Mark Krampf, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1316

Mark Krampf,
Appellant,

vs.

University of Minnesota, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 26, 2023
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Blue Earth County District Court
File No. 07-CV-20-2164

Mark Krampf, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Douglas R. Peterson, Dan Herber, Office of the General Counsel University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to amend his complaint
and the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents . Because we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion
to amend, and because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
2
respondents violated the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act (MGDPA), Minn.
Stat. §§ 13.01-.90 (2022), we affirm.
FACTS
On November 1, 2018, appellant Mark R. Krampf —a former student and employee
of respondent University of Minnesota (the University)—submitted the following MGDPA
request to the University:
Greetings Office of Records and Information Management,

Pursuant to the [MGDPA] § 13.04 you are requested to answer
the following:

1. Am I, Mark R. Krampf, an individual, the subject
of stored data (in any and all formats by the
University of Minnesota or any of its entities )?

If Yes to Question 1, then:

Please accept this written notice as a request for inspection
access to all private, public, or confidential data. In addition,
it is requested that the University informs me (Mark R.
Krampf, an individual) of both the content and meaning of the
data.

Please inform me, Mark R. Krampf, immediately or within the
ten (10) day statutory requirements if immediate compliance is
not possible.”

***THIS REQUEST SHALL NOT BE CONFUSED- WITH,
LINKED -TO, OR ASSOCIATED- WITH ANY OTHER
REQUESTS, ISSUES, LEGAL CASES, ETC. INVOLVING
THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA***[
1]

1 According to an affidavit submitted by the University, Krampf has “had certain past
interactions with various University offices or units, including involving MGDPA requests,
litigation, and law enforcement matters.” At the time of this MGDPA request, Krampf was
involved in litigation with the University ove r a separate MGDPA request. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the University in that case and this court
3
In response to Krampf’s request, the University began to upload responsive data
into a secure electronic data portal. The University had uploaded a portion of the data by
November 9, 2018 and finished uploading the remaining data by November 15, 2018—ten
business days following Krampf’s request.2 In total, the University provided Krampf with
more than 2,400 pages of responsive materials. The University sent Krampf a letter on
November 15, 2018, notifying him that the data was available and explaining that certain
information had been redacted, including private personnel information, st ud ent
educational data, attorney -client privileged information, and security information.
Krampf was not satisfied with the information that the University provided in
response to his request . He mailed a follow -up letter to the University and used the
University’s data portal to send a second message seeking confirmation that the University
had fully responded to his request . The University did not provide any additional data in
response to Krampf’s follow-up message s, and on December 21 , 2018, the Unive rsit y
responded to Krampf that it had “processed your request, responsive materials were
produced to you . . . , and the request was closed .” Still unsatisfied with the University’s
response, Krampf initiated this lawsuit against the University and respondent “University
of Minnesota Board of Regents Jane/John Doe” (also referred to in this opinion as “the
University”) in June 2020.

affirmed. Krampf v. Univ. of Minnesota, No. A19- 1753, 2020 WL 3410191 (Minn. App.
June 22, 2020) (Krampf I).
2 Minnesota Statut es section 13.04, subdivision 3, requires a response to a request by a data
subject “within ten days of the date of the request, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays, if immediate compliance is not possible.”
4
After several months during which time the parties engaged in discovery, the district
court held a scheduling conference in November 2020 and directed Krampf to “identify
specific documents which he seeks from [the University].” Three months later, in February
2021, the district court issued an order noting that Krampf had not yet responded to the
district court’s directive. The district court ordered that “unless [Krampf] amends his
complaint or otherwise provides written notice of his intent to prosecute this matter by
identifying the documents he seeks within two weeks of t his order, [Krampf’s] claims
against [the University] shall be dismissed without prejudice.” After two weeks, the district
court dismissed Krampf’s claims because Krampf had not yet responded.
Krampf filed a motion to amend his complaint to add two additi onal defendants and
an additional claim for declaratory judgment. Krampf’s proposed amended complaint was
significantly longer than his initial complaint and contained numerous new factual
allegations and legal assertions. These included allegations that the University had
provided “false and fraudulent” responses during discovery and that the University’s data
access policy violated the MGDPA , see Minn. Stat. § 13.025, subds. 2-3.
The district court rescinded its dismissal of the action when it received Krampf’s
motion to amend his complaint.
3 The district court then denied Krampf’s motion to amend
his complaint. The district court noted that while Krampf’s proposed amended complaint
was “considerably longer and includes more allegations than his origi nal complaint . . .
there are only two new elements” —the proposed new defendants and the proposed new

3 The district court did so because, although it received Krampf’s motion after it dismissed
the action, the postmark indicated that the motion was timely.
5
claim for declaratory relief. The district court reasoned that Krampf’s undue delay in
adding the new defendants, his “failure to explain his delay,” and the need to conduct
discovery with respect to those defendants weighed against granting the proposed
amendment. The district court also reasoned that allowing the addition of a declaratory
judgment claim would be futile.
After the denial of his motion to amend his complaint, Krampf sought a scheduling
order and the opportunity to conduct additional discovery. In October 2021, the district
court issued a scheduling order that provided for the completion of discovery by January
28, 2022. Krampf did not se rve any additional discovery requests on the University or
bring any motions to compel discovery.
Following the close of the discovery period, the University moved for summary
judgment. The University’s motion and supporting affidavits described the Unive rsity’s
response to Krampf’s request in detail. In an affidavit, Susan McKinney, the University’s
MGPDA responsible authority 4 at the time of Krampf’s request , explained that she
“contacted multiple staff in the University’s President’s Office, Board of Regents Office,
Office of General Counsel, Human Resources, Medical School, Student Records, and other
offices seeking all available information concerning [Krampf] as the subject of the data.”
She further stated that “[p]er University policies and proced ures and instructions provided
to these offices, all records, in any media, regardless of physical form, storage media or

4 Under the MGDPA, a “[r]esponsible authority” is “the state official designated by law or
by the commissioner as the individual responsible for the collection, use and dissemination
of any set of data on individuals, government data, or summary data .” Minn. Stat. § 13.02,
subd. 16(a).
6
conditions of use, that were responsive were requested and were to be provided to the [Data
Access and Privacy] Office as part of my i nquiries.”
McKinney identified by name more than forty individuals who were “contacted”
and “asked to search for data,” and stated that “[f]or those that did have data, other than
attorney-client data, data of which [Krampf] was the subject were released t o [Krampf] on
or before November 15, 2018.” She recounted that “the University’s search for potentially
responsive data included reviewing Google account data including emails, reviewing
electronic files in multiple University databases and software progr ams, and searching for
and reviewing paper files, including several bankers’ boxes of personnel, student, and legal
matters concerning [Krampf] located in cold, off -site storage locations.” She also noted
that human resources personnel searched for record s using Krampf’s “employee
identification number, name, and other means,” and that the health center and medical
school searched for personnel-related records using Krampf’s name.
Among the documents submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment,
the University submitted fifteen emails, dated between 2007 and 2017, that it obtained from
Krampf during discovery. Krampf asserted that these emails, which were communications
between him and various University staff , were responsive to his MGDPA request but
withheld from the data provided. These emails involved a wide variety of topics, including:
correspondence about multiple job applications by Krampf; Krampf’s offer to give a
University employee a discount from his private business; the fact t hat Krampf left a
business card on an acquaintance’s door; a conversation about a professor’s research
poster; a University employee’s request for a discount code; the death of a Stanford
7
University professor; a discussion of computer software; an attempt to schedule a phone
call; and Krampf’s mother’s medical condition. A senior paralegal with the University
stated in an affidavit that these emails involved two current employees who reported having
no responsive data to Krampf’s request and five former em ployees of the University.
McKinney also stated in her affidavit that a third current employee involved in the emails
also had no responsive data.
Krampf also submitted an affidavit in response to the University’s summary
judgment motion and attached several emails, including the following: (1) a late-November
or December 2018 5 email to biotechnology grant awardees regarding another MGDPA
request by Krampf; (2) a similar email from late 2017 or early 2018; (3) a 2010 letter from
an Executive Vice Dean ask ing Krampf to “cease and desist” his “unfounded and
disrespectful . . . inappropriate claims” and “repeated communications to this office, to
legislators, gubernatorial candidates, and others” regarding a University staff member;
(4) a 2010 email exchange with a University staff member disputing student debt statistics;
and (5) two February 2018 grant applications that Krampf submitted on behalf of his
company, BMT Laboratories. Krampf alleged that, based on these communications, he
“knew that numerous ad ditional emails and other government data responsive to [his]
request existed but had not been provided.”
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University and
dismissed Krampf’s claims. Krampf appeals.

5 Because some documents include more than one date, we refer to a da te range when
describing them.
8
DECISION
I. Denial of Krampf’s Motion to Amend the Complaint

“After a responsive pleading has been served, a plaintiff may amend the complaint
‘only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party,’ and ‘leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires.’” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. RBP Realty, LLC , 888 N.W.2d
699, 705 (Minn. App. 2016) (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18,
2017). “Generally, the decision to permit or deny amendments to pleadings is within the
discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn. 2003). But “[w]hether the district
court has abused its discretion in ruling on a motion to amend may turn on whether it was
correct in an underlying legal ruling.” Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 500- 01 (Minn. App.
2003), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003).
The district court denied Krampf’s motion to amend his complaint because it
determined that there was “undue delay” in Krampf’s attempt to add two defendants and
that Krampf’s proposed declaratory judgment claim was futile. Krampf argues that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend his complaint because
the district court had previously ordered him to amend his complaint. 6 We are not
convinced for two reasons. First, Krampf does not substantively challenge the
determinations of delay and futility or otherwise address the district court’s reasons for

6 Krampf does not argue on appeal that the district court erred by not addressing the
portions of the proposed amended complaint alleging that the University provided false
discovery responses or that the University’s data ac cess policy violated the MGDPA.
9
denying the motion to amend. See Meyer v. Best W. Seville Plaza Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 690,
694 (Minn. App. 1997) (noting that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it
denies a request to amend on the basis that the requesting party “failed to act with due
diligence in their attempts to amend”), rev. denied (Minn. June 26, 1997); see also Adams
v. Harpstead, 947 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Minn. App. 2020) (stating that declaratory judgment
“is not a remedy that is available to determine that a responsible authority violated the
MGDPA”). S econd, we do not agree that by directing Krampf to either “amend[] his
complaint or . . . identify[] the documents he seeks,” the district court suggested that it
would permit any and all proposed amendments to the complaint .7 We therefore discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Krampf’s motion to amend his
complaint.
II. Decision Granting Summary Judgment to the University

Krampf next argues that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment
in favor of the University because the record includes evidence that the University failed
to involve information technology personnel when responding to Krampf’s data request
and because the record includes evidence that the University did not provide data in its
possession that was responsive to his MGDPA request. 8 We affirm the district court’s

7 Portions of Krampf’s brief criticize the district court’s decision to dismiss the complaint
without prejudice in 2021 for his failure to sufficiently identify the data he sought from the
University. We need not address this decision, however, because the district court vacated
its dismissal after Krampf moved to amend his complaint.
8 Krampf also argues that the University failed to respond to three of his discovery requests.
Krampf’s argument cannot prevail, however, because he did not make a motion to compel
discovery and did not make additional discovery requests after the district court allowed
him to do so. See M.H. v. Caritas Fam. Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. 1992) (stating
10
decision because there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the University
violated the MGDPA. 9
The MGDPA “regulates the collection, creation, storage, maintenance,
dissemination, and access to government data in government entities.” Minn. Stat. § 13.01,
subd. 3. It generall y allows persons to “inspect and copy public government data at
reasonable times and places” and requires a written explanation for any denial of access.
Minn. Stat. § 13.03, subds. 3(a), (f). The MGDPA affords particular rights to individuals
who are th e subject of government data. Minn. Stat. § 13.04. An individual data subject
may request to “b e informed whether the individual is the subject of stored data on
individuals, and whether it is classified as public, private or confidential .” Id., subd. 3.
“Upon further request, an individual who is the subject of stored private or public data on
individuals shall be shown the data without any charge and, if desired, shall be informed
of the content and meaning of that data.” Id. “[W]hen the government violates the
[MGDPA] by improperly denying a person access to data that the government is required
by the Act to make available . . . the person denied access is an ‘aggrieved person’ under

that appellants who made no motion to compel cannot now argue that they lack the facts
to support their complaint).
9 Krampf also makes the following four arguments to this court that he did not make to the
district court: (1) statements in three emails between University employees indicate that
the University failed to produce responsive data ; (2) Krampf’s follow-up communications
with the University should be characterized as independent MGDPA requests and the
University failed to respond to these MGDPA requests; (3) the University redacted data
from its MGDPA response without explanation; and (4) disciplinary action should be taken
against the district court judge. We decline to address these arguments. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (“A reviewing court must generally consider only those
issues that the record shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding
the matter before it.” (quotation omitted)).
11
section 13.08, subd. 4(a) [of the MGDPA].” Wiegel v. City of St. Paul, 639 N.W.2d 378,
384 (Minn. 2002). Any “aggrieved person seeking to enforce the person’s rights under
[the MGDPA] or obtain access to data” may bring an action in district court to compel
compliance with the MGDPA. Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd. 4(a).10
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “We review the grant of summary judgment de novo t o
determine whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court
erred in its application of the law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prod., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623,
628 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists “when
reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Krampf argues that the record contains evidence that the University failed to enlist
the help of information technology personnel in responding to his reques t. We are not
persuaded that the University’s failure to involve information technology personnel creates
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the completeness of its response . Krampf does
not direct our attention to any provision of the MGDPA or any binding authority requiring

10 In addition to an action to compel compliance under subdivision 4(a), the MGDPA
authorizes injunctive relief, recovery of “ any damages sustained ,” and , in the case of a
“willful violation,” recovery of “exemplary damages .” Minn. Stat. § 13.08, subd s. 1, 2.
Although the complaint references each of these three provisions, on appeal, Krampf
asserts that his only claim was under subdivision 4(a). We limit our analysis to that claim,
and therefore need not analyze whether the alleged violations were “willful” or whether
Krampf sustained damages.
12
a governmental entity to involve information technology professionals in its response to a
data request.11 Nor does he point to any evidence indicating that the University could not
have provided a complete response without the help of information technology personnel.
Similarly, Krampf asserts that nothing in the record confirms that the employees of the
University who searched for data were “technologically competent .” But the record also
contains no evidence establishing the competence necessary to adequately search for data
in this case. McKinney identified more than forty individuals across numerous University
departments that were contacted in response to Krampf’s request , and the record contains
no evidence that any of these employees was unable to perform the tasks required of them.
For these reasons, we conclude that the record does not establish a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether the technological abilit ies of the employees involved affected the
completeness of the University’s response.
Krampf also argues that various emails —some attached to the University’s
summary judgment motion and some attached to his response—indicate that the University
did not pr ovide all of the data that he requ ested. He contends that his possession of the
emails, coupled with the University’s failure to produce them, indicates that the University
failed to provide a complete response to his MGDPA request. Again, we disagree. Some
of the emails Krampf relies on for this argument were created more than ten years before
Krampf’s MGDPA request and involve staff who no longer work with the University.

11 To the extent that portions of Krampf’s arguments to this court could be construed as
raising a separate claim that the University’s response policies and procedures themselves
violate the MGDPA, we decline to address this claim because Krampf did not make those
allegations in his complaint.
13
Others involve staff who were asked to search for responsive data and responded that they
did not have any. One of the emails that Krampf cites was sent after the University
responded to his MGDPA request. 12 In short, for any of these emails to indicate a genuine
issue of material fact, the record must contain some evidence that the University was in
possession of them. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, No. A17- 0355, 2017 WL 6418224, at
*4 (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 2017) (nonprecedential opinion cited for its persuasive value,
affirming summary judgment because appellant “offered no evidence that the . . .
respondents possessed any [responsive] data”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 20, 2018); Davis
v. City of Minneapolis , No. A06- 1114, 2007 WL 2034290, at *4 (Minn. App. July 17,
2007) (nonprecedential opinion cited for its persuasive value, observing that “appellant
simply argues that respondent is withholding information because appellant thinks
respondent is withholding information,” but that “[a]ppellant is not entitled as a matter of
right to that which does not exist.”). Because the record contains no such evidence, no
genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the emails relied on by Krampf .
Affirmed.

12 We also observe that Krampf is not the subject of many of the emails he relies on to
make this argument, and m any of the emails relate to topics such as requesting a discount
code or discussing a third party’s medical condition. These would not be responsive to
Krampf’s request. In addition, two of the most recent emails —the two 2018 grant
applications that Krampf submitted to RMM on behalf of his company, BMT
Laboratories—pertained to BMT Laboratories as an entity, not to Krampf as an individual.
See Minn. Stat. § 13.04, subd. 3 (requiring government entities to produce “stored data on
individuals”); Minn. Stat. § 13.02, subd. 8 (defining “[i]ndividual” as “a natural person”).