Russel D. Stueckrath, et al., Plaintiffs,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1188

Russel D. Stueckrath, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Charles Stueckrath,
Respondent,

State Bank of Bellingham, et al.,
Defendants,

vs.

Russel Stueckrath, et al.,
Third-Party Defendants,

Ivan J. Stueckrath,
Appellant.

Filed February 27, 2023
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Lac qui Parle County District Court
File No. 37-CV-18-131

Jon C. Saunders, Anderson Larson Saunders Klaassen & Dahlager, P.L.L.P., Willmar,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Douglas D. Kluver, Kluver Law Office and Mediation Center, P.L.L.C., Montevideo,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In this family dispute over real property, appellant argues that the district court erred
in determining a deed ambiguous regarding when certain lien interests attached and in
granting reformation of the deed. We affirm.
FACTS
Duane and Margret Stueckrath were the parents of seven children: Charles, Russel,
Michael, Ivan, Roy, Joel, and Joyce. The parents owned 242.5 acres of real property in
Lac qui Parle County, Minnesota. In 2002, the parents executed a deed conveying that
property to Charles. The deed, by its terms, was subject to the following liens:
Liens in favor of each of the following named persons in an
amount equal to one-seventh (1/7) of the net sales price of the
property (after taking into account any state or federal income
taxes owing by grantee in connection with the sale of the
property) if it is sold within one hundred eighty (180) days of
the death of the survivor of Grantors and, if the property is not
sold, one-seventh (1/7) of the net appraised value of the
property (after taking into account any projected state or
federal income taxes owing by Grantee in connection with the
sale of the property) on the date of the death of the survivor of
Grantors as determined by a certified appraiser selected by
Grantee: Russel D. Stueckrath, Michael D. St ueckrath, Ivan J.
Stueckrath, Roy H. Stueckrath, Joel A. Stueckrath and Joyce
R. Stueckrath-Karges. The amount of the lien established
pursuant to the appraisal shall be paid in full, without interest,
within five (5) years of the date of the death of the survivor of
Grantors. The foregoing liens shall be subordinate to any
mortgage which Grantee may place upon the above described
property during the life of the Grantors and the survivor of
them.

3
Margret, the mother, died in 2005, and Duane, the father, died in 2013. At issue is
whether the liens attached in 2002, at the time of the transfer of the property to Charles, or
instead attached after the death of the surviving grantor, Duane, in 2013. This issue arose
because Charles sold 60 acres of the prop erty pursuant to a contract for deed to Michael
Gloege for $111,000 in May 2006. Thus, there is a dispute regarding whether the liens had
attached at the time of that sale and, therefore, whether the lienholders have an interest in
those sale proceeds.
In April 2018, Russel commenced the underlying suit against Charles, Gloege, and
State Bank of Bellingham, seeking recovery of the amounts owed on the liens and other
relief.1 Russel’s wife was later added as a plaintiff. Charles countersued, named his six
siblings as defendants, and sought declaratory relief. S pecifically, he sought an
interpretation of the deed and an order declaring the parties’ interests.
In February 2019, Charles moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the
deed unambiguously stated that the liens would only attach after the death of the surviving
grantor. Russel and his wife also moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the
unambiguous language of the deed the liens attached “immediately” and were in effect
when the 60 acres were sold to Gloege. The district court denied the parties’ motions for
summary judgment, concluding that the deed was ambiguous as to when the liens attached.
In 2020, the district court held a court trial to resolve the ambiguity and received
extrinsic evidence regarding the parents’ intent. The evidence showed that the parents

1 State Bank of Bellingham was later dismissed from the proceedings by stipulation.
4
feared losing the real property due to Duane’s nursing home bills and therefore transferred
the property to Charles to provide for their care. The district court found that the parents
did not intend to provide the children with the real property “to the exclusion of their own
care” and that the parents knew that they “may need to sell the real property if
Duane[‘s] . . . care exceeded what they borrowed.” The district court found no evidence
that the parents “wanted the liens . . . to arise prior to [their] deaths . . . thereby requiring
all of the Stueckrath children to sign off and agree in the event that any portion of the real
property . . . were to be sold.”
The district court found that Charles was involved in meetings with the parents
regarding the deed and repeatedly talked with his parents about the deed. Charles believed
that the liens would not attach until the death of both his parents. The district court found
as follows: (1) Charles “provided documentation . . . accounting for all of the proceeds
from the conveyance of the 60-acre parcel to . . . Gloege, as well as all other income
generated by the real property,” (2) Charles “provided check ledgers which showed the
expenses and deposits paid and made respectively, the date of each transaction, the other
party to the transaction, and the income generated from the real property,” (3) Charles
“provided loan ledger statements to allow for the tracking of the loan proceeds and the
payments on the loans associated with the real property,” and (4) Charles “provided detail
of bills paid, including medical expenses; nursing home bills; farm expenses; and property
insurance payments.” The district court also found that Charles was diligent in following
his parents’ requests.
5
Based on its findings, the district court determined that the liens did not attach until
the death of the surviving grantor, Duane, and, therefore, that the liens had not attached
when Charles deeded the 60 acres to Gloege. The district court concluded that Charles
owed each sibling “a one-seventh interest in the value of the remaining 182.5 acres.”
At the end of its order, the district court noted that Charles raised the issue of deed
reformation in his closing argument and that the issue had not been raised in the pleadings
or addressed earlier at trial. 2 The district court recognized that it may rule on issues
impliedly raised by the parties, but it determined that the issue of deed reformation needed
“further analysis and response by the parties.” It therefore reserved the issue. The district
court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 13, 2021, to address the reformation
issue.
On October 5, 2021, Ivan, Joel, and Joyce moved to compel discovery,3 asking that
Charles be ordered to respond to interrogatories served in August 2021. The interrogatories
concerned Charles’s financial documents and financial information about the property.
The attorney for Ivan, Joel, and Joyce argued that the financial information was necessary
“as the only outstanding issues seem to be as follows: (1) whether it is equitable for
Charles[’s] individual [c]apital [g]ains [t]ax obligation to be shared by the siblings; and (2)

2 In his proposed findings, Charles requested deed reformation “so as to require the sale of
the property, require the mortgage(s) to be paid, require the capital gains tax to be
calculated and paid, require the normal closing expenses to be paid, and require the balance
to be split seven ways between the seven Stueckrath children.”
3 While the motion was titled as coming from the third-party defendants, that is, all six
siblings, the motion was made by attorney Douglas D. Kluver, who represented only Ivan,
Joel, and Joyce.
6
whether the mortgage currently encumbering the property, was proper and should have
been paid off by the income from the land prior to sale.”
At the evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2021, none of the siblings presented
evidence or argument regarding Charles’s request for reformation. Instead, Ivan, Joel, and
Joyce presented argument on their motion to compel discovery. In January 2022, the
district court denied the motion to compel discovery, finding that the requested financial
information had “already been submitted into the record.” Following the January 2022
order, Charles requested “a final order on the issue of [r]eformation.” In February 2022,
the district court adopted Charles’s proposed reformation language and reformed the deed
as follows:
In accordance with the intentions of the Stueckrath
Parents, the 2002 Quit Claim Deed shall be REFORMED so
as to require the sale of the property for a price and to a
purchaser totally within the discretion of Charles Stueckrath.
From the gross sale price, all closing costs shall be deducted,
all mortgages shall be paid, an estimate of any resulting capital
gains tax owed by Charles Stueckrath resulting from the sale
shall be withheld from the proceeds, and the balance shall be
split seven ways between the seven Stueckrath children. Once
Charles Stueckrath calculates his actual capital gains, and pays
that amount, providing proof to his siblings, any remaining
amount of the sale proceeds shall be split evenly between all
seven Stueckrath children.

On March 10, 2022, Ivan, Joel, and Joyce moved for a new trial or amended
findings. In June 2022, the district court denied the motion as untimely. Ivan appeals.

7
DECISION
I.
Ivan challenges the district court’s determination that the deed is ambiguous,
arguing that the deed’s mortgage-subordination language indicates that the liens attached
when the parents deeded the property to Charles.
“[O]nly if a deed is ambiguous can evidence other than its language be considered
to determine its meaning.” Danielson v. Danielson, 721 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. App.
2006). “A deed is ambiguous if, judged by its language alone and without resort to extrinsic
evidence, it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted).
We review de novo whether a deed is ambiguous. Id. “Where the intent of the parties is
totally ascertainable from the writing, construction is for the court.” Mollico v. Mollico,
628 N.W.2d 637, 641 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted). In construing a deed, the
language is to be considered as a whole. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004).
Ivan relies on the following language in the parents’ deed: “The foregoing liens shall
be subordinate to any mortgage which Grantee may place upon the above described
property during the life of the Grantors and the survivor of them.” Ivan argues that “there
would be no need to include a mortgage subordination clause unless the sibling liens
attached immediately after execution of the Deed.”
The subordination clause suggests that the liens attached when the deed was
executed. It implies that the liens were in effect during the lives of the grantors and that
there was a need to subordinate those liens to any mortgages taken out by Charles during
that time. But the subordination clause could also reasonably be read as simply clarifying
8
that Charles could mortgage the property during the life of the grantors and that when the
liens arose after the death of the grantors, those liens were subordinate to any existing
mortgages. Thus, the subordination clause does not foreclose a second reasonable
interpretation that the liens did not attach until after the death of the surviving grantor.
Moreover, under the language of the deed, the lien amounts were not to be established until
after the death of the grantors and nearly all of the deed language concerns actions to occur
after the death of the grantors.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that the deed
was ambiguous.4 Indeed, in this case, separate parties moved for summary judgment, each
arguing that the contract was unambiguous and each setting forth a reasonable
interpretation consistent with their position, suggesting ambiguity.
II.
Ivan argues that the district court erred in reforming the deed because the issue was
not pleaded or litigated and because the district court “made no finding of a prima facia
case for equitable relief, refused to compel disclosure necessary to defend the reformation,
and . . . failed to receive evidence regarding the equitable relief sought.”
“[R]eformation of a written agreement is available when parties reached an
agreement, attempted to reduce it to writing, but failed to express [the agreement] correctly
in the writing.” SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 779
N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn. App. 2010), aff’d, 795 N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 2011). Using its

4 Ivan does not challenge the district court’s resolution of that ambiguity or the district
court’s post-trial findings supporting its determination of the issue.
9
equitable powers, a district court may reform a written instrument, including a deed, when
it is proved that
(1) there was a valid agreement between the parties expressing
their real intentions; (2) the written instrument allegedly
evidencing the agreement failed to express the real intentions
of the parties; and (3) this failure was due to a mutual mistake
of the parties, or a unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud or
inequitable conduct by the other party.

Theros v. Phillips, 256 N.W.2d 852, 857 (Minn. 1977).
“The evidence supporting reformation of a written instrument, including a deed,
must be consistent, clear, unequivocal, and convincing.” Id. We review a district court’s
findings on the issue of reformation for clear error. Id.
Ivan argues that the issue of reformation was neither pleaded nor litigated in district
court. However, the issue was not litigated because Ivan did not oppose the proposed
reformation when he had the opportunity to do so at the evidentiary hearing on October 13,
2021. As the di strict court noted in its post-trial order, the district court reserved its
determination on Charles’s request for reformation, which was made in his closing
argument at trial. By reserving the issue, the district court allowed “any party to object to
the request” for reformation or present argument as to why the issue of reformation was
not properly before the court. Indeed, the intended purpose of the October 13 evidentiary
hearing was to receive “any additional testimony, documents, or legal arguments”
regarding Charles’s request for reformation. Yet, “No such evidence was provided.” The
district court therefore granted the request for reformation “without additional hearing.”
10
Although Ivan, Joel, and Joyce subsequently moved for a new trial or amended
findings, arguing that Charles had “used reformation to create an unjust enrichment,” the
district court deemed the motion for a new trial or amended findings untimely, and Ivan
does not challenge that determination on appeal.
“Appellants must preserve objections and provide an adequate record to afford
appellate review.” In re Estate of Magnus, 436 N.W.2d 821, 822 (Minn. App. 1989). “It
has long been the law in Minnesota that an appellate court may not grant relief never
requested in the [district] court.” Id. at 823. Moreover, “a party cannot complain about a
district court’s failure to rule in [his] favor when one of the reasons it did not do so is
because that party failed to provide the district court with the evidence that would allow
the district court to fully address the question.” Eisenschenk v. Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d
235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
Ivan did not preserve his challenge to the reformation by presenting evidence at the
scheduled evidentiary hearing or a timely argument that would have enabled the district
court to rule in his favor. Even though the district court reserved the issue of reformation
and provided Ivan an opportunity to oppose it, he failed to do so. Ivan cannot now
complain that the district court did not make findings in his favor on the issue of
reformation. Nonetheless, in the interest of thorough review, we briefly address Ivan’s
arguments that the district court erred in granting reformation.
Ivan cites Nichols v. Shelard National Bank and argues that a district court must
“first determine[] whether a prima facie case has been made sufficient to invoke the
consideration of equitable relief in the first place.” 294 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1980).
11
Although Nichols stands for the proposition that the requisite elements must be satisfied
for reformation to occur, the case does not state that the district court must make a threshold
finding of a prima facie case before granting reformation. See id. at 734 (stating that a
written instrument may be reformed if certain elements are “proved,” and concluding that
the record did not support the district court’s order for reformation).
Ivan also argues that the district court refused to compel disclosure s necessary to
oppose reformation. I n denying the request for compelled disclosure, the district court
reasoned that the requested financial information had “already been submitted into the
record.” Ivan does not dispute that finding. And he does not explain how he was
prejudiced by the district court’s ruling given that the requested documents were already
available to him. Any error is therefore harmless and must be ignored. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 61 (requiring courts to disregard harmless error).
Lastly, Ivan argues that the district court “held no evidentiary hearing prior to
signing Charles’[s] proposed order granting reformation” and failed to receive evidence
regarding the request for reformation. The record refutes that argument. The district
court’s order granting reformation states that the court reserved the issue of reformation to
allow “any party to object to the request,” that the court held an evidentiary hearing on
October 13, 2021, “where any additional testimony, documents or legal arguments were to
be made concerning Charles’s . . . request for reformation,” and that “[n]o such evidence
was provided.”
Thus, Ivan has not demonstrated that the district court erred in ordering reformation.
Affirmed.