2913 29th Avenue South LLC, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1388

2913 29th Avenue South LLC,
Appellant,

vs.

Treaunna K. Martin,
Respondent,

John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed July 3, 2023
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-22-966

Douglass E. Turner, Christopher T. Kalla, Hanbery & Turner P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

James A. Lee, Jr., Mid Minnesota Legal Aid, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this eviction action based on nonpayment of rent, appellant-landlord 2913 29th
Avenue South LLC challenges the district court’s order (1) granting respondent-tenant
Treaunna Martin’s motion to vacate the default judgment against her and (2) determining
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that tenant had substantially complied with redemption requirements and allowing her an
additional week to pay a remaining balance of $88.20. Because the district court did not
abuse its discretion by vacating the default judgment, we affirm in part. But because the
district court erred by setting the redemption amount without receiving evidence of what
tenant owed, we reverse in part and remand to the district court for further proceedings to
determine the redemption amount.
FACTS
In March 2022, landlord served and filed a summons and an eviction complaint for
nonpayment of rent against tenant, alleging that tenant had failed to pay rent for that month.
After the parties informed the district court that tenant had a pending application for
COVID-related rental assistance, the district court stayed the eviction action.
When the stay was lifted in June 2022, l andlord filed an amended eviction
complaint, asserting that tenant was still in possession of the apartment and owed rent for
March through June. The district court scheduled a hearing for August 2 and mailed a
hearing notice to tenant.
On July 22, 2022, landlord cashed a $6,467.59 check from a Hennepin County
rental-assistance program for tenant’s March through July rent.
Tenant did not appear at the August 2 hearing. At the hearing, landlord orally moved
to amend the complaint to include July and August rent. Landlord did not inform the district
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court that it had cashed the check from the county’s rental-assistance program for tenant’s
March through July rent.1
On August 3, the district court entered default judgment for landlord. The order
granted landlord an immediate writ of recovery and stated that it was granting landlord’s
motion to amend the complaint “to include June and July rent.”
Tenant was served with a copy of the writ of recovery sometime between August 6
and 10, 2022. On August 16, the sheriff executed the writ of recovery, restoring the
apartment to landlord.
On August 30, 2022, tenant filed a motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Minnesota
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. The district court heard the parties’ arguments on the motion
on Se ptember 9, 2022. At the hearing, tenant focused on landlord’s acceptance of the
payment for March through July rent prior to the August 2 hearing, and landlord
acknowledged that it accepted that payment. However, landlord asserted that tenant still
owed $88.20 of July rent, as well as court costs, and that tenant had not paid August rent.
As a result, landlord contended that tenant needed to pay $3,311.20 to redeem her tenancy.
By written order filed on September 27, 2022, the district court vacated the default
judgment and quashed the writ of recovery. The district court ordered landlord to reinstate
tenant to the apartment as soon as possible and ordered tenant to pay $88.20 to landlord by
October 3.
Landlord appeals.

1 Landlord asserts that its counsel was unaware of the county’s rental-assistance payment.
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DECISION
Landlord argues that the district court erred by granting tenant’s motion to vacate
the default judgment. In the alternative, landlord argues that the district court erred by
setting the amount of redemption—the amount of money tenant must pay to be reinstated
to her tenancy.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by vacating the judgment.

Landlord argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting tenant’s
motion to vacate the default judgment because the district court failed to make findings on
the four required factors to vacate a judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
60.02(a) and the record does not support findings in favor of vacating. 2
A court may vacate a judgment based on “ [m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). The decision whether to vacate a judgment
under rule 60.02(a) is “based on all the surrounding facts of each specific case, and is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. As such, a district court will not be
reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion.” Gams v. Houghton, 884 N.W.2d
611, 620 (Minn. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). A district court abuses its

2 The district court relied on rule 60.02(a) in vacating the default judgment. Tenant asserts
that, in addition to rule 60.02(a), the district court’s decision to vacate the judgment could
be affirmed under rule 60.02(c), (e), and (f). Tenant did not assert rule 60.02(e) or (f) in
district court, and thus those arguments are waived. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,
582 (Minn. 1988). As for rule 60.02(c), t enant did cite that provision in her motion to
vacate, although the district court did not address it in its order. We need not address it
because rule 60.02(a) suffices to affirm the district court’s decision.
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discretion “when it acts under a misapprehension of the law” or if “its factual findings are
clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotations omitted).
A party moving for relief under rule 60.02(a) must establish the four Finden factors.
Id. at 619; see Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1964). These four factors are (1) “a
reasonable defense on the merits,” (2) “a reasonable excuse” for the movant’s failure or
neglect to act, (3) that the movant acted “with due diligence after learning of the error or
omission,” and (4) “that no substantial prejudice will result to the other party.” Cole v.
Wutzke, 884 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted).
As an initial matter, we reject landlord’s argument that the district court failed to
make findings on all of the Finden factors. To grant relief under rule 60.02(a), a “district
court must consider, and expressly find that a party satisfied, all four of the Finden factors.”
Gams, 884 N.W.2d at 619 (quotation omitted). Landlord contends that a district court must
therefore make separate, explicit findings for each of the four Finden factors and that the
district court’s failure to do so here requires reversal. We disagree. The district court’s
order identifies tenant’s arguments on the four factors, accurately recites the factors, and
correctly states that the moving party “bears the burden of proving all four of the elements.”
Immediately thereafter, the order states “that the Court finds that Tenant has demonstrated
that the Default Judgment should be vacated.” The order makes clear that the district court
“consider[ed], and expressly [found]” that tenant satisfied all four Finden factors. Id.
We turn now to the analysis of the Finden factors themselves. Landlord asserts that
the district court abused its discretion in finding any of the factors satisfied. For the reasons
that follow, we disagree.
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Reasonable Defense on the Merits

Landlord argues that tenant had no reasonable defense on the merits at the time of
the default judgment. “A reasonable defense on the merits is one that, if established,
provides a defense to the plaintiff’s claim.” Northland Temps., Inc. v. Turpin, 744 N.W.2d
398, 403 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 2008). “Specific information that
clearly demonstrates the existence of a debatably meritorious defense satisfies this factor.”
Id.
Because this is an eviction action, landlord’s cause of action and tenant’s defenses
are governed by chapter 504B of the Minnesota Statutes. See SVAP III Riverdale Commons
LLC v. Coon Rapids Gyms, LLC, 967 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn. App. 2021). Under Minnesota
Statutes section 504B.291 (2022), “[a] landlord may bring an eviction action for
nonpayment of rent.” This statute provides an avenue for a tenant to “defend against such
an action by proving that rent actually has been paid.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 504B.291,
subd.1 (a)).
Section 504B.291 also grants tenants the opportunity to return to their tenancy even
if they failed to pay rent. In those cases, the tenant may “redeem the tenancy” by paying
“the amount of the rent that is in arrears, with interest, costs of the action, and an attorney’s
fee not to exceed $5, and by performing any other covenants of the lease.” Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.291, subd. 1(a). If a tenant pays the rent owed, the district court may grant a tenant
additional time3 to pay interest, costs, and attorney fees. See id., subd. 1(b).

3 The tenant’s right to redeem extends until the time that “possession has been delivered.”
Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(b). Possession is delivered when the court issues “an order
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The district court found that landlord cashed a rent payment check in the amount of
$6,467.49 on July 22, 2022, and that, “though a balance of $88.20 remain[ed] ,” tenant
“substantially performed to redeem the tenancy” before the writ of recovery was issued.
Landlord contends that “substantial redemption” is not a reasonable defense to an eviction
action because section 504B.291 imposes strict requirements for redemption. See Minn.
Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a).
We are unpersuaded that the district court abused its discretion. Tenant’s “debatably
meritorious defense” is that she in fact paid the rent due through July when the landlord
cashed the rent check for March through July. See Northland Temps., Inc., 744 N.W.2d
at 403. Moreover, even if $88.20 were still owing for July, landlord concedes that a
redemption period with respect to July rent “might have been appropriate” under section
504B.291, subdivision 1(b)—which allows a tenant to be restored even without fully
paying all interest, costs, and attorney fees.
Landlord argues, though, that tenant still lacked a reasonable defense on the merits
as of the August 3 judgment because August rent was due and unpaid. But the district court
approved landlord’s motion to amend the eviction complaint to include rent only through
July. Moreover, the eviction hearing that tenant missed took place on August 2—
immediately after August rent was due. In these circumstances, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by not considering August rent when concluding that tenant had a
reasonable defense to the eviction action.

dispossessing the tenant and permitting reentry by the landlord.” Paul McCusker & Assoc.,
Inc. v. Omodt, 359 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 1985).
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Reasonable Excuse for Failure to Appear

Landlord argues that tenant’s excuse for missing the August 2 eviction hearing—
her lack of act ual knowledge of the hearing —is not a valid excuse. Relying on Koski v.
Johnson, landlord asserts that lack of actual knowledge cannot be a reasonable excuse for
missing an eviction hearing when, as here, a party was properly served with a summons
and complaint. 837 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013).
But Koski holds that a district court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant in
an eviction proceeding if the landlord does not strictly comply with the statute governing
service, even if the defendant has actual notice of the proceeding. 837 N.W.2d at 745. Thus,
that case does not preclude a finding that lack of actual knowledge is a reasonable excuse
under rule 60.02(a) for failing to appear for a hearing.
As the supreme court has made clear, “there are no per se rules of law requiring
either the grant or denial of a Rule 60.02(a) motion under the ‘reasonable excuse’
requirement.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 639. Instead, “[t]he decision whether relief is warranted
under Rule 60.02 is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and is based
upon all the surrounding circumstances of each case.” Id. at 637. Here, it is undisputed that
landlord cashed tenant’s rent check in July, for her March through July rent, before the
August 2 hearing on landlord’s eviction complaint. And tenant asserted that she did not
have actual notice of the August 2 hearing. Under these circumstances, it was not an abuse
of discretion for the district court to determine that tenant had a reasonable excuse for
failing to appear.
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Due Diligence

Landlord contends that tenant did not act with due diligence after learning of the
default judgment. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 requires that a motion to vacate
be brought within a reasonable time. What constitutes a reasonable time is determined on
a case-by-case basis. Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006 -0A1, 775
N.W.2d 168, 177 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Jan 27, 2010). Due diligence in
bringing the motion to vacate is “assessed from the time that the movant learns of his or
her error or omission.” Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 639.
Landlord argues that, given the summary nature of eviction actions, tenant waited
an unreasonably long time to vacate judgment because she did not contact legal counsel
until five to nine days after discovering the writ of recovery and she did not file her motion
to vacate judgment for another two weeks. We are unconvinced. After learning of the writ
of recovery, tenant contacted legal counsel, who investigated what had happened with the
rental-assistance payment and, upon learning it had been cashed, filed a motion to vacate
within approximately three weeks of tenant’s learning about the writ. Even though
proceedings are summary, we are not persuaded on this record that the district court abused
its discretion by finding that tenant acted with due diligence.
No Substantial Prejudice

Landlord contends that it was substantially prejudiced because the district court
directed tenant to pay only the balance of unpaid rent for July in its order to vacate
judgment. Prejudice is inherent when a case is delayed. Finden, 128 N.W.2d at 751. But
when the prejudice claimed is limited to delay and added expense, that prejudice is not
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considered substantial. Id. Substantial prejudice to the other party may exist if that party
lost witnesses or evidence due to delay or if that party detrimentally relied on the dismissal.
See Cole, 884 N.W.2d at 639.
Landlord’s argument conflates prejudice arising from the amount that the district
court ordered for redemption with the prejudice related to the district court’s reopening of
the default judgment. Tenant alleged, and landlord does not dispute, that no other tenant
had occupied the premise following the issuance of the default judgment. Furthermore,
landlord does not identify any real or particular harm that it suffered as a result of a delay
in this case or how it detrimentally relied on the default judgment. Thus, landlord has not
established that the district court abused its discretion in finding that landlord was not
substantially prejudiced by vacatur of the default judgment.
In sum, landlord has not established that the district court abused its discretion by
vacating the default judgement.
II. The district court erred by setting the redemption amount without receiving
evidence of how much tenant owed.

Landlord argues that the district court erred by setting a redemption amount of
$88.20 and effectively dismissing landlord’s case when there were disputed material facts
about whether tenant had redeemed and how much tenant owed to redeem.
4 As discussed
above, the redemption amount includes “the amount of the rent that is in arrears, with

4 Landlord does not contest the portion of the district court’s order directing it to reinstate
tenant.
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interest, costs of the action, and an attorney’s fee not to exceed $5.” Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.291, subd. 1(a).
“On review of a district court order in an eviction action, we defer to the district
court’s findings of fact, and those findings will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous.” NY Properties, LLC v. Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Minn. App. 2022),
rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 27, 2022) and appeal dismissed (Minn. Aug. 24, 2022).
The district court’s order followed a September 9 hearing about whether to vacate
the default judgment. That hearing did not involve the presentation of evidence. No exhibits
were offered or received, no sworn testimony was obtained, and the parties did not stipulate
to any facts related to the redemption amount. Counsel for landlord and tenant discussed
whether $88.20 was the amount of rent still due after July’s rent payment. Tenant’s counsel
indicated a willingness to take landlord’s “word on the amount,” but we do not read this
exchange as a stipulation to $88.20 as the amount of rent owed or the total redemption
amount. Because there is no evidence in the record of what tenant actually owed in rent,
the district court clearly erred in setting tenant’s redemption amount at $88.20. See id.
(concluding that the district court erred by making factual findings and legal conclusions
without first receiving evidence and explaining that “[a] party has a right to a trial when
there are genuine issues of material facts”).
As a result, we affirm the portion of the district court’s order vacating the default
judgment, reverse the portion of the district court’s order directing tenant to pay $88.20 ,
and remand for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.