State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1314

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Rebecca Julie Malecha,
Respondent.

Filed March 6, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Smith, John, Judge*
Concurring specially, Frisch, Judge
Dissenting, Slieter, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-21-517

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian M. Mortenson, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Melvin R. Welch, Welch Law Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Smith, John,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We reverse the district court’s order granting respondent’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained incident to an arrest because the police followed appropriate steps in
verifying the validity of the warrant. As a result, a good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies when the warrant, which served as the basis for the arrest, had been withdrawn
but not properly documented due to a clerical error. Because the district court erred in
applying the exclusionary rule, we conclude that the evidence should be admitted and
remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
On November 12, 2020, the district court issued a bench warrant on respondent,
Rebecca Julie Malecha, after she failed to appear for her sentencing hearing. 1 Once the
bench warrant was issued, the warrant was sent to the Rice County Sheriff’s office and
entered in the district court records otherwise known as the Minnesota Court Information
System (MNCIS). About a month later respondent’s trial counsel moved to quash the
warrant. On December 15, 2020, the district court granted respondent’s request to quash
the warrant, but the recall of the warrant did not appear on MNCIS because of a clerical
error made by district court administration. The clerical error was failing to provide notice
of the recalled warrant. Thus, Rice County Sherriff’s office did not receive notice that the
warrant was recalled, nor did the district court administration contact the sheriff’s office.

1 The parties stipulated to these facts at the May 24, 2022, hearing.
3
Notably, the error was not discovered until respondent’s arrest on March 7, 2021.
The next day, district court administration issued a notice of judicial determination stating:
This notice is to provide verification that, based on
[respondent’s] request, [the district court] did grant the request
to recall the warrant on December 14, 2020. The request was
processed, and the warrant was recalled on December 15,
2020.

In other words, the district court backdated the recall of the warrant to reflect the December
15, 2020, date.
On March 7, 2021, police officers from the Faribault Police Department were
dispatched to conduct a welfare check on a woman behaving suspiciously and poss ibly
waiting for someone. When officers arrived, they identified the woman to be respondent
and suspected that respondent had an active warrant. To confirm their suspicion, the police
officers contacted dispatch. Dispatch contacted the National Crime Information Center
and the Rice County Jail, and both reported the warrant as active. Within a couple of
minutes, dispatch relayed that information back to the police officers.
Based on the information received, the police officers placed respondent under
arrest. Following the arrest, officers performed a search inc ident to arrest and found
respondent in possession of controlled substances. Consequently, the state charged
respondent with four felony counts in violation of: (1) Minn. Stat. § 152.022.1 (2020);
(2) Minn. Stat. § 152.022.1(7)(ii) (2020); (3) Minn. Stat. § 152.023.2(a)(1)(2020) ;
(4) Minn. Stat. § 152.023.2(a)(4) (2020). Respondent moved to suppress all evidence,
arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of her constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizure. A contested omnibus hearing was held on the search
4
and seizure issue. At the hearing, both parties agreed to submit briefs and then have the
district court issue an order. The district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss and
determined that respondent’s arrest on a quashed warrant violated her constitutional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizure and that all evidence obtained as a
result should be suppressed. The state filed this pretrial appeal.
DECISION
The district court erred by concluding that the Fourth Amendment violation required
applying the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a clerical error.

Appellant State of Minnesota argues that the district court erred by determining that
a Fourth Amendment violation automatically requires the exclusionary rule to be applied
as a remedy. We agree.
In a pretrial appeal by the state, an appellate court will only reverse if the state can
“clearly and unequivocally show both that the trial court’s order will have a critical impact
on the state’s ability to prosecute the defendant successfully and that the order constituted
error.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. 1995) (quotations omitted). “When
facts are not in dispute, as here, we review a pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo
and ‘determine whether the police articulated an adequate basis for the search or seizure at
issue.’” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011) (quoting State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 247-48 (Minn. 2007)).
The Fourth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution protect the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “The first step
5
when analyzing an alleged constitutional violation is to determine whether the officer’s
conduct constituted a search or seizure.” State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 37 (Minn.
2021). The second step is to decide whether it was unreasonable. Id. “A search or seizure
conducted without a warrant is considered unreasonable per se.” Id. However, a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions exist. State v. Burbach , 706
N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005). The state has the burden to show that a warrantless search
or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d at
37.
“A search incident to a lawful arrest is a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn.
App. 2018) (quotation omitted). An arrest is lawful if an officer has probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime. In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695
(Minn. 1997). “The arresting officer may then search (1) the arrestee’s person, and (2) the
area within the arrestee’s immediate control.” Bradley, 908 N.W.2d at 369.
The district court found that the police officers searched respondent because of the
“misinformation provided to them that there was an active arrest warrant for [respondent].”
It further found that “the warrant was quashed by the [d]istrict [c]ourt and thus [] no longer
active.” Id. As a result, the district court determined that because the warrant was recalled,
the officers did not have a valid basis to arrest respondent, so their subsequent “search
incident to arrest” was invalid. Thus, the district court applied the exclusionary rule and
suppressed the evidence. We therefore agree with the district court that the warrant had
been recalled and that the police officers did not a have a valid basis to arrest respondent
6
or to conduct a search incident to arrest. We agree that there was a Fourth Amendment
violation, but disagree that the exclusionary rule applies.
Appellant argues on appeal that the “flaw in the district court’s logic starts with its
singular analysis of Lindquist, and ends with its erroneous conclusion that every violation
of the Fourth Amendment automatically requires application of the exclusionary rule as a
remedy.” See State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 864 (Minn. 2015). When evidence is
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he exclusionary rule has traditionally
barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of
an unlawful invasion.” State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 15 (Minn. 2013). The
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the “exclusionary rule was historically
designed as a means of deterring police misconduct.” Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 869.
Moreover, “[t]he exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment where the erroneous information resulted from clerical
errors of court employees.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 2 (1995).
It is undisputed that the police officers followed proper protocol when they
responded to the welfare check on respondent. The exclusionary rule was meant to deter
police misconduct and the police officers here did nothing wrong in executing what they
believed (with good reason) was a valid warrant. The judiciary wants to promote the
execution of its orders . Further, it does not want to have the police second guessing
whether court orders are valid since that would be counterproductive and would not deter
police misconduct. Therefore, we conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply in
7
this case. The issue then becomes what the proper remedy should be in a unique case such
as this one. Which bring us to the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
The good-faith exception provides “that the exclusionary rule does not apply when
the police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant later held
invalid.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011). In Lindquist, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the good-faith exception applies only when law enforcement
officers act under binding appellate precedent. 869 N.W.2d. at 876. The court noted the
“narrowness” of its holding and explained that “nothing in [its] opinion should be construed
as authorizing the application of exceptions we have not explicitly adopted.” Id. Even
though we recognize the narrowness of applying the good-faith exception, the Minnesota
Supreme Court did not address a situation such as this one when it limited the scope of
Lindquist to mistakes over binding appellate precedent cases. We also note that in
Lindquist the Minnesota Supreme Court did cite Evans as an example of how the United
States Supreme Court has declined to apply the exclusionary rule in circumstances where
it would not serve the purpose of deterring police misconduct. 869 N.W.2d. at 869.
The Evans case is particularly instructive here. 514 U.S.at 1 In that case, the
defendant was arrested by police officers after a routine traffic stop when a patrol car’s
computer revealed that there was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest. Id.
at 4. Upon arresting defendant, a police officer observed defendant drop a hand-rolled
cigarette that smelled of marijuana. Id. Police officers searched his car and found him in
possession of a controlled substance. Id. They later found out that the arrest warrant had
been quashed 17 days before the defendant’s arrest and that a clerk failed to contact the
8
sheriff’s office to notify them of the quashed warrant. Id. Thus, the warrant still appeared
active at the time of the arrest. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because of clerical errors of court employees
fell within the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2.
Applying the principles recognized in Lindquist and Evans, we hold that the
circumstances of this case justify applying a limited good-faith exception. Like Evans,
there was no record of a warrant being recalled because of a clerical error and the warrant
stayed active at the time of the arrest. And like both Lindquist and Evans, there was no
police misconduct to deter. We conclude that the district court erred in determining that
the exclusionary rule applies, and we also conclude that the evidence should be admitted.
Reversed and remanded.

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FRISCH, Judge (concurring specially)
This case presents the threshold question of whether law enforcement conducted a
search of respondent Rebecca Julie Malecha incident to her arrest pursuant to an active
arrest warrant. Malecha argues that because the warrant was recalled before her arrest, law
enforcement conducted a warrantless search and the exclusionary rule requires suppression
of the fruits of that search. The state, appealing here, argues that because law enforcement
arrested and searched Malecha in reasonable reliance on contemporaneous records
showing an active arrest warrant, the fruits of the search should not be suppressed and
instead should be subject to a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The district
court agreed with Malecha and suppressed the fruits of the search pursuant to the
exclusionary rule, concluding that Minnesota has not recognized an applicable good-faith
exception.
Because law enforcement arrested Malecha pursuant to an active warrant and
therefore searched Malecha incident to lawful arrest, the district court erred in its
application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence discovered during the search. I
therefore concur in the judgment reversing the district court’s suppression order.
Factual Record
The circumstances of this case are unusual. In lieu of testimony, the parties at the
suppression hearing submitted exhibits and agreed to a verbal “recitation of the facts” as
“the parties agree them to be,” summarized as follows.
On November 12, 2020, a district court judge issued a warrant for Malecha’s arrest
following her failure to appear. On November 13 at 11:05 a.m., the warrant became active.
CS-2
On December 11, Malecha’s counsel requested that the warrant be quashed. A December
15 entry in the register of actions at 12:40 p.m. lists the warrant as “Served.”
On March 7, 2021, law enforcement came into contact with Malecha. Law
enforcement contacted dispatch to inquire whether Malecha had an active arrest warrant.
Dispatch contacted the jail to confirm whether Malecha had an active arrest warrant. The
jail then looked at the actual warrant for Malecha’s arrest, confirmed that it was active, and
relayed to dispatch that the arrest warrant was active. At 5:09 p.m., dispatch confirmed to
law enforcement that Malecha had an active arrest warrant. Law enforcement then arrested
Malecha, performed a search incident to arrest, and discovered that Malecha was in
possession of controlled substances. Law enforcement, dispatch, and the jail followed
standard operating procedure to confirm the existence of the active arrest warrant.
On March 8, the next day, sometime between 9:35 and 10:08 a.m. , changes to the
official court record occurred. The December 15 line entry in the register of a ctions was
changed from “Warrant Served” to “Warrant Recalled.” The case information entry for
December 15 at 12:40 p.m. was changed from “Served” to “Recalled Inactive.” The record
on appeal does not contain any other information about these changes to the official court
record.
The same day, the court administrator filed a document titled “Notice of Judicial
Determination.” The “Notice” purports that “Judge Christine A Long . . . had previously
reviewed [the] request to recall the warrant issued on November 13, 2020.” The “Notice”
purports to include a “Judicial Response” that the request was granted and that the “notice
is to provide verification that, based on [the] request, Judge Long did grant the request to
CS-3
recall the warrant on December 14, 2020. The request was processed and the warrant was
recalled on December 15, 2020.” Contemporaneous records of communications between
court administration and the jail showing activity on arrest warrants do not show that a
recall for Malecha’s warrant was processed or that court administration notified law
enforcement that the warrant had been recalled by a district court judge. The record does
not contain any other information about the court administrator’s “notice.”
After receiving the summary of stipulated facts and stipulated exhibits at the
contested omnibus hearing, the district court stated that “the question is pretty simple of
whether or not the police can rely on the sheriff’s office and dispatch for confirming a
warrant if a judge signs a judicial determination, and it never gets processed through the
computer system and relayed to everybody else.” The district court later issued an order
finding that at the time law enforcement arrested and searched Malecha, the warrant was
not active and concluding that the search incident to arrest was constitutionally prohibited.
It then suppressed evidence yielded from the illegal search, concluding that Minnesota has
not recognized a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in such circumstances. The
state appeals.
Analysis
The record on appeal presents many questions and offers few answers as to what
happened with the arrest warrant at issue. Certain facts are verified in the record. On
November 12, 2020, a district court judge issued an arrest warrant for Malecha, and the
warrant became active the next day. A month later, Malecha’s counsel requested that the
district court order the recall of the warrant. Records of activity on the status of court
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warrants around that time do not reflect any activity on Malecha’s warrant. Four months
after the judge issued the warrant, law enforcement detained Malecha and arrested her after
confirming through the usual procedure that the warrant remained active. The next day,
the status of the warrant was changed by altering December 2020 entries in the official
court record to convert an active warrant to a recalled warrant. The same day, the court
administrator issued a “Notice of Judicial Determination” purporting that a district court
judge had granted a recall of the warrant on December 14 and that the recall was processed
the next day.
Certain facts are not verified in the record. There is no record from a district court
judge of a response to the December 11 request to recall the warrant. There is no
contemporaneous order from a district court judge or other court record documenting that
a judge recalled the warrant. There is no record of communication between any district
court judge and court administration at any time related to a recall of the warrant. There is
no record of communication between court administration and either the jail or law
enforcement at any time regarding a recall of the warrant. There is no information as to
what occurred between law enforcement’s confirmation of the active warrant and changes
to the court record the following day. There is no information as to who changed the court
record, or what procedure was used to make such changes, or why such procedure was
used, or at who’s direction (if any) such changes were made. There is no information about
the issuance of the “Notice of Judicial Determination” by the court administrator, including
any information as to whether the court administrator was directed or authorized by anyone
to issue such a notice or how the administrator acquired or verified the information set forth
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in the notice. Given these unanswered questions, counsel for the state at the suppression
hearing submitted the stipulated documents and then stated as part of the “recitation of the
facts” as the “parties agree them to be” that, “I think that on December 15, Judge Long
probably had at that time the intention to quash the warrant. . . . But for whatever reason ,
that communication didn’t get to law enforcement.” (Emphasis added.)
The void of information regarding the underlying events, especially the changes to
the official court record, is troubling. The parties and the district court assumed that these
irregularities originated from administrative error, and I do not discount that is one
possibility as to what may have occurred. But we do not base legal determinations about
the constitutional validity of a search on possibilities; we base such high-stakes
determinations on facts as set forth in the appellate record. On appeal from a district court’s
pretrial decision to suppress evidence, we review a district court’s findings of fact for clear
error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Brown, 932 N.W.2d 283, 289 (Minn.
2019). And I am mindful of “the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in
accordance with the law,” and that “responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel’s . . .
failure to specify issues.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990)
(quotation omitted). The threshold and dispositive issue on appeal is the constitutional
validity of the search. For the reasons set forth below, the district court’s suppression order
is contrary to law and based on clearly erroneous factual findings.
First, the district court’s finding that the warrant had been recalled is contrary to
law. The district court found that, as a matter of fact, “the recall [was] issued by Court
Administration.” That factual finding is supported by the record. But that factual finding
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necessitates a legal conclusion that the purported recall of the warrant was ineffective
because a court administrator has no legal authority to recall a warrant.
At oral argument, both parties agreed that only a judge has the authority to either
issue or recall a warrant. That proposition, that only a judge can issue or change such a
court order, is well-grounded. Judges are responsible for the issuance of process with
respect to arrest warrants. See Minn. Stat. § 629.41 (2022) (“Judges . . . may issue process
to carry out law for the apprehension of persons charged with offenses.”); see also City of
St. Paul v. Tobler, 153 N.W.2d 440, 443 (Minn. 1967) (explaining that the issuance of an
arrest warrant “is a judicial function that cannot constitutionally be delegated to clerks. . . .
Each judge holds separate office with legal competence to perform all relevant judicial
acts.”); State v. Williams, 409 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. App. 1987) (“An arrest warrant is
a judicial process by which, in the name of the State, a defendant is brought before the
court to answer a criminal charge.”).
In recognition of the necessity of judicial process to recall a warrant, the district
court at the contested omnibus hearing identified the question it must answer as whether
“police can rely on the sheriff’s office and dispatch for confirming a warrant if a judge
signs a judicial determination, and it never gets processed.” (Emphasis added.) But the
record does not show that “a judge signed a judicial determination” recalling the warrant,
and the district court made no such finding.
Indeed, the record does not reflect either a contemporaneous or after-the-fact order
from a district court judge recalling the arrest warrant. At oral argument, both parties also
agreed that the record does not contain any judicial process changing the status of the active
CS-7
warrant. No judicial process exists in the record changing the status of the warrant before
Malecha was arrested. Law enforcement confirmed the existence of the active warrant at
that time and before arresting Malecha. Based on the appellate record, the arrest and search
of Malecha therefore occurred pursuant to an active warrant. Moreover, no judicial process
exists in the record changing the status of the warrant after Malecha was arrested. The
record does not reflect that the after-the-fact purported change to the status of the warrant
was accomplished through judicial process. The court administrator filed a document
entitled “Notice of Judicial Determination” purporting to represent that a district court
judge had recalled the warrant many months prior. But, as the district court correctly
recognized in its suppression order, the warrant recall was actually “issued by Court
Administration,” not a judge. Court administration has no authority to recall a warrant. A
court administrator’s “Notice” that a judge had issued judicial process many months prior
is not judicial process and had no effect on the status of the court- ordered warrant.1 See
Tobler, 153 N.W.2d at 441 (stating that a “judge issuing a judicial order in his identified
judicial capacity attests the order by his own signature”). The parties also agreed at oral
argument that a court administrator has no authority to recall a warrant. Accordingly, the
arrest warrant was not recalled because no judicial process exists in the record ordering the
recall of the warrant.

1 The record contains no evidence that a district court judge delegated or attempted to
delegate responsibility to the court administrator and no evidence that the court
administrator was authorized by a district court judge to issue a “Notice of Judicial
Determination.”
CS-8
Second, the district court clearly erred in finding facts not supported by the record.
“A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it does not have evidentiary support in the record
or if it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.” State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393,
403 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). The district court found that the warrant was invalid
“due to a clerical error by court administration [and] the quashing/recall of the warrant did
not appear on the register of actions until after the error was discovered upon Defendant’s
arrest.” The district court also found that, “Because Court Administration had not notified
Rice County Jail of the recalled warrant in court file number 66-CR -19-1081, the warrant
appeared active in the Rice County Jail’s database until March 8, 2021.” But no evidence
in the record, stipulated or otherwise, supports these findings, all of which fall squarely in
the category of questions unanswered by the record. The record on appeal is devoid of
evidence showing a “clerical error by court administration,” or what that error might be, or
the origin of the claimed error, or who discovered such error or how, or that the warrant
remained active in the jail database “because Court Administration had not notified Rice
County Jail of the recalled warrant.” I do not discount the possibility that the circumstances
may be explained by administrative error. But so too is it possible that there may exist a
reasonable explanation as to why the recall never became effective. Again, we do not
substitute possibilities for facts, and the record on appeal does not contain any factual basis,
stipulated or otherwise, to support these findings. Accordingly, the district court clearly
erred in relying on these factual findings to justify the suppression order.
Third, the district court erred in finding that the changes in the official court record
were effective in the absence of evidence showing that such changes comported with the
CS-9
unambiguous policies and procedures of the Minnesota Judicial Branch. The integrity and
security of the official court record is of paramount concern and priority. The Minnesota
Judicial Council enacted Policy 505 entitled “Core Judicial Branch Goals” “to ensure
accountability of the branch, improve overall operations of the court, and enhance the
public’s trust and confidence in the judiciary.” Minn. Jud. Council, Core Judicial Branch
Goals 505, https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Judicial_Council_Library/
Policies/500/505-Core-Judicial-Branch-Goals.pdf?ext=.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S8G-
DB7H] (Policy 505). One of the “Core Judicial Branch Goals” is to “ensure the integrity
and accountability of its performance by maintaining a record system that is accurate,
complete and timely.” Policy 505, supra. The Minnesota Judicial Council also enacted
Policy 505.3 entitled “Data Quality and Integrity,” which provides that it “is the policy of
the Minnesota Judicial Branch to expect high levels of data quality within the Minnesota
Judicial Branch and to emphasize the integrity and security of the data contained in the
statewide case management systems.” Minn. Jud. Council, Data Quality and Integrity
505.3, https://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Judicial_Council_Library/Policies/
500/505-3-Data-Quality-and-Integrity.pdf?ext=.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY6X-WS8A ]
(Policy 505.3).
Pursuant to those policies, the Minnesota State Court Administrator implemented
“Data Quality Procedures” “to help ensure”:
A. The integrity, quality, and security of the data
contained in the systems of District Courts.

B. Accurate, complete, and uniform access to court
records under the Rules of Public Access.
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C. Compliance with all applicable policies, rules,
and statutes with regard to data entry into systems of
District Courts.

Minn. State Ct. Adm’r, Data Quality Procedures 505.3(a), at 1 (Aug. 16, 2019) (Policy
505.3(a)). These procedures govern all district courts and the state court administrator’s
office. Policy 505.3(a), supra, at 1. The policy defines a data quality adjustment as a
“change made to a defined set of data to improve data accuracy and integrity” resulting,
for example, from incomplete or incorrect data. Policy 505.3(a), supra, at 2. Data quality
adjustments must adhere to strict procedures:
Upon discovery of a data quality issue, the [Minnesota
Judicial] Branch may implement a data quality adjustment
effort. Data quality adjustments will be a collaborative effort
between the District Courts and State Court Administration.

Communications regarding data quality adjustments will
be provided by designated staff at State Court Administration
and will include the following:

1. Explanation of the data quality issue.
2. Instructions for performing the data quality adjustment.
3. List of data requiring adjustment.
4. Delineation of the responsibilities for both District
Courts and State Court Administration.
5. Deadline for completion of the adjustment.
6. Monitoring methods.
Policy 505.3(a), supra, at 4.
The unexplained, backdated changes to Malecha’s official court record implicate
the integrity, quality, and security of court data. The record on appeal does not establish
that the changes were authorized by anyone with the authority to do so or carried out
CS-11
pursuant to branch policies and procedures. There is no record of a data quality adjustment
effort reflecting a collaboration between the Minnesota State Court Administrator and the
district court occurring between the confirmation of the active warrant and the changes to
the court record. The re is no record of the precise nature of the data quality issue,
instructions for performing the data quality adjustment, or list of data requiring adjustment,
delineation of the responsibilities of stakeholders, deadlines, or monitoring methods. In
sum, the record on appeal is silent as to whether the changes to the official court record
followed branch policies and procedures or were otherwise authorized.
Because the changes to Malecha’s official court record cannot be validated, those
changes cannot effectively alter the official court record. The district court had no factual
or legal basis to conclude that backdated changes of unidentified origin or procedure to the
status of the warrant in Malecha’s court record were valid. The district court therefore
erred in finding that the changes to the court record established that the warrant “was
quashed by the District Court and thus was no longer active” at the time of the search.
I acknowledge and am sympathetic to the adverse impact to Malecha resulting from
these irregularities. Again, it may be, as counsel for the state at the suppression hearing
speculated, that the issuing judge “probably had at that time the intention to quash the
warrant. . . . But for whatever reason, that communication didn’t get to law enforcement.”
(Emphasis added.) But an intention by a district court judge to take action on a warrant
has no effect; a completed action through the actual exercise of judicial process is required
to make such intention effective. A court administrator has no authority to fulfill a probable
intention of a district court judge in the absence of judicial process to accomplish that
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intention. And to ensure transparency, integrity, and security of the official court record,
any change to the official court record to correct an inaccuracy or mistake must follow
established policies and procedures.
The official court record at the time of the search reflected the existence of an active
warrant, and law enforcement searched Malecha incident to that valid arrest. The record
does not support a conclusion that the arrest warrant was recalled at the time law
enforcement arrested and searched Malecha. The official court record was changed after
Malecha was arrested and searched. The record on appeal does not reflect who made the
changes, what procedure was used to effect the changes, whether such changes complied
with established policies and procedures of the Minnesota Judicial Branch, or that the
changes were authorized or accomplished by judicial process from a constitutional
authority.2 Neither the changes of unknown origin to the official court record nor the notice
issued by the court administrator had any effect on the status of the active warrant. Because
law enforcement searched Malecha incident to a valid arrest, the district court erred in
applying the exclusionary rule to suppress the fruits of the search. See State v. Bernard,

2 These unusual factual circumstances do not favor the application of a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Assuming that Minnesota would recognize a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule for irregularities in the administration of the court record,
application of the exclusionary rule in a case such as this may well serve the purpose of
deterring administrative irregularities or errors and encouraging compliance with branch
policies and procedures to secure the integrity of the official court record. See State v.
Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 2015) (emphasizing deterrence of misconduct as the
touchstone of application of any good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in
Minnesota).
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859 N.W.2d 762, 766 (Minn. 2015). I would therefore reverse the district court’s order
suppressing evidence discovered during that search and remand for trial.

D-1
SLIETER, Judge (dissenting)
I agree with the principal opinion that the arrest warrant was recalled by the district
court prior to respondent Rebecca Julie Malecha’s March 7, 2021, arrest. And, as a result,
Malecha’s warrantless arrest violated her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. But, because
the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule only if law enforcement reasonably relied upon binding appellate precedent, which did
not here occur, I would affirm the district court’s suppression of the evidence. Therefore,
I respectfully dissent.
Recalled Arrest Warrant
I concur with the factual recitation in the principal opinion that “[o]n December 15,
2020, the district court granted [Malecha]’s request to quash the warrant.” It is this fact
which compels my disagreement with the special concurrence.
I first note that appellant State of Minnesota, for the first time in its reply brief,
argues that the district court’s finding that the arrest warrant had been recalled prior to
Malecha’s arrest was “directly contrary to the record evidence, including the register of
actions.” A review of the record compels my disagreement.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)).
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During the suppression hearing, the prosecutor informed the district court judge that
there was no dispute regarding the facts and that the is sue was solely one of law. The
prosecutor then recited the agreed upon facts. Among the stipulated facts recited by the
prosecutor is the following, “I think one of the facts that the State would also concede is I
think that on December 15, [the judge] probably had at that time the intention to quash that
warrant.” Among the stipulated exhibits submitted to the district court is a “Notice of
Judicial Determination” authored by the court administrator and which was created
following the arrest of Malecha. It states that, “This notice is to provide verification that,
based on [defense counsel’s] request, [the judge] did grant the request to recall the warrant
on December 14, 2020. The request was processed and the warrant was recalled on
December 15, 2020.”
These stipulated facts and evidence, among others, led to the following findings in
the district court’s suppression order:
• “On November 12, 2020, the court issued a bench warrant” for the arrest of
Malecha.

• “On December 12, 2020, [Malecha]’s attorney motioned to quash the warrant.”

• “The Court granted [Malecha]’s request on December 15, 2020, and the warrant
was quashed by the Court.”

• “However, due to clerical error by court administration, the quashing/recall of the
warrant did not appear on the register of actions until after the error was discovered
upon [Malecha]’s arrest.”

• “Because Court Administration had not notified Rice County Jail of the recalled
warrant . . ., the warrant appeared active in the Rice County Jail’s database until
March 8, 2021.”
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The state has pointed to no evidence which suggests that these findings are clearly
erroneous. The register of actions adds nothing to this analysis because, as noted, it is
factually undisputed that the judge’s order to recall the warrant on December 15 was
communicated to the court administrator but the order was not processed nor transmitted
to law enforcement’s database. Further, it is undisputed that the recall of the warrant did
not appear on the register of actions until after Malecha’s arrest.
And, it was proper for the district court to rely upon the statement of the court
administrator to accurately reflect the decision of the judge to order the recall of the arrest
warrant. Court administrators are constitutional officers. Minn. Const. art. VI, § 13; Minn.
Stat. § 485.01 (2022) (providing that the constitutional office of district court clerk “shall
be known as the court administrator”). As public officials, court administrators take the
oath of office prescribed by the Minnesota Constitution, which includes the promise to
“discharge faithfully the duties of [the] office to the best of [their] judgment and ability.”
Minn. Const. art. V, § 6; see also Minn. Stat. § 358.055 (2022). I see nothing in the record
which calls into question the court administrator’s statement that “the warrant was recalled
on December 15.” Thus, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
Because the district court’s factual finding that the arrest warrant was ordered
recalled before Malecha’s arrest is not clearly erroneous, I next analyze why the district
court correctly concluded that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical
errors is not the law in Minnesota.

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Good-Faith Exception
“In a criminal case, the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally limited
to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence” and the “fruits” of the illegal search or
seizure. State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Minn. 2016). The United States Supreme
Court “recognized” the exclusionary rule over a century ago and incorporated it to the
states over 60 years ago. State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2015) (citing
Weeks v. United States , 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961)). But, beginning in the mid-1980s, it “has limited the applicability of the
exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment through a series of good-faith exceptions.” Id.
at 869 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). One such exception established
by the United States Supreme Court is for “clerical errors of court employees.” Arizona v.
Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995).
In Lindquist, the supreme court addressed, for the first time, “whether to adopt any
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of a
defendant’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 869 N.W.2d
at 870.
Ultimately, the supreme court adopted the federal exception to the exclusionary rule
for evidence obtained “when law enforcement acts in objectively reasonable reliance on
binding appellate precedent.” Id. at 876. But it specifically “note[d] the narrowness of
[its] holding” and warned that “nothing in our opinion should be construed as authorizing
the application of exceptions we have not explicitly adopted.” Id. at 876. And the supreme
court has reiterated that Lindquist “recognized a very narrow good-faith exception to the
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exclusionary rule” and declined to extend the good-faith exception beyond “reliance on
binding appellate precedent.” State v. Leonard, 943 N.W.2d 149, 161 (Minn. 2020)
(quotation omitted); see also State v. Fawcett, 884 N.W.2d 380, 391 (Minn. 2016)
(Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (declining to join the portion of Justice Stras’s dissent which
announced his interest adopting the federal good-faith exception in full).
The role of this court is to identify and correct errors and “describe[] what we
believe to be the current state of the law.” State v. Rodriguez, 738 N.W.2d 422, 432 (Minn.
App. 2007) (citing Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988)), aff’d, 754
N.W.2d 672 (Minn. 2008). “The task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court
or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” Id.
The supreme court was clear in Lindquist that it was adopting an exception to the
exclusionary rule for reasonable reliance on binding precedent, but no other federally
recognized exceptions. 869 N.W.2d at 876. The supreme court has not “explicitly
adopted” the federally recognized good-faith exception stated in Evans for clerical errors
and, instead, has explicitly repeated the narrowness of its holding in Lindquist. See
Leonard, 943 N.W.2d at 161. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the
principal opinion and would affirm the district court’s suppression of the illegally obtained
evidence.