Jenny Rhoades, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1184

Jenny Rhoades,
Appellant,

vs.

The City of Bloomington,
a Minnesota Municipal corporation,
Respondent.

Filed July 3, 2023
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-21-9947

Jenny Rhoades, Plymouth, Minnesota ( self-represented appellant)

Susan M. Tindal, Andrew A. Wolf, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas , Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Jenny Rhoades challenges the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of respondent City of Bloomington (the city). Appellant argues the
district court erred when it granted summary judgm ent on appellant’s disability-
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discrimination, retaliatory-discharge, and failure-to-offer-continued-employment claims.
We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant began working for the city’s utilities division (the division) as the
division’s only part-time meter reader in 2015. 1 By January 2019, appellant typically
worked fewer than 28 hours weekly. Appellant’s job duties included driving to
residential and commercial customers to take meter readings to measure water
consumption. These duties required appellant to climb stairs, bend and kneel, work in
inclement weather, and traverse uneven ground.
Appellant shared the meter-reading duty with utility operators (UOs), a different
position within the division . UOs were full-time employees who also completed
infrastructure inspection, repair, and maintenance activities, and needed to have certain

1 The district court issued a stipulated protective order permitting the parties to file
certain evidentiary materials under seal , and the parties filed certain evidentiary materials
under seal according to that orde r. Those evidentiary materials remain under seal on
appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 112.01, subd. 1. The parties’ appellate briefs are not
under seal, and we are not constrained from disclosing information contained in the briefs
or appellant’s addend um. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4; see also
Coursolle v. EMC Ins. Grp., Inc., 794 N.W.2d 652, 655- 56 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2011), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011). Accordingly, the facts stated in this opinion are limited to
the facts st ated in the parties ’ briefs and other evidentiary materials in the record that are
not under seal. We have, of course, reviewed the record in its entire ty, i ncluding the
portions that are confidential and nonpublic, to ensure that the parties ’ briefs have
accurately stated the facts and to decid e the issues raised in the appeal.
3

training and licensure not required for appellant’s position. The city described both the
part-time meter-reader and UO positions as classified service. 2
In January 2019, appellant slipped on a patch of ice while taking a m eter reading
and injured her knee . Although initial physician consultations resulted in no work
restrictions, appellant’s condition deteriorated until, in February 2020, appellant’s
physician placed appellant on light duty work restrictions for approximately one month.
The division created light duty work for appellant, which she performed for a time, but at
appellant’s request, she returned to her meter-reading duties in March 2020.
Also in March 2020, the division predicted substantial financial losses due to the
developing COVID -19 pandemic and began internal discussions regarding cost -cutting

2 The city’s rules defined “[c]lassified service” as:

The group of positions having the entrance
requirements, recruiting procedures, formal classification and
rights as establis hed by these rules. Includes all regular
positions except the city manager, the city attorney, the
assistant city manager, and assistant city attorneys are not
covered by the merit system. May be full -time or regular part-
time positions.

The city’s rules provided that:

Each position in the classified service shall be assigned
to a classification (or “class”) on the basis of the duties and
responsibilities, authority, qualifications, and requirements of
the position. Positions in the same class shall be sufficiently
similar to permit the use of a single job title and the same pay
range or grade. The class may contain one or more positions.

(Emphasis added.) The city’s rules also note, “An appointing authority may layoff an
employee in the classified se rvice for lack of w ork, reduction of funds, elimination of the
position, or other material change in duties or organizational needs.”
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measures. In early April 2020, the division superintendent met with supervisors
throughout the division. During these discussions, the superintendent recommended
eliminating the part -time meter-reader position . The superintendent and appellant’s
supervisor agreed that the pandemic had reduced the division’s lab or needs and that the
UOs could absorb the part -time meter-reader position’s duties. Around April 20, 2020,
appellant’s supervisor informed appellant that the division had no more work for her that
week. When appellant asked why, her supervisor explained that the division was
“running out of work for [full -time employees].” Similarly, the record indicat es that the
division lacked work to assign appellant on April 30, 2020 because the pandemic had
reduced labor needs. The parties agree that appellant’s hours remained reduced
throughout May 2020.
Appellant had surgery on June 2, 2020, to address her work -related knee injury.
Following her surgery, appellant took approximately three weeks off. Despite having
some work restrictions into July 2020, appellant completed at least one meter -reading
route at the end of June. Around this time, the superintende nt told appellant that the
division would continue to have reduced labor needs for the foreseeable future.
On July 17, 2020, a human resource s (HR) representative emailed the
superintendent and appellant’s supervisor to summarize a phone call she had with
appellant. The HR representative said appellant believed “her job should be held for her ”
while she recovered from knee surgery, that the HR representative told appellant the lack
of work was unrelated to her knee injury, and that appellant “was not seein g how the
work has gone away.” The HR representative also expressed her “concern[] about the
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timing as this could easily appear to be disabi lity discrimination to permanently reduce
[appellant’s] hours by so much at this time.”
The city terminated appellant’s employment at a meeting on July 24, 2020. The
city informed appellant that her discharge was a “direct result of the impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic” on operations and “in no way related to her individual
performance.”
Appellant filed a complaint w ith the district court on October 28, 2021, alleging
disability discrimination3 under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.08, subd. 2 (2022), as well as retaliatory discharge and refusal to offer continued
employment under the Minnesota Workers ’ Compensation Act (WCA), Minn. Stat.
§ 176.82, subds. 1- 2 (2022). After a hearing, the district court granted the city’s motion
for summary judgment on all three claims. The district court determined that appellant
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that her knee injury qualified as a disability
under the MHRA, or that the city’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for her termination
was pretextual . With regard to the WCA claim s, the district court determined that the
parties did no t dispute that appellant received workers’ compensation benefits on certain
dates between February and July 2020. But the district court concluded appellant failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact because she “presented no evidence that her
termination was related to her receipt of worker’s compensation benefits.” The district
court finally concluded that even if appellant had raised genuine issue s of material fact, it

3 Appellant alleged she had a disability because her knee injury substantially limited her
ability to walk and care for herself.
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must grant summary judgment because the city enjoyed vicarious official immunity from
suit.
Appellant appeals.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment
because she raised genuine issues of material fact on her MHRA and WCA claims . We
review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Hanson v. Dep’t
of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 371 (Minn. 2022). “We will affirm a grant of summary
judgment if no genuine issues of material fact exist and if the court accurately ap plied the
law.” Id. at 371- 72. “In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all
doubts and factual inferences against the moving parties.” Id. at 372 (quotation omitted).
“Fact issue s exist when reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the
evidence presented.” Id. (quotation omitted) .
Employment relationships are generally at -will in Minnesota, so an employer may
discharge an employee for any reason or no reason, so long as the reason is not unlawful.
Id. Statutory exceptions exist that prevent an employer from discharging an employee for
improper reasons , including the MHRA, Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01- .44 (2022), and the
WCA, Minn. Stat §§ 176.001- .862 (2022). The MHRA prohibits em ployment
discrimination based on several protected cha racteristics, including disability . Minn.
Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. The WCA prohibits, among other bases , retaliatory discharge
7

or failure to offer continued employment because an employee seeks worke rs’
compensation benefits. Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd s. 1-2.
When reviewing summary-judgment decisions for the MHRA and WCA claims at
issue here, we employ the three -step analysis the U nited States Supreme Court articulated
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. G reen, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at
371-72 (MHRA claims) ; Schmitz v. U.S. Steel Corp., 831 N.W.2d 656, 670- 71 (Minn.
App. 2013) (WCA claims), aff’d, 852 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2014). 4 “At the first step, the
employee must establish a prima fa cie case of discrimination, the elements of which will
vary depending on the facts of the case.” Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 373. “ At the second
step, the burden of production shifts to the employer to provide some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason to expla in why it took the adverse employment action.” Id.

4 While Schmitz discussed McDonnell Douglas in the context of a retaliatory -discharge
claim brought under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 1, there is no controlling authority
expressly applying McDonnell Douglas to failure -to-offer-continued-employment claims
under Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subd. 2. For the purpose of this appeal, we conclude it is
appropriate to apply McDonnell Douglas to appellant’s failure-to-offer-continued-
employment claim. In Schmitz, we concluded that while the distr ict court must a pply
McDonnell Douglas to retaliatory -discharge claims in violation of Minn. Stat. § 176.82,
subd. 1, it need not do so for threat -of-discharge claims in violation of the same statutory
provision because “ [u]nlike the retaliatory -discharge context, in whic h the employee
suffers an adverse employment action, . . . for which there may have been a legitimate
reason, it is never permissible to deter an injured employee from seeking workers’
compensation benefits.” 831 N.W.2d at 671. But here, as with retaliat ory-discharge
claims, McDonnell Douglas is appropriate because it is possible that there was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the city’s failure to offer continued employment. See id.;
see also Kirk v. State, Dept. of Transp., A15- 0253, 2015 WL 5200798, at *5 (Minn. App.
Sept. 8, 2015) ( concluding appellant had failed to meet his burden to show pretext for his
failure-to-offer-continued-employment claim), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2015) ; Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecede ntial opinions . . . are not binding
authority except as law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, but nonprecedential
opinions may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
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(quotation omitted). “At the third step, the burden shifts back to the employee ,” id., who
must establish that the employer’s “ proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination ,”
Hoover v. Nw. Private Mortg. Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 542 (Minn. 2001).
Here, a ppellant challenges the district court’s decision that she failed to raise
genuine issues of material fact on her MHRA and WCA claims. We address appellant’s
claims in turn.
I.
Appellant argues the di strict court improperly granted summary judgment on her
MHRA claim. Appellant claims the city violated the MHRA when it discriminated
against her because of a disability —her work -related knee injury . See Minn. Stat.
§ 363A.08, subd. 2; Hoover , 632 N.W.2d at 542. When reviewing MHRA disability-
discrimination claims under the McDonnell -Douglas framework,5 we frequently apply
“principles which have evolved in the adjudication of claims under the [Americans w ith
Disabilities Act (ADA)]” because the two statu tes have substantial similarities. Hoover ,
632 N.W.2d at 542. Here, we assume without deciding that the parties met their
respective burdens to satisfy the first two steps in the McDonnell-Douglas framework,
because we conclude the district court correct ly determined appellant failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on the third step—pretext .

5 Respondent resurrects on appeal an argument that the district court rejected, asserting
that we should apply the elevated prima facie showing set forth in Dietrich v. Canadian
Pac. Ltd., 536 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. 1995), because appellant’s termination resulted
from a workforce reduction. But, r espondent conceded at summary judgment that it
lacked authority for the proposition that eliminating a single employee constitutes a
workforce reduction. We conclude the district court properly applied the McDonnell-
Douglass framework under the facts in this case.
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“The proper scope of inquiry on the issue of pretext is limited to whether the
employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.” Benassi v. Back & Ne ck Pain
Clinic, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn. App. 2001) , rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 11, 2001).
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “establish that there is a question about
whether the employer’s justification is pretextual that creates a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. ” Id. In Minnesota , an employee can show pretext “either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanati on i s unworthy of
credence.” Sigurdson v. Isanti County , 386 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. 1986) (citation
omitted); see also Hanson, 972 N.W.2d at 373 ( surviving summary judgment under the
pretext step includes offering evidence either that “the employer’s stat ed r eason is
untrue” or “that an improper reason ‘motivated the discharge decision’” ( citations
omitted)).
Here, the district court determined, and appellant does not dispute, that the city
“articulated a legitimate non -discriminatory reason for the disc harge – i.e., its budget
constraints and reduced staffing needs” due to the pandemic. On appeal, a ppellant relies
on two pieces of evidence she claims create d a genuine issue of material fact that the
city’s articulated, non-discriminatory reason was pretextual.
6 We conclude neither
creates a genuine issue of material fact.

6 Appellant argues for the first time on a ppeal that a genuine issue of material fact existed
because “ [t]here were websites of [a] city council meeting” that showed water usage
increased in 2020. We generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered
10

First, appellant argues that the HR representative’s June 17, 2020 email expressing
concern about discrimination liability shows that the city’s proffered reason for her
termination was pretextual. But employers charge HR personnel with ensuring legal
compliance. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. GlobalTranz Enter., Inc., 811 F.3d 282, 286 (9th Cir.
2015) (addressing HR director’s retaliation claim under -Fair Labor Standards Act and
noting em ployees like her are “responsible for ensuring compliance”); Makowski v.
SmithAmundsen LLC , 662 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting HR employee’s duties
included consultation with management regarding termination decisions and consultation
with outside c ounsel to ensure compliance with antidiscrimination laws). And the record
indicates the HR representative appropriately raised liability concerns with city
leadership. But m ore importantly, in the same sentence expressing liability concerns, the
HR repre sentative wrote, “[appellant] is not seeing how the work has gone away .”
(Emphasis added.) Far from pretextual evidence, the H R representative’s email
corroborates the city’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for appellant’s termination.
Second, appell ant argues she raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding
pretext when she presented evidence that she was the only “regular . . . classified worker”
the division discharged. “Instances of disparate treatment can support a claim of
pretext,” but ap pellant must present evidence showing “ [s]he and the disparately treated
[employees] were similarly situated in all relevant respects.” Harvey v. Anheuser -Busch,
Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted) ; cf. Peterson v. Minn. Dep’t of

by the district court. Thiele v . Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) . Therefore, we
decline to reach this argument.
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Labor and Ind., 591 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. App. 1999) (“An essential element of an
equal protection claim is that the persons claiming disparate treatment must be similarly
situated to those to whom they compare themselves.” (quotation omitted) ), rev. denied
(Minn. May 18, 1999) . “[T]he individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the
same supervisor, have been subject t o the same standards, and engaged in the same
conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” E.E.O.C. v. Kohler
Co., 335 F.3d 766, 776 (8th Cir. 2003).
Here, the record establishes that while appellant and UOs were employees in the
classified service, they did not belong to the same classification. The city’s rules state
that “[p]ositions in the same class shall be su fficiently similar to permit the use of a single
job title.” Appellant’s position was titled “part -time meter reader[,]” and did not share a
job title with UOs . And while UOs also took meter readings, their job duties included
several tasks which appellant’s did not, such as the replacement of water meters and other
infrastructural maintenance and repairs . Lastly, the city required UOs to have certain
training and licensure that it did not require for appellant’s position. Thus, UOs were not
similarly situated to appellant.7

7 Appellant also argues that the city failed to follow its own rules because employees with
“less seniority” should have been laid off first. But this argument presupposes that the
less-senior employees were in the same class. Because the evidence in the record shows
appellant was the only part -time meter reader, any less -senior employee would not be in
the sa me class. Additionally, the city’s rules state that the c ity “may layoff an employee
in the classified service for lack of work, reduction of funds, elimination of the position,
or other material changes in duties or organizational needs.” Appellant’s te rmination
does not violate the city rules . Therefore, app ellant’s argument does not demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact on the pretext issue.
12

For these reasons, we conclude appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact that the city’s stated non -discriminatory reason for discharging appellant was
pretextual. See Benassi, 629 N.W.2d at 482. We, therefore, aff irm the district court’ s
decision to grant summary judgment on appellant’s MHRA claim.
II.
Appellant separately challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment on her WCA claim s. Appellant argue s the district court erred when it
concluded she failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on both her retaliat ory-
discharge and failure-to-offer-continued-employment claims on the basis that she did not
set forth a prima facie case for discrimination . Under the first step in the McDonnell-
Douglass framework, to establish a prima facie case in this context , the employee must
meet three elements: “ (1) statutorily protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse
employment action by the employer [;] and (3) a causal connection between the tw o.”
Schmitz, 831 N.W.2d at 670.
The parties do not dispute, and we agree, that receiving workers’ compensation is
statutorily protected conduct and that discharge is an adverse employment action. See
Minn. Stat. § 176.82, subds. 1- 2; see also Randall v. N. Milk Prod s., Inc., 519 N.W.2d
456, 460 (Minn. App. 1994) . The parties dispute whether appellant introduced sufficient
causal-connection evidence to survive summary judgment. Appellant points to one piece
of evidence to argue she met her burden to show a causal co nnection—the city’s failure
to file a “first report of injury” with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry
until around the first time the division reduced her hours.
13

For both claims, the failure to timely submit a “first report of i njury” alone does
not create a genuine issue of material fact that a causal connection existed between
appellant receiving workers’ compensation benefits and appellant’s termination. If
anything, it demonstrates poor recordkeeping. Further, nothing in the record suggests
that the city ever attempted to impede appellant’s ability to receive workers ’
compensation, expressed displeasure over appellant receiving workers’ compensation, or
tied appellant’s termination to her receipt of workers’ compensation.8
For this reason, we conclude appellant failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact to meet her prima facie burden under the first step of the McDonnell -Douglass
framework.9 On this basis, we affirm the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment on appellant’s WCA claims.
Affirmed.

8 Appellant obliquely asserts in her issues statement that the division’s failure to follow
“city councils budget policies” established causation. Appellant for feits this argument for
otherwise failing to brief it. See McKenzie v. State , 583 N.W.2d 744, 746 n.1 (Minn.
1998) (applying the rule that arguments not briefed are waived in an appeal in which the
appellant “allude[d] to” an issue but “fail[ed] to addres s them in the argument portion of
his brief”).
9 Appellant argues the district court erred when it determined vicarious official immunity
barred her claim. B ecause we conclude appellant’s claims fa il on the merits , we do not
reach this issue.