Michael Dale Miller, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1355

Michael Dale Miller, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed April 17, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-19-3013

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Kathleen Schur, Assistant County Attorney,
Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Michael Miller argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his
petition to withdraw his Alford plea to first- degree burglary with a dangerous weapon
2
because his plea was not accurate. Because Miller’s plea was not accurate, we reverse and
remand.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Miller with (1) first-degree burglary with a
dangerous weapon, (2) theft of a firearm, (3) unlawful possession of a firearm, and (4) theft
of a motor vehicle, all in relation to an alleged burglary on September 10, 2019.
On February 5, 2021, Miller entered an Alford plea1 on count one, first-degree
burglary with a dangerous weapon. The state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and
recommended a downward dispositional departure.
The district court accepted Miller’s plea, finding “sufficient facts that if presented
to a jury that there’s a substantial likelihood that a jury of 12 persons would find . . . Mr.
Miller guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court imposed a 93-month
sentence and stayed execution for 20 years of supervised probation, a downward
dispositional departure. Following Miller’s violation of the probationary terms, the district
court executed his sentence in May 2022.
Miller petitioned for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his Alford plea
claiming that, because it was not supported by a strong factual basis, his plea was not
accurate. The postconviction court found Miller’s “plea to be barely sufficient to meet the

1 An Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining innocence of the
charged offense. State v. Goulette, 258 N.W.2d 758, 760-61 (Minn. 1977) (discussing
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).
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strong factual basis standard” for the possession of a dangerous weapon element and denied
Miller’s petition. Miller appeals.
DECISION
“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State
v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But “a court must allow withdrawal of a
guilty plea if withdrawal is necessary to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” Id. (quoting Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Id.
at 94. A constitutionally valid “guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”
Id. The validity of a plea is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
An accurate plea is “established on a proper factual basis.” Id. The accuracy
requirement of a valid guilty plea protects a defendant “from pleading guilty to a more
serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right to trial.” State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251
(Minn. 1983)). In the Alford-plea context, accuracy is particularly important “because of
the inherent conflict in pleading guilty while maintaining innocence.” Id. Thus, the
factual-basis inquiry is essential for a valid Alford plea. Id. Additionally, the defendant
must acknowledge “that the evidence the State would likely offer against him is sufficient
for a jury, applying a reasonable doubt standard, to find the defendant guilty of the offense
to which he is pleading guilty.” Id.
Thus, an Alford plea must consist of a “strong factual basis and the defendant’s
agreement that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction.” Id. Together these
two components “provide the court with a basis to independently conclude that there is a
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strong probability that the defendant would be found guilty of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, notwithstanding his claims of innocence.” Id.
A person who “enters a building without consent and commits a crime while in the
building” commits first-degree burglary if “the burglar possesses, when entering or at any
time while in the building, . . . a dangerous weapon.” Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b)
(2018).
Miller contends that his plea was not accurate because the state failed to establish a
strong factual basis that he possessed a dangerous weapon while entering or inside T.K.’s
residence. We agree.
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor asked Miller the following to establish a
factual basis for the plea:
Q: Have you reviewed all the evidence that the State would
offer against you in this case?

A: I have, yes.

Q: Do you understand that the State would present evidence,
both physical evidence and evidence through testimony, that
on or around September 10th of 2019 there was a report of a
burglary in Otter Tail County, Minnesota?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you understand that? Okay. And do you understand
that the State would present evidence through testimony of a
co-defendant, [A.T.], that she learned that you had stolen some
firearms from an individual with the initials T.K.?

A: Yes.

Q: And that she also knew that where you had stashed them
and that police were able to locate the firearms where she had
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indicated they were stashed. You understand that would be
presented at trial?

A: Yep.

Q: And you also understand that the State would present
evidence that some other items that were taken in the burglary
were found in a vehicle that you were the passenger in?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you believe -- the State would also present evidence
that you had no permission to be in T.K.’s residence or to take
possession of any of his belongings. You understand that?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you believe that if this evidence were presented at trial
there would be a substantial likelihood that a jury of 12 would
find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the first-degree
burglary while in possession of a firearm?

A: I do, yes.
The state did not supplement this factual basis with additional testimony or other evidence.
In denying Miller’s petition for postconviction relief, the district court found Miller
had provided a strong factual basis by reading three of his on-the-record admissions in
tandem. First, Miller agreed that the state would present evidence of a reported burglary
on or about September 10, 2019. Second, Miller conceded that the state would “present
evidence that he had no permission to be in T.K.’s residence or to take possession of any
of his belongs.” And third, Miller acknowledged that codefendant A.T. would testify that
Miller had stolen firearms from T.K.
Reading these admissions together might create a strong factual basis for two of the
three dismissed counts, theft of a firearm and possession of firearms, but not burglary in
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the first degree with a dangerous weapon. Instead, Miller’s admissions support only a
strong factual basis for one element of burglary in the first degree, that he did not have
permission to enter T.K.’s residence. And no evidence was presented, either via a summary
of evidence presented to Miller or by reference to any documents received into evidence
(as noted, the state presented no other evidence), that Miller entered the residence. And, it
naturally follows, there is no evidence that Miller “possesse[d], when entering or at any
time while in the [residence], . . . a dangerous weapon.” Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b).
Like in Theis, no facts alleged in the complaint “satisfy the protective function of
the accuracy requirement within the context of an Alford plea.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 650.
The complaint states that codefendant A.T. was interviewed by law enforcement and
reported that Miller “[c]ame here and stole the vehicle from [T.K.]. Tried to steal some
guns. Only got them halfway out a window and um, he was staying here in this room
number with me up until he did that; and then he just left.” A.T. did not indicate that Miller
was in T.K.’s residence nor that he possessed a dangerous weapon “when entering or at
any time while in the [residence].” Minn. Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(b).
Miller’s plea is invalid because it is inaccurate. It is inaccurate because the state
failed to provide a strong factual basis establishing that Miller possessed a dangerous
weapon while entering or inside T.K.’s residence. Miller must be allowed to withdraw his
Alford plea because the factual basis presented did not ensure that Miller did not “plead[]
guilty to a more serious offense than he could be convicted of were he to insist on his right
to trial.” Theis, 742 N.W.2d at 649 (quotation omitted).
Reversed and remanded.