John Joseph Wawersich, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1300

John Joseph Wawersich,
Respondent,

vs.

2020 Ford F150, MN Plate FLC249, VIN 1FTFW1E40LKE95724,
Appellant.

Filed April 17, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Gaïtas, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-21-5638

Michael J. Brandt, Isabel L. McClure, Brandt Kettwick Defense, Anoka, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Katrina E. Joseph, Mounds View City Prosecutor, Gregory P. Holly, Assistant City
Prosecutor, H│J LAW, Blaine, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Gaïtas, Judge; and Wheelock,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant 2020 Ford F150, MN Plate FLC249, VIN 1FTFW1E40LKE95724, a
vehicle that was seized for forfeiture, appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of respondent John Joseph Wawersich and order for the Mounds View
police department to immediately release the vehicle to Wawersich without charging
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towing, seizure, and storage costs, and without requiring security. Appellant argues that
the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the record does not establish
that Wawersich enrolled in the ignition interlock program, a requirement for him to obtain
release of the vehicle. Additionally, appellant contends that the district court had no
authority to waive the police department’s statutory rights to charge towing, seizure, and
storage costs, and to require a bond or security for the vehicle before its release. Because
appellant fails to identify any fact issue, and the district court correctly applied the law, we
affirm the district court’s order for release of the vehicle to Wawersich. But because the
district court did not have authority to waive the police department’s statutory rights to
charge reasonable towing, seizure, and storage costs, and to require security for the vehicle,
we reverse those portions of the order. We remand to the district court to address
Wawersich’s request for sanctions against the prosecuting authority.
FACTS
This appeal arises from proceedings for forfeiture of a pickup truck used in a
driving-while-impaired (DWI) offense. Appellant, the truck, is represented by attorneys
for the City of Mounds View, where the offense occurred. Wawersich, who is the
registered owner of the truck, admitted that he drove it while he was impaired.
The relevant facts, presented in the light most favorable to appellant, are as follows.
See STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 2002)
(stating that, on appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court views “the evidence
in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted”).
On October 6, 2021, a Mounds View police officer arrested Wawersich, who had been
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driving the truck, for suspected impaired driving. A breath test revealed that Wawersich’s
alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit. Following his arrest, Wawersich
was charged with two counts of second-degree driving while impaired and an open bottle
violation.
Because Wawersich had multiple DWI convictions, the Mounds View police
department seized the truck and initiated forfeiture proceedings. Wawersich received a
notice of seizure and i ntent to forfeit the vehicle. On October 22, 2021, Wawersich’s
counsel timely filed a demand for judicial determination, challenging the forfeiture of his
truck.
Wawersich’s counsel then made ten attempts to contact the Mounds View city
prosecutor (Mounds View attorney)—via email, text messages, and in person—to arrange
for service of his demand for judicial determination. He received no response. On
December 4, 2021, the Mounds View attorney finally contacted Wawersich and signed an
acknowledgment-of-service form.
Several weeks later, on December 21, 2021, Wawersich pleaded guilty to one count
of second-degree DWI .1 At the plea hearing, he produced a letter from the Minnesota
Department of Public Safety (DPS letter) authorizing the installation of an ignition
interlock device on his truck. 2 Under Minnesota law, a vehicle seized for forfeiture

1 The other two charges against him were dismissed.

2 An “ignition interlock device” is a piece of equipment that “measure[s] breath alcohol
concentration and . . . prevent[s] a motor vehicle’s ignition from being started by a person
whose breath alcohol concentration measures 0.02 or higher.” Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd.
1(b) (2022).
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following a DWI must be returned to the driver if the driver is a participant in the ignition
interlock program. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13 (2020). Wawersich showed the DPS
letter to the Mounds View attorney, and he also emailed it to her. The Mounds View
attorney agreed to communicate with Wawersich about the return of the truck.
But the December 2021 plea hearing was the last time the Mounds View attorney
communicated with Wawersich or his attorney until September 2022—when the parties
appeared before the district court to argue competing summary-judgment motions in the
forfeiture case. Between December 30, 2021, and January 13, 2022, Wawersich’s counsel
emailed the Mounds View attorney five times requesting arrangements for the return of the
truck. He received no response. On February 24, 2022, the district court held a settlement
conference in the forfeiture case. The Mounds View attorney failed to appear. On
March 3, 2022, the district court issued an order requiring the Mounds View attorney to
communicate with Wawersich about the return of the truck within seven days and warned
that “[f]ailure to comply . . . may result in an award of costs and attorney fees.” The
Mounds View attorney did not comply with the district court’s order.
Wawersich filed a motion for summary judgment in the forfeiture case and
requested an order releasing the truck to him under the statute authorizing release for
participants in the ignition interlock program. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13. He
also moved the district court to find that the Mounds View attorney had acted in bad faith
by refusing to communicate with him and to sanction the attorney by ordering attorney fees
and waiving the costs and fees associated with the forfeiture of the truck. A hearing on
Wawersich’s motion was set for September 15, 2022.
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The day before the hearing, appellant, represented by the Mounds View attorney,
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asking the district court to find that forfeiture
was required as a matter of law.
On September 15, immediately following the hearing, the district court filed an
order granting Wawersich’s motion for summary judgment and directing the Mounds View
police department to immediately release the truck to Wawersich without charging
Wawersich for towing, seizure, and storage costs, or requiring a bond or security for the
truck. The district court’s order does not expressly address Wawersich’s request for
sanctions against the Mounds View attorney. Appellant now challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Wawersich and the district court’s directives to
release the truck without payment of statutory fees and costs or requiring security. 3
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting Wawersich’s motion for
summary judgment because the truck was subject to forfeiture and Wawersich failed to
establish that he was e nrolled in the ignition interlock program. Alternatively, appellant
argues that the district court erred in prohibiting the Mounds View police department from

3 After filing the notice of appeal, the Mounds View attorney filed a motion in the district
court to stay the order releasing the truck until the completion of the appeal. But the
Mound’s View attorney did not appear at the hearing on the motion, and the district court
denied it. In a special term order, this court granted the Mounds View attorney’s motion
to stay the release of Wawersich’s truck pending appeal based on the in rem nature of the
action, the district court’s decision not to impose a security requirement, and the possibility
that the vehicle could become unavailable.
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charging for towing, seizure, and storage costs and from requiring Wawersich to provide
security or post a bond for the truck.
I. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and the district court did not err in
determining that Wawersich was entitled to release of the truck.

A party is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact” and the party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Minn. R. Civ. P.
56.01. Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de
novo. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn.
2010); see also Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020).
“In doing so, [appellate courts] determine whether the district court properly applied the
law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment.” Riverview, 790 N.W.2d at 170.
In considering whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the appellate court
views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, against whom
summary judgment was granted. STAR Ctrs., 644 N.W.2d at 76 -77. “A material fact is
one of such a nature as will affect the result or outcome of the case depending on its
resolution.” Zappa v. Fahey, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (Minn. 1976). Inferences and
doubts about material facts are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Senogles v.
Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 2017). If a reasonable person can draw different
conclusions based on the evidence presented, then a motion for summary judgment should
not be granted. Warren v. Dinter, 926 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 2019).
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Before turning to appellant’s arguments, we briefly review the law concerning civil
forfeiture. “Civil forfeiture is a process by which a law enforcement agency . . . obtains
legal title to property connected with criminal activity.” Jensen v. 1985 Ferrari, 949
N.W.2d 729, 734 (Minn. App. 2020). Vehicle forfeitures premised on an impaired driving
offense are governed by Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63 (2020). 4
The vehicle forfeiture process begins after a person commits a “designated offense.”
Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 6(a) (“A motor vehicle is subject to forfeiture . . . if it was
used in the commission of a designated offense or was used in conduct resulting in a
designated license revocation.”). Once a vehicle is seized, the prosecuting authority sends
a notice describing “its intent to seek forfeiture.” Jensen, 949 N.W.2d at 734-35; see also
Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 2(b)(3). A vehicle owner may challenge the forfeiture by
filing a demand for judicial determination. Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd s. 1(h), 8(e).
“There is a presumption that a vehicle seized under [section 169A.63] is subject to
forfeiture if the prosecuting authority establishes that the vehicle was used in the
commission of the designated offense . . . .” Id., subd. 9(e).
Wawersich c oncedes that he used the truck to commit a designated offense—
second-degree DWI. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.25 (defining second-degree DWI), .63,
subd. 1(e)(1) (stating that second-degree DWI is a designated offense) (2020). However,

4 Section 169A.63 was amended in 2021 before Wawersich’s DWI offense. See 2021
Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11, art. 5, § 7, at 2069-71. The amendments do not apply
to the forfeiture proceeding in Wawersich’s case as they only apply to seizures occurring
on or after January 1, 2022. Id. We rely on the version of the statute that was published in
2020 and was in effect at the time of Wawersich’s offense.

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under the version of the vehicle-forfeiture statute in effect when Wawersich committed the
designated offense, if the driver “becomes a program participant in the ignition interlock
program under section 171.306,” then “the forfeiture proceeding is stayed and the vehicle
must be returned.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(a) (emphasis added). And if the driver
successfully completes the program, “the stayed forfeiture proceeding is terminated or
dismissed and any vehicle, security, or bond held by an agency must be returned to the
owner of the vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 13(j); see also Minn. Stat. § 171.306
(2022) (detailing the ignition interlock program requirements).
The district court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
the Mounds View attorney agreed to return the truck if Wawersich complied with the
requirements of section 169A.63, subdivision 13. Wawersich emailed the Mounds View
attorney the DPS letter showing he had been authorized for the ignition interlock program,
and the Mounds View attorney failed to communicate with Wawersich thereafter. Based
on this undisputed record evidence, the district court concluded that Wawersich had
complied with the requirements of section 169A.63, subdivision 13(a), and was entitled to
the return of his truck.
Appellant contends that the district court erred when it failed to order Wawersich’s
vehicle forfeited under Minnesota law. In its brief to this court, appellant argues that the
truck is subject to forfeiture because Wawersich committed a designated offense. But the
district court did not determine otherwise. In ruling that Wawersich was entitled to return
of the truck based the ignition interlock program, the district court implicitly determined
that the truck is subject to forfeiture. And , as noted, Wawersich agrees that the truck is
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subject to forfeiture. We discern no error in the district court’s analysis of the threshold
issue of whether the truck is subject to forfeiture.
Appellant also argues that “there was no evidence produced in the court below that
Wawersich enrolled in the ignition interlock program or otherwise met the requirements of
subdivision 13(a).” Thus, appellant continues, “the district court committed plain error in
ordering that the vehicle be released.”
The summary-judgment record and the law do not support this argument. Along
with Wawersich’s motion for summary judgment, his attorney submitted an affidavit
stating:
4. On December 21, 2021, at Mr. Wawersich’s plea
hearing for the accompanying criminal matter . . . ,
Mr. Wawersich provided me with a letter from the Minnesota
Department of Public safety, dated December 14, 2021,
authorizing the installation of the ignition interlock device. I
communicated that to the Mounds View City Prosecutor and
the Mounds View City Prosecutor agreed to communicate to
me what was required to release Mr. Wawersich’s vehicle.

5. That same day, December 21, 2021, we emailed
a copy of the Ignition Interlock Device Program Installation
Authorization letter from DPS to the Mounds View City
Prosecutor.

Appellant presented no evidence in the summary-judgment proceedings. Accordingly,
based on the undisputed evidence, Wawersich qualified for the ignition interlock program.
On appeal, appellant does not contend that there is any factual dispute. See Warren,
926 N.W.2d at 374-75 (concluding that summary judgment should not be granted if a
genuine issue of material fact exists). Rather, appellant argues that Wawersich is not
eligible for return of the truck under subdivision 13 because he is not “enrolled” in the
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ignition interlock program. But subdivision 13 applies to a “program participant . . . under
section 171.306.” A “program participant” is defined as “a person who has qualified to
take part in the ignition interlock program under [section 171.306], and whose driver’s
license has been . . . revoked, canceled, or denied [as a result of violations including
impaired driving].” Minn. Stat. § 171.306, subd. 1(d)(1) (2022). Because the undisputed
evidence shows that Wawersich was authorized to participate in the ignition interlock
program, the district court correctly concluded that he was entitled to return of the truck
under section 169A.63, subdivision 13(a), and we affirm the order to the extent it requires
release of the truck.
II. The district court did not have authority to prohibit the Mounds View police
department from charging for towing, seizure, and storage costs and from
requiring Wawersich to provide security for the truck.

Appellant argues that, even if the district court properly ordered the Mounds View
police department to release the truck to Wawersich, the district court had no authority to
order the release without payment of statutory fees and costs or the provision of security.
To address appellant’s arguments, we must interpret section 169A.63,
subdivision 13. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, which is reviewed
de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016); see also Swenson v.
Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. 2011). “The object of all interpretation and
construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.
Stat. § 645.16 (2022); see also Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn.
2012). The first step when interpreting a statute is to determine if the plain language is
ambiguous. Green v. Kellen, 921 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn.
11
Feb. 19, 2019). If the statute is unambiguous, appellate courts apply the plain language
and do not “explore [the statute’s] spirit or purpose.” Cocchiarella , 884 N.W.2d at 624
(citing In re Welfare of J.J.P., 831 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 2013)). On the other hand, if
the statute is ambiguous, a court may utilize the tools prescribed by Minnesota Statutes
section 645.16—including legislative history—to ascertain the legislature’s intent. Staab,
813 N.W.2d at 73.
Applying these standards, we now turn to the applicable provisions in section
169A.63, subdivision 13.
Section 163A.63, subdivision 13(f), prov ides: “Nothwithstanding [the requirement
to return the vehicle to a participant in the ignition interlock program], an entity in
possession of the vehicle is not required to release it until the reasonable costs of towing,
seizure, and storage of the vehicle have been paid by the vehicle owner.” Moreover, when
a law enforcement agency releases a seized vehicle to a participant in the ignition interlock
program, the agency “may require an owner or driver to give security or post bond payable
to the agency in an amount equal to the retail value of the vehicle.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.63,
subd. 13(g), (h). If an owner or driver provides security or posts a bond, “any future
forfeiture action against the vehicle must instead proceed against the security as if it were
the vehicle.” Id., subd. 13(g).
These provisions unambiguously authorize a law enforcement agency to require
payment of the reasonable costs of towing, seizure, and storage, and to require security or
a bond before releasing a seized vehicle based on participation in the ignition interlock
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program. And the statute contains no language authorizing a district court to waive an
agency’s rights to reasonable costs and security equal to the value of the vehicle.
The district court’s order states that Wawersich “shall not be responsible for any
impound fees, storage costs, or administrative fees associated with the forfeiture of [the]
vehicle or the return of [the] vehicle.” It further states that Wawersich “s hall not be
required to post a bond or any other security for the return of his vehicle.” These directives
are not permitted by the plain language of section 169A.63, subdivision 13.
Wawersich argues that the district court has inherent power to bar fees, costs, and
security as a sanction. And according to Wawersich, the district court’s directives
regarding fees, costs, and security were sanctions for the bad-faith conduct of the Mounds
View attorney.
District courts are “vested with considerable inherent judicial authority necessary to
their vital function—the disposition of individual cases to deliver remedies for wrongs and
justice freely and without purchase; completely and without denial; promptly and without
delay, conformable to the laws.” Patton v. Newmar Corp., 538 N.W.2d 116, 118-19 (Minn.
1995) (quotation omitted). However, that power is not absolute. Courts cannot impede on
powers that are reserved for the executive and legislative branches of government. See
State v. M.D.T. , 831 N.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Minn. 2013). “[W] hen a question arises
regarding the scope of the judiciary’s inherent authority, courts must ‘resolve all reasonable
doubts in favor of a co-ordinate branch.’” Id. at 280 (quoting Gollnik v. Mengel, 128 N.W.
292, 292 (Minn. 1910)).
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We are not convinced that the district court had inherent judicial authority to
sanction the Mounds View attorney by waiving the statutory rights of the Mounds View
police department to fees, costs, and security . Moreover, we previously concluded in a
nonprecedential (and therefore nonbinding) opinion 5 that the state cannot be made to pay
storage costs for a forfeited vehicle directly. Janssen v. 2012 Harley Davidson Motorcycle,
No. A18-1015, 2019 WL 3886607, at *1, *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 19, 2019). And, although
Wawersich contends that the district court’s directives to release the truck without fees,
costs, and security were intended to sanction the Mounds View attorney, the district court
made no findings regarding its intent. Because the district court’s order to release the truck
without payment of any statutory fees or costs or the provision of security is not supported
by the law, we reverse in part.
However, in his motion for summary judgment, Wawersich specifically asked the
district court to find that the Mounds View attorney acted in bad faith by failing to
diligently communicate about release of the truck and by unreasonably delaying the
proceedings. And Wawersich moved the district court to impose sanctions, including
attorney fees, based on the conduct of the Mounds View attorney . The district court did
not expressly address these requests in its order.
A district court has authority to impose sanctions under rule 16.06 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure if “a party or party’s attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial
order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial

5 See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (nonprecedential decisions of this court are
nonbinding but may be cited as persuasive authority).
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conference, . . . or if a party or party’s attorney fails to participate in good faith.”
Furthermore, the district court may make any orders that are “just, including any of the
orders provided in Rule 37.02(b)(2), (3), (4).” Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.06. Rule 37.02(b)(4)
of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that a district court
may issue “an order treating as a contempt of court [a party’s] failure to obey” prior orders.
Under both rule 16.06 and 37.02, the district court may order reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 16.06; Minn. R. Civ. P. 37.02(b).
The vehicle forfeiture statute also specifically allows for sanctions. See Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.63, subd. 9(h) (stating that a district court “may order sanctions under section
549.211 (sanctions in civil actions)” and that “[a]ny reimbursement fees or sanctions must
be paid from other forfeiture proceeds of the law enforcement agency and prosecuting
authority involved”). Under Minnesota Statutes section 549.211, subdivision 4(a) (2022),
“[a] motion for sanctions . . . must be made separately from other motions or requests.”
Because the district court did not expressly address Wawersich’s request for
sanctions, we remand to the district court. On remand, the district court has discretion to
consider Wawersich’s request for sanctions, to determine whether sanctions are
appropriate, and to make findings supporting any decision. Our opinion should not be
construed as expressing any opinion regarding the imposition of sanctions.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.