State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1222

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ivan Ray Vaughan,
Appellant.

Filed March 20, 2023
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CR-18-1414

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad M. Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Max Brady Kittel, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order revoking appellant’s probation and
executing his sentence for first-degree controlled-substance crime, appellant argues that
the district court abused its discretion by finding that the need for confinement outweighed
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the policies favoring continued probation. Because we discern no abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
FACTS
In March 2021, appellant Ivan Vaughan pleaded guilty to first-degree possession of
a controlled substance. Consistent with the parties’ plea agreement, the district court
sentenced Vaughan to a downward dispositional departure of 115 months in prison. The
district court stayed execution of a 115- month prison sentence and placed Vaughan on
probation.
In June 2021, Vaughan was charged with domestic assault. A probation violation
report was subsequently filed alleging that Vaughan violated the terms of his probation by
failing to remain law abiding. The report also alleged that Vaughan failed to complete a
chemical-use assessment and follow the recommendations. Addenda to the violation report
were later filed, the first alleging that Vaughan failed to remain law abiding because he
was charged with fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance, and the second alleging
that Vaughan admitted to using methamphetamine. Although the charges against Vaughan
were still “pending” at the time of the contested revocation hearing, the district court found
that Vaughan violated the conditions of his probation by using methamphetamine. The
district court then reinstated Vaugh an on his original terms of probation and ordered him
to serve 98 days in jail as an intermediate consequence with credit for time served.
Shortly after his reinstatement on probation, another probation violation report was
filed. It alleged that Vaughan violated the terms of his probation by failing to (1) maintain
contact with probation; (2) tell probation that he was charged with a new crime; and (3)
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submit to random testing. Addenda to the violation report were later filed alleging that
Vaughan tested positive for methamphetamine and failed to comply with testing as
directed. The district court found that Vaughan violated the terms of his probation by
failing to (1) maintain contact with probation as directed, and (2) submit to random testing.
The district court also found that the violations were “intentional and inexcusable.” The
district court, therefore, revoked Vaughan’s probation and executed his 115-month
sentence. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Vaughan challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his probation and execute
his prison sentence. “The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is
sufficient evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse
of that discretion.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). But we review
de novo whether the district court made the required findings to revoke probation. State v.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
In deciding whether to revoke probation, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
identified three factors, known as the Austin factors, that a district court must consider and
make specific findings on before revoking probation. See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250.
The Austin factors require a district court to (1) “designate the specific condition or
conditions that were violated,” (2) “find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable,”
and (3) “find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id.
When analyzing the third Austin factor, district courts must balance “the
probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and
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the public safety.” Id. To make a finding on the third Austin factor, a district court weighs
three “Modtland subfactors”: whether (1) “confinement is necessary to protect the public
from further criminal activity by the offender,” (2) “the offender is in need of correctional
treatment which can most effectively be provided if [the offender] is confined,” or (3) “it
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.”
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). Only one Modtland subfactor is
necessary to support revocation. See Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 283
(Minn. 2008) (stating that courts “normally interpret the conjunction ‘or’ as disjunctive
rather than conjunctive”).
District courts “should not assume that they have satisfied Austin by reciting the
three factors and offering general, non-specific reasons for revocation.” Modtland, 695
N.W.2d at 608. Moreover, probation revocation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an
accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior
demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295
N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). And a district court must be mindful that the purpose
of probation is rehabilitation, and revocation should be a last resort. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d
at 606. Therefore, district courts must make “thorough, fact-specific records” and “seek to
convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Id. at 608.
Vaughan challenges only the third Austin factor, arguing that the “district court’s
revocation of [his] probation must be reversed because the court’s finding that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation went against logic and was not
supported by the facts in the record.” But in addressing this factor, the district court made
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findings related to each of the three Modtland subfactors. Concerning the first Modtland
subfactor, the district court found that “confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity” because, while he was on probation, there were “admissions” that
Vaughan used methamphetamine and “[t]here are other offenses charged.”
Vaughan argues that, because the district court said new charges were “just
pending” at this point, they do not warrant a revocation of his probation. But an offender
need not commit a new crime for a district court to properly determine that confinement is
necessary to protect the public. See, e.g., State v. Rottelo, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App.
2011) (addressing and rejecting the “often-heard argument that [appellant] ‘committed no
new crimes’ while he was on probation”), rev. denied (Minn. July 19, 2011). Here, the
record reflects that Vaughan was charged with several offenses while he was on probation.
Although the charges were not resolved at the time of the contested revocation hearing, the
fact that Vaughan was charged with multiple offenses while on probation demonstrates
Vaughan’s continued anti-social behavior. The pending charges against Vaughan, when
considered in conjunction with Vaughan’s continued methamphetamine use, support the
district court’s determination that Vaughan’s confinement is necessary to protect the public
from further criminal activity.
With respect to the second Modtland subfactor, the district court found:
You are not particularly amenable to probation, as evidenced
by your failure to maintain contact with your agent. You
certainly need some kind of treatment, which can most
effectively be provided in prison. I mean, you are just not able
to get into treatment outside of a prison setting based on your
physical condition.

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Vaughan argues that the district court’s finding on this subfactor is “not supported
by the facts in the record” because “[w]hile the record is clear” that he “needs medical and
chemical dependency treatment, there is nothing in the record to support that [his] medical
dependency needs will be better addressed in prison as opposed to the community.” To
support his position, Vaughan refers to his “litany of health issues,” including his major
back problems. He claims that these “issues will be exacerbated in a prison setting,
whereas in the community, his insurance was adjusted, and he was working with his
doctors.” Vaughan also asserts that he had his back fusion surgery scheduled in the
community, and that “it seems unlikely that following a major back fusion surgery that
prison will be better equipped to rehabilitate [him] than his community doctors.” And
Vaughan asserts that his success at Teen Challenge, before his back injury, demonstrates
that his chemical-dependency-treatment needs would be better met in the community.
We are not persuaded. Vaughan’s probation agent reported that he has “continued
to see avoidance when it came to discussing treatment [with Vaughan] and that
[Vaughan’s] medical situation dominates his focus in attempt to avoid treatment.” The
agent also noted that Vaughan’s “back issue has existed for many years and continues to
persist as a priority to him. Yet, no surgical action has been taken to address it.” As the
agent told the district court, Vaughan has “been going on with this surgery for a long time,
but I have seen nothing of legitimate follow through of this process.” The agent then
explained that
unfortunately, that leads to when there is no follow through
there, or a lack of follow through of getting this surgery
scheduled only when it comes up in court and only when I’m
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looking to try and get him into treatment to assist his chemical
dependency needs, as well as some of his anger issues, that’s
when this surgery comes up.

And the agent stated: “I am not really understanding how [Vaughan] can’t go into a
treatment facility because his back pain is so bad, and yet, he can [work, and] drive all the
way from Alexandria down to St. James.” The agent’s report and testimony support the
district court’s finding that Vaughan is in need of correctional treatment that can most
effectively be provided if he is confined.
Finally, with respect to the third Modtland subfactor, the district court found that it
would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked
because Vaughan received a departure and he has “had multiple chances.” Vaughan
challenges this determination, arguing that, because his violations were “minor,” it would
not unduly depreciate their seriousness if probation were not revoked. But Vaughan failed
to submit to random testing and admitted to using methamphetamine, which was the
controlled substance he possessed that led to the charged offense in this case. In light of
the offense of which he was convicted, Vaughan’s violations were not “minor.” Although
the district court’s findings relating to the Modtland subfactors are relatively sparse, they
sufficiently convey the court’s substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence upon
which it relied. Accordingly, Vaughan cannot show that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking his probation and executing his sentence.
Affirmed.