Anthony Scott David Auginaush, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1358

Anthony Scott David Auginaush, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 1, 2023
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Clearwater County District Court
File No. 15-CR-18-33

Anthony Auginaush, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn Lorsbach, Clearwater County Attorney, Bagley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Wheelock ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the postconviction court’s order denying his second petition
for postconviction relief, arguing that the postconviction court erred by failing to properly
respond to his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the postconviction court
correctly construed appellant’s request to be a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to
2
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (202 2), and appellant’s petition for relief is procedurally
barred, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Anthony Scott
David Auginaush in juvenile court with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(g) (2012). The petition alleged incidents of
criminal sexual conduct by Auginaush other than the incident for which he was charged
but did not include any charges based on those other incidents. Auginaush was 22 years
old at the time he was charged, although the charge arose from events alleged to have taken
place when he was 17. Auginaush waived his right to a certification hearing and agreed to
be prosecuted in district court.
The state and Auginaush entered into a plea agreement in which the state agreed to
charge only one count of criminal sexual conduct, notwithstanding allegations that there
were additional victims, and recommend a stayed sentence in exchange for Auginaush’s
guilty plea. The district court held a plea hearing, and it questioned Auginaush as to his
understanding and acceptance of the agreement. Auginaush’s counsel also questioned him
under oath about his signed petition to enter a guilty plea and his understanding of the plea,
the agreement, and his rights. Auginaush confirmed that he understood the plea agreement
and his rights.
At the sentencing hearing, Auginaush’s counsel requested time to confer with
Auginaush about possibly withdrawing his guilty plea, and the district court continued the
hearing to a later date. At the continued sentencing hearing, Auginaush confirmed that he
3
was not withdrawing his plea and asked the district court to grant a downward dispositional
departure pursuant to his agreement with the state. The district court verified that
Auginaush understood that, pursuant to the plea agreement, the state recommended a stay
of execution, but the court was not required to follow the recommendation and could
instead sentence him to prison. Auginaush affirmed that he understood, and the parties
jointly recommended a stayed sentence. The district court found no basis for a sentencing
departure and sentenced Auginaush to 144 months in prison.
In August 2018, Auginaush filed a direct appeal, arguing that the district court
abused its discretion by failing to grant a downward dispositional departure based on
mitigating factors and his particular amenability to probati on. This court affirmed the
district court’s sentencing decision. State v. Auginaush, No. A18-1363, 2019 WL
3407225, at *5 (Minn. App. July 29, 2019) (Auginaush I ), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15,
2019).
In January 2021, Auginaush filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel based on allegations that his attorney failed to adequately
advise him of his right to a certification hearing and his trial rights and failed to argue that
his guilty plea should not have been accepted. The postconviction court denied his petition.
Auginaush then filed a request with the postconviction court to withdraw his guilty
plea on May 20, 2021, and filed a notice of appeal of the postconviction court’s denial of
his first petition for postconviction relief on May 26, 2021. This court affirmed the
postconviction court’s decision to deny Auginaush’s January 2021 petition for
4
postconviction relief. Auginaush v. State, No. A21-0690, 2021 WL 5550092, at *7 (Minn.
App. Nov. 29, 2021) (Auginaush II).
On April 14, 2022, Auginaush filed a letter with the postconviction court requesting
that it rule on his previously filed request to withdraw his guilty plea. The state did not file
a response, and the postconviction court took the matter under advisement. After
considering Auginaush’s request, the postconviction court construed it as a petition for
postconviction relief and filed an order denying it on the grounds that his May 2021 request
to withdraw his plea was procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737
(Minn. 1976), and that the petition filed on April 14, 2022, was time-barred by Minn. Stat.
§ 590.01, subd. 4(a)(2) (2022).1
Auginaush appeals.
DECISION
Minnesota Statutes section 590.01 permits a person convicted of a crime to seek
postconviction relief based on a claim that the conviction violated the person’s rights under
the constitution or laws of the United States or the state. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1).

1 We conclude that the postconviction court correctly characterized Auginaush’s May 2021
request to withdraw his guilty plea as a second postconviction petition and that the issues
he raised in that petition are Knaffla barred. The postconviction court referred to the letter
filed in April 2022 as a “petition” in its order. Because the April 2022 filing did not raise
new issues and only requested that the postconviction court rule on the May 2021 request,
we decline to address whether the April 2022 filing was statutorily time barred. See Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (establishing the time period within which a petitioner may file a
postconviction petition ). Even so, we note that the May 26, 2021 notice of appeal
suspended the postconviction court’s authority to make orders affecting the order on
appeal, pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 2. Thus, the postconviction court
likely lacked jurisdiction to address Auginaush’s May 2021 request to withdraw his guilty
plea until judgment had been entered in his appeal of the first postconviction petition.
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Appellate courts review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.
Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015). We review legal issues de novo but
limit our review of factual issues to whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to
sustain the postconviction court’s findings. Id. We will not reverse the postconviction
court’s decision unless it “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Hannon v. State, 957 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
On appeal, Auginaush asserts that the postconviction court’s response to his request
in the form of an order denying a petition for postconviction relief was improper because
he claims to have filed a motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea pursuant to Minn. R.
Crim. P. 15.01 instead of a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01
(2022).
Auginaush appears to rely on Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.01, subd. 1(6)(n),
2 which states
that before the district court accepts a guilty plea, the judge must question the defendant to
ensure the defendant has been counseled and understands the absolute right to withdraw
the guilty plea and proceed to trial if the district court does not approve the plea agreement.
Here, the district court questioned Auginaush and confirmed his understanding as required
by subdivision 1(6)(n), then approved the plea agreement as originally presented. Thus,
we conclude that the district court complied with subdivision 1(6)(n)’s requirements.

2 In his brief, Auginaush cites “Minn. R. Crim . P. 15.01, subd. 1(N)” for the proposition
that he has an “absolute right to withdraw the guilty plea and have a trial.” Because rule
15.01 does not have a subdivision “1(N),” we turn to the context of his argument to discern
that Auginaush is referring to subdivision 1(6)(n).
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Indeed, Rule 15.01 does not provide a procedural mechanism for withdrawing a
guilty plea that is distinct from the postconviction remedy of chapter 590. Rather, Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05 sets out the authority for plea withdrawal, permitting a defendant to
“withdraw a guilty plea upon a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that
withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1.
And the supreme court has interpreted Minn. Stat. § 590.01 to require that “[w]hen a
criminal defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea under Rule 15.05, after the defendant
has been sentenced, the motion to withdraw the plea must be raised in a petition for
postconviction relief.” James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 727 (Minn. 2005). Therefore, we
conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by construing
Auginaush’s request to withdraw his guilty plea as a petition for postconviction relief and
responding accordingly.
Because the postconviction court correctly construed Auginaush’s request to
withdraw his plea as a petition for postconviction relief, we further conclude that the
postconviction court was corre ct in determining that Auginaush’s petition is Knaffla
barred. A petitioner may not request postconviction relief based on “grounds that could
have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 1. “Claims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should have been
known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred,” or Knaffla barred.
Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741);
see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. A claim is not Knaffla barred if “(1) the claim is
novel; or (2) the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief.” Sontoya, 829 N.W.2d at
7
604. The postconviction court may decline to apply these exceptions if the petitioner fails
to argue that they apply. Erickson v. State, 725 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2007). And a
postconviction court’s summary denial of a successive petition for postconviction relief
will be upheld if the petition raises claims for relief that are similar in substance to claims
raised in the prior postconviction petitions. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2022) ( also
stating that a district court “may summarily deny a petition when the issues raised in it have
previously been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case”);
Perry v. State, 595 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1999) (citing Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3
(1998)).
In denying Auginaush’s postconviction-relief petition to withdraw his guilty plea,
the postconviction court determined that Auginaush could have argued for plea withdrawal
during his direct appeal and did not do so. Our review of the record confirms that
Auginaush knew of his claim regarding his guilty plea and could have raised it on direct
appeal but did not. Se e Auginaush I, 2019 WL 3407225 (addressing Auginaush’s appeal
of the district court’s decision not to depart dispositionally on his sentence).
Further, Auginaush’s claim in his petition to withdraw his guilty plea is substantially
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Auginaush alleges in his petition that
he decided to go forward with the plea because his attorney convinced him that it was his
“best chance” and that based on those conversations, he did not believe he would be subject
to an executed sentence of 144 months. Auginaush raised ineffective-assistance claims in
his first petition for postconviction relief. In affirming the postconviction court’s denial of
his first postconviction petition, this court discussed the plea colloquy and Auginaush’s
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counsel’s performance in consulting with him, concluding Auginaush was unable to prove
his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Auginaush
II, 2021 WL 5550092, at *5. Auginaush’s claims in this second petition overlap
considerably with his claims in the first.
Auginaush does not argue the exceptions that his claim is novel or that the interests
of fairness and justice warrant relief. And he does not address the postconviction court’s
determination that his petition is procedurally barred under Knaffla. The record
demonstrates that Auginaush’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea raised substantively
similar claims to those in his first petition for postconviction relief and that the claims were
known to him at the time of his direct appeal. Auginaush’s petition is therefore Knaffla
barred, and the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Auginaush
postconviction relief on that basis.
Affirmed.