State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1326

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Luke Adam Eckman,
Appellant.

Filed August 14, 2023
Affirmed
Kirk, Judge*

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-21-960

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Chelsea Langton, Assistant County
Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa A. Haley, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Wheelock , Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
Appellant Luke Adam Eckman appeals directly from his conviction for second-
degree burglary, challenging the district court’s pretrial denial of his motion to suppress
evidence against him. Because police had a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying an
investigative stop of appellant, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 12, 2021, at around 3:15 p.m., J.E. called1 911 to report a possible burglary
at the cabin of his cousin, R.E. 2 J.E. gave his name and date of birth to the 911 operator.
J.E.’s family-owned land was adjacent to R.E.’s land and J.E. would routinely check on
R.E.’s property when J.E. was in the area. A round 1:45 p.m., he visited R.E.’s property
and found the cabin’s front door open, two pickup trucks in the yard, and several people—
specifically, one adult woman, two adult men, and a young child. When J.E. approached,
appellant introduced himself as “Luke Eckman,” stated the parties had permission to be on
the property, and that they were performing yard work at R.E.’s request. J.E. initially
believed appellant’s statements and returned to his land, but became suspicious and
contacted R.E. to confirm appellant’s statements. After R.E. told J.E. that no one was
supposed to be at the property, J.E. contacted 911.

1 J.E.’s mother placed the first call, but J.E. spoke with 911 dispatch during subsequent
calls that day and interacted in person with responding officers. For simplicity, we refer to
J.E.’s communications with law enforcement.
2 Although appellant shares a surname with J.E. and R.E., the record is unclear whether
there is a familial relationship. R.E. told officers he did know appellant, and that if there
was any familial relationship then “they would be [third] or fourth cousins.”
3
J.E. told the 911 operator that there were two vehicles on the property: one “was an
old maroon Ford [that was] [r]usted [and] probably around early 90s, mid 90s,” and the
other was a “black Chevy Avalanche.” He described the woman on the property as
“Caucasian[,]” “[m]id build[,]” in her late 20s, and that she had “[b]lack braces on both of
her legs.” He described appellant as mid to late 20’s, with blonde hair, “scruff on his
face[,]” and between five-foot-nine and five- foot-ten. He described the second man as
around six feet tall, Caucasian, “[m]issing his front tooth[,]” and with a “light beard.”
Around 3:30 p.m., 911 dispatch radioed to police that there was a “possible burglary
in progress, maroon early to mid 90s pickup Ford truck very rusty, black [C]hevy
[A]valanche, 2 males and 1 female[,]” and that the “female had two knee braces on.”
Within ten minutes, officers arrived at the cabin property, found no one except J.E., and
took J.E.’s statement.3 J.E. told law enforcement it had been about one-and-one-half hours
since he observed the parties on the property. Dispatch radioed this lag time to officers.
Around 4:30 p.m., an officer (the first officer) checked appellant’s registered
residence, but appellant was not there. The officer began a stationary patrol on a main road
nearby until around 5:00 p.m. when he saw a black Chevrolet Avalanche. He called the
vehicle in to dispatch, which advised the officer to identify the vehicle’s occupants. At
approximately 5:30 p.m., the officer initiated a stop of the vehicle. The stop took place 26

3 According to J.E., appellant said he was R.E.’s cousin and that appellant’s father used to
work for R.E.’s father. This appears to be how appellant either had keys to the property or
knew where to find hidden keys on the property.
4
miles from the cabin, 0.8 miles from appellant’s residence, and three-and-three- quarter
hours after J.E. discovered appellant on R.E.’s property.
The officer identified the driver as appellant and the passengers as the woman and
young child J.E. had reported. A second officer arrived on the scene and arrested appellant.
The first officer searched the vehicle and located, in relevant part, three “collectible
looking” watches and a wooden sign which appellant had taken from R.E.’s property.
The state charged appellant with second-degree burglary. Appellant filed a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence resulting from the stop. The district court denied the motion,
finding that:
First, there was reason to believe that a crime was
committed as [appellant] had been personally named by the
informant; second, the officers were searching for (and
located) the vehicle in the vicinity of [appellant’s] residence;
and third, the vehicle matched the description provided by the
informant. These circumstances together provide the officer
with an articulable suspicion that [appellant] was the person
driving the vehicle and a limited investigatory stop is
permissible to confirm that suspicion. Though [the first
officer] did not possess all of the information to create the
articulable suspicion at that time, the instructions he was
receiving through dispatch were issued with this knowledge.

Appellant waived a jury trial and the parties agreed to a trial on stipulated evidence so
appellant could preserve for appeal his challenge to the denial of suppression. The district
court convicted appellant and sentenced him to four years’ supervised probation.
Appellant challenges the district court’s pretrial denial of his motion to suppress the
evidence resulting from the vehicle stop.
5
DECISION
Appellant argues the district court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to
suppress evidence resulting from the investigative stop of the vehicle he was driving.
When reviewing a stipulated-evidence trial pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,
subd. 4, our review “is limited to the pretrial order that denied the motion to suppress. ”
State v. Sterling, 782 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Minn. App. 2010). We may independently review
the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in its suppression
ruling. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). “When reviewing a district
court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal
determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation
omitted).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. An officer
may initiate a limited, investigative seizure without a warrant if the officer has reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); State v.
Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011). Evidence obtained during an unconstitutional
search or seizure must be suppressed. Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 842.
To determine whether a search or seizure is unreasonable, appellate courts examine
the specific police conduct at issue. See State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. 2007)
(explaining that “what constitutes an unreasonable search must be assessed based on the
facts of each particular case”). “Police must be able to articulate more than an inchoate
6
and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity[;] [t]hey must articulate a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal
activity.” State v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted).
The factual basis for the stop may be minimal; “[a]ll that is required is that the stop be not
the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. McKinley, 232 N.W.2d 906,
911 (Minn. 1975) (quotation omitted).
“In reviewing the validity of investigative stops, the courts have balanced several
factors, including: the reliability of the informant, the description of the vehicle, the
reported location of the vehicle, the officer’s observation of traffic violations, and the time
lag between the report of criminal activity and the stop.” State v. Warren, 404 N.W.2d
895, 897 (Minn. App. 1987). “The reliability of the informant varies from an anonymous
telephone tipster to a known citizen’s face-to-face meeting with police officers.” Id. “The
vehicle description varies from minimal to very detailed.” Id. “The reported location of
the vehicle varies from pinpoint accuracy to a general direction of travel.” Id. “The shorter
the time lag [between the informant’s report and the stop], the more likely the stop is valid.”
Id. An officer may rely on information from another officer under the “collective
knowledge” doctrine, which imputes the entire knowledge of the police force to all officers.
Magnuson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 703 N.W.2d 557, 559-60 (Minn. App. 2005) (“Under
the doctrine of collective knowledge, the factual basis justifying the investigatory stop need
not be known to the officer acting in the field.”); see also Rancour v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 355 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Minn. App. 1984) (“The factual basis for stopping a vehicle
may arise from information supplied by someone other than the arresting officer.”). When
7
the factual basis supporting a stop is supplied by another person, “the information must be
reliable and credible.” Warren, 404 N.W.2d at 896. The reliability of a private citizen is
presumed. Id. The reliability and credibility of an informant’s information is increased
when the informant interacts face-to -face with officers. E.g., State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d
179, 181 (Minn. 1986). An officer is justified in assuming an informant is being truthful
when the informant provides enough identifying information that law enforcement could
hold the informant accountable for providing false information. Playle v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1989). “Stops based upon informant’s tips have
been found valid upon a showing that there was a basis for the informant’s knowledge.”
Id.
Appellant argues that proximity to his registered address and the make, model, and
color of his vehicle, without more, did not provide the first officer with a reasonable
articulable suspicion to justify an investigative stop.
4
We first note that J.E. provided police with numerous specific facts regarding
appellant and appellant’s suspected criminal activity. See Warren, 404 N.W.2d at 897
(reviewing caselaw upholding stops made based on “specific facts” reported). J.E.
described to police in detail: appellant’s appearance, the appearance of appellant’s
associates, how the cabin property was open, how the cabin’s condition suggested a

4 As a threshold issue, the state correctly argues that reasonable articulable suspicion is an
objective standard that incorporates what the entire police department knew at the time of
the stop. E.g., Magnuson, 703 N.W.2d at 559-60. Appellant, therefore, misplaces
emphasis on what the first officer subjectively knew at the time he stopped appellant.
Under the collective-knowledge doctrine, the reasonable-articulable-suspicion inquiry also
considers what Pine River Police Department knew at the time of the stop.
8
possible burglary, and the make, model, and color of the vehicles on the property. J.E. also
provided police the name by which appellant introduced himself. This degree of detail
substantially exceeds the detail provided in cases where we have concluded an informant
failed to provide specific facts. Cf. State v. Teigen, 381 N.W.2d 529, 530-31 (Minn. App.
1986) (invalidating a stop from an anonymous informant reporting a “possible” drunk
driver in a black Nissan pickup).
Additionally, dispositive factors identified in Warren reveal that caselaw has upheld
investigative stops made on similarly robust knowledge about an informant, a suspect, the
suspect’s vehicle, and his general direction of travel. 404 N.W.2d at 897. J.E. was a highly
reliable informant. He gave his name and date of birth to police, he explained how he came
to know what he was reporting, and he met face-to-face with responding officers to give a
statement. This is substantially more identifying information than the supreme court
approved of in City of Minnetonka v. S hepherd, where the only manner of holding an
informant accountable was that the informant told police his place of employment. 420
N.W.2d 887, 887 (Minn. 1988); Playle, 439 N.W.2d at 748 (stating an officer may rely on
an informant’s statement when the informant gives enough identifying information to be
held accountable for providing false information). And while J.E. failed to capture or
report the license plate numbers of the vehicles he found on R.E.’s property, he identified
the make, model, and color of the vehicle appellant drove at the time of the stop. Lastly,
like in Warren, police here had a reasonable inference regarding appellant’s direction of
travel. In Warren, police were informed by Warren’s wife that he was “possibly” headed
to White Earth from Detroit Lakes because Warren’s mother lived there. Police pulled
9
Warren over on this travel path. 404 N.W.2d at 897. Here, although no one informed
police of appellant’s expected travel route, police reasonably inferred that because the
reported vehicles had left the property by the time responding officers arrived, appellant
might have been driving in the vicinity of his registered address.
Appellant argues that police lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him
because they did not observe the occupants of the vehicle before the stop. But caselaw
contains no such requirement under similar circumstances. In State v. Waddell, police had
a detailed description from reliable informants of the race, height, weight, and clothing of
two suspects, as well as a description of the body-type of the car they drove. 655 N.W.2d
803, 809 (Minn. 2003). The supreme court upheld police’s investigative stop, which was
made “[t]wo-and-one- half hours after ” the crime and “approximately 6-8 miles” from
where it happened, without noting that police observed the occupants of the vehicle before
stopping it. Id. at 807, 810. Similarly, in State v. Ferraro, police sighted a “white window
van” in a mall parking lot that, “[b]ut for one digit in the license number, . . . matched the
description of a vehicle involved in the theft of a chair from a local department store four
days earlier.” 290 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Minn. 1980). The vehicle left the mall before police
could “maneuver into a better observation position,” but after a description of the vehicle
was broadcast, it was pulled over on an interstate highway. Id. at 178. After officers
observed that “defendant substantially matched the description of the suspect in the earlier
theft,” police arrested him. Id.
Here, police had a detailed description of appellant and his female passenger, their
vehicle, and reasonably inferred that appellant might be driving near his registered address
10
approximately one-and-one-half hours after responding officers arrived at R.E.’s property
to discover that the vehicles J.E. observed had departed. In these circumstances, as in
Waddell and Ferraro, police’s failure to observe the occupants of the vehicle prior to an
investigative stop did not vitiate reasonable articulable suspicion.
Therefore, the district court did not err in de nying appellant’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of the investigative stop.
Affirmed.