The holding in the court’s own words
2 Because we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment, we need not address Green’s assertions that he should be allowed to amend his complaint and to seek punitive damages.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Montemayor v. Sebright Products, Inc. 898 N.W.2d 623
- Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC 705 N.W.2d 746
- Star Centers, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P. 644 N.W.2d 72
- DLH, Inc. v. Russ 566 N.W.2d 60
- Bates v. Armstrong 603 N.W.2d 679
- Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co. 575 N.W.2d 578
- Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler 177 N.W.2d 786
- Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co. 565 N.W.2d 23
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1219
Carl Green,
Appellant,
vs.
USA Towing & Recovery, et al.,
Respondents.
Filed May 1, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge
St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CV-21-2257
Carl Green, Duluth, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Scott A. Witty, Hanft Fride, A Professional Association, Duluth, Minnesota (for
respondents)
Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant contends that respondent wrongfully towed his vehicle when it was
blocking a driveway he shared with his neighbor, and the district court erred by granting
respondent summary judgment because his neighbor’s shared ownership of the driveway
2
is a disputed fact. Because there is no factual dispute that appellant’s vehicle was blocking
the driveway and the driveway is subject to a reciprocal easement, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2021, Michael McArthur and his fiancé intended to leave their home but
were unable because a vehicle which belonged to their neighbor, appellant Carl Green,
blocked their shared driveway. McArthur and his fiancé attempted to contact Green to ask
that he move the vehicle. When their attempts were unsuccessful, they contacted
respondent USA Towing & Recovery. 1 USA Towing removed the vehicle from the
driveway and impounded it. The next day, Green demanded that USA Towing release his
vehicle from its impound lot but refused to pay the towing fee for his vehicle’s release.
Green sued USA Towing, alleging trespass, conversion of chattels, and negligence.
USA Towing moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had the legal authority to tow
Green’s vehicle based on McArthur’s request. The district court granted USA Towing
summary judgment based on McArthur’s easement right to full use of the driveway and
the undisputed fact that Green interfered with that right by blocking the driveway. Green
appeals.
DECISION
“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine ‘ whether there
are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of
the law.’” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017)
1 USA Towing is the trade name of respondent Troy’s Towing LLC, and respondent Troy
Dewall is one of the owners of USA Towing.
3
(quoting Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn.
2005)). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom
summary judgment was granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644
N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002). To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must
present sufficient evidence “to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions”
and create more than “a metaphysical doubt as to the factual issue.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ,
566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997).
Minnesota Statutes section 168B.035 (2022) outlines situations in which a towing
authority may tow a vehicle. A “towing authority” is, as relevant, “a private towing
company authorized by a local authority.” Minn. Stat. § 168B.035, subd. 1(1). There is
no dispute that USA Towing is a towing authority authorized by the City of Duluth.
Section 168B.035 “does not restrict the authority of the owner of private property to
authorize under chapter 168B the towing of a motor vehicle unlawfully parked on the
private property.” Id., subd. 5. “A vehicle may also be impounded after it has been left
unattended” on private single-family residential property as soon as it has been left
unattended. Minn. Stat. § 168B.04, subd. 2(b)(2)(i) (2022). The owner of an impounded
vehicle has the right to reclaim it “upon payment of all towing and storage charges resulting
from taking the vehicle into custody.” Minn. Stat. § 168B.07, subd. 1 (2022).
“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion or control over t he property of
another.” Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn.
Mar. 14, 2000). “Although a refusal to deliver property upon demand is evidence of
4
conversion, proof of conversion must also demonstrate repudiation of ownership rights by
the possessor.” Id.
Green argues that USA Towing is wrongfully exercising dominion and control over
his vehicle because the vehicle was located on his property and, therefore, USA Towing
did not have authority to remove and impound it. USA towing submitted to the district
court the easement agreement, which created a reciprocal easement “for driveway
purposes.” Green argues that the district court should have “allow[ed] discovery to show
the easement where [he] parked [his vehicle] is 100% owned by [him] and not 50% as
alleged.” We are not persuaded.
“An easement is an interest in land possessed by another which entitles the grantee
of the interest to a limited use or enjoyment of that land.” Scherger v. N. Nat. Gas Co. ,
575 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1998); Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 177 N.W.2d
786, 789 (Minn. 1970). An easement privileges its owner “to make particular uses of a
servient tenement,” but generally “does not preclude the grantor from using the land in a
manner not unreasonably interfering with the special use for which the easement was
acquired.” Minneapolis Athletic Club, 177 N.W.2d at 789. The extent of an easement
“depends entirely upon the construction of the terms of the grant.” Bergh & Misson Farms,
Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co., 565 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted).
The easement agreement created a reciprocal nine-foot-wide easement straddling
the property line “for driveway purposes.” McArthur and his fiancé submitted affidavits
stating that Green’s vehicle was parked on the driveway in a way that interfered with their
5
ability to use the driveway. Green presented photos of a different vehicle parked in a
different location and entirely on one side of the easement but does not dispute that his
towed vehicle was parked on the easement in a manner which interfered with McArthur’s
use of the easement.
Therefore, there are no genuine issues of material fact —an easement existed for
McArthur’s full use of the driveway, Green’s vehicle was parked on the driveway subject
to the easement, and it interfered with McArthur’s use of the driveway. Based on
McArthur’s request as a private property owner, USA Towing had the legal authority to
tow and impound Green’s vehicle and require payment of the towing and storage charges
before releasing the vehicle. Minn. Stat. §§ 168B.035, subd. 5; .04, subd. 2(b)(2)(i); .07,
subd. 1. Thus, USA Towing did not convert Green’s vehicle, and the district court properly
granted USA Towing summary judgment.2
Affirmed.
2 Because we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment, we need
not address Green’s assertions that he should be allowed to amend his complaint and to
seek punitive damages.