State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1182

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Michael Manton,
Appellant.

Filed August 21, 2023
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-20-2529

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Molly M. Doda, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal- Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Shawn Manton arrived drunk at his former girlfriend’s home and stabbed a man in
the back. Manton challenges his consequent second-degree-assault conviction, arguing that
the district court erred by not suppressing in -custody statements he made to a police
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investigator because the investigator initiated contact with him after he had been appointed
legal counsel. Manton also contends that the district court erred by admitting into evidence
a computer-generated report that organized data and text messages from his cell phone
because it deprived him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him and
because the report was not properly authenticated. Because a police investigator may
interview a represented, in-custody defendant who validly waives his right to have counsel
present, we hold that the district court did not err by denying Manton’s motion to suppress.
And because the computer-generated report containing Manton’s cellphone data does not
implicate Mant on’s rights under the Confrontation Clause and was sufficiently
authenticated, we reject his evidentiary argument. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Shawn Manton and his former girlfriend, whom we will call Andrea for her privacy,
exchanged dozens of increasingly hostile text messages throughout one day and into the
evening in July 2020. Andrea taunted Manton to come to her Moorhead home to confront
her in person, and, after consuming an unspecified number of alcoholic beverages, Manton
acquiesced. He parked at the McDonald ’s across the street from Andrea’s house and
walked over to her front door. Manton and Andrea argued, Andrea told Manton to leave,
and she shoved him away and closed the door.
Andrea’s friend, whom we will call Bill to maintain his privacy, was at Andrea’s
house. After Andrea told Manton to leave, Bill heard a noise near his motorcycle and went
to check on it. Manton stabbed Bill in the back with a paring knife. Manton drove to his
home across the border in Fargo. At the request of Moorhead police, a Fargo, North Dakota
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police officer arrested and jailed him. Moorhead Police Detective Shaun Van Dyke sought
to interview Manton at the jail in Fargo, where Manton was being detained. Manton refused
to be interviewed.
The State of Minnesota charged Manton with one count of second- degree assault
with a dangerous weapon. During his arraignment on July 31, 2020, Manton requested a
public defender be appointed to represent him. The district court denied his request.
Manton repeated his request for appointed counsel two days after the arraignment, and the
district court approved the request on August 3.
On August 4 and 5, Detective Van Dyke went to the Clay County jail where Manton
had been transferred and remained in custody, intending to interview him. Detective Van
Dyke read Manton the Miranda warning on both occasions, including the right to have
counsel present during questioning. Manton affirmed that he understood his rights and said
he was willing to proceed with the interview. Neither Manton nor Detective Van Dyke
were then aware that the district court had already appointed counsel to represent Manton.
Manton admitted during the August 4 interview that he went to Andrea’s house to confront
her. He denied getting into an altercation with another man, but he acknowledged that it
was possible and that, if it happened, it would have been in self-defense. He at first denied
stabbing the man, but he said he could not remember the events because of his drinking.
During the August 5 interview, the detective read text messages Manton sent to others
stating, “I just stabbed someone.” After he read Manton a text message he sent to Andrea
shortly after the altercation, which stated, “You need to take your man to the hospital; I
just stabbed the f--k out of him,” Manton acknowledged that he must have stabbed Bill. He
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added, “I don’t know how it went from fighting to stabbing; he must have threatened me
somehow. Something had to have happened. I assume both of them came at me, so, did
what I had to do.”
Manton moved the district court to suppress the statements he made to Detective
Van Dyke, contending that the detective violated his constitutional right to counsel. The
district court denied the motion , concluding that suppression was not warranted. The
district court based this conclusion on the fact that Manton had waived his right to have
counsel present during the interview and that Detective Van Dyke’s conduct was not
egregious because Manton and Detective Van Dyke were both unaware that Manton was
represented by counsel at the time of the interviews.
The primary dispute at Manton’s three-day jury trial was whether Manton stabbed
Bill in self- defense. Bill testified that he went to the backyard with Andrea to smoke
cigarettes after her confrontation with Manton at the door. Bill stated that he became
concerned that someone was messing with his motorcycle parked on the side of Andrea’s
house, and he went to investigate. He said that Manton appeared before he could reach his
motorcycle and said, “I got something for you.” He testified that both men squared up to
fight but that, before he could throw a punch, Manton swung and stabbed him in the back
with a knife. He said that Manton then returned to his car across the street. Andrea testified
that she did not witness the stabbing but saw Manton run towards the McDonald’s while
she tended to Bill’s stab wound.
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Detective Van Dyke testified, recounting his investigation and reading Manton’s
text messages admitting to the stabbing. The detective also testified that he interviewed
Manton in jail, and jurors heard a redacted audio recording of only the August 4 interview.
Manton testified claiming that he stabbed Bill in self-defense in the McDonald’s
parking lot after Bill chased him to his car. He testified that Bill swung at him, prompting
Manton to stab him once in the back because he could not get into his car without a fight.
Manton also discussed the text messages he sent after the altercation, insisting that he had
not stated that he was acting in self-defense in those messages because he was afraid and
did not know what was happening. He gave these same reasons to explain why he had not
described the events the same way during his interview with Detective Van Dyke.
The district court instructed the jury that if it found that Manton had acted in defense
of himself when he stabbed Bill , then he was not guilty of the charged crime. The jury
found Manton guilty of second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon, rejecting his claim
that he acted in self-defense. It sentenced Manton to a 21-month term of imprisonment,
stayed on probationary conditions. Manton appeals.
DECISION
Manton argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court improperly
admitted evidence, specifically, the content of his interview with Detective Van Dyke and
the report generated from information on his cellphone revealing data about the text
messages he sent shortly after the stabbing. He questions admission of the former on right-
to-counsel grounds and the latter on Confrontation Clause and authentication grounds. We
address the arguments in turn.
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I
We are not persuaded by Manton’s contention that the district court erred by failing
to suppress statements he made to Detective Van Dyke during his August 4 in-custody
interview. We review a district court’s pretrial order deciding a motion to suppress
evidence by considering the factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de
novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). Manton argues that the detective
violated his right to counsel by initiat ing the interview and proceeding with it without
notifying Manton’s counsel. The argument is unconvincing.
The argument fails because Manton validly waived his right to have counsel present
during this encounter. Both the federal and state constitutions entitle a criminal defendant
to counsel to aid in his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. “This right
attaches as soon as the accused . . . is subject to adverse judicial proceedings, including
arraignments.” State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 337 (Minn. 2007). This right entitles
defendants to have counsel present at all critical stages of the proceeding, including during
police interrogations. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009); State v. Ware, 856
N.W.2d 719, 725 (Minn. App. 2014). But a defendant may waive this right. Ware, 856
N.W.2d at 725 (citing Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786). After Detective Van Dyke informed
Manton of his right to have counsel present before both interviews, Manton expressly
waived that right before proceeding to answer questions.
Manton maintains that his waiver is invalid. For this he relies primarily on two cases.
He relies on Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981), which held that “an
accused . . . , having expressed his desire to deal with the pol ice only through counsel, is
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not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.” And he relies on Montejo, which he maintains left open the
question as to whether the Edwards rule applies to a defendant’s request for counsel at an
arraignment or similar proceeding. Minnesota caselaw has already resolved th is question
against Manton’s contention.
Our decision in State v. Ware, applying Montejo, refutes Manton’s theory. Ware had
repeatedly contacted police before being arrested, seeking to discuss an assault he had
committed. 856 N.W.2d at 722–23. The district court appointed Ware a public defender at
his first appearance. Id. at 723. An investigator went to the jail five days later to interview
him, unaware that he had been appointed counsel. Id. Ware waived his right to counsel and
made incriminating statements that he later sought to suppress. Id. We held that suppression
was not warranted, relying on Montejo and State v. Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d 64 (Minn.
2009). Id. at 725–26. We explained that Montejo was consistent with Minnesota precedent
holding that “[p]olice may speak with a defendant, even after appointment of counsel, so
long as the defendant does not clearly assert a desire to deal with the police only through
counsel.” Id. at 725 (quoting Buckingham, 772 N.W.2d at 70). And we expressly referenced
Edwards and its relation to Montejo as an essential case safeguarding a defendant’s rights
while in custody and subject to interrogation. Id. We concluded that “‘[w]hen a defendant
is read his Miranda rights’ in a post-arraignment interview ‘and agrees to waive those
rights, that typically’ constitutes a valid waiver for Sixth Amendment purposes.” Id. at 726
(quoting Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786). Because Ware validly waived his right to have counsel
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present during the interrogation, we held that his statements should not be suppressed under
the Sixth Amendment. Id.
Manton argues that the Ware court “did not explain how the defendant’s invocation
of his right to counsel by applying for a public defend[er] at his first appearance and the
police, not the defendant, subsequently initiating contact satisfied the Edwards rule.” But
the logic of Ware undermines this argument. We explained that, if a “defendant does not
clearly assert a desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” Edwards allows police
to initiate contact with the defendant and then interview him so long as police obtained a
valid waiver of Miranda rights. Id. at 725–26 (quotation omitted) . Requesting a public
defender at arraignment is not clearly asserting a desire to speak only through counsel. We
also need not address Manton’s suggestion that the state constitution may afford greater
protection to defendants than the United States Constitution; we have already held that
Montejo is consistent with state supreme court precedent on this issue. Id. at 726.
Under Montejo, Edwards, Buckingham, and Ware, Detective Van Dyke could
initiate contact with Manton despite Manton’s having already be en appointed counsel.
Manton does not argue on appeal that the waiver of his rights during his in-custody
interview was unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786
(explaining requirements for defendant to waive Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
Because Manton validly waived his right for counsel to be present during the interview
with Detective Van Dyke, the district court did not err by refusing to suppress the
statements made during the interview.

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II
Manton next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court
violated his right to confront witnesses against him by admitting into evidence the report
organizing and containing the data from his cellphone, including his text messages, and
alternatively because the district court failed to follow the rules of evidence by admitting
the report without sufficient authentication. Neither contention prevails.
The district court did not violate Manton’s right to confrontation by admitting the
report because the report is not a testimonial statement. The Sixth Amendment affords the
criminally accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.
amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Subject to exceptions, the Confrontation
Clause bars the admission of prior testimonial statements of an unavailable witness who
was not subject to cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights is a
question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Sutter, 959 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Minn.
2021). Manton did not raise his Confrontation Clause objection to the district court, so we
evaluate his contention under our plain-error standard of review. See State v. Ramey, 721
N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standard, the defendant has the burden of first
demonstrating that the district court erred. Id. Manton fails at this first step.
The report generated from Manton’s cellphone data is not a testimonial statement
under the
Confrontation Clause. It is the same sort of report we have held to be
nontestimonial. In State v. Ziegler, the state utilized software to extract data from a car’s
data recorder. 855 N.W.2d 551, 552–53 (Minn. App. 2014). Ziegler argued that the report
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contained testimonial information prepared for litigation. Id. at 554. We rejected the
argument, holding that machine-generated statements are not subject to a Confrontation
Clause analysis if the resulting report summarizing the data is not altered or modified by
human intervention. Id. at 557–58. Although our holding was limited to data “that do not
contain the statements of human witnesses,” id. at 558, our analysis focused on whether
the person utilizing the extraction software alters or manipulate s the data during its
extraction and recording, id. at 557. We emphasized that the class of testimonial statements
under the Confrontation Clause analysis generally includes extrajudicial statements like
affidavits or depositions, custodial examinations, or other evidence that “would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial.” Id. at 554 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52). Ziegler is instructive here.
The report generated from Manton’s cellphone data is likewise not a testimonial
statement. Detective Van Dyke executed a warrant to search Manton’s cellphone before
directing a technician to connect the phone to a data-extraction program and generate a
report of the phone’s contents and data. The detective received a copy of the report, and
the record does not suggest that the report was modified after the program extracted the
data. Under Crawford and Ziegler, we see no error in the district court’s decision admitting
the computer-generated report.
Manton also contends that the report was improperly a dmitted because it was not
sufficiently authenticated. The decision to admit evidence falls within the discretion of the
district court, and we will not reverse an evidentiary ruling unless the district court clearly
abused that discretion. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014); see also Turnage
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v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2006) (discussing standard of review for objection
based in foundation). Manton fails to establish that the district court abused its discretion.
The state laid sufficient foundation to authenticate the report. Authentication
requires evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). Evidence can be authenticated through
“[t]estimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Detective
Van Dyke testified that he obtained a warrant for Manton’s cellphone and directed the
technician to extract the data from the phone. The technician used an extraction program
to generate the report, and the detective received the report generated by the program and
confirmed that the report the state offered as evidence was the same report based on his
pretrial review of the exhibit. He also described the information contained within the report
and confirmed that the phone number associated with the report belonged to Manton. This
testimony sufficiently authenticated the report.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Manton ’s assertion that only the technician
could properly authenticate the report that the district court admitted into evidence. Our
caselaw does not require such a rigid approach. We have previously recognized that “it is
not the case . . . that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of
custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person
as part of the prosecution’s case.” Ziegler, 855 N.W.2d at 558 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009)); see also State v. Coy, 200 N.W.2d 40, 44
(Minn. 1972) (“Except when foundation and probative value are entirely absent, they bear
on the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.”). Manton was free to urge the
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jury not to rely heavily on the report by pointing out that the state produced only the
detective, but not the technician, to verify that the report accurately documented the
contents of Manton’s phone. But we are satisfied that the district court acted within its
discretion by admitting the report based on the detective’s testimony. Because the district
court acted within its discretion, we need not discuss whether the alleged error was
harmless.
Affirmed.