State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1287

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mohammed Abdi Dahir,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-16471

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree assault and attempted second-
degree intentional murder, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
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(1) permitting the state to present his statement to police through an officer’s testimony
because the recording of the statement is the best evidence and (2) imposing an upward
durational departure. In a pro se supplemental brief, appellant challenges the district
court’s handling of his mental-illness evaluation and the deliberating jury’s request for a
transcript of several witnesses’ testimony. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2020, appellant Mohammed Abdi Dahir shared an apartment with A.J., his
roommate of several years, and M.J., who had been staying with them for a few months.
The evening of July 24, Dahir entered A.J.’s room, telling A.J. that he paid his share of the
electricity bill. He approached A.J. and asked about money he owed A.J., which A.J. did
not recall. Dahir then pulled out a knife and started stabbing A.J., first in the stomach then
all over his body. M.J. heard A.J. screaming from the other room and went to see what
was happening. A.J. was partially obscured by the bed, but M.J. could see Dahir standing
over him holding what appeared to be a metal object and moving his hand “in a downward
motion.” M.J. fled and called 911, reporting that two men were “fighting very bad.”
Dahir continued stabbing A.J. all over, despite A.J.’s pleas for him to stop. At one
point, Dahir left the room and then returned and continued stabbing A.J. After what A.J.
estimated to be 20 minutes, Dahir left. A.J. struggled to call 911 because his phone was
covered in blood, then struggled to speak because his mouth was full of blood. A.J. told
the dispatcher that he had been stabbed and did not think he would survive.
When police arrived, M.J. pointed out Dahir, who was in his car. They detained
Dahir and used his keys to enter the apartment. They discovered A.J. inside; his intestines
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were protruding from his body, and he had cuts “all over.” And they found a bloody knife
in a garbage can. A.J.’s injuries were extensive: an eviscerated bowel; multiple lacerations
on his face and head— nose, cheek, left ear, scalp, eyebrows, eyelids, and underneath the
eyes—and a fracture to underlying bone; a stab wound to his neck that fractured a vertebra;
a stab wound to his right knee that exposed muscle; a stab wound to his chest that fractured
a rib; a lacerated spleen and liver; and additional stab wounds to his back, chest, shoulders,
elbow, arms, hands, and fingers. Several of the injuries were independently life-
threatening, and A.J. required a “massive” blood transfusion and multiple surgeries.
Photographs taken of Dahir in police custody reveal only minor hand injuries.
After advising Dahir of his rights, a Minneapolis Police sergeant interviewed Dahir.
The recorded interview was partially in English and partially in Somali, with the assistance
of an interpreter. Dahir told the sergeant that A.J. was his roommate, they got in a fight
“over some type of bill” and were “pushing each other,” and he stabbed A.J. with a knife.
Dahir did not know how many times he stabbed A.J. and acknowledged that A.J. did not
have a weapon.
Dahir was charged with first-degree assault and attempted second-degree intentional
murder. Dahir requested an examination to evaluate a possible mental-illness defense
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02. The evaluator did not support the defense.
At trial, A.J. and M.J. testified about the incident, and the jury heard both men’s 911
calls. A.J. described the nature and long- term effects of his injuries, and a nurse testified
about the extent of A.J.’s injuries and his treatment. The sergeant testified about his
interview with Dahir. Dahir objected that the state should present the full recording of the
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interview under the best-evidence rule. B ut the district court overruled the objection, and
the sergeant recounted Dahir’s statements to him.
Dahir testified in his own defense. He described tension with his roommates over
financial concerns in July 2020 and an incident the prior month in which A.J. lunged toward
him with a knife. Regarding the incident in question, Dahir testified that A.J. initiated the
altercation by yelling about paying the electric bill and grabbing him. Dahir tried to escape
through the kitchen, but A.J. pursued him. Dahir picked up a knife, which he used to
“pok[e]” A.J. after A.J. got a hold of him and began squeezing. When A.J. tackled him to
the floor, punched him, and attacked his eyes, Dahir “scraped” the knife “along [A.J.’s]
abdomen.” Dahir then wanted to go to a “safe spot” and heard A.J. calling 911, so he left
the apartment and went to his car to wait for police.
On the first day of deliberations, the jury sent a note to the district court requesting
“testimony from” M.J., A.J., Dahir, and “police,” and the police interviews with Dahir and
A.J. The district court described the request as “basically [asking for] a transcript of the
trial” and noted that none of the recorded police interviews were introduced in evidence.
Upon the agreement of the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Dahir, the district court told
the jury: “[Y]ou should rely on the evidence presented during the trial. You may rely on
your recollection and the notes that you took during the trial. To the extent that you are
requesting a transcript of testimony, no such transcript exists.”
The jury found Dahir guilty on both counts. The state sought an aggravated sentence
based on particular cruelty. Dahir waived his right to a sentencing jury, and the district
court found that Dahir acted with particular cruelty as reflected in the manner and extent
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of the attack. The district court sentenced Dahir to 240 months’ imprisonment for the
attempted-murder conviction.1
Dahir appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the state to present
Dahir’s statements to police through testimony rather than the recording.

We will not reverse a district court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse
of discretion. State v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 872 (Minn. 2016). A district court
abuses its discretion if its decision is based on an error of law or is “against logic and the
facts in the record.” State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). The party challenging an evidentiary ruling must demonstrate both abuse of
discretion and resulting prejudice. Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362-63 (Minn. 2020).
Under the best-evidence rule, a party seeking to introduce a writing, recording, or
photograph must prove its content with “the original.” Minn. R. Evid. 1002. The rule
generally “prohibits the introduction of secondary evidence to establish the contents” of a
writing or recording if the original is “available.” State v. DeGidio, 152 N.W.2d 179, 180
(Minn. 1967). But in State v. Bauer, where an officer testified about statements the
defendant made during a recorded interview, our supreme court held that the best-evidence
rule does not require admission of the original recording if a witness with first-hand
knowledge of the conversation is available to testify. 598 N.W.2d 352, 368 ( Minn. 1999)

1 The presumptive sentence is 130 to 183 months’ imprisonment. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
2.G.2, 4.A (2018).
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(citing Minn. R. Evid. 602), overruled on other grounds by State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d
153, 160 n.6 (Minn. 2004).2
Dahir argues that Bauer compels admission of the recording of his police interview.
He highlights a sentence that notes Bauer did not “point[] to any inaccuracies in the
officers’ testimony or provide[] evidence that the testimony was in any way misleading.”
See id. He asserts that this language means a recording is required to prove a defendant’s
statements to police when the officer’s testimony about the statements is misleading. And
he contends this is such a case because the interpreter had some difficulty understanding
and conveying Dahir’s words. This argument is unavailing.
The sergeant testified that there were some “ difficulties” with the interpreter and
“back and forth about what certain words meant.” But Dahir did not object to any aspect
of the sergeant’s account of the interview as inaccurate or misleading. To the contrary, he
acknowledged that he was not claiming the sergeant misrepresented his statements, only
that “in an ideal world ” the whole recording would be played “for completeness.” And
while Dahir now contends the sergeant’s testimony about the interview was misleading
because it did not “capture the back-and-forth between Dahir and the interpreter,” he
identifies no inaccuracies in the sergeant’s testimony. Because Bauer addresses this very
circumstance, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in rejecting Dahir’s
best-evidence challenge.

2 Similarly, Minn. R. Evid. 106 —which provides that when a party introduces part of a
“recorded statement” the adverse party may seek to introduce other portions —does not
apply when no part of the recording is introduced as evidence. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d at 368;
see Dolo, 942 N.W.2d at 364-65.
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Moreover, Dahir has not demonstrated prejudice. An erroneous evidentiary ruling
is prejudicial when “there is a reasonable possibility that without the error the verdict might
have been more favorable to the defendant.” State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686, 703 (Minn.
2008) (quotation omitted). Dahir contends the jury would have been more likely to credit
his claims of self-defense and lack of intent to kill had it heard the interview recording.
The record defeats this contention. Dahir admitted at trial that he told the sergeant he
fought with A.J., who was unarmed, and stabbed him. He did not recant those state ments
but claimed that A.J. was the aggressor, he merely defended himself, and the recording
would prove that he relayed these facts to the sergeant. But even if the recording confirmed
that he made these statements to the sergeant, we are not convinced presenting it to the jury
would have yielded Dahir a more favorable verdict. The extensive and severe injuries
Dahir inflicted all over A.J.’s body and Dahir’s minor hand injuries belie his claim to have
acted defensively. In sum, nothing in the record persuades us that admitting the interview
recording would have presented a reasonable possibility of a more favorable verdict.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an aggravated
sentence.

A district court must impose a sentence within the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines’ presumptive range unless it finds substantial and compelling circumstances to
depart. State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 270 (Minn. 2020). A durational departure
must be based on factors that reflect t he seriousness of the offense. State v. Solberg, 882
N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). It cannot be based on facts already accounted for as
elements of the offense. State v. Meyers, 869 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2015). We will
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affirm an upward departure if the district court’s reasons for the departure are legally
permissible and factually supported. State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2015).
Treating a victim with “particular cruelty” is a recognized basis for an upward
sentencing departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.b(2) (2018); Barthman, 938 N.W.2d
at 270. A violent offense like murder or attempted murder “is by nature a cruel act.” State
v. Schroeder, 401 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 23, 1987).
Such an offense is distinguished as particularly cruel only when “the cruelty associated
with the crime . . . is of a kind not usually associated with the commission of the offense
in question.” Tucker v. State, 799 N.W.2d 583, 587 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted); see
also State v. Cox, 343 N.W.2d 641, 645 (Minn. 1984) (stating that an offense is particularly
serious when it involves “gratuitous cruelty which was unjustified within the context of the
crime”). An attempted murder is particularly cruel when the def endant “did more than
attempt to murder the victim,” such as by “inflicting unusual pain and injury.” Schroeder,
401 N.W.2d at 674.
Dahir contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an aggravated
sentence because its finding of particular cruelty was based on “the same facts . . . used to
prove the element of intent to kill.” Dahir is correct that a district court may not impose an
aggravated sentence for attempted murder based on intent to kill because that fact is already
accounted for as an element of the offense. See Meyers, 869 N.W.2d at 897. But he
identifies no caselaw precluding a district court from finding that evidence that a defendant
inflicted extensive and serious injuries, several of which were independently life-
threatening, proves not only the element that the defendant intended to kill but also the
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additional fact that the defendant went well beyond what was necessary to achieve that end
and inflicted gratuitous pain and violence.
The district court recognized this distinction by aptly noting that “cruelty is a matter
of degree.” And its findings reflect its determination that Dahir’s attack on A.J. was not a
typical attempted murder; it was particularly cruel in two ways. First, the court noted that
Dahir stabbed A.J. “multiple times, left, came back and stabbed him some more.” Second,
it noted that Dahir inflicted injuries along “multiple planes of the body,” including “the C1
vertebrae was fractured, the spleen and liver were lacerated,” and there were “injuries to
the face, back of the scalp, face fractures, neck, chest, rib fractures, shoulders, both arms,
right knee, left knee, stomach, and cuts on the eyelids,” causing extensive blood loss and
“permanent and serious” damage. Dahir does not dispute any of these findings.
In sum, because the facts of Dahir’s attack on A.J. are undisputed and support the
district court’s determination that Dahir inflicted gratuitous pain and violence, beyond that
typical in an attempted murder, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
an aggravated sentence for the attempted-murder conviction.
III. Dahir is not entitled to relief based on his pro se arguments.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Dahir assigns two additional errors: (1) denial of
the court-appointed evaluator’s request for additional evidence in conducting her rule 20.02
examination and (2) denial of the jury’s request for a transcript. We address each in turn.
Rule 20.02 Evidence
At Dahir’s request, the district court appointed an evaluator under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.02 to assess Dahir’s mental state at the time of the offense. After interviewing Dahir
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with an interpreter and reviewing the police reports and investigative materials, the
evaluator asked to interview A.J. and M.J. because “she did not feel that she had sufficient
information to make a determination.” She acknowledged that she had never made such a
request during her 20 years of practice, but felt it was justified because of “interpreter
issues” and a witness’s statement that “led [her] to think that there was incomplete
information.” The district court denied the request as exceeding the scope of a rule 20.02
evaluation. The evaluator thereafter submitted a report opining that Dahir knew what he
was doing and knew right from wrong at the time of the offense.
Dahir now contends the district court “violated Rule 20.02, subd. 2,” by denying the
evaluator’s request to interview the two witnesses. This argument calls for interpretation
of the rule, which presents a question of law that we review de novo based on the rule’s
plain language. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 482 (Minn. 2016).
Rule 20.02 provides that the court-appointed examiner’s role is “to examine the
defendant and report to the court on the defendant’s mental condition.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 20.02, subd. 2. Likewise, if a party retains an examiner, that examiner’s role is simply
to “observe” the court-appointed examiner’s examination and “examine the defendant.”
Id. Nothing in the plain language of the rule authorizes an examiner to interview witnesses.
Dahir does not identify and we have not discovered any caselaw that permits a rule 20.02
examiner to interview witnesses as part of assessing the defendant’s mental condition.
Moreover, any error in denying the request was harmless and therefore does not
require reversal. Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01. Dahir contends the additional interviews might
have led the examiner to conclude he has a mental illness. But even if that were the case,
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he does not claim that he did not know his actions were morally wrong, let alone that the
requested interviews would have established that required element of a mental-illness
defense. See State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2016) . Accordingly, Dahir
has not demonstrated that he is entitled to relief based on the district court’s denial of the
examiner’s request to interview A.J. and M.J.
Transcript
Dahir argues that the district court erred by denying the jury’s request for a transcript
of the witnesses’ testimony and instructing the jurors that no transcript exists. “If the jury
requests review of specific evidence during deliberations, the court may permit review of
that evidence after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.03, subd. 20(2)(a). Where, as here, the appellant did not object to or acquiesced in
the district court’s decision, we review only for plain error. State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d
272, 284 (Minn. 2006) . Under the plain-error standard, an appellant must demonstrate
(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects their substantial rights. State v. Davis, 864
N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. 2015). An error is plain if it is “clear or obvious,” such as if it
“contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d
782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). If the appellant demonstrates plain error, we
“may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Davis, 864 N.W.2d at 176 (quotation omitted).
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(2)(a), provides that a district court “may” grant a
jury’s request to review “specific evidence.” The rule does not require the district court to
do so under any circumstance. And the only controlling authority Dahir cites in support of
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his argument, State v. Spaulding, does not impose such a requirement; it simply requires a
district court to exercise its discretion rather than preemptively precluding any review of
testimony. 296 N.W.2d 870, 878 (Minn. 1980). Spaulding also is distinguishable because
that case involved a request to review the 35 pages comprising t he defendant’s testimony,
id., while the request here was for testimony amounting to more than 200 transcript pages.
The supreme court “has made it clear that, when the jury requests review of numerous
pages of transcript, the trial court may deny the request.” Young, 710 N.W.2d at 284-85
(quotation omitted). Given the language of the rule and applicable caselaw, Dahir has not
demonstrated that the district court committed plain error by instead providing the agreed-
upon instruction reminding the jurors to rely on their notes and recollections.
Moreover, the record confirms that the decision did not impair Dahir’s substantial
rights. The jury requested the transcript on the first day of deliberations and did not indicate
that a transcript was needed to recall certain matters or to help resolve a deadlock. Cf.
Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d at 877 (noting that jury requested testimony because they were
deadlocked). With the parties’ agreement, the district court denied the request the next
day. The jury returned a verdict later that same day, showing that the jury did not struggle
to reach a verdict without being reminded of the requested testimony. This result makes
sense. The overwhelming evidence against Dahir —including his admission to fighting
with and stabbing an unarmed A.J., and the evidence of A.J.’s extensive, life-threatening
injuries—belies Dahir’s claim to have acted defensively. On this record, Dahir has not
demonstrated that he is entitled to relief.
Affirmed.