State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1299

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Marc Richard Redmond,
Appellant.

Filed July 31, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Watonwan County District Court
File No. 83-CR-21-426

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin Peralta, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Stephen Lindee, Watonwan County Attorney, St. James, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Marc Richard Redmond challenges his convictions, following a jury trial,
for seven offenses that respondent State of Minnesota charged after police found Redmond
in a shed located on someone else’s property. Redmond argues that the evidence was
2
insufficient to prove his guilt of any of the offenses and that the warrant of commitment
unlawfully reflects convictions for both second-degree burglary and the lesser-included
offense of third-degree burglary. Additionally, Redmond raises several issues in a pro se
supplemental brief. Because sufficient evidence supports Redmond’s convictions, and
Redmond fails to adequately support the issues raised in his pro se supplemental brief, we
affirm in part. But because the warrant of commitment shows convictions for both second-
degree burglary and the lesser-included offense of third-degree burglary, we reverse in part
and remand for the district court to correct the warrant of commitment.
FACTS
In August 2021, law enforcement officers arrested Redmond after finding him in
E.K.’s shed, which was located on a rural property in Watonwan County. Following the
arrest, the state charged Redmond with seven criminal offenses: second- and third-degree
burglary, possession of burglary tools, fifth -degree drug possession, fleeing a police
officer, receiving stolen property, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Redmond
maintained his innocence and demanded a jury trial. The trial was held in May 2022.
At trial, E.K. testified that he owns a farm in Watonwan County, but he does not
regularly reside there. There are at least two buildings on the farm —a residence and a
machine shed. In late August 2021, E.K., discovered that the farm residence had been
ransacked and damaged. Some items were missing from the residence, and the windows
and doors had been left open. E.K. alerted the police and installed trail cameras around his
property.
3
On August 30, 2021, E.K. returned to check on the farm, arriving at about noon.
Soon after he arrived, he heard a tractor in the driveway. He was on the north side of the
shed. E.K. looked around the corner of the shed and saw that the tractor was towing a
flatbed trailer. According to E.K., he did not recognize the driver. E.K. observed the
tractor park on the west side of the shed, where there was a sliding barn-style door. Then,
E.K. heard the driver enter the shed and begin to “rummag[e]” and “root[]” around inside.
E.K. testified that he called law enforcement and that officers arrived about ten minutes
later while the intruder was still in the shed. He later provided police with footage from
the trail cameras, which showed the intruder—who was ultimately identified as
Redmond—looking at, touching, and moving items in the shed. E.K. testified that he did
not know Redmond and had not given Redmond permission to be on his farm, to enter the
shed, or to take any property.
Responding to E.K.’s call, a sergeant with the sheriff’s department arrived at the
farm and entered the shed. As the sergeant entered the shed, he shouted “sheriff’s office.”
The sergeant testified that he observed the person who was later identified as Redmond
inside the shed. According to the sergeant, Redmond ran toward the opposite side of the
shed.
Another law enforcement officer —a deputy—was parked on the opposite side of
the shed near the sliding barn-style door. The deputy testified that he saw Redmond’s
hands and face briefly appear at the barn door and then disappear.
Soon, Redmond surrendered, putting his hands up. The sergeant arrested him.
4
Following Redmond’s arrest, the sergeant spoke with E.K. According to the
sergeant, E.K. had been in the shed the day before—on August 29 —and noted that his
motorcycles were in their usual spot on the eastern wall of the shed. But after Redmond’s
entry into the shed, E.K. observed that one motorcycle had been moved “two-thirds” of the
way across the shed, and it was now located nearer to the door on the west side of the
building.
While other law enforcement officers were apprehending Redmond, the chief
deputy monitored the tractor and attached flatbed trailer. He testified that he continuously
observed these items until a tow truck arrived, and then followed them as they were towed
to an impound facility. According to the chief deputy, there were items on the trailer,
which remained undisturbed until they were removed by the sergeant pursuant to a search
warrant.
Once a search warrant was obtained, officers removed a white cardboard box from
the trailer. Inside the box, they found the following items: a saw; a silver-black box
containing pipes to smoke methamphetamine, torch lighters, a small blue container with a
white crystal substance, some coins, and some pens; a knife; two flashlights; and items that
belonged to E.K., which had been stolen from the home a week before, including a
drawstring athletic bag, a military bag, and some paracord.
According to the sergeant, the saw, which was cordless and had a blade for cutting
metal, was “made for destruction.” The sergeant testified that it was the type of saw that
is often used for criminal behavior, such as catalytic convertor thefts. A forensic scientist
testified that the white crystal substance in the small blue container was methamphetamine.
5
The state also introduced thirty-four photos into evidence, including photos from trail
cameras on E.K.’s property and photos from the police investigation.
Following the state’s case, Redmond testified on his own behalf. He admitted that
he drove the tractor to E.K.’s property and entered the shed, and he acknowledged that he
did not have permission to be on the property. Redmond testified that he went there
because he had recently purchased a few push mowers from a “guy at [Redmond’s
lawnmower] shop” for about $30. He implied during his testimony that the mowers were
on E.K.’s property and that he had been instructed to pick them up there. Redmond testified
that, when the police arrived and announced themselves, he immediately surrendered. He
also testified that the white cardboard box was “simply not on [his] trailer.”
The jury found Redmond guilty of all seven charged offenses. Following the jury’s
verdicts, the district court adjudicated Redmond guilty of second- degree burglary, fleeing
a police officer, receiving stolen property, and the petty misdemeanor offense of possession
of drug paraphernalia, and stayed adjudication for the offense of fifth-degree drug
possession. The district court stayed imposition of sentence for the second-degree burglary
conviction, placed Redmond on probation for five years, and ordered him to serve 90 days
in jail. It imposed concurrent 90-day jail sentences for the remaining convictions, and a
$100 fine for the petty misdemeanor. Although the district court did not adjudicate guilt
or pronounce sentences for the offenses of third-degree burglary or possession of burglary
tools, the warrant of commitment reflects a disposition of “convicted” for those offenses.
6
DECISION
I. Sufficient trial evidence established Redmond’s guilt of the offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Redmond argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.
He therefore contends that his seven convictions must be reversed.
Before turning to the evidence underlying Redmond’s convictions, we note our
standard of review. D ue process requires the prosecution to prove every element of a
charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Culver, 941 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Minn.
2020). “In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court’s review ‘is limited to a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction,’ is sufficient to allow the fact-finder to reach the
verdict that it did.” In re Welfare of C.J.W.J. , 699 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Minn. App. 2005)
(quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989)). Because the appellate court
does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670 (Minn.
2011), it “must assume the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
evidence to the contrary,” C.J.W.J., 699 N.W.2d at 334 (citing State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d
101, 108 (Minn. 1989)). “The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder,
acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the
charged offense.” Id. (citing State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988)).
When an element of an offense is supported by circumstantial evidence alone,
however, an appellate court applies a heightened level of scrutiny in reviewing the
sufficiency of that evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473-75 (Minn. 2010).
7
To determine the level of scrutiny required, the appellate court must first consider whether
the elements of an offense are supported by direct evidence or solely circumstantial
evidence. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). Direct evidence is
“based on personal knowledge or observation and . . . proves a fact without inference or
presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not
required with direct evidence.” Id.
If the evidence underlying an element of an offense is entirely circumstantial, the
court applies a two-step standard of review. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598. “The first step
is to identify the circumstances proved.” Id. In applying this step, the appellate court
assumes the trier of fact believed the state’s witnesses and rejected all evidence contrary to
the verdict; in other words, all conflicting evidence is resolved in the state’s favor. See
State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). “The second step is to determine
whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation
omitted). During this step of the analysis, the reviewing court does not defer to the fact-
finder’s choice between reasonable inferences. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-
30 (Minn. 2010). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of
the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a
reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at
473 (quotation omitted).
8
Having identified our standard of review, we next consider Redmond’s challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions. We separately address each
conviction.
A. Second-and third-degree burglary
Redmond presents two challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
burglary convictions. First, he argues that the state failed to prove an element of second-
degree burglary— that he possessed a tool to gain access to money or property while
entering or in the building. Second, he argues that the state failed to prove the intent
element of both the second- and third-degree burglary offenses. We reject both of these
arguments.
1. The evidence established that Redmond possessed a tool to gain
access to property while entering or in the shed.

Minnesota law defines the relevant second-degree burglary offense as follows:
Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to
commit [theft]
1, or enters a building without consent and
commits [theft] while in the building . . . commits burglary in
the second degree . . . if:

. . . .

when entering or while in the building, the burglar possesses a
tool to gain access to money or property.

Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4). At trial, the state argued to the jury that, when
entering or while in the shed, Redmond possessed a saw to gain access to property.

1 Although the statute criminalizes the entry of a building with intent to commit “a crime,”
the jury in Redmond’s case was instructed that the specific crime at issue was theft. Minn.
Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4) (2020). In our analysis, we likewise assume that the specific
crime at issue was theft.
9
Redmond argues that, because the saw was on the flatbed trailer and not on his
person, the state failed to establish that he possessed the saw when entering or while in the
shed. And, Redmond contends, the state also failed to prove that his purpose in possessing
the saw was to gain access to property.
We first consider Redmond’s possession argument. Ordinarily, “[p]ossession may
be proved through evidence of actual or constructive possession.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at
601. As Redmond notes, when he was apprehended, he was not in actual, physical
possession of the saw. See State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016)
(defining actual possession as the exercise of “direct physical control” over an object
(quotation omitted)).
Redmond seems to suggest that to be convicted of second-degree burglary under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.582, subdivision 2(a)(4), there must be evidence of actual
physical possession of a tool at the time of apprehension. To the extent that Redmond is
making such an argument, the law does not support it. In State v. Spangler, the Minnesota
Supreme Court specifically rejected such a narrow interpretation of the second-degree
burglary statute, stating that “[i]t is sufficient under our statute that [a] defendant have
constructive possession and immediate access to the tools.” 153 N.W.2d 278, 192 (Minn.
1967).2 Moreover, the language of the second-degree-burglary statute does not contain

2 The supreme court considered a predecessor version of the statute that contained an
almost identical tool-possession element. See Minn. Stat. § 609.58, subd. 2(1)(a) (1965)
(“When entering or while in the building, [the defendant] possesses an explosive or tool to
gain access to money or property.”).
10
any requirement for actual physical possession at the time of apprehension, merely
requiring possession “when entering or while in the building.”
We further conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish both
that Redmond constructively possessed the saw when entering the shed, and that he
constructively possessed the saw while he was in the shed. Constructive possession may
be established in two ways. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. The state must show that either
(1) the “police found the item in a place under the defendant’s exclusive control to which
other people normally did not have access” or (2) if others had access, “there is a strong
probability (inferable from other evidence) that at the time the defendant was consciously
or knowingly exercising dominion and control over it.” Id.
Because the evidence of constructive possession was entirely circumstantial, we
must identify and examine the circumstances proved. The circumstances proved are as
follows. One week before law enforcement officers found Redmond in the shed, E.K.
discovered that the residence located on the same property had been burglarized. On
August 30, Redmond drove a tractor with an attached trailer onto the property. Redmond
did not have permission to be there. He parked the tractor a few feet away from the shed
near a barn-style door. In a box on the trailer, there was a portable saw, which was capable
of cutting metal, and of a type commonly used for criminal purposes, including catalytic
converter thefts. E.K. heard Redmond enter the shed, and then heard him “rummaging”
and “rooting” around inside. E.K. called the police to report a burglary. Still photos created
from surveillance-camera footage from inside the shed show Redmond looking at,
touching, and moving items. A motorcycle, which had been located near one side of the
11
shed the day before was moved “two-thirds of the way across” the shed toward the door on
the opposite side of the shed. Redmond’s tractor—and the trailer where the saw was
located—was parked just outside the shed door. The box that contained the saw also
contained items that had been stolen from the residence the week before. A law
enforcement officer continuously observed the box containing the saw and did not observe
anyone in the vicinity. When law enforcement arrived at the scene, Redmond initially tried
to leave the shed in the direction of the tractor.
The second step of the circumstantial-evidence analysis requires us to examine the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the circumstances proved. Those
circumstances are consistent with Redmond’s guilt, and only with Redmond’s guilt. The
circumstances proved establish that Redmond alone brought the saw to the property. No
one else had access to the saw while Redmond was there. The circumstances proved also
establish that, at all times, the saw was readily accessible to Redmond. While he drove the
tractor, the saw was just behind him on the attached trailer. And while Redmond entered
and was in the shed, the saw remained on the trailer, which was parked just outside the
shed door. Thus, the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Redmond constructively possessed the saw while he entered and was in the shed.
3
We next consider Redmond’s argument that the evidence did not prove that he
possessed the saw with the purpose of using it to gain access to property. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4). Redmond notes that the state was required to prove that he

3 Redmond does not argue that the circumstances proved also support a theory of
innocence, and we do not speculate as to what such a theory might be.
12
possessed the saw when he entered or was in the shed for the purpose of gaining access to
money or property. Citing State v. Nixon, Redmond suggests, but does not explicitly argue,
that it imposes an additional requirement on the state—showing that a tool was used during
a burglary. 957 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Minn. App. 2021). However, Nixon does no such thing.
There, we determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Nixon used a tool
to break a window because no tool was ever found and there was no evidence that a tool
was used. Id. at 136-37. This court also rejected the state’s argument that Nixon used
gloves and a garbage bag as tools to gain access to money or property. Id. at 137. We
noted that neither gloves nor a garbage bag w as needed to access the property that Nixon
stole once he entered the building. Id. Nixon did not alter the elements of second- degree
burglary; rather, the decision considered the sufficiency of the evidence under the
circumstances presented. Section 609.582, subdivision 2(a)(4), which provides the
elements of second -degree burglary, contains no “use” requirement. Rather, it requires
proof that the purpose of the tool was to gain access to money or property. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.582, subd. 2(a)(4).
Here, the only reasonable inference from the circumstances proved is that Redmond
possessed the saw to gain access to the shed or to property inside the shed. The saw had a
special blade used to cut metal and was made “for destruction.” Again, the saw was capable
of cutting metal. It is a type of saw often used in criminal activity. And Redmond brought
the saw to a burglary. We therefore conclude that the state’s evidence established that
Redmond possessed a tool to gain access to money or property.
13
2. The state proved that Redmond intended to commit theft, an
element of second- and third-degree burglary.

To convict Redmond of second-degree burglary and third-degree burglary, the state
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Redmond entered the building with
intent to commit a crime or that he committed a crime in the building. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.582, subds. 2(a) (“Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to
commit a crime, or enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the
building, either directly or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the second degree . . . .”),
3 (“Whoever enters a building without consent and with intent to steal or commit any
felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building, or enters a building without consent
and steals or commits a felony or gross misdemeanor while in the building, either directly
or as an accomplice, commits burglary in the third degree . . . .”) (2020). The state’s trial
theory was that law enforcement interrupted a burglary in progress. Thus, the state opted
to prove Redmond’s intent to commit a crime—theft—that was not completed.
4
Redmond argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove that he
intended to commit the offense of theft. He argues that the evidence supported a reasonable
alternative hypothesis—that he went to the property because a “buddy” instructed him to
go there to pick up lawn mowers. As noted, the appellate court must resolve all conflicting
evidence in the state’s favor. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858. Redmond’s alternative
hypothesis is based entirely on his own testimony. Because we do not include Redmond’s

4 Redmond’s jury was instructed that a theft occurs when a person “intentionally or without
claim of right takes, uses, transfers, conceals or retains possession of moveable property of
another without the other’s consent and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner
of possession of the property.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020).
14
testimony in the circumstances proved, there is no support for his proposed alternative
hypothesis. Moreover, the circumstances proved are wholly consistent with the state’s
theory that Redmond entered the shed with the intent to commit theft. Thus, the evidence
was sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts for second- degree burglary and third-
degree burglary.
B. Possession of burglary tools
To convict a person for the offense of possession of burglary tools, the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person possessed a tool “with intent to use . . . [the
tool] to commit burglary or theft.” Minn. Stat. § 609.59 (2020). Such intent “may be
drawn from the character of the objects and from the circumstances surrounding [the
defendant’s] possession.” State v. Conaway, 319 N.W.2d 35, 41 (Minn. 1982). The intent
is a general intent to use the tools, or permit the use of the tools, in the commission of a
burglary or theft. Id. At trial, the state argued to the jury that the saw was a burglary tool.
Redmond argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove that the
saw was a burglary tool. He argues that the evidence is equally consistent with the
alternative theory that he intended to use it for a “legal purpose.”
Beyond Redmond’s testimony, which we do not include in the circumstances
proved, there was no evidence from which the jury could infer a legal purpose for the saw.
A reviewing court should not “overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on
the basis of mere conjecture.” Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473 (quotation omitted). Because
the circumstances proved are only consistent with the state’s theory that Redmond intended
15
to use the saw to commit burglary or theft, the evidence was sufficient to support his
conviction of this offense.
C. Receiving stolen property
To establish that a person committed the offense of receiving stolen property, the
state must prove that the person knew or had reason to know that “the property was stolen
or obtained by robbery.” Minn. Stat. § 609.53 (2020). At trial, the state argued to the jury
that Redmond was guilty of receiving stolen property because he possessed property taken
during the earlier burglary of E.K.’s residence , which was found in the white box on the
trailer.
Redmond contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of
this offense because the circumstantial evidence was consistent with the alternative
hypothesis that Redmond did not know the items were stolen. Because the circumstances
proved do not support Redmond’s argument, we reject it. We conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to prove Redmond’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of receiving stolen
property.
D. Possession of methamphetamine
5
To convict Redmond of fifth-degree drug possession, the state was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Redmond possessed methamphetamine, either actually or

5 In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his drug-possession
conviction, Redmond’s brief also argues there was insufficient evidence to support the
judgment for the petty-misdemeanor offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. See
Minn. Stat. § 152.092(a) (2020). But to challenge this offense, Redmond was required to
file an appeal within 30 days of final judgment or entry of order. See Minn. R. Crim. P.
28.02, subd. 4(3)(b). The district court entered judgment on the drug paraphernalia offense
16
constructively. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2020). The state’s theory at trial was
that Redmond constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the box on the
trailer.
Redmond argues that the evidence of possession was insufficient. He contends that
the only evidence that the box containing the methamphetamine was on the trailer was the
testimony of law enforcement officers. He also points to his own testimony that the
methamphetamine was not on the trailer.
We reject Redmond’s argument. Because witnesses testified that they observed the
box on the trailer—providing direct evidence of that fact—we apply the standard of review
for direct evidence. That standard of review requires us to assume that the jury believed
the state’s witnesses and did not believe any contrary evidence. C.J.W.J., 699 N.W.2d at
334. We therefore assume that the jury believed the law enforcement witnesses and did
not believe Redmond. Because the jury reasonably could have concluded from the
evidence that Redmond possessed the methamphetamine located in the box on the trailer,
the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for fifth-degree drug possession.
E. Fleeing a police officer
To convict Redmond of fleeing a police officer, the state was required to prove that
Redmond attempted to “evade or elude a peace officer . . . by means of running, hiding, or
by any other means except fleeing in a motor vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 6
(2020). Here, the state relied on direct evidence to prove this offense. The sergeant

on June 22, 2022, and Redmond did not file an appeal within 30 days of that date. We
therefore address only the drug-possession conviction.
17
testified that when he yelled, “sheriff’s office,” Redmond “ran away” from him “instead of
stopping as [the sergeant] instructed.” Another officer, the deputy who was positioned
outside the other side of the shed , testified that Redmond “attempt[ed] to come out” the
barn-style door but, after observing the deputy, Redmond retreated back into the shed.
Redmond argues that the evidence of fleeing a police officer was insufficient
because the state “did not present any evidence that [he] attempted to evade or elude the
officers after they announced their presence.” However, Redmond’s argument is not
supported by the direct evidence. Assuming that the sergeant and deputy testified
truthfully, as we must, see C.J.W.J., 699 N.W.2d at 334, we conclude that a reasonable jury
could have found that Redmond was guilty of fleeing the police. Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to support his conviction of this offense.
II. Redmond is not entitled to relief based on his pro se claims.
Redmond makes the following claims in his pro se supplemental brief: (1) a warrant
signed by a judge was incomplete or invalid ; (2) Redmond’s request for a new judge was
improperly denied; (3) the jurors were not impartial because Redmond knew some jurors,
and other jurors knew the prosecutor and state’s witnesses; (4) voir dire, trial, and
sentencing “in one day is unfair” and caused the jurors to “rush[]” the verdict;
(5) “everything [should] have been fingerprinted” because the drugs in E.K.’s bag
belonged to E.K.; (6) testimony and the pictures of the trailer do not unequivocally
demonstrate that the white box was on the trailer; (7) other arguments challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence, and (8) Redmond’s sentences, including probation, court-
ordered treatment, and fines, “set [him] up for failure.”
18
The arguments of a pro se appellant are waived if they contain no argument or
citation to legal authority. State v. Krosch, 642 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Minn. 2002). Factual
assertions must also be supported by citation to the record. Hecker v. Hecker, 543 N.W.2d
678, 681 n.2 (Minn. App. 1996), aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1997); see State v. Manley,
664 N.W.2d 275, 286 (Minn. 2003) (refusing to consider portions of pro se briefs that
contain only argument and are not supported by the facts in the record).
Here, Redmond’s pro se brief contains no citations to the factual record or to legal
authority. Thus, we conclude that he has waived the claims made in his pro se supplemental
brief.
III. The warrant of commitment erroneously reflects a conviction for the lesser-
included offense of third-degree burglary.

Redmond argues, and the state agrees, that the warrant of commitment improperly
shows the entry of a conviction for third-degree burglary, which is a lesser-included offense
of second- degree burglary, for which Redmond was also convicted. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.04, subd. 1(1) (2020) (stating that a defendant may not be convicted of both the crime
charged or “a lesser degree of the same crime”). We agree. The district court did not direct
the entry of a conviction for the third-degree burglary at sentencing . But the warrant of
commitment erroneously includes a conviction for this offense. Because the inclusion of
a conviction for the lesser-included offense of third-degree burglary violates section
609.04, subd. 1(1), we reverse and remand for correction of the error.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.