State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1157

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sterling Royce Haukom,
Appellant.

Filed June 20, 2023
Affirmed
Klaphake, Judge*

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-21-1068

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge
Appellant Sterling Royce Haukom appeals his sentence of 96 months’
imprisonment—an upward durational departure—for his conviction of felony criminal
vehicular homicide. 1 Because Haukom’s offense was more serious than a typical
criminal-vehicular-homicide offense, the district court did not abuse its discretion and we
affirm.
DECISION
“We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guidelines
sentence for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
“If the reasons given for an upward departure are legally permissible and factually
supported in the record, the departure will be affirmed. But if the district court’s reasons
for departure are improper or inadequate, the departure will be reversed.” State v. Edwards,
774 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. The guidelines seek to “maintain uniformity,
proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09,
subd. 5 (2022). A district court may depart from the presumptive sentence only when there
are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a departure.”
Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020); see also State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7

1 Respondent State of Minnesota charged Haukom with this crime in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.2112, subdivision 1(a)(2)(i) (2020).
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(Minn. 1981). “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those circumstances that
make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” State v. Peake,
366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).
A durational departure is a sentence shorter or longer than the presumptive range
prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.b (2020). This
type of departure “must be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense, not
the characteristics of the offender.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623-24. A durational
departure is justified where the conduct underlying the offense represents “a greater than
normal danger to the safety” of other people, State v. McClay, 310 N.W.2d 683, 684
(Minn. 1981), or where the conduct is significantly more serious than conduct typically
involved in the commission of the crime. State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn. 1984).
We will not modify an upward durational departure unless we have a “strong feeling” that
the sentence is disproportional to the offense and that the district court exceeded its
discretion in granting the departure. State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487
(Minn. 1981).
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is entitled to have a jury find the facts that
would justify an up ward departure —referred to as aggravating factors—unless the
defendant waives this right. State v. Jones, 745 N.W.2d 845, 847 -48, 851 (Minn. 2008)
(citing Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)). Haukom waived this right and
allowed the district court to determine potential aggravating factors. The district court,
after an evidentiary hearing on the state’s suggested aggravating factors, found that
Haukom was highly intoxicated at the time of the crash, his driving behavior—inclusive of
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his excessive speed—was egregious, and his state of mind while operating his vehicle went
beyond simple negligence into gross negligence, including recklessness.
Haukom pleaded guilty to felony criminal vehicular homicide which states that “a
person is guilty of criminal vehicular homicide . . . if the person causes the death of a
human being not constituting murder or manslaughter as a result of operating a motor
vehicle . . . in a negligent manner while under the influence of . . . alcohol.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.2112, subd. 1(a)(2)(i). The degree of Haukom’s intoxication, Haukom’s
egregious driving behavior, and his grossly negligent and or reckless state of mind are not
elements of this crime. Haukom’s alcohol concentration was 0.251, he drove at a speed of
60 miles per-hour in a 30 mile-per-hour residential neighborhood, ran a red light, hit
another vehicle, and killed its occupant. And in an interview after the crash, he stated that
while he was not trying to kill himself, “I’d say I was willing to go.” These actions and
circumstances distinguish the crime he committed from a typical
criminal-vehicular-homicide offense and can justify an upward durational departure
because they make his crime more serious than the conduct typically involved in this crime.
Haukom gave the factual basis in his guilty plea to support these aggravating factors, and
he does not contest t hat basis on appeal. The district court properly determined the
aggravating factors that it based its sentencing decision on and did not abuse its discretion
here.
Haukom contends that because the conduct that justified an upward durational
departure is criminalized by different parts of the same statute, his conduct cannot be more
serious than conduct supporting a typical criminal-vehicular-homicide charge. But
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Haukom’s conduct is more severe than a typical criminal -vehicular-homicide crime
because his conduct went beyond violating the single subdivision to which he pleaded
guilty. “[G]enerally, it is proper for the sentencing court to consider the course of conduct
underlying the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced.” Cox, 343 N.W.2d at
643. Because the district court based its sentencing decision on (1) evidence supporting
the conclusion that Haukom committed the offense in a particularly serious way, and
(2) conduct underlying the charge for which the district court sentenced him, not other
potential charges, it did not abuse its discretion here.2
Affirmed.

2 Haukom also argues that this situation is ripe for charging manipulation, incentivizing
prosecutors to charge a defendant only under one part of a statute to use conduct that they
could have charged under another part to argue for an aggravated sentence. But the state
charged Haukom with two felonies and two gross misdemeanors, though he only pleaded
guilty to one felony. Thus, while Haukom’s argument may have merit, it is not meritorious
here given the charges Haukom faced when he chose to plead guilty.