Ronald Kenneth Maas, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1247

Ronald Kenneth Maas, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed March 20, 2023
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Faribault County District Court
File No. 22-CV-22-111

Thomas K. Hagen, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ryan Pesch, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Ronald Kenneth Maas challenges the district court’s order denying his
petition to rescind his driver’s license revocation. Appellant argues the district court erred
when it determined probable cause existed that he exercised physical control over a motor
vehicle while impaired. We affirm.
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FACTS
On February 11, 2022, around midnight, a Faribault County deputy observed a 2007
Dodge Durango (the Durango) in a snow -filled ditch. Upon approaching the Durango, the
deputy noticed it was unoccupied, locked, and turned off. Through the Durango’s window,
the deputy observed a plastic cup in the center console containing an amber liquid. The
deputy recognized the plastic cup as a type bars and other establishments use to sell alcohol.
The deputy left the Durango and did not interact with anyone.
Approximately two hours later, the deputy passed the Durango again. This time,
the deputy noticed a man, later identified as appellant, ne xt to the Durango. The deputy
observed appellant on the passenger side attempting to dig the Durango’s wheels out of the
snow. Appellant waved to the deputy seeking assistance . The deputy activated the
emergency lights and parked near the Durango. The deputy did not observe anyone other
than appellant within or near the Durango. At this time, the Durango was running with the
keys in the ignition.
The deputy asked appellant how the Durango ended up in the ditch. Appellant
admitted he drove the Durango into the ditch but provided an explanation the deputy found
inconsistent with the Durango’s current position. Appellant also told the deputy the
Durango belonged to him and that he had been drinking before driving into the ditch.
The deputy asked appellant about the plastic cup in the center console. Appellant
told the deputy he had recently placed the plastic cup in the center console . When the
deputy informed appellant that his story conflicted with her own observations, appellant
appeared confused. Appellant also mentioned he had been drinking beer in the back of the
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Durango after it went in the ditch and the deputy observed numerous empty beer cans in
the Durango’s trunk.
As the conversation progressed, the deputy noticed appellant exhibited signs of
intoxication. The deputy smelled a slight odor of alcohol emanating from appellant. The
deputy observed appellant had watery and bloodshot eyes. Additionally, the deputy
perceived appellant had slightly slurred his speech.
Appellant agreed to perform standardized field sobriety tests. The deputy testified
that appellant exhibited several indicators of impairment.1 When asked, appellant refused
to submit to a preliminary breath test. The deputy arrested appellant based on probable
cause that appellant exercised physical control of the Durango while intoxicated.
Appellant’s driver’s license was subsequently revoked.2
Appellant filed a petition requesting an implied-consent hearing. 3 Appellant sought
an order rescinding his license revocation . The district court held an implied-consent
hearing and heard testimony solely from the deputy.

1 The deputy administered the horizontal -gaze-nystagmus field sobriety test. The deputy
testified that appellant exhibited all six indicators of impairment during the test.
2 The record does not contain the statutory basis for appellant’s license revocation. But the
implied-consent hearing and the current appeal focus on “whether there is probable cause
to believe [appellant] was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in
violation of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) .” Both grounds for revoking a
license under the implied-consent statute require the same probable-cause showing, so we
need not examine the specific statutory basis for appellant’s license revocation. See Minn.
Stat. § 169A.52, subds. 3 (license revocation for test refusal), 4 (license revocation for test
failure) (2022).
3 A hearing to challenge the revocation of a driver ’s license under the implied -consent
statute is civil in nature, not c riminal. Harrison v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety , 781 N.W.2d
918, 919-20 (Minn. App. 2010).
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Following the hearing, the district court determined that “probable cause exists that
[appellant] exercised physical control over a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.” In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the following factual
findings: (1) “[appellant]’s vehicle was running, and he was in the process of trying to dig
it out of the snow”; (2) “by [appellant]’s own admission, he had been consuming alcohol”;
(3) appellant showed “physical symptoms of intoxication (e.g., watery and bloodshot eyes,
slurring of speech and odor of alcohol)”; (4) the deputy observed a “plastic cup filled with
amber liquid in the Durango’s center console”; and (5) the deputy observed “numerous
empty beer cans littering the trunk of the Durango.” The district court denied appellant’s
petition to rescind his license revocation.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues the district court erred when it denied his petition to rescind his
license revocation. Appellant asserts that (1) he did not exercise “physical control” over
the Durango and (2) the deputy did not have probable cause to believe that appellant was
driving while impaired.
The implied-consent statute authorizes a law-enforcement officer to administer field
sobriety tests if the officer has probable cause to believe that an individual “ was driving,
operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle” while impaired. Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.51, subd . 1(b) (2022) (emphasis added) . An officer has probable cause to believe
a person is in physical control of a vehicle while impaired when, based on the totality of
the circumstances, there is “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
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sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious [observer] in believing that the
person was in physical control.” Shane v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 587 N.W.2d 639, 641
(Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted) . Courts should give “great deference” to an officer ’s
probable-cause determination. State v. Olson, 342 N.W.2d 638, 640-41 (Minn. App. 1984)
(quotation omitted).
“A determination of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and law; once the
facts have been found, the court must apply the law to determine if probable cause exists.”
Otto v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Minn. App. 2019). We review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 642
N.W.2d 435, 440 (Minn. 2002). We will conclude that findings of fact a re clearly
erroneous only when we are “left with a def inite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review questions of law de novo. Harrison,
781 N.W.2d at 920.
I.
Appellant first argues the district court erred when it determined that he exercised
physical control over the Durango. We are not persuaded.
We give the term “physical control . . . the broadest possible effect” to “enable the
drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes” and to “deter individuals who have
been drinking from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers.” Shane, 587 N.W.2d
at 641 (quotations omitted). Thus, “physical control” encompasses more than “drive” or
“operate.” State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Minn. 1992). But “mere presence in
or about the vehicle is insufficient [to show] physical control; it is the overall situation that
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is determinative.” Id. at 838. Courts consider several factors when determining whether a
driver exercised physical control over a vehicle, including: “the person’s location in
proximity to the vehicle; the location of the keys; whether the person was a passenger in
the vehicle; who owned the vehicle; and the vehicle’s operability.” State v. Fleck , 777
N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 2010).
Appellant asserts that he did not exercise physical control because the deputy never
observed appellant seated in the Durango. But a person does not need to be seated behind
the steering wheel to exercise physical control over the vehicle. For example, in State v.
Woodward, 408 N.W.2d 927, 927-28 (Minn. App. 1987), we concluded a motorist standing
alone outside the rear of her vehicle was in “physical control” when the engine was running
with the key in the ignition. We noted that “a person is in physical control of a vehicle if
[they have] the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle and [they are] in close
proximity to the operating controls of the vehicle.” Id. (quoting State v. Duemke , 352
N.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Minn. App. 1984)).
Appellant also argues that he did not exercise physical control because the Durango
was inoperable. But we have repeatedly held that a person may exercise “physical control”
over a temporarily disabled vehicle. Flamang v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 516 N.W.2d 577,
580-81 (Minn. App. 1994) , rev. denied (Minn. July 27, 1994) ; see also Woodward, 408
N.W.2d at 927-28 (concluding appellant exercised physical control even though the vehicle
had a flat tire); Abeln v. Comm ’r of Pub. Safety , 413 N.W.2d 546, 547- 48 (Minn. App.
1987) (concluding appellant exercised physical control over a vehicle with a dead battery);
Duemke, 352 N.W.2d at 429, 432 (concluding the sleeping appellant stuck in a snow-filled
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ditch exercised physical control over the vehicle). “Inoperability or, more precisely, the
nature and duration of any inoperability, is simply a factor or circumstance to be evaluated
with all the surrounding facts and circumstances . . . in determining whether the situation
gives rise to physical control.” Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 839.
The facts in this case are similar to Starfield. There, the supreme court held that
Starfield exercised physical control over a vehicle when an officer found Starfield alone
behind the steering wheel in a vehicle that was stuck in a snow -filled ditch that could not
be moved without a tow truck. Id. When deputies arrived, Starfield’s vehicle was not
running, but the keys were in her pocket. Id. at 835. In determining that Starfield exercised
physical control over the vehicle, th e supreme court explained that “physical control is
meant to cover situations where an inebriated person is found in a parked vehicle under
circumstances where the car, without too much difficulty, might again be started and
become a source of d anger to the operator, to others, or to property.” Id. at 837.
Here, the record reflects an even clearer example of physical control, especially
when considering the factors outlined in Fleck. See 777 N.W.2d at 236. The deputy found
appellant, by himself, digging the Durango out of the snow. When the deputy arrived, the
Durango was running with the keys in the ignition. Additionally, appellant admitted the
Durango belonged to him and that he drove the Durango into the snow -filled ditch. In this
case, the “overall situation” supports the district court’s decision that appellant exercised
physical control over the Durango. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 838; Fleck, 777 N.W.2d at
236.
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For these reasons the district court did not err when it determined appellant
exercised physical control over the Durango.
II.
Appellant also argues the district court erred in determining the deputy had probable
cause to believe he “was driving while impaired.” To clarify, the district court did not find
appellant “was driving while impaired.” Instead, the district court found “probable cause
exists that [appellant] exercised physical control over a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.”
As discussed above, the district court did not err when it determined appellant
exercised physical control over the Durango. See Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 839; Fleck, 777
N.W.2d at 237. We now turn to whether probable cause existed that appellant exercised
physical control while impaired.
To determine whether probable cause exists to believe a person is impaired, a court
must examine the “ totality of the circumstances and the rational inferences that can be
drawn from those particular f acts.” State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 758 (Minn. 2021).
“One objective indicator of intoxication can constitute reasonable and probable grounds to
believe a person is under the influence.” Otto, 924 N.W.2d at 661 (quotation omitted) .
Common indicia o f intoxication include bloodshot and watery eyes, the odor of alcohol,
slurred speech, the admission of drinking, an uncooperative attitude, and failing or having
difficulty with field sobriety tests. See id. (citations omitted) ; Reeves v. Comm ’r of Pub.
Safety, 751 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Minn. App. 2008).
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Here, the deputy observed signs and circumstances which gave her probable cause
to believe appellant was impaired while in physical control over the Durango. The record
shows that appellant: (1) admitted he had consumed alcohol; (2) exhibited symptoms of
intoxication; (3) placed a plastic cup with amber liquid in the Durango’s center console;
and (4) consumed beer and scattered beer cans around the Durango ’s trunk. Additionally,
when the deputy administered the field sobriety test, appellant exhibited several indicators
of intoxication. These circumstances provided probable cause to believe appellant was
under the influence. Otto, 924 N.W.2d at 662 (“An admission of drinking, coupled with
other indicators of intoxication, is generally sufficient probable cause to arrest [for driving
under the influence].”).
The circumstances the deputy observed upon arriving at the Durango, combined
with appellant’s own admissions, support the district court’s determination that the deputy
had probable cause to believe appellant exercised physical control over the Durango while
impaired. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d at 837; Fleck, 777 N.W.2d at 237; Taylor, 965 N.W.2d
at 758. For these reasons, the district court appropriately denied appellant’s petition.
Affirmed.