State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1156

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jacob Daniel McPheeters,
Appellant.

Filed September 18, 2023
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-16374

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant seeks review of judgments of conviction for first- degree assault and
unlawful possession of a firearm and argues that we should reverse and remand for a new
trial. Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by ruling that
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relationship evidence and impeachment evidence were admissible. Because the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting either type of evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
These facts summarize the evidence received during an April 2022 jury trial.
Appellant Jacob Daniel McPheeters met S.L. in 2016, and they began a romantic
relationship in 2017. In July 2020, McPheeters and S.L. were living together in
Bloomington. The relationship, according to S.L., “had become abusive verbally,
emotionally, and physically.”
During the late evening of July 23 and early morning of July 24, 2020, McPheeters
and S.L. “ended up fighting.” McPheeters “chase[d]” S.L. around their home while S.L.
“was trying to climb over stuff to get away from him.” McPheeters “pulled [S.L.] down by
[her] neck.” McPheeters told S.L. that they were leaving the home “to go finish this.” When
S.L. resisted leaving, McPheeters brandished a “black .45 . . . handgun” and “scream[ed]”
at S.L., “You’re going to get in the f--king car . . . [a]nd we’re going to finish this.” S.L.
testified that she recognized the handgun. McPheeters pointed the handgun at her as he
repeated his command to get in the car. S.L. “was terrified,” and McPheeters dragged her
to the car.
Around 2:00 a.m., McPheeters drove S.L. to see two friends, A.C. and M.E., who
parked their recreational vehicle (RV ) in a Bloomington hotel’s parking lot. When they
arrived, McPheeters, who suffered from migraines, “was expressing extreme discomfort.”
S.L. left the car and asked A.C. to “go check on [McPheeters].” S.L. entered the RV and
said to M.E., “[P]lease don’t let me in [McPheeters’s] car.” Fifteen to twenty minutes later,
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McPheeters entered the RV and, accor ding to S.L., “started with that, Get in the car,
insistent stuff again.” Then “the [handgun] got pulled out again . . . and [McPheeters] put
[the handgun] in [S.L.’s] mouth” while choking her with his other hand. McPheeters
“flung” S.L. to the ground.
McPheeters put the handgun in his waistband and “pulled [S.L.] out of the RV”
while he was choking her. S.L. “was blacking out” but “could see that [M.E.] was behind
[McPheeters], that “[M.E.] had the [handgun],” and that M.E. “was putting it in her car.”
S.L. “fell against the RV, and [McPheeters] went after [M.E.] . . . and started choking her.”
A.C. intervened, and M.E. returned to talk to S.L.
S.L. saw McPheeters in his car loading a “revolver” that S.L. had seen before.
McPheeters approached and said, “[Y]our time is up.” S.L. testified that McPheeters was
“standing right in front of [her]” as “he put the gun against [her] side and shot [her] under
[her] armpit.” S.L. fell to the ground and touched her side; her “hand was covered in blood.”
McPheeters “picked [S.L.] up” and “put [her] in the car.” McPheeters drove S.L. to the
emergency department at a nearby hospital.
McPheeters helped S.L. walk into the hospital. When a nurse arrived with a
wheelchair, S.L. told the nurse that her boyfriend had shot her. S.L. noticed then that
McPheeters “was gone.” S.L. remained in the hospital for three and a half weeks.
McPheeters fled to Wisconsin, where police arrested him and later recovered a
revolver from the driver’s side of McPheeters’s car. Respondent State of Minnesota
charged McPheeters with second-degree attempted murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19,
subd. 1(1) (2018) (count one), first-degree assault inflicting great bodily harm under Minn.
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Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2018) (count two), second-degree assault with a dangerous
weapon inflicting substantial bodily harm under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 2 (2018)
(count three), and unlawful possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2)
(2018) (count four).
After hearing arguments on pretrial motions, the district court granted the state’s
motion to allow evidence of two prior drug convictions to impeach McPheeters if he
testified. The district court also granted the state’s motion to admit testimony about a prior
assault between McPheeters and S.L. as relationship evidence.
During the jury trial, the state offered testimony from S.L., a hotel employee,
law-enforcement officers, and two forensic scientists. McPheeters did not testify. The jury
found McPheeters not guilty of count one and guilty of counts two, three, and four. The
district court sentenced McPheeters to serve concurrent prison terms of 60 months for count
four and 175 months for count two.
McPheeters appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence.

Evidence of prior wrongful conduct unrelated to the crime for which a person is on
trial is generally inadmissible. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). One exception to this general rule
provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of
domestic conduct, or against other family or household members , is admissible unless the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” or other
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concerns. Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2022); see also State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161
(Minn. 2004) (adopting Minn. Stat. § 634.20 as a rule of evidence). “Domestic conduct”
includes “evidence of domestic abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “[F]amily or household
members” include “persons who are presently residing together or who have resided
together in the past.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(4) (2022). This evidence “is
commonly referred to as relationship evidence.” State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 549
(Minn. 2010).
Appellate courts review the admission of relationship evidence for abuse of
discretion. Id. at 553. To establish reversible error, McPheeters “must prove that the
admission of evidence was erroneous and prejudicial.” State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872,
879 (Minn. 2009). Appellate courts “will reverse the district court ’s ruling if the error
substantially influenced the jury’s decision.” Id.
Over McPheeters’s pretrial objection, the district court allowed relationship
evidence. S.L. testified that, one week before the July 2020 incident, she and McPheeters
“got into an argument” and McPheeters “squeez[ed her] neck so hard that [she] thought he
was going to crush [her] windpipe.” After McPheeters let go, S.L. “threw up everywhere
all over the floor and on [McPheeters].”
On appeal, McPheeters argues that the relationship evidence had “no legitimate
probative value” and that “any probative value was outweighed by the potential for
prejudice” because “it is possible the jury used the evidence for an improper purpose.” We
address each argument in turn.
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A. Probative Value
McPheeters argues that the district court should have excluded the relationship
evidence because “this case does not present . . . ‘unique prosecution challenges’” like
other cases in which relationship evidence has been admitted. McPheeters cites McCoy,
682 N.W.2d at 161, to support his argument. McPheeters correctly points out that McCoy
identified some traits of domestic abuse: “Domestic abuse is unique in that it typically
occurs in the privacy of the home, it frequently involves a pattern of activity that may
escalate over time, and it is often underreported.” 682 N.W.2d at 161. The facts in McCoy,
for example, involved a victim of domestic abuse who “could not remember what she told
the police regarding [McCoy’s] alleged assault,” and “[n]o one else was able to provide
eyewitness testimony.” Id.
Although McPheeters’s charged assault of S.L. matched only some of the “unique
traits” of domestic abuse identified in McCoy and therefore did not present the state with
the same challenges the prosecution faced in McCoy, we are not persuaded of McPheeters’s
premise. According to our caselaw, the probative value of relationship evidence does not
depend on the challenges the prosecution faces. The supreme court explained in McCoy
that, under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, “evidence of prior conduct between the accused and the
alleged victim . . . may be offered to illuminate the history of the relationship, that is, to
put the crime charged in the context of the relationship between the two.” Id. at 159. The
supreme court has recognized the “inherent” probative value “of evidence of past acts of
violence committed by the same defendant against the same victim.” State v. Williams,
593 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. 1999).
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McPheeters urges that his case is distinguishable from domestic -assault cases that
have allowed relationship evidence. McPheeters discusses State v. Barnslater, in which we
determined that the district court properly allowed relationship evidence to prove a pattern
of harassing conduct. 786 N.W.2d 646, 649-51 (Minn. App. 2010) , rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 27, 2010). McPheeters argues that his case is unlike Barnslater because here, “the
state was not required to prove a pattern of harassing conduct. ” We disagree with
McPheeters’s reading of our decision. In Barnslater, we stated that “[t]he admissibility of
relationship evidence . . . does not depend on the particular offense charged” but whether
“the evidence address[es] similar conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic
abuse.” Id. at 651 (quotation omitted).1
Here, S.L.’s testimony about the prior assault concerned similar conduct by
McPheeters and provided context for their relationship. In State v. Andersen, we
determined that evidence that a defendant “verbally and physical ly abused” a victim
“earlier in their relationship” had “obvious probative value” because it “informed the jury
of the nature of their relationship, the times that [the victim] felt afraid of [the defendant],

1 McPheeters cites three additional cases and tries to distinguish them from his case. We
are not persuaded. In all three cases, Minnesota courts affirmed a district court’s decision
to admit relationship evidence because the evidence provided context for the appellant’s
relationship with the victim. See State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006)
(determining that evidence that the defendant twice violated an order for protection was
“probative of a material fact, namely the history of [the defendant and victim’s]
relationship”); State v. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 756-57 (Minn. App. 2008) (stating that
evidence establishing the relationship between the victim and the defendant has probative
value), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008); State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.
App. 2008) (determining that the district court did not err by admitting “extensive
evidence” of a “troubled, long-term relationship” to demonstrate the context of the
relationship).
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and the times that [the defendant] attempted to manipulate, control, and restrain [the
victim].” 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). Like the relationship evidence admitted
in Andersen, S.L.’s testimony about the prior assault provided context for her relationship
with McPheeters. Thus, we conclude that the district co urt did not abuse its discretion in
analyzing the probative value of the relationship evidence.
B. Danger of Unfair Prejudice
Relationship evidence is admissible unless the probative value is “substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the
jury.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “When balancing the probative value against the potential
prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging
evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving
one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation omitted).
McPheeters argues that “any probative value ” of the challenged evidence “was
outweighed by the potential for prejudice.” We are not convinced. “Evidence that is
probative, though it may arouse the passions of the jury, will still be admitted unless the
tendency of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means overwhelms its legitimate
probative force.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474, 478-79 (Minn. 2005). In Word, we
noted that the “extensive [relationship] evidence” was “dramatic and prejudicial” but that
“the evidence had substantial probative value which was not clearly outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” 755 N.W.2d at 784. Here, we similarly conclude that the
danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
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relationship evidence. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the
probative value of the relationship evidence against any unfair prejudice.
C. Harmless Error
Even if the district court abused its discretion by admitting the relationship evidence,
the error was harmless. An error is harmless if “there is no reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Hormann,
805 N.W.2d 883, 891-92 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400,
407 (Minn. 2006)), rev denied (Minn, Jan. 17, 2012). To determine whether the admission
of relationship evidence significantly affected the verdict, appellate courts “consider
[1] whether the district court provided the jury a cautionary instruction, [2] whether the
State dwelled on the evidence in closing argument, and [3] whether the evidence of guilt
was strong.” State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 274 (Minn. 2017). We consider each factor
in turn.
First, before the relationship evidence was introduced at McPheeters’s trial, the
district court instructed the jury that the evidence was “being offered for the limited
purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of the relationship between” McPheeters
and S.L. and that the jury was “not to convict [McPheeters] on the basis of” his prior
conduct. During the final jury instructions, the district court again read the cautionary
instruction.
Appellate courts must “presume that juries follow instructions given by the [district]
court.” Matthews, 779 N.W.2d at 550. Minnesota courts have repeatedly upheld the
admission of relationship evidence when paired with cautionary instructions. See, e.g.,
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State v. Benton , 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015); Andersen, 900 N.W.2d at 441-42.
Here, the district court “minimized any potential prejudice” to McPheeters by providing
cautionary instructions about the relationship evidence. Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d at 757; see
State v. Ware, 856 N.W.2d 719, 730 (Minn. App. 2014) (“[T]he danger of unfair prejudice
in this case is low because the district court gave the jury a cautionary instruction.”).
Second, the state did not dwell on the relationship evidence. The prosecuting
attorney did not refer to the relationship evidence during closing argument. See Benton,
858 N.W.2d at 542 (determining that any error in the admission of relationship evidence
was harmless where the prosecuting attorney made “sparse use of relationship evidence in
closing argument”).
Third, the other evidence supporting McPheeters’s convictions was strong.
McPheeters argues that “[t]he jury clearly questioned the state’s evidence; it found
McPheeters not guilty of [attempted murder], ” and therefore, the jury “likely” convicted
McPheeters because of the relationship evidence. We disagree. Evidence presented during
trial corroborated S.L.’s testimony—namely, the ballistic analysis, which showed that the
revolver found in McPheeters’s car fired a bullet recovered from the RV, and S.L.’s
previous statements to law enforcement, which were made around the time she was shot.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence against McPheeters because the evidence illuminated his relationship with S.L.
Alternatively, any error in admitting the relationship evidence was harmless for the reasons
discussed above. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any error that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded.”).
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling impeachment evidence
was admissible.

“We will not reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness by
prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 651
(Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “On appeal, the defendant has the burden of proving
both that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence and that the
defendant was thereby prejudiced.” State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. 1997).
Evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes
when the prior crime is punishable by more than one year in prison and the probative value
of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). District courts
exercise discretion under this evidentiary rule and, in doing so, must consider the five
factors established in State v. Jones: “(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the
date of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity of the past
crime with the charged crime . . . , (4) the importance of [the] defendant’s testimony, and
(5) the centrality of the credibility issue.” 271 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978).
In its pretrial ruling allowing the state to impeach McPheeters with his prior
convictions if he chose to testify, the district court determined that factor one weighed
against admission because although the prior convictions were “felonies, that is the extent
of their impeachment value.” The district court also determined that factor four “weigh[ed]
against admission.” The other three factors, however, supported admission. The district
court concluded that “on balance, the two drug cases weigh in favor of admission ” and
allowed them.
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On appeal, McPheeters does not challenge the district court’s determination on any
individual factor; rather, McPheeters seems to argue that the district court erred in
balancing the five factors. McPheeters argues that factors one and four weigh against
admitting the impeachment evidence, which aligns with the district court’s reasoning.
McPheeters, however, does not address factors two, three, or five, which the district court
determined supported admitting the impeachment evidence.
Because McPheeters does not discuss three of the five Jones factors and we discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s balancing of these factors, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the impeachment testimony was
admissible. Thus, we need not discuss whether any error was harmless.
Affirmed.