State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1172

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Wesley Buchanan, IV,
Appellant.

Filed January 23, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-04-006269, 27-CR-CV-22-000062

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Jon Schmidt, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

John Wesley Buchanan, IV, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant challenges a district court’s denial of his petition under Minn.
Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (2022 ), to restore his firearm rights. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition, we affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant John Wesley Buchanan is prohibited from possessing firearms and
ammunition as a result of being convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance in
2004 and third-degree assault (substantial bodily harm) in 2007. See Minn.
Stat. §§ 624.712, subd. 5, .713, subds. 1, 3 (2022).
In April 2022, Buchanan filed a petition with the district court under Minn.
Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d, to restore his firearm rights. Respondent State of Minnesota filed
a letter stating that it did not oppose Buchanan’s petition.
In his petition, Buchanan noted that he had been discharged from probation in 2011.
He also indicated that he had not been charged with or convicted of any offenses since that
time. Buchanan explained that he seeks to restore his firearm rights because he wishes to
participate in sporting activities, hunt wild game, practice self-defense, and protect his
home. Buchanan asserted that good cause exists to restore his firearm rights because: he
has remained law-abiding since his release from probation; he works as a truck driver and
owns his own truck; as a truck driver, he works in a highly regulated industry and interacts
with the public daily; “a lot of time has passed”; and he is now a “better person and model
citizen.”
After a hearing, the district court denied Buchanan’s petition. The district court
determined that Buchanan had not shown good cause to restore his firearm rights. The
district court specifically determined that Buchanan’s interests in “hav[ing] his full rights
back as a citizen” and “go[ing] on hunting trips with . . . family and friends” are insufficient
reasons to establish good cause. The district court further concluded that Buchanan’s
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multiple crimes of violence, one of which resulted in “serious injury to a victim,”1 left the
district court without a “significant level of comfort with respect to the maturity of
[Buchanan’s] judgment.” In light of his crimes and the presumptive lifetime nature of the
firearm ban, the district court explained that “there must be a longer length of time in the
record for [Buchanan] to establish he is law- abiding” before the district court would be
willing to grant a petition to restore his firearm rights.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Persons who are convicted of certain crimes, known as “crime[s] of violence,” are
generally ineligible to possess firearms and ammunition for the remainder of their lives.
Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1, 3. But a district court may restore the firearm rights of a
person convicted of a crime of violence if the person demonstrates, upon petition, that there
is good cause to do so. Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d. 2 Even if a petitioner shows good
cause, the district court still has discretion to grant or deny the petition. Id. (providing that
the district court “may” grant the petition when the statutory criteria are met);
Averbeck v. State, 791 N.W.2d 559, 560-61 (Minn. App. 2010).
The district court’s determination of whether a petitioner has shown good cause
presents a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at 560. In reviewing a district court’s

1 The district court found without explanation that the assault Buchanan committed
“involved a serious injury to a victim,” presumably based on the nature of one of his
crimes—third-degree assault causing substantial bodily harm.
2 A petitioner must also show that they have been released from confinement. Minn.
Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d. There is no dispute that Buchanan satisfies this requirement.
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good-cause determination, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
its legal conclusions de novo. See id. at 561. We then review the district court’s ultimate
decision to grant or deny a petition for an abuse of discretion. Id.
I. Buchanan’s argument that the district court made an erroneous factual finding
does not warrant reversal.

Buchanan first argues that the district court’s denial of his petition should be
reversed because the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding. Recently, the
Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the clear -error standard that appellate courts use to
review a district court’s factual findings. The supreme court stated: “In applying
the clear-error standard, we view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. We will
not conclude that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment
of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations and citation omitted).
In its order, the district court found that Buchanan plea ded guilty to and was
convicted of two crimes of violence: first -degree sale of a controlled substance and
third-degree assault (substantial bodily harm). Buchanan does not dispute the district
court’s finding that he was convicted of these crimes or its determination that they
constitute crimes of violence. Rather, he disputes the district court’s finding as to how he
was convicted of first- degree sale of a controlled substance. He contends that he was
convicted by a jury verdict, not a guilty plea. Buchanan is correct. The record conclusively
shows that Buchanan was convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance by a jury,
not pursuant to a plea agreement. Thus, the district court made a mistake when it found
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that Buchanan’s drug-crime conviction was the result of a guilty plea rather than a jury
verdict.
Nonetheless, we conclude that this error was harmless and does not warrant reversal.
Guilty pleas do not prevent a petitioner from establishing good cause and may even favor
a petitioner by demonstrating remorse. See Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at 561 (denying a
petition to restore firearm rights in part because petitioner refused to accept the jury’s
verdict and thus showed “no remorse for the victim’s suffering”). Moreover, in rendering
its decision, the district court did not rely on the method by which Buchanan was found
guilty. As a result, Buchanan was not prejudiced by the district court’s error. Accordingly,
the error was harmless, and it must be ignored. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that
harmless error be ignored); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987)
(stating that “[a]lthough error may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no grounds exist
for reversal”).
II. The record supports the district court’s determination that Buchanan did not
show good cause to restore his firearm rights.

Next, we consider the district court’s good-cause determination. “Good cause is a
reason for taking an action that, in legal terms, is legally sufficient, and, in ordinary terms,
is justified in the context of surrounding circumstances.” Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at 561.
“[T]he most significant surrounding circumstance in the context of restoring the right to
possess firearms is the interest in public safety,” which courts weigh against the private
interests of the petitioner. Id. We review the district court’s good-cause determination for
an abuse of discretion. See id. at 562. We will not determine that a district court abused
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its discretion unless “its decision was based on an erroneous view of the law or was against
logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn. 2019)
(quotation omitted); see also Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016)
(quotations omitted).
In its order, the district court determined that Buchanan’s interests in regaining his
“full rights” as a citizen and in hunting with family and friends are “insufficient to show
‘good cause.’” The district court explained that Buchanan’s right to bear arms is subject
to lawful restrictions, including statutory prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
persons who have committed felonies. The district court also determined that Buchanan’s
interest in hunting recreationally does not outweigh the interest in public safety, given the
violent nature of Buchanan’s crimes.
Buchanan argues that the district court ignored several of his proffered reasons for
restoring his firearm rights, including his desire to engage in sporting activities, practice
self-defense, and protect his home. Buchanan insists that these reasons, taken together with
the reasons that the district court did address, show good cause. We are not persuaded by
this argument.
As a preliminary matter, Buchanan is correct that the district court did not expressly
consider his interests in engaging in sporting activities, practicing self-defense, and
protecting his home when determining whether he had shown good cause. But Buchanan
does not point to any legal authority requiring a district court to explicitly consider each of
a petitioner’s stated reasons for seeking to have his firearm rights restored. Rather, caselaw
suggests that a district court’s findings may be implicit. See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik,
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765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (deferring to a district court’s implicit credibility
determinations and factual findings); Hockenson v. State, No. A17-1933, 2018 WL
3097721, at *2 (Minn. App. June 25, 2018) (explaining that the district court “implicitly
rejected Hockenson’s proffered reasons” for wanting to possess a firearm and affirming
the district court’s denial of Hockenson’s petition).3 We read the district court’s order in
this case to have implicitly rejected Buchanan’s proffered reasons, to the extent that those
reasons were not explicitly addressed.
Thus, the question before us is whether the district court’s good-cause determination
is supported by the record. See Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at 561-62. Considering the record
as a whole, w e conclude that it is. With regard to Buchanan’s interests in restoring his
firearm rights, Buchanan provided no evidence to show that his interest in hunting is
genuine. Nor did he explain why he cannot hunt or recreate by some other means such as
with a bow. Likewise, Buchanan did not explain why he need s a gun to practice
self-defense or protect his home. Conversely, the district court’s concern for public safety
is supported by the record given the violent nature of Buchanan’s crimes and the relatively
short amount of time (about ten years) between when Buchanan was discharged from
probation and when he filed his petition , in view of his presumptive lifetime ban on
possessing firearms. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s good-cause
determination is not contrary to logic or the facts in the record. In sum, the district court

3 Hockenson is a nonprecedential case. 2018 WL 3097721, at *1. Accordingly, we cite it
only for its persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential
opinions . . . are not binding authority . . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.”).
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did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Buchanan had not shown good cause
to restore his firearm rights.
III. The district court properly exercised its discretion in analyzing its level of
comfort with restoring Buchanan’s firearm rights.

Lastly, Buchanan challenges the district court’s denial of his petition based, in part,
on the district court’s determination that it did not have a significant level of comfort with
restoring Buchanan’s firearm rights. A district court may deny a petition to restore firearm
rights, even when a petitioner establishes good cause, if the district court does not have “a
significant level of comfort with respect to the maturity of judgment in those seeking a
restoration of firearm rights.” Id. at 562; see Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (stating that
the district court “may grant” a petition to restore firearm rights (emphasis added)).
We first note that we need not reach this argument because, as discussed above, we
conclude that the record supports the district court’s determination that Buchanan failed to
establish good cause to restore his firearm rights. That conclusion alone provides a
sufficient basis for this court to affirm the district court’s denial of Buchanan’s petition.
See Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (requiring a showing of “good cause” before a district
court may grant a petition to restore firearm rights). But, even assuming Buchanan had
shown good cause, there is no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion
with respect to its “significant level of comfort” analysis.
In its order, the district court stated that it did not have a “significant level of comfort
with respect to the maturity of [Buchanan’s] judgment” because Buchanan committed two
crimes of violence, both of which carry presumptive lifetime bans on possessing firearms,
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and because one of the crimes involved serious injury to a victim. The district court
acknowledged Buchanan’s efforts to rehabilitate himself and lauded his “noticeable
achievements” since 2010, but ultimately decided that “there must be a longer length of
time in the record for [Buchanan] to establish he is law-abiding” before the district court
could grant relief.
Buchanan objects to the district court’s determination on several grounds. None of
these objections have merit. First, Buchanan argues that the lifetime ban does not apply to
him because his civil rights have been restored. Under Minn. Stat. § 624.713 (2022), a
person who is convicted of a “crime of violence” is prohibited from possessing firearms
“for the remainder of the person’s lifetime,” regardless of whether other civil rights have
been restored. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1, 3(a). There is no dispute that Buchanan
has been convicted of two separate crimes of violence. See Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5
(defining “crime of violence”). Thus, we reject this argument.
Second, Buchanan asserts that the district court should have reached a “significant
level of comfort” with restoring his firearm rights because “10 years is the maximum
amount of time that” a person convicted of a crime of violence can be prohibited from
possessing a firearm. Buchanan relies on an outdated version of Minn. Stat. § 624.713 to
support this argument. That version of the statute prohibited persons convicted of crimes
of violence from possessing firearms for ten years after their civil rights were restored or
their sentences ended. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (1998). Under current law,
persons convicted of crimes of violence are presumptively prohibited from possessing
firearms for life. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1, 3; see 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, art. 3, at
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290 (amending Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2002) to prohibit persons c onvicted of
crimes of violence from possessing firearms for life).
Moreover, as discussed above, even if such a person files a petition to have their
firearm rights restored and demonstrates good cause, the district court may still deny the
petition if it does not have “a significant level of comfort with respect to the maturity of
judgment” of the person seeking to restore those rights. Averbeck, 791 N.W.2d at 562; see
Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d. Ten years of abiding by the law does not automatically
satisfy the “significant level of comfort” standard. See Averbeck , 791 N.W.2d at 562
(holding that “the [c]ourt needs a significant level of comfort with respect to the maturity
of judgment in those seeking a restoration of firearm rights” without explaining what
satisfies this standard). Indeed, in Averbeck , the district court concluded that it did not
have a “significant level of comfort” with the petitioner’s maturity of judgment even
though the petitioner had committed only one crime of violence 19 years earlier. Id. at
561-62. Thus, Buchanan’s argument that ten years was sufficient for the district court to
reach a “significant level of comfort” in this case is not persuasive.
Third, noting that the state did not object to his petition, Buchanan argues that the
absence of an objection by the state indicates that he met the requirements to have his
firearm rights restored. Buchanan is correct that the state did not object to his petition. But
he provides no support for his assertion that the absence of an objection by the state
demonstrates that the district court must grant his petition. This argument is also
unavailing.
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For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Buchanan’s petition to restore his firearm rights.
Affirmed.