State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1430

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Neal Shelton,
Appellant.

Filed July 24, 2023
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-22406

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Craig E. Cascarano, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant challenges the existence of probable cause for his warrantless arrest.
Because the police had probable cause to believe he committed criminal damage to
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property by obscuring pavement markings with tire marks caused by doing “donuts” and
“burnouts” with his vehicle, we affirm.
FACTS
Following a stipulated -facts trial, appellant Justin Neal Shelton was convicted of
possessing a firearm as an ineligible person, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd.
1(2) (2020). Shelton agreed to a stipulate d-facts trial to appeal the district court’s denial
of his pretrial motion to suppress the firearm Minneapolis police seized in a search incident
to his warrantless arrest. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. The following facts come
from testimony and exhibits received at the suppression hearing.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on August 9, 2020, a large group assembled in
downtown Minneapolis to watch people do “burnouts” and “donuts” with their cars at the
intersection of North Fourth Street and North First Avenue. See State v. Abdus-Salam, 988
N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. App. 2023) (describing “intersection takeovers” occurring in
“urban Minnesota”), petition for rev. filed (Minn. May 3, 2023) . After the incident, a
Minneapolis police officer reviewed surveillance video of the intersection and identified
one of the drivers as Shelton. The officer identified Shelton’s car as the one that
“conducted the majority of the damage to the street,” and the officer described the damage
as “defacing of crosswalks and bike lanes, surfacing of painted lines.” The officer also
received estimates that it would cost $8,000-$9,000 to repair the intersection.
Based on this information, the officer issued a “PC pick-up” on the suspicion that
Shelton had committed felony criminal damage to property, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.595, subd. 1(4) (2020). The officer explained at the suppression hearing that a “PC
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pick-up” is an internal police department notice that there is proba ble cause to arrest an
individual in relation to a crime.
On October 17, 2020, a Minneapolis police officer recognized Shelton at a gas
station and arrested him based on the “PC pick-up.” Shelton was wearing a fanny pack
and asked that the officer “give [it] to [his] girlfriend.” The officer searched the fanny pack
and found a loaded 9-millimeter handgun.
Three days later, the state charged Shelton with one count of possessing a firearm
as an ineligible person. Shelton moved to suppress the firearm based upon an illegal arrest.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which the officer who issued the “PC
pick-up” and the arresting officer testified, and the state presented surveillance video of the
intersection. After the hearing and with the consent of the district court, the parties
submitted invoices showing that the intersection was repainted in early October 2020 and
photos of the intersection from February 2021.
The district court denied Shelton’s suppression motion because Shelton was arrested
based upon probable cause to believe he committed felony criminal damage to property.
After a stipulated-facts trial, the district court found Shelton guilty of possessing a firearm
as an ineligible person and sentenced him to 60 months’ i ncarceration, stayed for three
years of probation, a downward dispositional departure. Shelton appeals.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; State v. Williams,
794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011). “A warrantless arrest is reasonable if supported by
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probable cause.” Williams, 794 N.W.2d at 871. Probable cause to support a warrantless
arrest exists “when a person of ordinary care and prudence, viewing the totality of the
circumstances objectively, would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a specific
individual has committed a crime.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). This
standard “requires more than mere suspicion but less than the evidence necessary for
conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted). “When determining the legality of a warrantless
arrest, we look to the information that police took into consideration when making the
arrest, not what they uncovered thereafter.” State v. Cook, 610 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn.
App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). If a warrantless arrest is not supported by
probable cause, the remedy is generally to exclude evidence seized as a result, pursuant to
the exclusionary rule. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178 (Minn. 2007). When the
facts underlying a pretrial order on a motion to suppress are not in dispute, we review de
novo “whether the police articulated an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue.”
State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 247- 48 (Minn. 2007); State v. Bradley, 908 N.W.2d
366, 369 (Minn. App. 2018).
Felony criminal damage to property in the first degree occurs when a person
“intentionally causes damage to physical property of another without the latter’s
consent . . . if . . . the damage reduces the value of the property by more than $1,000
measured by the cost of repair and replacement.” Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4). The
cost of repair and replacement may be established by estimates, which gives effect to the
statute’s “plain language and structure” focusing on “the degree of culpability on the
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defendant’s actions, not on the action or inaction of the victim.” State v. Powers, 962
N.W.2d 853, 860 (Minn. 2021).
At the suppression hearing, the officer who issued the “PC pick-up” testified that
the intersection was damaged because the tire marks “defac[ed]” crosswalks and bike lanes
and “surfac[ed]” painted lines. The officer also received estimates that it would cost over
$8,000 to repair the intersection. Thus, the officer knew the intersection had been altered
by Shelton’s actions and, based on the repair estimates, it would cost more than $1,000 to
repair it. 1 This is sufficient for a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an
“honest and strong suspicion” that Shelton committed felony criminal damage to property.
Williams, 794 N.W.2d at 871.
Shelton argues that the tire marks were not “damage” as required by the statute
because there were no “cracks or holes” in the pavement, vehicles and pedestrians could
still traverse the intersection, and the tire skid- marks eventually disappeared and thus did
not require repair. We interpret Shelton’s argument to be that damage must be more than
cosmetic and have some degree of permanence. The law compels our disagreement.
First, the statute defines the damage amount to be “measured by the cost of repair
and replacement.” Minn. Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1(4). The officer possessed such evidence

1 The parties do not dispute that the cost of repair was over $1,000, but we note that the
relevant source of the cost of repair is the estimates, not the actual cost of repainting
reflected in invoices the state submitted after the suppression hearing. The actual cost to
repaint the intersection is irrelevant to our analysis because it did not exist when the officer
issued the “PC pick-up ” and there is no evidence the arresting officer was aware of the
actual cost of repair at the time of the arrest. Therefore, it is not part of “the information
that police took into consideration when making the arrest.” Cook, 610 N.W.2d at 667.
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in the form of a repair estimate. Nothing in the statute suggests that damage must be more
than cosmetic and must have some (undefined) degree of permanence before it rises to the
level of criminal damage to property. Moreover, to read such requirements into the statute
would inappropriately shift the focus away from the defendant’s actions. Powers, 962
N.W.2d at 860.
Second, even if the statute defined damage to be more than cosmetic, the tire marks
left by Shelton’s driving conduct would constitute damage. The value of roads is not
simply the public’s ability to travel on them, but to travel on them safely, and pavement
markings play a key role in guiding traffic to ensure the safety of all users. See Minn. Stat.
§ 169.21 (2022) (requiring drivers to yield to pedestrians in a marked crosswalk ); Minn.
Stat. § 169.222 (2022) (providing rules for bicycle use in bike lanes and crosswalks); Minn.
Stat. § 169.18 (2022) (prohibiting drivers from driving in a bicycle lane except in limited
circumstances). The tire marks caused by Shelton as he conducted “burnouts” and
“donuts” with his vehicle obscured bike lanes and crosswalks, which prevented them from
guiding traffic. Thus, it was reasonable for the officer to believe the intersection was
damaged and, therefore, probable cause existed to arrest Shelton.
Affirmed.