating the law
during its rebuttal argument.

Appellant argues for the first time on appeal tha t the state engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct during its rebuttal argument. We are not persuaded.
We review unobjected -to prosecutorial misconduct under a modified plain- error
standard. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). An appellant bears the
burden of establishing error that is plain, but upon doing so, the burden shifts to the state
to prove that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct would
have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict. Id. “To evaluate the effect on substantial
rights, [appellate courts] consider various factors, including the pervasiveness of improper
suggestions and the strength of evidence against the defendant.” State v. Parker , 901
N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. 2017) (quotation and citation omitted). “If the [s]tate fails to
demonstrate that the alleged error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights,
[appellate courts] consider whether the error should be addres sed to ensure fairness and the
integrity of judicial proceedi ngs.” Id.
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In its closing argument, the state argued that it had proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant assaulted Z.S. with a baseball bat. Appellant maintained that he hit
Z.S.’s head with his fist instead of a bat, emphasizing that, while Z.S. was bleeding from
his head, there was no blood on the baseball bat. During rebuttal, the state responded with
two arguments. It first pointed out that Z.S. was approximately three inches taller than
appellant, making it unlikely that appellant could have hit Z.S.’s head with his rings and
cause those injuries. The state alternatively argued that, even if the jury were to accept that
appellant hit Z.S. with his fist, appellant’s large rings coul d be dangerous weapons within
the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2020).
A dangerous weapon is “[a] device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used
or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” Minn.
Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (2020). Great bodily harm in turn is defined as “bodily injury which
creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement,
or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ or other serious bodil y harm. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2020).
Whether an object or a body part qualifies as a dangerous weapon depends on the
circumstances of the assault rather than the injuries of the victim. See State v. Davis, 540
N.W.2d 88, 89 (Minn. App. 1995). In Davis, we held that Davis’s hands a nd feet
constituted dangerous weapons because he used them “in a manner likely to produce death
or great bodily harm,” even if the victim did not suffer great bodily harm. Id. at 91.
Here, the state argued that appel lant’s large rings were no different t han “brass
knuckles” and could constitute dangerous weapons. This was an issue of fact properly left
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for the jury to decide. See Davis, 540 N.W.2d at 90 (stating that whether defendant used
their hands or feet as dan gerous weapons is question of fact). Had the jury found that
appellant struck Z.S. with large rings on his hand in a manner that was likely to produce
death or great bodily harm, then the jury could have found that the rings constituted
dangerous weapons within the meaning of section 609.222, subdivision 1. The state
therefore did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct.
IV. The cumulative effect of alleged errors did not deny appellant a fair trial.
Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of alleged errors denied him a fair trial.
We disagree.
The supreme court has held that, “ in rare cases, the cumulative effect of trial errors
can deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial when the errors and
indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales, operate to the
defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased jury.” State v. Davis , 820 N.W.2d 525, 538
(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Having denied appellant’s claims of alleged errors, we
further deny appellant’s argument based on their cumulative effect.
Affirmed.