State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1428

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

David Wokeph Natee,
Respondent.

Filed March 20, 2023
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-21-17142

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lisa Lopez, Acting Chief
Hennepin County Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant argues that (1) the district court’s pretrial suppression order in
respondent’s favor had a critical impact on the state’s ability to prosecute the case, and
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(2) the district court erred by suppressing evidence because the district court did not
properly credit the veracity and basis of knowledge of the confidential reliable informant.
We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2021, police officers with the Minneapolis Police Department Gun
Investigation Unit received a tip from a confidential reliable informant (the CRI) that
respondent David Wokeph Natee was near Lake Street and 12 th Avenue South in a blue
BMW SUV . The CRI reported that Natee was in possession of a firearm and drugs, and
that the firearm was concealed in the waistband of his pants . Natee is prohibited from
possessing a firearm because of a prior felony conviction.
Officers went to the area about 30 minutes later and found a blue BMW SUV parked
one block away from the Lake Street and 12th Avenue intersection. Natee was the sole
occupant of the vehicle. Officers approached Natee and took him into custody. Officers
found a firearm in the waistband of Natee’s pants and discovered a bag containing drugs
in the back seat of the vehicle. Natee acknowledged that the drugs belonged to him, but
claimed the firearm belonged to his wife and he was only carrying it for protection.
Appellant State of Minnesota charged Natee with one count of unlawful possession
of a firearm and one count of first-degree possession of a controlled substance. Natee filed
a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the firearm and the drugs. The district court held
an evidentiary hearing on Natee’s suppression motion and heard testimony from an officer
who works as an investigator in the gun investigation unit. Following the hearing, the
district court grant ed Natee’s motion. The district court determined that the state did not
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adequately establish the basis for the CRI’s knowledge of a crime and that the information
underlying Natee’s arrest was not sufficiently corroborated. The district court determined
that the information received from the CRI “was insufficient to establish probable cause to
arrest and search the car and therefore evidence obtained from that arrest and search is
suppressed.”
The state appeals.
DECISION
I. Critical Impact
The state’s ability to appeal in a criminal case is limited. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d
476, 481 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted). In the case of a pretrial order, t he state must
establish that unless the district court ’s ruling is reversed, the alleged error will have a
“critical impact” on the outcome of the trial. State v. Trei, 624 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn.
App. 2001), rev. dismissed (Minn. June 22, 2001) . Critical impact exists “where the lack
of the suppressed evidence significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful
prosecution.” State v. Ault, 478 N.W.2d 797, 799 (Minn. App. 1991) (quotation omitted).
Here, the suppression of the state’s evidence related to the firearm and the controlled
substances meets this requirement. Thus, the critical -impact requirement is satisfied and
we turn to a consideration of whether the district court’s suppression order was erroneous.
II. Suppression of Evidence
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may
independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court
erred in suppressing—or not suppressing—the evidence.” State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90,
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98 (Minn. 1999) (citing State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. 1992)). We review
de novo the legal issue of whether a search was justified , and we review findings of fact
for clear error. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right of the people to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. This guarantee extends to the right of the people to be secure in their motor
vehicles. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d
84, 87 (Minn. 2000) . Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable unless a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145,
149 (Minn. 2009). The level of suspicion required for a search or seizure is less than that
required for a n arrest. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (noting that the
reasonable-suspicion standard is “obviously less demanding than . . . probable cause”) . A
seizure requires reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of law , Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19- 22 (1968), while a seizure amounting to an arrest generally requires probable
cause, State v. Pike , 551 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. 1996) . The state bears the burden of
proving that a warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible . State v.
Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2003) .
Here, the state agrees that the officers did not perform a Terry stop of Natee , but
instead arrested him. The state argues that police officers had probable cause to do so
because the CRI provided reliable information that Natee was in possession of a firearm
and drugs. The state also argues that because officers had probable cause to arrest Natee,
they also had authority to conduct a search incident to that arrest. Again, “[a] warrantless
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arrest is reasonable if supported by probable cause.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867,
871 (Minn. 2011). Probable cause may be established by information provided by a CRI.
State v. Ross , 676 N.W.2d 301, 304- 05 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. June 15,
2004).
Minnesota law recognizes several kinds of informants, including concerned
citizens, confidential informants, and anonymous informants. See State v. McCloskey, 453
N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that courts “recognize[] that each informer is
different and that all of the stated facts relating to the informer should be considered in
making a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis”); see also State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d
532, 540- 42 (Minn. App. 2005) (distinguishing between confidential informants a nd
concerned citizens) , rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006) . A CRI has been defined as
someone who has provided reliable information to the police in the past that led to an arrest.
State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search
& Seizure § 3.3(a) ( 6th ed. 2004) (noting that informant’s credibility is often established
because of the informant’s past performance).
“Whether the information provided by [an informant ] is sufficient to establish
probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, particularly
the credibility and veracity of the informant.” Ross, 676 N.W.2d at 303-04 (quotation
omitted). When determining the reliability of an informant, we consider:
(1) a first-time citizen informant is presumably reliable; (2) an
informant who has given reliable information in the past is
likely also currently reliable; (3) an informant’s reliability can
be established if the police can corroborate the information;
(4) the informant is presumably more reliable if the informant
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voluntarily comes forward; (5) in narcotics cases, “controlled
purchase” is a term of art that indicates reliability; and (6) an
informant is minimally more reliable if the informant makes a
statement against the informant’s interests.
Id. at 304.
The crux of this appeal turns on the second and third considerations .1
Informant’s past history with the police department
An informant’s prior collaboration with the police enhances the veracity of the tip
because it puts the informant in “a position to be held accountable.” McCloskey, 453
N.W.2d at 704. The officer testified that the CRI worked with other law enforcement
officers for about two years and provided reliable and accurate information. The district
court found that the CRI “had a two- year record with the Minneapolis Police Department
in providing timely and reliable information that resulted in charges.” The district court
determined that the CRI’s past history with the police department leaned toward reliabilit y.
“Having a proven track record is one of the primary indicia of an informant ’s
veracity.” Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 136. But “[r]ecitation of facts establishing [an
informant’s] reliability by his proven ‘track record’ . . . does not by itself establish probable
cause.” State v. Cook , 610 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. July
25, 2000). The informant “must still show a basis of knowledge.” Id. This basis of
knowledge “may be supplied directly, by firs t-hand information,” or “indirectly through

1 The district court also reviewed the fourth consideration, which provides that an
informant “is presumably more reliable if the informant voluntarily comes forward .” Ross,
676 N.W.2d at 304. Although the informant came forward voluntarily with the
information, the police paid him $400 for the information. The district court therefore
found this consideration was neutral.
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self-verifying details that allow an inference that the information was gained in a reliable
way” and may not be based on the suspect ’s general reputation or on rumor. Id. “Recent
personal observation of incriminating conduct has traditionally been the preferred basis for
an informant’s knowledge.” State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1985).
The district court found that the CRI did not have a basis of knowledge about
Natee’s activities, and we agree with this determination. The CRI told officers that he
personally observed Natee in a blue BMW SUV in possession of drugs and saw a firearm
in the waistband of his pants. Beyond this description, however, we agree with the district
court that the information provided was scant. The CRI provided no details about how he
was able to personally observe Natee in possession of drugs or a firearm . The CRI did not
provide a detailed description of the vehicle, su ch as the make, model, or license plate
number. The CRI also failed to provide a physical description of Natee or describe what
he was wearing. While the CRI told officers that Natee was in possession of drugs, the
CRI did not claim that they personally observed any drug sales. A nd as to the firearm, the
CRI generically described it as a “black semi -automatic firearm.” Given this record, we
determine the second consideration does not favor a probable-cause finding.
Corroboration
The third consideration also weighs against a finding that the police officers had
probable cause to arrest Natee and search his vehicle . An informant’s “[v]eracity can be
established . . . by showing that details of the tip have been sufficiently corroborated so
that it is clea r the informant is telling the truth on this occasion.” State v. Holiday , 749
N.W.2d 833, 840 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted ). Here, the record shows that the
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police officers did little to investigate the CRI’s tip so that they could corroborate the CRI’s
information about the firearm or the drugs to establish that a crime occurred . Officers
reviewed Natee’s criminal history and learned that he had a felony drug conviction for drug
possession. Natee is prohibited from possessing a f irearm because of this conviction.
Officers went to the area about 30 minutes after receiving the CRI’s tip and saw a
blue BMW SUV parked one block away from Lake Street and 12th Avenue. Natee was
the sole occupant of the vehicle.
But officers did not ascertain whether Natee committed a crime before arresting
him. A police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a person has engaged in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-
22. Additio nally, an officer may conduct a brief stop when observing a traffic violation.
See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004) (permitting a police officer to
make a brief investigatory stop when the officer observes even an “insignificant” violat ion
of traffic law ). The officers did not make a brief investigatory stop here. Instead, they
arrested Natee based on the CRI’s tip alone. Although officers eventually recovered a
firearm from Natee’s waistband and drugs from inside the vehicle, evidence obtained after
an arrest cannot establish probable cause for the arrest. Henry v. United States , 361 U.S.
98, 103 (1959) (stating a defendant ’s “arrest is not justified by what the subsequent search
discloses”); State v. Walker, 584 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Minn. 1998) (“The legality of the arrest
is determined based on the information the police took into consideration when making the
arrest, not what was uncovered thereafter.”). The record merely shows that police officers
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corroborated only easily obtainable facts such as the color of Natee’s car and its
approximate location. This information is insufficient to sustain a probable-cause finding.
Caselaw supports our conclusion. In Cook, an informant reported a crime and
provided police officers with the defendant’s “ appearance and present location .” 610
N.W.2d at 669. This court reasoned that the information about the defendant’s appearance
and location was “ easily obtainable by anyone ” and that there was “nothing suspicious
about the time and place of events.” Id. Additionally, the informant’s information “ di d
not predict any future behavior on [the defendant’s] part.” Id. We therefore determined
that the tip did not establish probable cause. Id. We acknowledge that, in Cook, the
informant did not claim to have personally observed any illegal activity. Id. at 668-69. In
this case, by contrast, the CRI claimed to have personally observed illegal conduct. But
the CRI failed to provide a basis of knowledge for this information.
We similarly held in State v. Albrecht that an informant’s tip did not establish
probable cause. 465 N.W.2d 107, 108 (Minn. App. 1991). In Albrecht, an informant
reported to police that the defendant was selling marijuana inside his home and provided
officers with a description of the defendant’s home and directions to his home. Id. at 108-
09. The informant als o indicated that the defendant had a red and white truck parked
outside when he was at home . Id. Based on this information, officers obtained a search
warrant for the defendant’s home. Id. On appeal, we determined that the tip was
inadequate to establi sh probable cause because the facts provided by the informant were
“easily obtained facts and conditions [that] by themselves [were] inadequate to support a
finding of probable cause.” Id. at 109.
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Applying these cases, the district court found that the information provided by the
CRI was “no more able to establish probable cause than the information in Cook and
Albrecht.” We agree. The CRI identified Natee by name and said that he was at a particular
intersection in Minneapolis in a blue BMW SUV. The CRI also reported that Natee was
in possession of a firearm and drugs. Although officers found Natee sitting in a blue BMW
SUV near the Lake Street and 12 th Avenue intersection, this information could be easily
obtained and cannot form the basis for a warrantless arrest.
The state argues that the district court “required a level of corroboration that is not
necessary according to [Minnesota] caselaw.” The state relies on Ross, in which an
informant provided officers with a description of the defendant and information about
where he would be engaging in future drug sales. 676 N.W.2d at 303. But Ross is
distinguishable from this case. In Ross, the informant provided “detailed” information,
describing what the defendant was wearing, what vehicle he was driving, the license plate
number of the vehicle, and a description of when the defendant was going. Id. at 303-04.
We determined that the informant was sufficiently reliable. Id. at 304- 05. Ross also
instructs that w hen evaluating probable cause based on an informant ’s tip, an informant ’s
detailed prediction of a suspect ’s future behavior is a “key distinguishing characteristic”
from situations in which an informant shares onl y “easily obtain[ed] information and not
inside information.” Id. at 305 (concluding that probable cause existed when informant
provided “a detailed prediction of future behavior that was corroborated by police before
the search”). Here, the CRI did not provide detailed information about Natee or predictive
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information for the police to test the veracity of the CRI’s personal knowledge. As a result,
we do not consider Ross persuasive.
Based on the record before us, we agree with the district court that the officers
lacked probable cause to arrest Natee. We thus hold that the district court did not err by
concluding that the CRI’s tip did not establish probable cause for Natee’s arrest and
suppressing the evidence.
Affirmed.