Maurice Culpepper, petitioner, Appellant,

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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1335

Maurice Culpepper, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 15, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-18-4053

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Att orney, Jeffrey A. Wald, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it de nied
his petition for postconviction relief because he did not enter an accurate, voluntary, or
intelligent plea. We affirm.
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FACTS
On June 24, 2017, appellant Maurice Culpepper bought a 2005 Dodge Dakota pick-
up truck from University Auto Sales in Ramsey County, Minnesota. Appellant paid for
the truck with a cash down payment and entered into a retail installment contract financed
by Credit Acceptance Corporation (the Corporation) which granted the Corporation a
security interest. The Corporation later assigned and transferred the security interest to
University Auto. The Corporation also returned the funds it had received under the
contract, totaling $1,033.52, via a check made out to appellant in care of University Auto.
University Auto in turn notified appellant of the assignment and requested that appellant
endorse the check from the Corporation and return it to University Auto in a letter dated
December 15, 2017. University Auto also informed appellant of his default status for
failing to make payments for the past five months. Because of the severity of the default,
appellant needed to bring the account current by December 27, 2017, and any further failure
to make payment s would lead to the truck being repossessed. Appellant deposited the
check but did not send the funds to University Auto or make payments to bring the account
current.
University Auto met with appellant in person and talked to him on the phone , but
appellant refuse d to return the truck or let University Auto know of its location. In an
attempt to resolve the dispute, Minnesota State Patrol requested that appellant bring the
truck to University Auto on March 29, 2018, at 9:00 a.m. Appellant arrived there, but in a
different vehicle. The state trooper on scene told appellant that he needed to return the
truck unless he planned to pay the amount owed under the contract. The trooper explained
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that concealing a truck from a lienholder is a felony and that if he did not return the truck
that day, he would be arrested. Appellant said that the truck was in Burnsville, Minnesota.
At 10:30 a.m. on March 29, 2018, appellant contacted the trooper , informing him that he
had lied about the Burnsville address to buy some time to talk to his attorney. Appellant
told the trooper that the truck was in Las Vegas, Nevada.
University Auto agreed to hire a towing service in Las Vegas to retrieve the truck
and hold it for auction there. A couple of days later, appellant informed the trooper that an
auto shop had towed the truck and provided the trooper with an address. An online search
revealed that appellant gave the trooper an address of a storage garage facility not affiliated
with any auto shop. As a result , respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with
defeating a security interest by concealing property with an intent to defraud under Minn.
Stat. § 609.62, subd. 2(1) (2016).
At appellant’s omnibus hearing on October 18, 2018, he asserted his right to a
speedy trial. Then on January 25, 2019, appellant moved to dismiss the case, arguing a
speedy-trial violation, because the trial had been delayed more than 60 days. The district
court denied his motion and scheduled a jury trial for February 25, 2019. Before trial,
appellant asserted that he would need more time because he was “halfway literate” and
only had a third-grade education. The district court ordered a competency evaluation under
Rule 20.01 (2016). The report determined that appellant was competent to proceed and
diagnosed him with a personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits. The
district court found him competent and proceeded with the trial now scheduled for July 29,
2021.
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Appellant filed another motion to dismiss , asserting that he did not have the intent
to defraud. Before trial, appellant moved for a continuance, and his trial counsel moved to
withdraw. The district court granted the motion to withdraw and set a new trial date for
September 25, 2019. A ppellant again requested a continuance citing his mental health.
Appellant explained that he did not have the cognitive ability to participate in his own
defense and requested 90 days to stabilize. The district court denied his request and
appointed standby counsel for trial.
Appellant filed an objection to having standby counsel. The district court denied
his motion, and his standby counsel requested a c ontinuance, explaining that they could
not communicate with appellant or be an effective attorney for him. To address these
concerns, the district court ordered another rule 20.01 evaluation. In response, appellant
asked to go to trial , and the district court withdrew its order for a nother rule 20.01
evaluation. At the start of voir dire, appellant’s standby counsel informed the district court
that appellant had passed a note to them stating that he wanted to plead guilty. On the
record, appellant entered a waiver of his trial rights and provided a factual basis for the
guilty plea, which t he district court accepted .
A few days later, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea on various grounds ,
including that his mental-health issues induced him to plead guilty. The day before the
sentencing hearing, appellant moved to request another rule 20.01 evaluation. The next
day, appellant did not appear at his sentencing hearing because he had been admitted to a
hospital after having homicidal ideat ions and hallucinations. The district court continued
his sentencing and issued a bench warrant when appellant failed to appear again. After
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appellant’s arrest in February 2020, the district court scheduled a new sentencing hearing
and ordered another rule 20.01 competency evaluation.
The second rule 20.01 report found appellant competent and provided the same
diagnosis as the first one. Appellant moved to withdraw his plea before sentencing, arguing
that it was inaccurate and involuntary. The district court denied his motion and sentenced
him to 15 months in prison, stayed for three years of probation, and ordered him to pay
$8,914.93 in restitution. Appellant petitioned for postconviction relief , and the
postconviction court denied his request. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues that his plea was: (1) inaccurate when he negated the intent -to-
defraud element multiple times; (2) involuntary because he was pressured and coerced d ue
to his mental illness, and his standby counsel stat ed that they were not prepared for trial;
(3) not knowing and intelligent because the district court wrongfully foreclosed a
stipulation to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of his speedy-trial claim under Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4.
We review a denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Crow v.
State, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 2019). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is agains t logic and the facts in the
record, or exercises its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Id. (quotations
omitted).
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A district court “may allow withdrawal
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any time before sentencing if it is fair and just to do so.” Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d at 93
(quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2). The “fair and just” standard requires the district
court to consider two fa ctors: “(1) the reasons a defendant advances to support withdrawal
and (2) prejudice granting the motion would cause the State given reliance on the plea.”
Id. at 97. “A defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support withdrawal,” and
“[t]he State bears the burden of showing prejudice caused by the withdrawal.” Id. In
addition, a district court may allow plea withdrawal at any time if a manifest injustice
occurs, meaning a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Perkins v. State ,
559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997); Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Appellant argues
that his plea was inaccurate and not knowing or intelligent under the m anifest-injustice
standard and that it was involuntary under the fair-and-just standard .
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
appellant provided an accurate plea under the manifest-injustice standard.

Appellant argues that he did not provide an accurate plea because he negated the
intent-to-defraud element several times at the plea hearing. We are not persuaded.
For a plea to be accurate, “a plea must be established by a proper factual basis.”
Lussier v. State , 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012) . The “factual-basis requirement is
satisfied if the record contains a showing that there is credible evidence available which
would support a jury verdict that defendant is guilty of at least as great a crime as that to
which he pled guilty.” Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236, 243 n.3 (Minn. 2011) . The state
must show that a person charged with defeating a security interest had the intent to defraud
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by concealing, removing, or transf erring any personal property in which the actor knows
that another has a security interest . Minn. Stat. § 609.62. subd. 2(1).
Appellant does not dispute that he concealed, removed, or transferred the truck or
that he knew that University Auto had a security interest. Instead, appellant argues that he
negated the element of intent to fraud because his statements were inconsistent with guilt.
The postconviction court determined that appellant provided an accurate plea , explaining
that “the record as a whole shows [ that appellant] agreed [that] he lied about the truck’s
location to prevent University Auto from finding that truck, which was subjected to an
unpaid loan.” The record supports the postconviction court’s determination.
During the plea hearing, appellant admit ted to (1) concealing the truck ; (2) having
knowledge that the truck had an outstanding loan; and (3) providing false information to
law enforcement of the truck’s location. When questioned about his intent, appellant
responded with “I didn’t understand w hat was going on.” The district court clarified by
asking “you didn’t want them to get to the vehicle. Is that true?” Appellant answered,
“[n]o that’s not true. I didn’t understand what was going on. I was having a panic attack
and -- well, yes your H onor.” The district court reasserted that it wanted the truth and
appellant responded that he did not like the trooper and wanted to “give him a hard time .”
In turn, the district court read the statutor y language of defeating a security interest to
appellant and asked appellant, “were you refusing to disclose the location of the property
with intent to defraud?” Appellant answered “yes, your Honor.” The record therefore
shows that , while appellant initially claimed he did not understand the situation, he
ultimately and unequivocally admitted to the intent-to-defraud element.
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The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellant
provided an accurate plea.
II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
appellant provided a voluntary plea under the fair-and-just standard.

Appellant argues that his guilty plea stemmed from his mental illness and his
attorney stating that they were not prepared for trial. We are not convinced.
“To determine whether a plea is voluntary, the court examines what the parties
reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.
“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper
pressure or coercion.” Id. “Whether a plea is voluntary is determined by considering all
relevant circumstances.” Id.
The postconviction court determined that appellant “had the choice of going to trial
but chose to plead guilty voluntarily and without coercion.” The record supports the
postconviction court’s determination. During voir dire, appellant voluntarily informed his
standby counsel that he wished to enter a guilty plea. In turn, the district court confirmed
with appellant twice that he wanted to enter his guilty plea. Appellant responded “yes”
both times and confirmed that he was clear -headed, understood his rights, and admitted
that no one forced him to plead guilty.
The record also shows that the district court took careful measures to address
appellant’s mental-health concerns. The district court ordered a rule 20.01 evaluation
before trial and before sentencing. Both rule 20.01 evaluations found appellant competent.
Additionally, appellant argues that his plea was not voluntary because his attorney stated
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that they were not prepared for trial. The record shows that appellant initially objected to
having standby counsel and that his standby counsel told the district court that they had not
communicated with appellant. Despite his initial objection , when appellant entered his
plea petition, he confirmed with the district court his satisfaction with his representation.
Therefore, the postconviction court di d not abuse its discretion by determining that
appellant entered a voluntary guilty plea.
Finally, while the fair -and-just standard requires the district court to consider the
prejudice to state, we have stated that “[e]ven when there is no prejudice to the state, a
district court may deny plea withdrawal . . . if the defendant fails to advance valid reasons
why withdrawal is fair and just.” State v. Cubas, 838 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Minn. App. 2013),
rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2015). Appellant here has failed to advance valid reasons to
support that plea withdrawal would be fair and just. Therefore, we need not address the
prejudice factor.
Even if we were to consider the prejudice factor, the state has shown prejudice. The
state argued that appellant had unduly delayed the case. The district court scheduled the
first jury trial for February 25, 2019, but continued it several times. The state did not cause
these delays. Eventually, the jury trial began and ended on September 25, 2019, but
sentencing did not take place until March 25, 2020, because of delays caused by appellant.
The state also argued that the delays caused it to incur unnecessary expenses. Following
the first continuance, one of the state’s witness es moved to Colorado. The state therefore
had to pay for the witness to fly back to Minnesota twice. Lastly, the state argued that
appellant had inconvenienced witnesses who made plans to be available to testify many
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times. Based on the information provided by the state, the state would be prejudiced if the
postconviction court accepted the plea withdrawal.
III. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
appellant provided an intelligent plea under the manifest-injustice standard.

Appellant argues that he did not provide an intelligent plea because the district court
denied him the option to stipulate to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of his speedy-
trial claim under Minn. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. We disagree.
Because appellant made this argument after sentencing, we apply the manifest -
injustice standard. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A defendant bears the burden of
showing the validity of the plea. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.01 subdivision 4, requires that “the parties agree that the [district] court’s
ruling on a specified pretrial issue is dispositive of the case . . .” Appellant’s argument
fails because the state did not agree. As such, this rule does not apply.
Affirmed.