State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1248

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Majed Issac Ijong,
Appellant.

Filed May 22, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-17-7367

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Hooten,
Judge.∗

∗Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Majed Issac Ijong was placed on probation after he pleaded guilty to second-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Ten times he violated conditions of his probation but was
continued on probation. After the eleventh violation, the district court revoked Ijong’s
probation and imposed an executed sentence of 36 months of imprisonment. We conclude
that the district court did not err by finding that Ijong made a valid waiver of his right to
counsel at the final probation-violation hearing. We also conclude that the district court
did not err by revoking Ijong’s probation and imposing an execut ed prison sentence.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2018, the state charged Ijong in an amended complaint with three counts
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a)
(2016), and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2016). The state alleged that, in September and October of
2017, Ijong sexually abused a four-year -old girl by inserting his penis in her mouth,
touching her genital area with his hand, and touching her genital area with his mouth.
In March 2018, after a rule 20.01 competency evaluation, the district court found
that Ijong was mentally ill and incapable of understanding the criminal proceedings and
participating in his defense, and the case was stayed. Two months later, it was determined
that Ijong “no longer required hospital level of care,” and he was discharged from a
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treatment facility and returned to jail. In September 2018, the district court found that Ijong
was competent, and the case was reactivated.
In October 2018, the state and Ijong entered into a plea agreement. Ijong agreed to
plead guilty to the second-degree charge in count 4, and the state agreed to dismiss the
other charges. Ijong admitted that, in September 2017, he touched the girl’s genital area
with his mouth on two occasions and inserted his penis into her mouth on one occasion.
In December 2018, the district court stayed imposition of sentence and placed Ijong
on probation, with numerous conditions, for 25 years.
During the next three and one-half years, Ijong violated conditions of his probation
on multiple occasions. On some of those occasions, Ijong admitted in writing that he had
violated conditions of his probation and agreed to participate in a “sanctions conference”
with his assigned probation officer in lieu of a court hearing. On other occasions, the
district court conducted a hearing and made a finding that Ijong had violated conditions of
his probation.
First, in February 2019, Ijong admitted in writing that he contacted the victim or her
family without approval. He agreed to three particular sanctions, including the sanction of
staying three blocks away from the victim’s home.
Second, in May 2019, Ijong admitted during a court hearing that he did not maintain
probation-approved housing after he was discharged from a halfway house for
“[i]nappropriate sexual behavior.” The district court found that he violated a condition of
his probation, reinstated him on probation, and ordered that he serve up to 50 days in jail.
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Third, in March 2021, Ijong admitted during a court hearing that he used alcohol,
accessed pornography, contacted the victim’s mother through social media, and refused to
submit to a search requested by his probation officer. The district court found that he
violated conditions of his probation and continued his probation with the same conditions.
Fourth, in July 2021, Ijong admitted in writing that he contacted a minor, accessed
social media without permission, used alcohol, and possessed pornography. He agreed to
the sanction of being placed on GPS monitoring.
Fifth, in August 2021, Ijong admitted during a court hearing that he refused to
submit to a search requested by his probation officer, refused to submit to a random drug
test, and did not comply with the requirements of GPS monitoring. The district court found
that he violated conditions of his probation, reinstated him on probation, and ordered that
he serve 20 days in jail.
Sixth, in September 2021, Ijong admitted in writing that he used marijuana. He
agreed to the sanction of completing an updated chemical-use assessment and abiding by
the assessor’s recommendations.
Seventh, again in September 2021, Ijong admitted during a court hearing that he did
not take his medications as prescribed. Ijong’s probation officer stated that Ijong had “a
ton of technical violations,” that “at some point his treatment provider is going to run out
of options,” and that Ijong should know that “this behavior needs to stop.” The state
requested that the district court revoke the stay of imposition and convert it to a stay of
execution. The district court maintained the stay of imposition but informed Ijong that he
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had “one more opportunity to keep the stay of imposition and keep the felony off your
record.”
Eighth, in October 2021, Ijong admitted in writing that he access ed social media
without permission, accessed pornography, and disabled his GPS monitor. He agreed to
the sanction of complying with the requirements of GPS monitoring.
Ninth, in December 2021, Ijong admitted in writing that he access ed the internet
without permission, contacted the victim’s family through social media, and accessed
social media without permission. He agreed to the sanction of complying with the rules of
his treatment facility and the directives of its staff.
Tenth, in April 2022, Ijong’s probation officer filed a pr obation-violation report
alleging that Ijong violated a probation condition when his participation in a sex-offender-
treatment program was terminated. Ijong admitted during a court hearing that he
committed the alleged violation. The parties agreed that the district court should continue
Ijong on probation with additional conditions that required him to serve 10 days in jail, to
then re-enter a treatment program for two months, and to then serve 60 additional days in
jail. The district court adopted the parties’ recommendation.
Finally, in May 2022, Ijong’s probation officer filed a probation-violation report
alleging that Ijong possessed pornography and other sexually explicit materials, some of
which depicted partially clothed children, and did not take his medications as prescribed.
At an admit-deny hearing later that month, Ijong informed the district court that he wanted
to represent himself. The district court conducted a contested revocation hearing in June
2022. At the outset of the hearing, Ijong reiterated that he wanted to represent himself.
6
The district court asked him a series of questions to confirm that he did not want an attorney
and wanted to represent himself. The district court received testimony from Ijong’s
probation officer and from Ijong. After listening to the oral arguments of Ijong and the
prosecutor, the district court revoked the stay, imposed a sentence of 36 months of
imprisonment, and ordered execution of the sentence. Ijong appeals.
DECISION
I. Waiver of Right to Counsel
Ijong first argues that the district court erred by not obtaining a valid waiver of his
constitutional right to counsel.
Both the United States and Minnesota constitutions give criminal defendants a right
to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. In Minnesota,
it is well established that the right to counsel applies at a probation-revocation hearing.
Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 2 (2022); Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 2(1)(c)a; State v.
Ferris, 540 N.W.2d 891, 893 (Minn. App. 1995). Likewise, criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975);
State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 2003). Accordingly, “forcing a lawyer
upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants
to do so.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817.
A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel “may be relinquished in three ways:
(1) waiver, (2) waiver by conduct, and (3) forfeiture.” State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496,
504 (Minn. 2009). In this case, the parties’ arguments focus on the first means by which a
defendant may relinquish the constitutional right to counsel: waiver.
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“Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right.” Id. To be valid, a
waiver of the constitutional right to counsel must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
Id. Whether a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel is valid “depends ‘upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused.’” State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 275-76 (Minn.
1998) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). To ensure that a waiver is
valid, a defendant “‘should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. at 276 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).
Specifically, a district court “‘ should comprehensively examine the defendant regarding
the defendant ’s comprehension of the charges, the possible punishments, mitigating
circumstances, and any other facts relevant to the defendant’s understanding of the
consequences of the waiver.’” Id. (quoting State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 173 (Minn.
1997)).
If a district court finds that a defendant has made a valid waiver of the right to
counsel, this court applies a clear-error standard of review to that finding. Id. If the
relevant facts are undisputed, this court applies a de novo standard of review to the question
whether a defendant’s waiver is constitutionally valid. State v. Rhoads, 813 N.W.2d 880,
885 (Minn. 2012). If a district court does not conduct a proper inquiry concerning a
defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel, reversal is required only if “the particular facts
and circumstances of the case” do not “demonstrate a valid waiver.” Id. at 889.
8
In this case, the district court made multiple inquiries of Ijong in response to his
statement that he wanted to represent himself at the probation-revocation hearing. At the
outset of the June 2022 hearing, the district court confirmed that Ijong had been offered
but had declined a public defender. The district court confirmed that Ijong still wanted to
represent himself. The district court asked Ijong whether he was “thinking clearly today”
and whether he was “under the influence of any alcohol or mood-altering substances,” and
Ijong gave clear, satisfactory responses to both questions. On two occasions, the district
court explained to Ijong—and confirmed that he understood—that the hearing was a
contested revocation hearing. Specifically, the district court explained that the state had
the burden to prove that Ijong violated conditions of his probation and that the violations
were intentional and inexcusable and, further, that if the state satisfied its burden on those
issues, the district court would “decide whether you stay on probation or whether you need
to be sent to prison.” The district court confirmed that Ijong understood that the state was
recommending that Ijong “be sent to prison.” The district court also confirmed that Ijong
understood that he had “a right to be represented by an attorney to . . . help you fight the
probation violation as well as help you put forth a case for staying on probation” but that,
“if you represent yourself, you’re going to have to do that on your own.” The district court
further confirmed, with four additional questions, that Ijong was sure that he wanted to
represent himself and would not change his mind. The district court then proceeded with
the hearing.
Ijong contends that his waiver of his constitutional right to counsel is invalid for
four reasons. First, he contends that his waiver is invalid because he did not sign a written
9
waiver pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure. Ijong cites a rule providing that, at a
first appearance in a felony case, a district court “must ensure that defendants charged with
a felony who appear without counsel, do not request counsel, and wish to represent
themselves, enter on the record a voluntary and intelligent written waiver of the right to
counsel.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). The next sentence of the rule provides, “If
the defendant refuses to sign the written waiver form, the waiver must be made on the
record.” Id. The provisions of rule 5.04 generally apply to a defendant’s first appearance
after the initiation of probation-revocation proceedings. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04,
subd. 2(2). We are unaware of any caselaw for the proposition that rule 5.04, subdivision
1(4), applies at a probation-revocation hearing. In any event, this court has held that, “even
if a waiver is not in writing, it may still be constitutionally valid if the circumstances
demonstrate that the defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his
right to counsel.” State v. Haggins, 798 N.W.2d 86, 90 (Minn. App. 2011) (affirming
waiver of counsel at fourth pre-trial hearing) . Thus, Ijong’s waiver of his constitutional
right to counsel is not invalid simply because it was not in writing. Nonetheless, we note
that parties and district courts may choose to use written waivers of counsel in th is
circumstance, which would help ensure that a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel
is valid.
Second, Ijong contends that his waiver is invalid on the ground that the district court
conducted a “limited examination into [his] comprehension of the proceedings or any other
facts relevant to [his] understanding of the consequences of the waiver.” As stated above,
a district court “should comprehensively e xamine the defendant regarding [1] the
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defendant’s comprehension of the charges, [2] the possible punishments, [3] mitigating
circumstances, and [4] any other facts relevant to the defendant’s understanding of the
consequences of the waiver.” Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 276 (quotation omitted; numerals
added). Ijong has not identified any particular subject that was missing from the district
court’s inquiry. The district court’s inquiry satisfies the requirements of Worthy. The
district court clearly explained to Ijong that the hearing would be concerned with whether
he had violated a condition of his probation and, if so, the consequences of such a violation.
The district court confirmed that Ijong understood that he could be sent to prison. The
district court confirmed that Ijong understood that, after waiving his right to counsel, he
would be responsible for representing himself. The district court’s inquiry was not
“limited”; it was as “comprehensive” as is required by Worthy.
Third, Ijong contends that his waiver is invalid on the ground that his decision “was
heavily influenced by his understanding that, if he chose to use counsel, he would remain
in custody.” At the admit-deny hearing, Ijong stated that he would lose his job if he did
not return to work within three days. The district court was unable to schedule the
revocation hearing for a date any sooner than seven days later. At the revocation hearing,
Ijong did not make any further reference to his employment. Ijong did, however, ask the
district court whether, if he requested an attorney, he would need to remain in custody. The
district court responded by saying that Ijong would remain in custody until an attorney was
appointed and that the district court would appoint an attorney without waiting for Ijong to
apply for an attorney. Ijong then said, “Okay, we can proceed today.” In light of “the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case,” id. at 275, it does not appear that
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Ijong’s decision was unduly influenced by his interest in the earliest possible resolution.
Rather, it appears that the primary reasons why he waived his right to counsel were, as he
said at the admit-deny hearing, he believed that he could represent himself better than an
attorney and he wanted to express himself in his own words.
Fourth, Ijong contends that his waiver is invalid on the ground that the district court
did not specifically inquire into Ijong’s mental health or ask whether he was taking his
medications as prescribed. Ijong asserts that the district court should have done so in light
of the previous finding of incompetency and Ijong’s prior violations for not taking his
medications as prescribed. Ijong does not cite any caselaw for the proposition that
additional inquiries are required if a defendant has a history of mental illness. He does not
assert that he was not competent at the time of the revocation hearing, nor does he identify
anything in the record of the hearing that might give rise to doubts about his competence.
In any event, the district court did make an inquiry into this subject by asking Ijong whether
he was thinking clearly and whether he was under the influence of any mood-altering
substances. The district court may have intentionally refrained from asking Ijong whether
he was taking his medications as prescribed because that was one of the alleged violations
to be determined at the hearing. In short, the district court did not err by not making more
detailed inquiries into Ijong’s mental health.
Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that Ijong made a valid waiver
of his constitutional right to counsel.

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II. Revocation of Probation
Ijong also argues that the district court erred by revoking his probation. Specifically,
he argues that the need for his confinement does not outweigh the policies favoring
probation.
If a probationer violates one or more conditions of probation, a district court may
either continue the probationer on probation or revoke probation and execute the sentence.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b)(iv)-(v). The supreme court has prescribed a three-
step analysis to guide district courts in deciding whether to revoke probation. A district
court may revoke probation only if the court (1) designates the specific condition that has
been violated, (2) finds that the violations were “intentional or inexcusable,” and (3) finds
“that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” State v. Austin, 295
N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). A district court may find that the third Austin factor is
satisfied if any of three sub-factors is present: (1) confinement is needed to “‘protect the
public from further criminal activity by the offender,’” (2) confinement is necessary to
provide treatment, or (3) a further stay of the sentence “‘ would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the violation.’” Id. at 251 (quoting A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice,
Probation § 5.1(a) (Approved Draft 1970)). In making these findings, district courts “must
seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” State
v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. 2005). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion
standard of review to a district court’s decision to revoke probation. Id. at 605.
In this case, Ijong challenges the district court’s decision only with respect to the
third Austin factor: that the “need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
13
probation.” See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250. The district court found that the third Austin
factor is satisfied by relying on the third sub-factor. Specifically, the district court stated
to Ijong that “to not revoke your probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness not
only of these violations, but the prior violations, . . . your whole history of probation.” Id.
at 251. Before making that finding, the district court noted that Ijong had violated
conditions of his probation 11 times, that his probation officer nine times had worked with
him instead of recommending revocation of probation, that he had a “fairly serious”
violation when he was terminated from a sex-offender-treatment program but his probation
officer still did not recommend revocation, and that the current violations were “very
serious.” The district court was especially troubled by Ijong’s possession of pornography
and his viewing of images depicting partially clothed children.
Ijong argues that the evidence does not support a finding that the third Austin factor
is satisfied. He contends that, although much of his time on probation was “turbulent,” he
was showing progress in his rehabilitation and was taking responsibility for his actions.
He further contends that the district court had “other options,” such as additional jail time
or a mental-health evaluation.
The record provides ample support for the district court’s determination that not
revoking probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of Ijong’s violations. Ijong
had violated conditions of his probation on ten prior occasions, which is a remarkable fact
in itself. In addition, Ijong was found to be in possession of pornography and images of
partially clothed children, which is a serious violation in light of the fact that he was
convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct by engaging in sexual penetrati on of
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a four-year-old girl. Furthermore, Ijong had committed three prior violations by accessing
pornography. Moreover, he previously had been terminated from a sex-offender-treatment
program and, despite being reinstated, had not completed the program at the time of the
revocation hearing. The district court had attempted numerous lesser sanctions, including
jail time, but none of them proved effective in inducing Ijong’s compliance with the
conditions of his probation. The district court was well within its discretion when it
determined in June 2022 that not revoking Ijong’s probation would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of his probation violations.
Thus, the district court did not err by revoking Ijong’s probation and imposing an
executed prison sentence.
Affirmed.