A22-1361

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1348
A22-1361

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
R. T. and J. T., Parents.

Filed May 8, 2023
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-21-2621

Matthew Ralston, Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant
R.T.)

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
J.T.)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Rapp, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Health and Human Services
Department)

Alex Brusilovsky, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Catherine Stratton)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After less than one year of living with appellant-parents after court-ordered
reunification—and after about 18 additional reports of child neglect —the district court
returned the two children of appellants R.T. (mother) and J.T. (father) back into
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out-of-home placements. And respondent Hennepin County Health and Human Services
Department (the county) filed its third termination-of -parental-rights petition against
parents for these children.
After trial, the district court terminated the parental rights of mother and father.
Parents appeal the termination on the basis that the district court abused its discretion in
ruling that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify their family;
statutory conditions existed to support the termination; and termination was in the best
interests of the children. Because the county made reasonable efforts tailored to parents’
cognitive limitations, those reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to
their children’s approximately four years of out-of-home placement, and the best interests
of the children are best served by termination of parents’ rights, we affirm.
FACTS
For the entire lives of both children 1—son, who was born in September 2013, and
daughter, who was born in October 2017—their family has been enmeshed in the services
of the county. From the beginning of that involvement, there have been recurring reports
involving parents of verbal and physical abuse, unstable, unsafe, and uninhabitable living
conditions for their children, and an inability to provide for the daily, medical, and
emotional needs of their two children, partly due to their own cognitive delays. Both

1 Mother has another older daughter with severe disabilities who no longer resides with
mother.
3
parents have borderline cognitive and intellectual disabilities. And son and daughter have
physical and mental disabilities.2
The children have spent most of their lives outside their parents’ home. Between
April 2017 and the third termination-of-parental-rights trial in May 2022,3 son has been in
eight out-of-home placements over approximately four and a half years. And between her
date of birth and the trial, daughter has been in nine out-of-home placement s over
approximately four years.
In August 2018, the district court denied the first termination-of- parental-rights
petition filed by the county against parents because the county had not made reasonable
efforts toward reunification, and the case reverted to a Child in Need of Protection or
Services (CHIPS) proceeding. And again, in October 2020, the district court denied the
county’s second termination-of-parental-rights petition specifically noting that, although
Kindred Family Focus was a program that could meet the needs of both parents and the
children, the county did not offer this option to the parents before trial. According to the
district court, this demonstrated that the county failed to meet the reasonable-efforts

2 Specifically, son struggles to regulate his emotions on his own, transition between tasks,
and control his impulses; he was diagnosed with a chromosomal deletion, which causes
developmental delays and cognitive disabilities; he has a hormone deficiency for which he
needs to receive daily shots; he needs prescription eyeglasses to correct optic nerve
hypoplasia; he has speech and language delays for which he receives speech therapy; his
coordination and sensory processing requires occupational therapy; and he has
musculoskeletal dysfu nction for which he receives physical therapy. And daughter is
developing below her age level; has a speech and language articulation disorder; needs
eyeglasses; and receives physical, speech, and occupational therapy.
3 The third termination- of-parental-rights trial was held over four days in the summer of
2022—May 16, 2022, May 17, 2022, June 10, 2022, and July 26, 2022. A new district
court judge was assigned to the family for this trial.
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requirement. The children, who had been living in out-of- home placements since 2017,
were returned to the care of parents in December 2020.
The county appealed the district court’s decision. We affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded in a May 2021 opinion. In re Welfare of Child. of R.T., No. A20-1458,
2021 WL 1733363 , at *1-2 (Minn. App. May 3, 2021). We affirmed the district court’s
determination that the county failed to prove the statutory condition of palpable unfitness
necessary to support termination. Id. at *7. But we reversed and remanded as to the district
court’s determinations that the county did not make reasonable efforts towards
reunification, that no other statutory grounds existed, and that termination was not in the
children’s best interests. Id. at *7-10. In our opinion, we concluded that the district court’s
order lacked “any findings as to whether the myriad services the [county] did provide since
2017 were relevant, adequate, culturally appropriate, available, consistent, and timely,” and
that “the relevant findings the district court did make are incomplete.” Id. at *8-9. In
response, within t he same month, the district court reopened the record to solicit
submissions concerning the reasonable efforts of the county and best interests of the
children.
Meanwhile, after the children’s return home during the pendency of the appeal,
about 18 reports were filed against parents alleging abuse or neglect due to the unclean
appearance of the children, environmental hazards in the home, and physical and domestic
abuse. And the children’s guardian ad litem reported in January 2021 that son was not
engaging in school or therapy, daughter had an increase in aggressive behaviors, and
daughter reported to a therapist that she was sleeping on the floor in a basement.
5
Approximately two months after the district court reopen ed the record, one of the social
workers reported that parents were not fully engaging in services, they lack insight and
awareness into the consistent parenting practices needed to meet the extensive needs of the
children, and they would need parenting support for 24 hours all seven days of the week to
be able to safely parent their children.
In August 2021, the district court ordered the children removed from parents’ care,
ruling that the county had made reasonable efforts to prevent foster -care placement and
that it was not in the children’s best interests to remain in parents’ care. Subsequently, in
November 2021, the county filed its third termination- of-parental-rights petition. Both
mother and father sought to maintain rights to their children. A
termination-of-parental-rights trial was set and a new district judge appointed. At trial, the
district court heard testimony from son’s and daughter’s occupational, speech, and physical
therapists; the manager of the clinic the children attend for their therapies; four
child-protection-services social workers, who collectively have worked on the fam ily’s
case between early 2017 to summer 2022; the most recent guardian ad litem; and mother
and father.4
The testimony revealed that both parents had case plans with the county for at least
six years. The case plans required both parents to maintain safe and suitable housing,
complete a combined parenting and psychological assessment and follow

4 The district court made credibility determinations within its order and found that mother’s
and father’s testimony would receive limited weight because parents lack “reasonable
insight” into the reasons why child protection is needed for their family, the needs of their
children, the efforts the county has put forth, and the efforts they have put forth.
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recommendations, participate in supervised visitation with the children, and cooperate with
the county and guardian ad litem. Father additionally was ordered to participate in anger
management programming and follow all recommendations.
To help parents comply with their case plans, according to the testimony at trial, the
county provided services through Children’s Theraplay, which monitors parents’ visits
with children and offers physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy to son
and daughter; St. David’s, which provides parenting education; Family Partnership, which
provides parenting education tailored toward adults with cognitive disabilities; Families in
Transition Services, where a parenting educator worked with the family from January 2018
to June 2022; developmental disabilities waivered services; and Adult Rehabilitative
Mental Health Services, which helps adults with budgeting, cleaning, and appointment
reminders. Parents received approximately 300 parenting-education sessions that ranged
from 45 minutes to two-and-a-half hours. The parenting educator tailored her sessions to
the parents’ cognitive limitations by providing videos in addition to hands-on, in-home
lessons.
Parents were also assigned child-protection-services social workers who worked
with them throughout their cases . In total, four social workers worked with parents
between early 2017 and their third termination-of-parental-rights trial. And all four
consistently testified that the parents did not engage meaningfully in any of the county’s
programming and were not able to correct the conditions that led to the CHIPS petitions
and the children’s out-of-home placements.
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In September 2022, the district court ordered that the parents’ rights to their son and
daughter be terminated. The district court summarized its findings as follows:
Reunification with [parents] from whom the children were
removed was not possible at the time of this trial and will not
be possible for the reasonably foreseeable future. Despite
being offered and provided with numerous services to address
their issues with mental health, lack of parenting skills, and
inability to maintain safe and suitable housing, [parents] have
failed to address the conditions that led to the original out of
home placement of the children. . . . [Parents] fail to recognize
their own cognitive limitations and mental health needs, and
thus fail to understand why ongoing services to help them
parent their children is necessary. . . . To parent successfully,
[parents] will need assistance 24 hours per day for 7 days a
week, and this is not a current option for the family. . . . Even
if it was an option, [parents’] history of inconsistency in
accepting services over the last several years indicates that they
would not be willing or able to continue supportive services in
the future.

Each parent appealed, and this court consolidated the appeals.
DECISION
“Parental rights are terminated only for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare
of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). Whether to terminate parental rights is
discretionary with the district court. In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127,
136 (Minn. 2014). We will affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when
three elements are met: the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification, at least
one statutory condition—proved by clear and convincing evidence—exists to support
termination, and termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Welfare of Child. of
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
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We review an order terminating parental rights to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and are supported by substantial evidence. In
re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). And we review
factual findings for clear error and whether there was a statutory condition for abuse of
discretion. In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Minn. App. 2021),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). In conducting our review, we give “[c]onsiderable
deference” to the district court’s decisions due to its “superior position to assess the
credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of Child of S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d 723, 733
(Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court found that (1) the county made reasonable efforts to reunify
the family, (2) three statutory conditions existed—parents are palpably unfit, reasonable
efforts by the county failed to correct the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home
placements, and the children are neglected and in foster care— and (3) that the termination
of parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
Father argues that the district court erred in ruling that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify his family. And mother asserts that the district court erred in concluding
that statutory conditions existed to support termination of her rights because if the county
had made reasonable efforts, those statutory conditions would not have been met. Further,
mother contends that the district court abused its discretion in determining that terminating
her parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
We address both parents’ arguments on the county’s reasonable efforts together, and
then turn to mother’s two additional arguments on statutory conditions and the best
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interests of the children. I n so doing we are mindful that, while we give deference to the
findings of the district court, we exercise great caution in termination-of-parental-rights
proceedings. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn. App. 2011),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
I. The district court properly exercised its discretion by ruling that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family before terminating the parents’
rights.

Parents contend that the county did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification
because the efforts were not tailored toward parents with cognitive limitations . For the
county to have satisfied its burden, the county’s efforts must have reasonably served to
prevent placement of the children outside the home and to rehabilitate and reunify the
family. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Reasonable efforts are “services that go
beyond mere matters of form so as to include real genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of
Child. of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). For the county’s efforts to be reasonable, the services offered must
be:
(1) selected in collaboration with the children’s family and the
children;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the children and the
children’s family;
(3) relevant to the safety and protection and well -being of the
children;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the children
and family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.

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Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022 ). But termination of parental rights is appropriate when
providing additional services to parents would be futile and therefore unreasonable. In re
Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn. 1996); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2) (2022).
On this record, the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination was not an abuse
of its discretion. Substantial evidence supports that the parents were unsuccessful in
complying with their case plans. And it was not due to the county’s lack of effort. For
example, the record establishes that the county would help schedule parents’ intake
appointments for services, but after mother and father would complete their initial testing,
parents would not foll ow through with services. Mother claimed on more than one
occasion that she was “too busy” or was not interested in the county’s services. And father
has declined services entirely because he “didn’t feel that they would be helpful for him.”
Additionally, the county—taking into account parents’ cognitive limitations—
tailored its efforts to aid parents. For example, the county, through its social workers and
a Families in Transition parenting educator:
• Worked with father on his anger management and outbursts
in front of the children through psychiatric help;

• Helped parents fold clothes, clean dishes, and create a
household chore chart to make their home cleaner;

• Taught parents about healthy food options for the children;

• Helped with financial concerns by creating a chart to track
and monitor parents’ expenses so they could pay rent on
time;

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• Purchased wall calendars and marked down the children’s
appointments;

• Scheduled transportation to and from children’s therapy
appointments;

• Showed videos—instead of providing verbal instruction—
to parents to mirror nonphysical disciplining methods for
their children;

• Provided 300 parenting education sessions, each with a
length of between 45 minutes and two and a half hours; and

• Provided resources to parents for parenting education with
Family Partnership and developmental disabilities
waivered services.

The record further supports that even with the tailored programming, parents
struggled to identify what they have learned in their years of parenting education. And,
according to the parenting educator, social workers, and therapists, parents were generally
uninterested, on their cell phones, and minimally receptive to their parenting lessons. Or
the parents did not show up to the appointments at all.
Finally, all four of the family’s social workers shared the same outlook on the
parents at trial: they did not believe that there was, as one worker stated, “some miracle
service that could come in and change the trajectory of [parents’] ability to provide
appropriately for both the kids.” The parenting educator, who has been on the case for
over four years, testified that she has witnessed “no change [in the parents’ ability to
parent]. Nothing is getting better. I don’t see it getting better.” And the guardian ad litem
echoed these statements when she testified that she did not believe that there was a service
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that could be offered that would change the circumstances, because if there was, she would
have advocated for it.
To persuade us otherwise, mother argues that because the district court twice found
that the county did not make reasonable efforts after their prior
termination-of-parental-rights trials and their case plans did n ot change, the county is still
not making reasonable efforts. This argument fails. The county continued to consistently
work with the parents after the October 2020 district court order that concluded that the
county did not make reasonable efforts. And in our May 2021 opinion after the county
appealed the district court’s order, this court called into question the district court’s
reasonable-efforts determination, concluding that its findings were insufficient . R.T.,
2021 WL 1733363, at *7. We remanded for the district court to reevaluate the evidence.
Id. at *9. And after approximately nine months of the children being back in the parents’
care—and three months after remand —the district court removed the children from the
parents’ home, ruling that reasonable efforts had been made by the county to prevent foster-
care placement. Accordingly, the October 2020 district court order does not persuade us
that the subsequent district court determination of the county’s reasonable efforts is clearly
erroneous.
In sum, the district court acted within its discretion because the record supports its
determination that the county provided reasonable efforts to reunify parents with children,
including efforts tailored to parents with cognitive limitations. But parents have chosen
not to fully utilize these services to achieve their case-plan goals and reunify their family.
And even if there were services the county could provide parents, this record supports the
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district court’s determination that those efforts would be futile. See S.Z., 547 N.W.2d at
892.
II. The district court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that at least one
statutory condition existed to support the termination of mother’s rights.

Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that a statutory
condition was met to support its decision to terminate her parental rights. Because a district
court may terminate parental rights if at least one statutory ground for termination is
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and because we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in ruling that parents failed to correct the conditions leading to
the children’s out-of- home placement under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,
subdivision 1(b)(5) (2022), we address only that statutory condition for termination.
S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
This statutory condition is presumably met when four factors are present: (1) the
children have resided out of the parental home under court order for a cumulative period
of 12 months within the preceding 22 months;5 (2) the court has approved the out-of-home
placement plan; (3) the conditions leading to the out- of-home placement have not been
corrected; and (4) the county has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and
reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv). Since mother is the only

5 This statute further outlines that if the child is under eight years old, like daughter here,
“the presumption arises when the child has resided out of the parental home under court
order for six months unless the parent has maintained regular contact with the child and
the parent is complying with the out-of-home placement plan.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5)(i). But because the duration daughter spent outside of the parents’ home
satisfies both time requirements, we primarily apply the 12-month requirement to both
children in our analysis.
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parent who argues that the prerequisites for invoking the presumption are not satisfied, we
analyze her actions here.
Turning to the record before us, the district court properly exercised its discretion
in concluding that this statutory condition was met. First, the record supports that both
factors (1) and (2) were satisfied: in the preceding 22 months from the date of the
termination trial, between July 2020 to May 2022, son and daughter have been in
out-of-home placements from July 2020 to December 2020 and August 2021 to May 2022,
which equals approximately 14 months, which exceeds the 12-month period required for
son’s age and the six-month period required for daughter’s age. Id. subd. 1(b)(5)(i). And
court-approved out-of- home placement plans were filed with the court and in place.
Id. subd. 1(b)(5)(ii).
Next, the record provides substantial evidence that factors (3) and (4) were also met
because the conditions leading to the out -of-home placement— uninhabitable living
conditions of the home and unstable housing, allegations of physical and verbal abuse, and
parents’ inability to provide for the medical, emotional, and daily needs of the children—
have not been remedied by mother despite reasonable efforts by the county.
It is presumed that the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement
have not been corrected if mother has not substantially complied with the court’s orders
and her reasonable case plan. Id. subd. 1(b)(5)(iii). In mother’s case plan, the key concerns
to be fixed included completing psychological and parenting assessments and following all
recommendations, cooperating with Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services,
maintaining safe and suitable housing, and cooperating with supervised visitations with the
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children. The record firmly supports the district court’s determinations that mother has not
substantially complied with any of those case-plan items. And , as addressed above, the
county has made reasonable efforts to help mother do so, such as provide transportation,
organize appointments, conduct parenting-education lessons tailored to her cognitive
limitations, arrange housing, and help with the children’s medical needs. The social
workers and parenting educator on mother’s case helped her pay rent and security deposits
for more suitable apartments. But the district court found that mother was unable to keep
the apartments safe for her children. And she stopped attending supervised visits with the
children after father was suspended from supervised visits due to repeated absences,
claiming she was too busy with her new job to attend. Thus, even with the efforts of the
county, mother has failed to fulfill the three primary tenets of her case plan: progress in her
parenting, safe and stable housing, and supervised-visit attendance with her children.
As a result, because at least one of the district court’s statutory conditions was
supported by substantial evidence, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
this element was met to support its conclusion to terminate mother’s parental rights.
III. The district court properly exercised its discretion in determining that
termination of mother’s rights was in the best interests of the children.

Finally, mother asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded
that the termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests because she
loves her children, she wants them to be in her care, and a strong bond exists between her
and her children. The district court found mother’s testimony on these three contentions
credible but also found that the children’s competing interests —needs for permanency,
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safety, and stability —outweigh mother’s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship. We review this best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion.
In re Welfare of Child of J.R.R., 943 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Minn. App. 2020).
In any termination proceeding, when a statutory basis for terminating parental rights
is present, “the best interests of the child[ren] must be the paramount consideration.”
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (202 2) (stating further that if the parents’ and
children’s interests conflict, the children’s interests control). In determining what is in the
best interests of the children “the district court must balance (1) the child’s interest in
preserving the parent -child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” J.H.,
968 N.W.2d at 604 (quotation omitted). But the district court is not required to give the
parent’s and the children’s interests equal weight. In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4
(Minn. App. 1992). Because a child’s need for stability, health considerations, and
preferences may constitute compelling interests, the district court is permitted to weigh
children’s interests over their parents. Id.
Here, the district court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the children’s
competing interests over the mother’s credible testimony on her love for her children and
the bond she has with them. Because the mother’s interest in preserving the parent-child
relationship is only one factor to consider, and the district court found that these children
are t oo young to give their input on their interests in preserving the parent-child
relationship, we look to the district court’s findings addressing the children’s competing
17
interests— stability, health considerations, and preferences 6—to determine whether the
district court abused its discretion. See J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 604.
Turning to the first of the children’s competing interests, of paramount concern is
the children’s stability. The following instances from the record illustrate the children’s
complete lack of stability under mother’s care and support the district court’s well reasoned
best-interests determination:
• At the time of the termination-of -parental-rights trial, son
had been in out-of-home placement for about 1,640 days
(since April 17, 2017) which is about four and a half years;

• At the time of the termination- of-parental-rights trial,
daughter ha d been in out-of-home placement for about
1,482 days (since about five days after her date of birth),
which is over four years;

• Parents have not maintained stable housing while children
were in their care : within three years— between 2018 to
2021—parents were evicted from their apartment, lived in
father’s mother’s basement where they were asked to leave
due to incidents of domestic violence, lived in a motel
before moving to the People Serving People shelter, and
then moved to an apartment in northeast Minneapolis,
which mother moved out after further incidents of domestic
violence by father; and

• Parents have not maintained safe housing: social workers
and therapists testified that the living situations parents
were in had constant health concerns, were dirty and
cluttered, one of their apartments had bed bugs, and the
basement they lived in had exposed ductwork and wires.

6 The district court found that the children were too young to inquire into their preferences
at trial. As such, we do not specifically analyze that interest here.
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These instances support the district court’s determination that the children’s stability is best
served outside of mother’s care.
Next, the record also supports the district court’s finding that the children’s
competing interest of their personal health also favored termination of mother’s parental
rights. The social workers on the family’s case consistently testified that under parents’
care, they had concerns that the children’s significant medical needs, educational needs,
and general hygiene and nutritional needs were not being met.
And the children’s needs are extensive. Both children need to attend physical,
occupational, and speech therapy and need individualized help with regulating their strong
emotional responses to trauma from their upbringing. The record supports the district
court’s findings that mother has failed to address her children’s needs. The children, in
mother’s care, regress physically and emotionally—testimony by the children’s therapists
revealed that the children are in a constant stress-response while in mother’s care. And the
children are subjected to physical and verbal abuse. Social workers and therapists testified
that they witnessed mother screaming at the children and yanking on their arms and noticed
marks and bruises on the children’s bodies.
In contrast, the children’s needs are being met in their out-of -home placements.
Social workers and therapists observed that the children’s overall health and progress in
their therapies was better when in their foster-care placements. The guardian ad litem also
testified that of the 100 times she has met with the children and parents, the children were
doing better in their placements because they were getting the consistency and structure
that they need. Based on this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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weighing the children’s competing interests for stability, safety, permanency, and health,
in favor of terminating mother’s parental rights, even given the love and bond the children
have with mother.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunify the children with parents, that a statutory basis for termination
existed—because reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to the
children’s out-of-home placements—and that the termination of the parents’ rights were in
the best interests of the children. As a result, we affirm the district court’s determination
to terminate the parental rights of both mother and father for their two minor children.
Affirmed.