A22-1332 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Malcolm Renfro.

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed March 6, 2023

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1332

In re the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Malcolm Renfro.

Filed March 6, 2023
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-MH-PR-21-670

Mary Huot, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Malcolm Renfro)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his indeterminate civil commitment as a sexually dangerous
person (SDP) and a sexual psychopathic personality (SPP), arguing that the district court
clearly erred in finding that (1) he “engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct,” (2) he
exhibited “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,” and (3) there was no less-
restrictive treatment program available that would accept him and would offer services
consistent with his treatment needs and the requirements of public safety. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant Malcolm Renfro committed the first of three sex crimes in June 2012,
when he was 17 years old. He offered to walk an 18-year-old acquaintance to her cousin’s
house late at night. As they walked through a park, he grabbed the victim and pulled down
her pants. Despite her multiple pleas for him to stop, Renfro got on top of her and vaginally
penetrated her. The assault caused injuries to the victim’s neck, lower back, and vaginal
area.
One month later, Renfro met a 16-year -old girl. After communicating via social
media and text messages, Renfro asked her to meet him early one morning at a store.
Shortly after she arrived, Renfro suggested they go to his sister’s house. Renfro walked
behind the house and asked the girl to follow. Once there, he pulled down her shorts,
pinned her to the ground on her stomach, and anally penetrated her. Renfro ignored her
pleas to stop; the assault caused bruising on the girl’s body.
In April 2013, Renfro met another 16-year-old girl through a friend. After she left
that friend’s house, Renfro texted her and asked her to meet him at a different house. When
she arrived, Renfro brought her inside the garage. He closed the garage door and sat next
to her on a couch, where he began rubbing her legs. When she moved his hand away,
Renfro pushed her over, got on top of her, and started choking her. When she tried to
unlock her phone to call for help, Renfro grabbed her arm with one hand and continued
choking her with the other. He then pulled her pants down and vaginally penetrated her
while she repeatedly told him to stop and tried to fight him off. When she managed to sit
up and attempted to pull up her pants, Renfro struck her face with his open hand.
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In August 2013, Renfro pleaded guilty as an adult to two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. He
received concurrent 144-month prison sentences. Despite pleading guilty, Renfro
continues to deny any wrongdoing. Accordingly, he did not participate in sex-offender
treatment while he was in Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) custody.
As Renfro’s period of incarceration was ending, the DOC referred him to respondent
Ramsey County for civil commitment. The county petitioned to have Renfro civilly
committed as an SDP and an SPP. The commitment petition was based on Renfro’s three
criminal-sexual-conduct convictions and uncharged sexual misconduct that occurred while
he was in prison. Renfro was disciplined six times between January 2016 and September
2021 for intentionally and openly masturbating in front of female staff. Notably, the final
masturbation incident occurred after Renfro learned that the DOC had referred him to the
county for civil commitment.
As part of the commitment proceedings, the district court appointed Andrea Lovett,
Ph.D., L.P., to examine Renfro. At Renfro’s request, the district court appointed Amber
Lindeman, Psy.D., as the second examiner. Both examiners interviewed Renfro, reviewed
his records, and co nducted multiple statistical risk assessments. They submitted detailed
reports addressing the statutory criteria for commitment. Both examiners stated that Renfro
“engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct” and “a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters.” Dr. Lovett concluded that Renfro met the criteria for commitment as an
SDP. Dr. Lindeman— Renfro’s chosen examiner—concluded that he met the criteria for
commitment as both an SDP and an SPP.
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Dr. Lovett further concluded that Renfro needs long-term, inpatient sex-offender
treatment, and that the only appropriate placement for Renfro is the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) because lifetime supervision would neither meet his treatment
needs nor protect the public. She specifically noted:
The least restrictive alternative to commitment is the inpatient
program at Alpha Emergence Behavioral Health, but this is not
an appropriate placement for [Renfro]. The program is only
two years in duration, and participants have access to the
community after one year. Mr. Renfro has a substantial history
of impulsivity, irresponsibility, denial of responsibility,
criminal attitudes/cognitive distortions, sexual misconduct,
and verbal and physical aggression. There is little or no
evidence suggesting he is capable of consistent, responsible,
law-abiding behavior in the community.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing in March 2022. Drs. Lovett and
Lindeman testified consistent with their reports. Dr. Lindeman added that she saw no
viable less-restrictive alternative to civil commitment. She described significant concerns
about Renfro’s ability to cooperate with intensive supervised release (ISR), given his
inability to follow rules or participate in sex -offender treatment while incarcerated. She
specifically opined that programming such as the alternative Renfro suggested would not
be adequate to meet his treatment needs, and that ISR —even if coupled with GPS
monitoring—would not address public-safety concerns.
The ISR agent who would supervise Renfro if he were released into the community
also testified regarding less-restrictive treatment alternatives and public-safety concerns.
She provided an overview of community- based programming options that mi ght be
available to Renfro, stating that the only potential inpatient option—Alpha Human
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Services—is “kind of hit or miss because they only have like three openings ever at a time,
if that, and they are . . . gobbled up pretty quickly.” She also explained that GPS
monitoring would not “guarantee public safety” because ISR ag ents are not able to
immediately respond when a supervisee leaves their home without authorization or cuts
their GPS bracelet.
Renfro testified that he thought his victims wanted to have sex with him because
they “never said no.” He acknowledged that he did not participate in sex-offender
treatment while in prison. But he stated that he would do so if he were released and thought
it would “help [him] understand what this 16/17-year-old Malcolm was thinking at the time
these incidents happened.”
Renfro’s family pastor testified about her 25- year affiliation with Transformation
Ministries. She described Transformation Ministries as a “one-on-one” program designed
to “transform” individuals’ thoughts and behaviors, with a “focus on bringing the African
American man to know who they are so they can be productive and begin to find their
purpose in life.” She testified that she would offer Renfro “[g]uidance, coaching, support,
you know whatever I can do to help him become a better man” through one- hour weekly
meetings. But she conceded that she is not educated or trained to treat sex offenders.
The district court found that clear and convincing evidence established that Renfro
met the statutory and other legal requirements for commitment as an SDP and an SPP. The
district court also found that Renfro did not offer clear and convincing evidence that a less-
restrictive treatment program is available, noting that both examiners recommended
against it and the ISR agent testified that Renfro had neither been accepted to an appropriate
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program nor could count on one being available. In July 2022, the district court ordered
that Renfro be indeterminately committed to MSOP.
Renfro appeals.
DECISION
A person may be civilly committed as an SDP or an SPP if the county proves the
statutory commitment criteria by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 253D.07,
subd. 3 (2022). We review a district court’s factual findings on the elements of the civil-
commitment statutes for clear error. In re Civ. Commitment of Stone, 711 N.W.2d 831,
836 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). Under this standard, we view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings, do not reweigh the evidence, and do
not resolve conflicting evidence. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-
22 (Minn. 2021). We will not set aside findings of fact as clearly erroneous unless “we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 221
(quotation omitted). But whether the evidence meets the statutory requirements for
commitment is a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Civ. Commitment of
Crosby, 824 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 2013).
An SDP is a person who: (1) “has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct”;
(2) “has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction”; and
(3) “as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct.” Minn. Stat.
§ 253D.02, subd. 16 (2022). An SPP is a person who (1) has “conditions of emotional
instability,” impulsive behavior, “lack of customary standards of good judgment,” “failure
to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these
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conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to
sexual matters”; (2) has “an utter lack of power to control” his sexual impulses , as
evidenced by “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters”; and (3) “as a result, is
dangerous to other persons.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.02, subd. 15 (2022).
If a district court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports
commitment as an SDP or an SPP,
the court shall commit the person to a secure treatment facility
unless the person establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that a less restrictive treatment program is available, is willing
to accept the [person] under commitment, and is consistent
with the person’s treatment needs and the requirements of
public safety.

Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3.
Renfro’s narrow challenges to his SDP and SPP commitment focus on the district
court’s factual determinations that he “engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct” and
exhibited “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,” and that there was not clear
and convincing evidence that a less-restrictive treatment program is available, willing to
accept him, and consistent with his treatment needs and public safety. We address each of
Renfro’s contentions in turn.
I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Renfro engaged in “a
course of harmful sexual conduct” and exhibited “a habitual course of
misconduct in sexual matters.”
“Harmful sexual conduct” is defined as “sexual conduct that creates a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Minn. Stat. § 253D .02,
subd. 8(a) (2022 ). It is presumed that the conduct underlying convictions for criminal
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sexual conduct in the first and third degree meets this definition. Minn. Stat. § 253 D.02,
subd. 8(b) (2022) (establishing a rebuttable presumption). Repeated i ncidents may
constitute a “course” of harmful sexual conduct even if they did not occur recent ly, and
“the existence of a period in which a person has not committed sex offenses does not
preclude a determination that he engaged in a course of sexual misconduct.” Stone, 711
N.W.2d at 837-38. In determining whether a person engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct, courts consider “both conduct for which the [person] was convicted and conduct
that did not result in a conviction.” Id. at 837.
Renfro argues that his three criminal-sexual- conduct offenses do not constitute a
course of harmful sexual cond uct because he committed them more than ten years ago.
And he asserts that the six times he was disciplined for masturbating in front of female
prison staff is insufficient to demonstrate a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters.
We are not persuaded by Renfro’s legal or factual assertions.
First, Renfro cites no supporting legal authority. See Christie v. Est. of Christie,
911 N.W.2d 833, 837 n.4 (Minn. 2018) (stating that arguments without analysis or citation
to legal authority are waived); State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,
558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to consider an inadequately briefed
question); In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp , 895 N.W.2d 647, 654 (Minn. App. 2017)
(applying Wintz in a civil-commitment matter), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017) . His
three convictions establish a presumption that he engaged in harmful sexual conduct. The
fact that he committed his harmful criminal acts approximately a decade ago does not
preclude the district court from finding that the offenses establish a “course” of conduct.
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See In re Robb, 622 N.W.2d 564, 573-74 (Minn. App. 2001) (ten-year gap between sexual
offenses), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001). Likewise, that Renfro has not reoffended in
the same way over the past decade—while he was incarcerated—does not mean the district
court clearly erred. See In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 374-75 (Minn. App. 1995) (affirming
appellant’s civil commitment as an SPP and as mentally ill and dangerous despite a lack of
harmful criminal acts while appellant was imprisoned), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995).
Second, the record supports the district court’s findings regarding Renfro’s
continued course of sexual misconduct. Both examiners testified that Renfro “engaged in
a course of harmful sexual conduct” and “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual
matters.” Dr. Lovett expressly based her findings on Renfro’s criminal offenses and the
six prison masturbatory incidents, defeating his contention that any course of behavior
ended in 2013. Without the benefit of sex-offender treatment, Renfro continued to act out
sexually, even after he had learned that DOC had referred him for civil commitment. We
discern no error by the district court in considering both the presumed harmful sexual
conduct that resulted in convictions and Renfro’s repeated masturbation in front of female
prison staff. See In re Civ. Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. App.
2002) (stating a “course of conduct” takes into account both conduct for which a person
was convicted and conduct that did not result in a conviction), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17,
2002).
In sum, the record supports the district court’s finding that Renfro engaged in a
course of harmful sexual conduct and exhibited a habitual course of misconduct in sexual
matters. Because Renfro does not otherwise challenge the district court’s determinations
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that he meets the statutory criteria for commitment as an SDP and an SPP, we affirm that
determination.
II. The district court did not clearly err by finding that there is no less-restrictive
treatment program that is available, willing to accept Renfro, and would meet
both treatment and public-safety needs.
A person opposing commitment does not have the right to be placed in a less -
restrictive treatment program. In re Kindschy , 634 N.W.2d 723, 731 (Minn. App. 2001),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2001). Rather, they must prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, that such a program is available, willing to accept them, and will meet their
treatment needs and the public’s need for safety. Minn. Stat. § 253D.07, subd. 3. In
considering treatment alternatives, courts may consider factors such as the need for
security, whether the individual needs long-term treatment, and what type of treatment is
required. In re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902, 910 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.
30, 1995); In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn.
Oct. 27, 1994). Unless it is clearly erroneous, we will not reverse a district court’s finding
regarding the availability of a less-restrictive treatment program. In re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d
140
, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).
Renfro argues that he met his burden of proof because Transformation Ministries is
an appropriate treatment option and that the public’s need for safety will be met by his
lifetime period of supervised release and the numerous conditions his ISR agent will
impose. These contentions are unavailing.
Renfro does not directly address the factors and evidence the district court
considered in finding that no less-restrictive treatment program was available. He points
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to the ISR agent’s testimony about the conditions of his release, but he completely ignores
her testimony that the only potential inpatient treatment program was not necessarily
available to him— let alone willing to accept him—and that GPS monitoring would not
address public-safety concerns. He also ignores the recommendations of both examiners
that he be committed to MSOP because it is the only viable treatment option that addresses
both public safety and Renfro’s treatment needs. And he does not explain how the
proposed weekly one-on-one counseling with his pastor— who concedes she is not trained
to treat sex offenders— will appropriately meet his treatment needs. Renfro is an untreated
sex offender who committed violent offenses in the community and continued to engage
in sexual misconduct while in prison. On this record, we discern no clear error in the
district court’s finding that Renfro did not provide clear and convincing evidence of a less-
restrictive treatment alternative that is available and willing to accept him, that will
adequately meet his treatment needs and the public’s need for safety.
Affirmed.