Laurie J. Stangel, et al., Respondents,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1318

Laurie J. Stangel, et al.,
Respondents,

vs.

Elliot Day Whipple,
Defendant,

Jordan Gall,
Respondent,

Greg Rutten,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2023
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CV-22-1271

Robert J. Kouba, Carl E. Christensen, Christensen Law Office PLLC, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondents Laurie J. Stangel, et al.)

Jordan Gall, Sturgeon Lake, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John G. Westrick, Savage Westrick, P.L.L.P., Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting
respondents’ motion for a temporary injunction and issuing the injunction without a bond.
We affirm.
FACTS
This case arises from a dispute over who owns a property in Cass Lake, Minnesota
(the property). Robert Day Whipple was the owner of the property until his death in 2021.
Prior to his death, Western National Bank gave Robert Whipple a loan in exchange for a
mortgage on the property. In March 2022, Western National commenced foreclosure
proceedings based on a default of the mortgage. On June 7, 2022, the district court issued
an order reducing the mortgagor’s redemption period to five weeks from the date of the
order or the date of the foreclosure sale, whichever came later . On June 22, 2022,
respondents Laurie and Russell Stangel purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale. The
Stangels received a sheriff’s certificate of sale, which they recorded on June 29, 2022.
On July 18, 2022, several acts occurred. First, defendant Elliot Day Whipple
recorded an affidavit averring that he is Robert Day Whipple’s sole heir and the successor
in interest to the property. Second, respondent Jordan Gall recorded an affidavit stating
that Robert Day Whipple passed away in October 2021 with no surviving spouse and that
his estate had not been probated. Third, Elliot Whipple1 recorded a quitclaim deed

1 From this point forward, we refer to Elliot Whipple as “Whipple.”
3
purporting to convey the property to Gall. Fourth, Gall hired appellant Greg Rutten to
paint a garage on the property. Finally, Rutten filed both a mechanic’s lien statement and
a notice of intent to redeem the property as a creditor based on painting work that he
claimed to have performed that same day.
On July 26, 2022, the Stangels filed a complaint against Whipple, Gall, and Rutten
(the defendants), alleging that they “concocted a scheme to steal the property” from the
Stangels by illegally transferring Whipple’s interest in the property to Gall and
manufacturing a mechanic’s lien so that Rutten could redeem the property. The complaint
sought to quiet title and alleged that the defendants committed slander of title, violated
various provisions of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act and the Minnesota Unifo rm
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and damaged the property. The Stangels also filed a notice
of lis pendens.
Three days later, on July 29, 2022, Rutten paid the foreclosure sale price plus
interest and received a certificate of redemption from the sheriff’s office, which he
recorded. See Minn. Stat. §§ 580.23-.24 (2022) (setting forth redemption requirements).
On the same day, the Stangels filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or a
temporary injunction to prevent the “[d]efendants from redeeming as creditors, taking
possession of, or otherwise acquiring title to, and ousting” the Stangels from the property.
In support of their motion, the Stangels filed a memorandum of law and several exhibits.
The exhibits included: copies of the sheriff’s certificate of sale, Whipple’s affidavit, Gall’s
affidavit, the quitclaim deed from Whipple to Gall, Rutten’s mechanic’s lien statement,
Rutten’s notice of intent to redeem the property, and the district court order reducing the
4
redemption period to five weeks. On August 1, 2022, Rutten filed a memorandum
opposing the Stangels’ motion. Rutten attached as an exhibit the sheriff’s certificate of
redemption.
After a hearing, the district court issued an order granting the Stangels’ motion for
a temporary injunction . The district court concluded that the following factors weigh in
favor of an injunction: (1) the need to preserve the status quo, (2) the harm the Stangels
would suffer if temporary relief was denied versus the harm the defendants would suffer if
the injunction was granted, (3) the Stangels’ likelihood of success on the merits, (4) public
policy considerations, and (5) the burden on the court to supervise or enforce the temporary
relief. The district court emphasized that the Stangels “do not have an adequate legal
remedy to protect their interest in their real property from ouster” and that “[t]he Stangels
stand to lose their home” in the absence of injunctive relief. The district court therefore
enjoined the defendants “from engaging in further proceedings to acquire title or otherwise
oust the Stangels from the property . . . during the pendency of the litigation.”
In the same order, the district court also declined to require the Stangels to post a
bond “for [the] injunction to have full force and effect.” The district court reasoned that
“it need not require the Stangels to post a bond to protect [d]efendants” because “the
Stangels are currently residing at the property and performing maintenance to improve [it]”
and because the “[d]efendants will still have a fully secured interest in the property” if “it
is later determined [that] an injunction should not have issued.”
Rutten appeals.
5
DECISION
Rutten argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the Stangels’
motion for a temporary injunction. Rutten also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by issuing the injunction without setting a bond. We consider each issue in turn.
I. Rutten has not proven that the district court clearly abused its discretion by
granting a temporary injunction.

A district court may grant a temporary injunction if, upon review of any affidavits,
deposition testimony, or oral testimony presented to the court, it determines that there are
sufficient grounds to warrant such relief. Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.02(b). The decision to grant
an injunction “rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court, and its action will
not be disturbed on appeal unless, based upon the whole record, it appears that there has
been an abuse of such discretion.” Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc. ,
278 N.W.2d 81, 91 (Minn. 1979). A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its
decision to grant a temporary injunction on an erroneous interpretation of the law or if it
disregards important facts. DSCC v. Simon, 950 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Minn. 2020);
Cramond v. Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. o f Indus. Orgs., 126 N.W.2d 252, 256-57
(Minn. 1964). An appellant must affirmatively show that the district court abused its
discretion to merit reversal. Loth v. Loth, 35 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1949); see also
Luthen v. Luthen, 596 N.W.2d 278, 283 (Minn. App. 1999) (applying Loth).
Because a temporary injunction is granted before a trial on the me rits, the party
seeking an injunction must show that they would be irreparably harmed for an injunction
to issue. Simon, 950 N.W.2d at 286 . In reviewing the district court’s decision to issue a
6
temporary injunction, we consider the same five factors as the district court considered.
Id.; see Dahlberg Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 323 (Minn. 1965). These
factors, known as the Dahlberg factors, include:
(1) The nature and background of the relationship between the
parties preexisting the dispute giving rise to the request for
relief.

(2) The harm to be suffered by plaintiff if the temporary
restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on defendant if
the injunction issues pending trial.

(3) The likelihood that one party or the other will prevail on the
merits when the fact situation is viewed in light of established
precedents fixing the limits of equitable relief.

(4) The aspects of the fact situation, if any, which permit or
require consideration of public policy expressed in the statutes,
[s]tate and [f]ederal.

(5) The administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision
and enforcement of the temporary decree.

Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. And, in conducting our review, we view the facts in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party. Bud Johnson Constr. Co. v. Metro. Transit
Comm’n, 272 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 1978).
The district court found that each of the Dahlberg factors weighs in favor of granting
injunctive relief. Rutten challenges the district court’s findings on each of these factors.
We consider each factor in turn.
A. Nature of the Parties’ Relationship
The first Dalhberg factor considers “[t]he nature and background of the relationship
between the parties preexisting the dispute giving rise to the request for relief.” Dahlberg,
7
137 N.W.2d at 321. This factor stems from the purpose of a temporary injunction —“to
preserve the status quo until adjudication of the case on the merits.” Pacific Equip. & Irr.,
Inc. v. Toro Co., 519 N.W.2d 911, 915 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 16,
1994). The district court concluded that “[t]he first Dahlberg factor weighs in favor of
granting an injunction to preserve the status quo.” In reaching this conclusion, the district
court emphasized that the Stangels are currently in possession of the property and “stand
to lose their home.”
Rutten argues that this finding is erroneous because it is based on the district court’s
mistaken determination that “[t]he Stangels are the owners of [the property]” and because
the district court characterized the status quo in relation to the Stangels’ possession of the
property. The Stangels acknowledge that they were not the “owners” of the property at the
time they brought the motion for a temporary injunction, but rather were the highest bidders
at the sheriff’s sale. But they contend that “[t]he district court was fully apprised of this”
and that the district court did not err in its other factual findings on the first Dahlberg factor.
The Stangels emphasize: “[T]he undisputed facts show that the status quo was that the
Stangels[] were the sheriff’s certificate holders, were in posse ssion of the [p]roperty, and
were residing at the [p]roperty.”
We are persuaded by the Stangels’ argument. The district court found that “[t]he
Stangels acquired an interest in the property . . . when they were the highest bidders at
the . . . [s]heriff’s sale” on June 22, as evidenced by the certificate itself. The district court
also found that “the Stangels are currently residing at the property” and that they “stand to
lose their home” in the absence of temporary injunctive relief. And, regarding Rutten and
8
the other parties opposing the temporary injunction, the district court found that their
connection to the property arose when Rutten painted the garage, filed a mechanic’s lien
statement, and later obtained a certificate of redemption. In making these findings, the
district court correctly described both the nature of the parties’ relationship to each other
before the dispute arose and the parties’ claimed interests in the property.
Rutten does not challenge the factual findings that the district court relied upon to
support its analysis of the first Dahlberg factor. Rather, Rutten focuses on the district
court’s characterization of the Stangels as the “owners” of the property—language included
in the “Findings of Fact”—to argue that the district court abused its discretion when it
found that the first Dahlberg factor weighs in favor of the Stangels. To the extent that the
district court erred by characterizing the Stangels as the “owners” of the property at this
procedural stage, any error was harmless because the district court did not refer to this
finding in its analysis of the first Dahlberg factor. Instead, in analyzing the first Dahlberg
factor, the district court accurately described the Stangels’ possessory interest in the
property as well as their interest based on the sheriff’s certificate of sale. Therefore, we
decline to reverse on the basis that the district court prematurely characterized the Stangels
as the owners of the property. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that harmless error be
ignored); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn. 1987) (“A lthough error
may exist, unless the error is prejudicial, no grounds exist for reversal.”). Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the first Dahlberg
factor weighs in favor of granting temporary injunctive relief.
9
B. Balance of Harms
The second Dalhberg factor considers “[t]he harm to be suffered by plaintiff if the
temporary restraint is denied as compared to that inflicted on defendant if the injunction
issues pending trial.” Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321. The district court found that the
second Dahlberg factor weighs in favor of granting a temporary injunction because
temporary injunctive relief would prevent the defendants from ousting the Stangels and
divesting them of their “incumbent rights” before a legal factfinder could “determine[] the
validity of the [defendants’] assertions.” The district court noted that “[r]eal property rights
are unique in Minnesota” and that “[m]oney damages are insufficient to negate” the
potential harm to the Stangels from ouster. The district court further found that “[t]he
[d]efendants are unlikely to be harmed should an injunction issue” because the injunction
would impose only a “slight temporal restriction” on the defendants’ ability to take
possession of the property if they prevail in the pending litigation, which “is
insignificant . . . compared to the deprivation of property rights that [would] occur if an
injunction [did] not issue.”
Rutten argues that the district court abused its discretion when it found that the
second Dahlberg factor favors the Stangels because, according to Rutten, he is the “prima
facie owner” of the property and “has the superior claim [to title].” Rutten also contends
that the Stangels are not likely to be irreparably harmed if temporary injunctive relief is
denied because their legal interest in the property is adequately protected by the underlying
lawsuit and the notice of lis pendens.
10
We agree with Rutten that the Stangels have an adequate remedy at law to protect
their legal interest in the property, but we are not convinced that Rutten has demonstrated
that the district court abused its discretion in its analysis of the second Dahlberg factor,
given the Stangels’ current possessory interest in the property. After a party files and
records a notice of lis pendens affecting real property, a subsequent purchaser of the
property takes it “subject to the final disposition of the pending case and is bound by the
decision which may be entered against the party from whom he derives his title, even
though he is not a party to such action.” Marr v. Bradley, 59 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Minn.
1953); see Minn. Stat. § 557.02 (2022) (stating that a notice of lis pendens provides “notice
to purchasers and encumbrancers of the rights and equities of the party filing the same to
the premises”). By initiating the underlying lawsuit and filing a notice of lis pendens, the
Stangels ensured that any subsequent attempts to take title to the property would be subject
to whatever legal interest the district court determines they have in the property. Bradley,
59 N.W.2d at 335; see Minn. Stat. § 557.02. In doing so, the Stangels adequately protected
their legal interest in the property from divestment pending litigation. See Bradley,
59 N.W.2d at 335; Real Est. Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 720 N.W.2d 352, 359 (Minn.
App. 2006) (explaining that the owners “had other options for protecting their alleged
interests in the property, including the filing of a notice of lis pendens” (emphasis added)).
Thus, a temporary injunction is not necessary for the Stangels to protect their legal interest
in the property while this litigation proceeds.
We conclude nonetheless that Rutten has not met his burden to show that the district
court abused its discretion with regard to the second Dahlberg factor. When considering
11
the harms that the Stangels would face if an injunction did not issue, the district court
focused primarily on the Stangels’ current possession of the property. The district court
emphasized that, without injunctive relief, “[t]he Stangels stand to lose their home.” The
district court then determined that, “but for an injunction [,] the Stangels will be ousted
from their property and lose their incumbent rights before a judge and jury have determined
the validity of the [defendants’] assertions.” Rutten has not addressed this portion of the
district court’s analysis, except to assert that “[the Stangels’] occupation of the premises,
seemingly relied on by the [district] court, was wrongful and does not support the
injunction.” This argument puts the cart before the horse. No court has found that the
Stangels’ possession of the property is wrongful. Whether the Stangels are lawfully
occupying the property will be adjudicated when the case is decided on the merits.
Consequently, we conclude that Rutten has not met his burden of proving that the district
court abused its discretion when it concluded that the balance of harms weighs in favor of
protecting the Stangels’ possession of the property through a temporary injunction. See
Loth, 35 N.W.2d at 546; Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 283.
C. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The third Dahlberg factor focuses on “[t]he likelihood that one party or the other
will prevail on the merits.” Dahlberg, 137 N.W.2d at 321. This is a “primary factor” in
our analysis of a district court’s decision to grant temporary injunctive relief. Minneapolis
Fed’n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., Special Sch. Dist. No. 1,
512 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 1994). The bar for
establishing likelihood of success on the merits is not high. As long as the party seeking
12
the injunction makes “ a doubtful showing” that they will prevail on the merits, a district
court may consider granting injunctive relief to preserve the status quo until the case is
adjudicated on the merits. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Minn. Twins P’ship,
638 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 2002); see Dahlberg,
137 N.W.2d at 321 (upholding a temporary injunction even though the plaintiff had
“serious obstacles to overcome” to establish a legal claim).
The district court found that the Stangels were likely to succeed on the merits of
their claims because they “can demonstrate that the [d]efendants’ actions are inconsistent
with and violative of state statute and that they have been injured as a result of the same.”
Rutten contends that this finding is erroneous because his claim to the property via
the sheriff’s certificate of redemption is superior to the Stangels’ claim to the property via
the sheriff’s certificate of sale. We are not persuaded.
The Stangels have presented sufficient evidence for the district court to conclude
that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The holder of a sheriff’s
certificate of sale for a property gains title to the property after the redemption period has
passed, subject to the lawful redemption of the property by a mortgagor or creditor. Minn.
Stat. § 580.23, subd. 1 (redemption by mortgagor); Minn. Stat. § 580.24(a) (redemption by
creditor); Minn. Stat. § 580.27 (2022) (providing that a creditor’s redemption of a property
“operates as an assignment to the creditor of the right acquired under [a foreclosure] sale”);
see Minn. Stat. § 580.12 (2022) (providing that, “upon expiration of the time for
redemption,” a certificate of sale “shall operate as a conveyance to the [certificate holder]”
(emphasis added)). It is undisputed that the Stangels hold the sheriff’s certificate of sale
13
and that Rutten holds the sheriff’s certificate of redemption. But we cannot conclude at
this stage in the litigation that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
the Stangels were likely to succeed on the merits even though Rutten holds the sheriff’s
certificate of redemption, because questions remain as to whether Rutten’s redemption was
legally effective.
Properly perfecting a mechanic’s lien is a complicated process prescribed by state
statute. See Minn. Stat. §§ 514.01-.03, .05-.08, .10-.15 (2022) (governing mechanics’
liens); Lighthouse Mgmt. Inc. v. Oberg Fam. Farms, 966 N.W.2d 29, 40-41 (Minn.
App. 2021) (“A lien claimant must follow the statutory procedures to perfect a mechanic’s
lien.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2021). Redeeming a property as a
creditor is also complex. See Minn. Stat. §§ 580.24-.26 (2022) (governing redemption of
a property by a creditor); N. Realty Ventures, LLC v. Minn. Hous. Fin. Agency, 748 N.W.2d
296, 300-01 (Minn. App. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he validity of a redemption depends on
whether the party redeeming has substantially complied with the statutory redemption
procedures” and describing those procedures). Rutten claims that he was hired to perform
work on the property. He further claims that he performed the work on the property,
recorded a mechanic’s lien statement against the property, and recorded a notice of intent
to redeem the property all on the same day. This peculiar chain of events raises doubts as
to whether the mechanic’s lien was valid. Likewise, there is evidence of Rutten’s
involvement in similar “schemes,” which the district court found raised doubts about
whether Rutten’s redemption of the property through the mechanic’s lien statement was
legally effective.
14
Taken together, these facts are sufficient to make at least a “doubtful showing” that
the Stangels are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Metro. Sports Facilities
Comm’n, 638 N.W.2d at 226. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s finding that the third Dahlberg factor weighs in favor of granting a temporary
injunction.
D. Public Policy Considerations
The fourth Dalhberg factor focuses on public policy considerations. Dahlberg,
137 N.W.2d at 321-22. The district court found that the fourth Dahlberg factor weighs in
favor of granting a temporary injunction because the defendants’ “scheme to acquire title
to the Stangels’ property” would “deprive[] the Stangels of their property rights and
circumvent[] the Stangels’ right to challenge the issues in court” if an injunction did not
issue. The district court then found that “[s]uch a result would run strongly against the
public policy considerations that promote due process to resolve legal claims through
judicial proceedings and protect property owners from a deprivation of their property.”
Rutten argues that the district court erred by finding that the fourth Dahlberg factor
favors an injunction because the district court arbitrarily “preferred the rights granted [to]
the [Stangels], under the [sheriff’s certificate of sale], to the rights granted . . . Rutten under
the later [c]ertificate of [r]edemption” and thereby contravened Minnesota’s “strong policy
favoring redemption.” This argument is unavailing.
Rutten has not demonstrated that the district court erred by finding that the fourth
Dahlberg factor favors an injunction. Rutten does not provide any legal support for his
argument that the district court erred by prioritizing certain public policy considerations
15
over others, and we are aware of no such authority. An assignment of error that is based
on “mere assertion” and is unsupported by legal authority is forfeited and need not be
considered “unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander
Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971); see also Scheffler v. City of
Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (applying this aspect of Schoepke), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017). Accordingly, we could decline to address Rutten’s argument
on the fourth Dalhberg factor.
Regardless, we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its analysis of
this Dahlberg factor. The fourth Dahlberg factor requires courts to consider “[t]he aspects
of the fact situation, if any, which permit or require consideration of public policy
expressed in the statutes, [s]tate and [f]ederal.” 137 N.W.2d at 321-22. Under this
language, the district court has broad discretion to consider any state or federal policy that
may provide guidance on whether injunctive relief is appropriate. See id. The district court
found that public policy promoting due process, efficient resolution of legal claims, and
the protection of private property rights from divestment all weigh in favor of granting a
temporary injunction. We discern no error in this assessment. In sum, Rutten has not met
his burden of proving that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the fourth
Dahlberg factor favors a temporary injunction, and we decline to reverse on that basis. See
Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135; Scheffler, 890 N.W.2d at 451; see also Loth, 35 N.W.2d at
546; Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 283.
16
E. Administrative Burdens
The fifth Dahlberg factor focuses on the administrative burdens involved in judicial
supervision and enforcement of a temporary injunction. 137 N.W.2d at 322. The district
court found that the fifth Dahlberg factor weighs in favor of granting a temporary
injunction because “[t]he burden on judicial resources to supervise or otherwise enforce a
temporary injunction . . . would be slight.” The district court noted that the case was
“likely headed to trial” and found that “the practical effect of enjoining [d]efendants from
ousting the Stangels . . . or taking possession of the [p]roperty until after a trial on the
merits would not require any judicial resources above and beyond those necessary to try
the case.”
Rutten contends that the district court’s finding on the fifth Dahlberg factor is
erroneous because the “factor does not favor either party.” We are not persuaded.
Rutten has not met his burden of proving that the district court erred by finding that
the fifth Dahlberg factor favors an injunction. Rutten does not provide any analysis or cite
any legal authority to support his assertion that the fifth Dahlberg factor “does not favor
either party.” Accordingly, Rutten has forfeited this argument. See Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d
at 135; Scheffler, 890 N.W.2d at 451.
Even so, any error by the district court in its conclusion that the fifth Dahlberg factor
weighs in favor of the Stangels was harmless. In deciding whether to issue the injunction,
the district court considered “[t]he administrative burdens involved in judicial supervision
and enforcement of the temporary decree” along with the four other Dahlberg factors. 137
N.W.2d at 321-22. The district court concluded that these other factors all weigh in favor
17
of granting a temporary injunction—including a primary factor: likelihood of success on
the merits. Minneapolis Fed’n of Teachers, 512 N.W.2d at 110. And, as discussed above,
Rutten has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion with regard to its
findings on the first four Dahlberg factors. Thus, even if we assume that the fifth Dahlberg
factor is neutral, as Rutten contends, the other four factors still support issuance of the
temporary injunction. Any error regarding the fifth Dahlberg factor did not prejudice
Rutten and must be ignored. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61; Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 98.
In sum, Rutten has not met his burden of proving that the district court abused its
discretion by determining that a temporary injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable
harm to the Stangels. For the reasons set forth above, we decline to reverse the district
court’s decision to grant the Stangels’ motion for a temporary injunction. See Loth,
35 N.W.2d at 546; Luthen, 596 N.W.2d at 283.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by not setting a bond.
Finally, Rutten argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
condition the temporary injunction upon the filing of a bond. Generally, a district court
may not issue a temporary injunction without requiring the party seeking the injunction to
give security “in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and
damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.03(a). But “the amount of security required
on a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s discretion and may be waived entirely
if appropriate.” Bio-Line, Inc. v. Wilfley, 366 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn. App. 1985)
(emphasis added), rev. denied, (Minn. June 27, 1985). To facilitate appellate review, a
18
district court should note its decision to waive a bond requirement. See Bio-Line,
Inc. v. Burman, 404 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. App. 1987). We review a district court’s
decision to set or waive a bond requirement for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 321-22.
The district court waived the bond requirement based on its determination that a
bond was not necessary to protect the defendants. The district court reached this conclusion
because “the Stangels are currently residing at the property and performing maintenance
to improve the property.” The district court also explained that, “[t]o the extent that it is
later determined [that] an injunction should not have issued, [d]efendants will still have a
fully secured interest in the property that fully satisfies any delinquency and associated
costs incurred as a result of the injunction.”
Rutten asserts that the district court abused its discretion by waiving the bond
requirement because a bond is necessary to secure his interest in the property against
potential legal claims arising from the Stangels’ occupation of the property and to
compensate him for his “loss of the use of his property should he prevail.” We are not
persuaded.
As an initial matter, Rutten has provided no legal authority to support his assertion
that a bond is required to compensate him for the “loss of the use of [the] property should
he prevail.” As discussed above, “[a] n assignment of error based on mere assertion and
not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant’s brief is waived and will not be
considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke,
187 N.W.2d at 135; see Minn. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue).
19
Because Rutten has failed to support his argument with any legal authority, we need not
address it.
But even if Rutten’s argument were properly before us, reversal of the district
court’s decision regarding the bond still would not be appropriate. The district court has
broad discretion to waive a bond requirement provided it explains its decision to do so. See
Ecolab, Inc. v. Gartland, 537 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. App. 1995); Burman, 404 N.W.2d
at 322. The district court explained that it waived the bond requirement because the
Stangels were maintaining the property (and thereby preventing it from descending into
disrepair) and because Rutten’s inte rest in the property was “fully secured” against
divestment while the litigation was pending. This logical explanation is sufficient to
support the district court’s decision to waive the bond requirement. See Ecolab, Inc. ,
537 N.W.2d at 297. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by waiving the bond requirement under Minn. R. Civ. P. 65.03(a).
Affirmed.