State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1436

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeron Garding,
Appellant.

Filed September 5, 2023
Reversed
Frisch, Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CR-21-3812

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ed Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian A. Lutes, Wright County Attorney, Buffalo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Ted Sampsell-Jones, Assistant
Public Defender, Tacota LeMuel (certified student attorney), St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence discovered in his vehicle because law enforcement lacked the necessary
2
reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a drug-dog sniff. Because the objective facts
do not establish reasonable, articulable suspicion to infer that drugs were in the vehicle, we
reverse.
FACTS
This case arises from appellant Jeron Garding’s challenge to the district court’s
pretrial order denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered in a vehicle he was
driving. At the suppression hearing, the district court received testimony from Trooper
Jacob Bredsten, a photo taken during the search of the vehicle, and Trooper Bredsten’s
squad-car video and screenshots from that squad-car video. A summary of the evidence at
the suppression hearing follows.
On August 10, 2021, Trooper Bredsten was monitoring a gas station with a
connected restaurant off of Interstate 94 (I- 94) in Hasty in Wright County. Trooper
Bredsten was participating in “a high visibility saturation” operation in Clearwater related
to drug, sex, and weapons trafficking occurring near I-94, Highway 24, and Highway 10.
Around 8:30 p.m., Trooper Bredsten focused his attention on a vehicle that was
parked away from the gas pumps and the general business at the gas station. The vehicle
was parked near other vehicles, but no other vehicles in the area appeared to be occupied.
During his surveillance, Trooper Bredsten saw two occupants of the vehicle, a male (later
identified as Garding) in the driver’s seat and a female in the passenger seat.
Trooper Bredsten checked the vehicle registration and discovered that the vehicle
was registered to a male in his 60s living in Fergus Falls. Trooper Bredsten drove his squad
3
car around the front of the vehicle and noted that both occupants appeared younger than
the listed age of the registered owner.
Trooper Bredsten continued driving by the vehicle but remained nearby for
observation. The occupants exited the vehicle, and Trooper Bredsten watched as Garding
began to “thorough[ly]” clean the vehicle, including reaching under a seat and around the
door. Garding placed items in a plastic bag. Trooper Bredsten did not see any drug
paraphernalia and instead saw what appeared to be cups and a Styrofoam container.
Trooper Bredsten testified that he “was confident it was trash.” Trooper Bredsten watched
the passenger go into the gas station without a purse or wallet and then return to the vehicle
without appearing to have purchased anything.
Approximately 15 minutes after Trooper Bredsten began surveilling the vehicle, he
activated his squad-car camera and approached the vehicle. Trooper Bredsten parked his
squad car behind and to the left of the driver’s side of the vehicle so that he was nearby but
not blocking the vehicle from moving. Garding was standing at the driver’s side door
holding the white plastic bag filled with items, and Trooper Bredsten testified that it
appeared to be the same bag of trash he observed earlier. Trooper Bredsten exited his
squad car. Garding closed the driver’s side door and moved toward the trunk. Trooper
Bredsten greeted Garding while Garding placed the bag of trash in the trunk. Trooper
Bredsten asked if everything was alright with the vehicle. Garding responded that
everything was fine and volunteered that they had stopped and that he was cleaning the
vehicle. Garding then walked to the gas station. Trooper Bredsten did not ask Garding
additional questions or stop or follow Garding to the gas station.
4
Trooper Bredsten approached the front driver’s side of the vehicle and spoke to the
passenger through a partially open window. Trooper Bredsten asked the passenger how
she was doing and if everything was all right. The passenger replied that she was “good.”
Trooper Bredsten asked the passenger who she was riding with, and she replied that she
was with her boyfriend. She also told Trooper Bredsten that they were traveling from the
Twin Cities.
Trooper Bredsten observed that the passenger appeared to have scabbed marks on
her face, bruising on her arms and legs, and poor dental hygiene. Trooper Bredsten testified
that, in his experience, physical characteristics such as these are consistent with signs of
“prolonged” drug use. Trooper Bredsten expressed concern about the marks on her face,
and the passenger attributed her appearance to poison ivy. He asked her if she used drugs,
and she stated that she did not. Trooper Bredsten asked if she had used drugs recently
because, in his experience, her marks were not consistent with poison ivy. She explained
that she had scratched as a kid.
Trooper Bredsten asked the passenger to identify the driver several times, and the
passenger eventually identified the driver as Garding. Trooper Bredsten further questioned
the passenger and in response she stated that she had a purse but no identification. Trooper
Bredsten asked if she had any outstanding warrants, and she replied that she thought she
did.
5
Trooper Bredsten observed the interior of the vehicle. He saw a radar detector, loose
paneling around the radio, and three radio heads in the backseat. 1 Trooper Bredsten also
observed in the backseat a white plastic bag similar to a grocery or convenience store bag
that was “tied up and rolled over.” He observed that “the way that the contents of the bag
were pushing out, it looked rocky,” as if “there were numerous rocks on the inside.” He
testified that in his experience, a large amount of a controlled substance like
methamphetamine can “break[] up like rocks” and “look like rocks from the outside within
[a] bag.” But when specifically asked if the substance in the bag that he observed in the
vehicle “appear[ed] to be consistent with controlled substances,” he answered only that “it
looked rocky” and “like there were numerous rocks on the inside.”
Approximately 13 minutes after Trooper Bredsten approached the vehicle, he went
into the gas station to look for Garding. Gas station employees stated that Garding had
watched through the window and then left through the doors on the opposite side of the
store from where the vehicle was parked and headed toward the wood line. Trooper
Bredsten testified that there is “no highwa y or really any houses or anything beyond [the
wood line].”
Trooper Bredsten returned to the vehicle to conduct a drug-dog sniff. As Trooper
Bredsten prepared to conduct the drug -dog sniff, he learned that Garding also had an
outstanding arrest warrant. Trooper Bredsten led the drug dog around the exterior of the

1 Trooper Bredsten testified that a “radio head” is the portion of a radio that is visible from
the dash, and has equipment such as a CD player and controls to change the volume and
radio stations.
6
vehicle, and the dog alerted on the partially open front driver’s-side window. Trooper
Bredsten searched the interior of the vehicle and found controlled substances in the
backseat. Police eventually found Garding and arrested him.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Garding with one count of first-degree sale
of a controlled substance and one count of first-degree possession of a controlled substance
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subds . 1(4), 2(a)(1) (2020). Garding moved to
suppress the evidence against him, and the district court denied his motion. Garding
waived a jury trial and proceeded with a stipulated-evidence trial under the procedures
described in Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Gar ding agreed that the issues preserved
for appeal were “the constitutional issues argued at the contested omnibus hearing.”
(Emphasis omitted.) The district court found Garding guilty of first- degree possession of
a controlled substance, entered judgment of conviction for that offense, and sentenced him
to 105 months’ imprisonment.
Garding appeals.
DECISION
Garding argues that the evidence discovered as a result of the drug-dog sniff of the
vehicle should be suppressed because Trooper Bredsten did not have reasonable,
articulable suspicion based on objective facts to infer that drugs may be present in the
vehicle. We agree.2

2 Garding also argues that Trooper Bredsten unlawfully seized him when Trooper Bredsten
seized the passenger, and therefore, the evidence discovered in his vehicle should be
suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure. Evidence obtained through an illegal seizure
must be suppressed. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999). “[E]vidence
7
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “We may independently review facts that are not in
dispute, and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Searches and
seizures conducted without warrants are presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Lugo, 887
N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016).
Specific constitutional requirements accompany the use of a drug dog. The supreme
court has determined that the level of suspicion necessary to conduct a drug-dog sniff is
reasonable suspicion. State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 134-35 (Minn. 2002).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts that allow the officer to
be able to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting [a] person of criminal activity.” State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842-

discovered by exploiting previous illegal conduct” is inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous
tree.” State v. Olson, 634 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. App. 2001) (quoting Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 11, 2001). But the
evidence may be admissible if it was obtained “by means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint.” Id. (quotation omitted). Assuming without deciding that
Garding was unlawfully seized, the record shows that Trooper Bredsten did not discover
contraband by exploiting Garding’s seizure. Instead, the contraband was discovered as a
result of the drug-dog sniff of the vehicle, which was not based on circumstances derived
from Garding’s seizure. Thus, the discovery of contraband was not the fruit of an illegal
seizure, and we do not address Garding’s seizure argument.
8
43 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 486 (reviewing
lawfulness of a drug-dog sniff and stating that reasonable suspicion is “a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity” (quotation
omitted)).
Further, the supreme court has held that to conduct a drug-dog sniff of the exterior
of a motor vehicle, police must have “a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related
criminal activity. ” Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137 (emphasis added). Such suspicion
necessarily requires some objective, articulable basis suggesting that drugs presently may
be in the place to be searched, and law enforcement must be “able to articulate reasonable
grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek” to search. State v.
Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 212 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted).
This requirement is evident from the supreme court’s emphasis that in order to
conduct a drug- dog sniff of a particular place, law enforcement must have a reasonable,
articulable basis to suspect that the place to be searched contains drug-related contraband.
In Wiegand, the supreme court “construe[d] the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution” as “limit[ing] the
scope of a Terry investigation to that which occasioned the stop” and “to the investigation
of only those additional offenses for which the officer develops a reasonable, articulable
suspicion within the time necessary to resolve the originally -suspected offense.” 645
N.W.2d at 136 (referencing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The supreme court
concluded that the officer had not developed the requisite reasonable, articulable suspicion
of drug-related criminal activity to expand the investigation to conduct a drug-dog sniff.
9
Id. at 137. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court explained that the officer “did
not conclude at the point that he determined to retrieve his dog that the driver was under
the influence of anything” and the officer “indicated no reason to suspect drug-related
activity.” Id. at 137. The supreme court “stress[ed] that the officer testified he did not
suspect appellants were under the influence of anything, nor did he have any indication
that they were transporting drugs.” Id. at 136. Similarly, in State v. Burbach, the supreme
court concluded that nervous behavior, an unsubstantiated tip, and speeding, without signs
that the driver was currently impaired, did not establish reasonable, articulable suspicion
of drug possession sufficient to allow the officer to expand the traffic stop by requesting to
search the vehicle. 706 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (Minn. 2005). This authority is consistent
with the bedrock principle set forth in Terry, namely that the “scope of the search must be
strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (quotation omitted); see also Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
In evaluating reasonable, articulable suspicion, we are “deferential to police officer
training and experience,” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Minn. 2000), and a “trained
police officer is entitled to draw inferences and deductions ‘that might well elude an
untrained person,’” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 487 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981)). But the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion is an objective inquiry
even when we evaluate reasonableness in light of an officer’s training and experience. See
Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 88 (“[W]e examine whether the [officer’s] suspicion was
objectively reasonable.”); cf. State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Minn. 2011) (stating
10
that in determining whether there was probable cause, “the reasonableness of the officer’s
actions is an objective inquiry, even if reasonableness is evaluated in light of an officer’s
training and experience” (quotation omitted)). Thus, “reasonable suspicion requires
something more than an unarticulated hunch ” and “the officer must be able to point to
something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted). Significantly, the justification for the
suspicion generally cannot solely be based on conduct consistent with the “activities of any
multitude of innocent persons.” Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 100-01; see United States v.
O’Neal, 17 F.3d 239, 242 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[C]onduct typical of a broad category of
innocent people provides a weak basis for suspicion.” (quotation omitted)).
“An assessment of reasonable suspicion must be based on the totality of the
circumstances.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 486-87 (quotation omitted). But we may consider
the strength of the suspicion based on the facts independently before ultimately considering
them in their totality. See id. at 487-88 (considering the relevance and significance of the
objective facts independently before considering them in their totality); Burbach, 706
N.W.2d at 489-91 (concluding that police did not have reasonable suspicion of drug
possession justifying a search of appellant’s vehicle and stating that “[e]ach of these factors
is weak evidence of drug possession, and they are also weak in the aggregate”); cf. State v.
Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 253 (Minn. 2007) (noting that “while the officers had their
suspicions, the strength of their suspicions was not great”).
Accordingly, in conducting a drug-dog sniff, reasonable, articulable suspicion of
drug-related criminal activity requires that the objective facts establish a reasonable basis
11
to infer that drugs may be present in the place that law enforcement seeks to search. We
do not suggest that any one particular fact is necessary to satisfy this requirement. But in
evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the objective, articulated facts must constitute
reasonable grounds to infer that drugs may be present in the place that police seek to search
before conducting a drug-dog sniff. Evidence that is merely consistent with a generalized
suspicion of possible criminal activity is not the reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-
related criminal activity required to conduct a drug-dog sniff. See Carter, 697 N.W.2d at
212 (addressing drug-dog sniff of storage locker).
Applying these principles, we consider whether the drug-dog sniff was justified by
reasonable, articulable suspicion of present, drug-related criminal activity. The state
asserts that the totality of the following circumstances suggest that the vehicle may have
contained drugs: (1) the vehicle was registered to a third-party owner; (2) after Trooper
Bredsten drove by the vehicle, Garding exited and began to clean the vehicle; (3) the
passenger went into the gas station without a purse or wallet and returned without
appearing to have purchased anything; (4) when Trooper Bredsten approached the vehicle
on foot, Garding put a bag of trash in the trunk and walked into the gas station; (5) Garding
and the passenger had traveled from the Twin Cities; (6) both Garding and the passenger
had outstanding arrest warrants; (7) Garding had left the gas station and headed in the
direction of the woods; (8) the passenger’s physical appearance; (9) the passenger’s
differing explanations for her scabbed marks; (10) the bag with a rocky appearance in the
back seat; and (11) the loose paneling in the car radio area. At oral argument, the state
acknowledged that none of these circumstances, on their own, establish the necessary
12
reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the drug-dog sniff. We agree, and also
conclude that these circumstances in their totality, altho ugh generally suspicious, do not
give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion that illegal drugs were then in the vehicle—a
necessary requirement to conduct a drug-dog sniff.
To the extent that some of these circumstances are “consistent with the activities of
any multitude of innocent persons” or merely consistent with a general aura of potential or
general criminality, they are insufficient to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
present, drug-related criminal activity. See Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 95, 100-01 (concluding
that police did not have reasonable suspicion of drug possession where an officer testified
he observed conduct that, in his training, was consistent with drug-courier “counter
surveillance activities,” but the activities “could be consistent with the activities of any
multitude of innocent persons” and the police “did not provide any facts sufficient to
distinguish [appellant] from innocent passengers in the depot”); Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at
128, 136-37 (concluding officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related
criminal activity to justify drug-dog sniff, despite testimony that appellant was “evasive,
nervous and had glossy eyes,” because officer did not conclude that defendant was under
the influence of any drugs or indicate a reason to suspect drug-related activity); State v.
Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that officer did not have reasonable,
articulable suspicion supporting investigation for presence of narcotics when stop was in a
“‘high drug’ area,” but “the officer never said he suspected any crime other than the traffic
violations” and the purpose of the stop was to process the traffic violations).
13
We give little weight to the fact that it appeared to Trooper Bredsten that the vehicle
was registered to someone other than Garding. Trooper Bredsten testified that in his
experience, “a person involved in criminal behavior, criminal activity” will drive a third-
party vehicle, which he also described as “evasive” conduct. Even c onstruing this fact as
indicative of a possibility of general criminal activity, there is no evidence in the record
that this fact could form an objective basis to infer that illegal drugs were currently in the
vehicle. See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 845 (“Even if [in the officer’s experience] mismatched
plates supported a reasonable suspicion that the truck was stolen or that the owner was
attempting to evade automobile registration fees, a search for drugs was not reasonably
related to those justifications.”).
Regarding Trooper Bredsten’s observations of Garding cleaning the car, Trooper
Bredsten testified that, after he drove by, Garding “immediately” got out of the vehicle and
started to clean. Trooper Bredsten testified that, in his experience, this is a “delaying or
stalling” tactic. But this behavior does not reasonably suggest drug-related criminal
activity or that drugs may be present in the place Trooper Bredsten sought to search. See
Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 212; State v. Benavides , No. A16-1677, 2017 WL 1375339, at *2-
6 (Minn. App. Apr. 17, 2017) (concluding that law enforcement did not have reasonable,
articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in drug-related criminal activity to justify
a drug-dog sniff where the district court did not find that defendant was driving deliberately
evasively or was unreasonably nervous, officer testified that in his experience defendant
knowing a friend only by a nickname indicated a “drug related” relationship, and officer
knew defendant had previously been involved in drug-related activity), rev. denied (Minn.
14
June 28, 2017). 3 Trooper Bredsten did not testify that, in his experience, delaying or
stalling is indicative of drug-related criminal activity. 4 Rather, he testified only to his
perception that such behavior, along with the “third-party vehicle,” was a “possible evasive
indicator.” And Trooper Bredsten affirmatively testified that he did not observe that the
vehicle cleaning involved criminal drug-related items, instead conceding that he did not
see any drug paraphernalia in the trash and that he was “confident” that the bag Garding
placed in the trunk was, in fact, garbage.
We give little to no weight to the fact that the passenger entered and exited the gas
station without a purse and without making a purchase because this behavior is entirely
consistent with use of a restroom inside a gas station. T he record provides no objective
basis to infer otherwise. Trooper Bredsten did not testify about any inference or suspicion
of present, drug-related criminal activity based on his trai ning or experience regarding
these actions by the passenger.

3 We cite n onprecedential opinion s for their persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

4 We note that there is no evidence that Garding saw or made eye contact with Trooper
Bredsten or was otherwise “delaying or stalling” because of Trooper Bredsten’s presence
before Trooper Bredsten approached. Cf. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825, 827
(Minn. 1989) (concluding trooper had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle
when defendant made eye contact with the trooper and engaged in “evasive” driving by
immediately turning off the highway and returning within a minute). Even so, we note that
the district court did not make a finding that Garding attempted to delay or stall anything,
and the video recording of this interaction objectively shows that Garding was not delaying
or stalling. Garding was cleaning his car and continued to do so after Trooper Bredsten
approached. Garding also directly answered all of Trooper Bredsten’s questions.
15
That Garding walked away from Trooper Bredsten is likewise innocuous. Trooper
Bredsten testified that when he approached Garding at the vehicle, Garding “walk[ed]
back” while responding to Trooper Bredsten’s questions and ultimately walked into the gas
station. Trooper Bredsten testified that Garding “back[ing] away” indicated “an
evasiveness to my presence” and that “he didn’t want to be talking to me.” But Garding’s
choice to back away and walk into the gas station after responding to all of Trooper
Bredsten’s questions or Garding’s desire not to further interact with law enforcement are
not objectively reasonable bases to suspect that Garding or his vehicle were involved with
present, drug-related criminal activity. See State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 279-80
(Minn. App. 2003) (recognizing an individual has the right not to speak with police and
concluding that police did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-re lated
criminal activity in part where defendant did not respond to police speaking to him), rev.
denied (Minn. July 15, 2003). Even if Trooper Bredsten considered this behavior to be
generally suspicious, we have stated that an individual “act[ing] in a manner that implied
that he did not want to interact with the officers supports nothing more than a hunch, a
mere whim, or a guess that [he] had violated or was about to violate some law.” State v.
Davis, 910 N.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Minn. App. 2018) (considering as a factor for reasonable,
articulable suspicion that defendant had looked away from the officers and started to walk
away quickly); see also State v. Schrupp, 625 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating
that an officer’s conclusion that a driver “might be trying to avoid [them],” based on facts
that the vehicle was being driven by someone other than the registered owner, in different
city from where the car was registered, and that the driver quickly pulled into and out of a
16
driveway, without an inference of possible criminal activity, did not constitute reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity), rev. denied (Minn. July 24, 2001).
That Garding and the passenger were traveling from the Twin Cities area is also
weak evidence only of a general possibility of criminal activity. Although Trooper
Bredsten testified that the Twin Cities is an area of origin for “weapons” and “drug
trafficking,” it is also true that the Twin Cities is the most populated area of Minnesota,
where many people travel without engaging in criminal behavior of any kind. This fact
alone is not strong evidence of general criminal activity, let alone present, drug-related
criminal activity. See City of St. Paul v. Uber, 450 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. App. 1990)
(“It may be true that Summit-University has a higher incidence of prostitution than
Moundsview, but simply being on a public street in an area where one ‘ might’ find a
prostitute or drug dealer does not, without more, meet any constitutional standard for a stop
by the authorities.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1990).
And although both the passenger and Garding had an outstanding arrest warrant,
there was no evidence before the district court as to the basis for those warrants, and
therefore no objective basis to suspect present, drug-related criminal activity based on the
warrants. Cf. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137 (requiring reasonable, articulable suspicion of
“drug-related criminal activity” to justify a drug-dog sniff). The outstanding arrest warrant
is also consistent with Trooper Bredsten’s testimony that by Garding leaving the gas station
and going into the woods, it “looked like he was trying to hide from the situation and run
away from the vehicle.” While Garding’s behavior is undoubtedly suspicious, the officer’s
17
inference that Garding desired to “run away from the vehicle” does not reasonably support
suspicion that the vehicle was presently involved in drug-related criminal activity.
Next, w e consider the passenger’s appearance and her explanation of her
appearance. Trooper Bredsten testified that the passenger had scabbed marks on her face,
bruising on her arms and legs, and poor dental hygiene. Trooper Bredsten testified about
his training and experience in identifying indicators of prolonged drug use, including tooth
decay and scabbed marks from picking. But he also testified as to his experience in
identifying signs of recent drug use, such as dilated pupils, restlessness, rigid movement,
rapid talking, inability to focus, and increased perspiration. Notably, Trooper Bredsten did
not testify to any observation of the passenger consistent with recent drug use. Rather, he
testified that her appearance was consistent with signs of “prolonged drug use” and that the
marks on her face looked like they were “relatively recent” but “scabbed.” These facts are
not consistent with the degree of observations of recent drug use that we have typically
found to be sufficient to support a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal
activity. Compare Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 137 (holding that officer did not have
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity justifying a dog sniff
when officer testified that appellant was evasive, nervous, and had glossy eyes, but that he
did not conclude “that [appellant] was under the influence of anything” and “indicated no
reason to suspect drug-related activity”), and Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 490-91 (invalidating
expansion of traffic stop for speeding to i nclude drug-dog sniff and search of vehicle for
controlled substances when evidence of additional criminal activity was driver’s nervous
behavior, uncorroborated tip, and driving behavior, and driver exhibited no signs of
18
impairment), with State v. Cox, 807 N.W.2d 447, 449, 452 (Minn. App. 2011) (upholding
expansion of stop for traffic violation to investigate whether defendant was driving under
the influence when defendant demonstrated signs of intoxication and officer detected odor
of alcohol), and State v. Folkert, No. A12-0854, 2013 WL 499764, at *1, *5 (Minn. App.
Feb. 11, 2013) (concluding that police had reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related
criminal activity justifying a dog sniff when, in part, police observed signs of possible drug
use based on appellant’s “fresh puncture wound in the crook of his arm,” constricted pupils,
droopy eyelids, shaking abdomen, sweat on nose, and the driver’s “bleeding scratches on
her legs” consistent with methamphetamine use).
We agree with the state that the passenger’s changing explanation for her
appearance may indicate an evasiveness about past drug use, but her responses do not
support an inference of current drug use that provided Trooper Bredsten with an objective
basis to form a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle presently contained drugs.
Cf. Carter , 697 N.W.2d at 203, 212 (concluding that appellant’s drug-related criminal
history, police’s knowledge of appellant’s brother’s drug-related convictions, and appellant
and his brother’s frequent visits to their storage units were not enough to give police
reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to conduct a warrantless drug-dog
sniff of the storage units); Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843-45 (concluding that an officer’s
assertion that they had probable cause to arrest a passenger in the defendant’s vehicle for
previous drug sales was not enough to give reasonable suspicion that the defendant
possessed drugs at the time).
19
Likewise, the observation of a bag with a “rocky” appearance in the back seat of the
vehicle did not provide Trooper Bredsten with an objectively reasonable basis to infer that
illegal drugs were in the vehicle. When asked directly, with a leading question, whether
he observed that the bag appeared to contain controlled substances , Trooper Bredsten did
not answer in the affirmative and instead stated that the bag looked like it contained
numerous rocks. Trooper Bredsten testified to his observations of the bag:
PROSECUTOR: What did you notice from your vantage point
outside of the vehicle about the contents of the bag?

TROOPER BREDSTEN: It appeared kind of rocky, but I
couldn’t make out whatever was on the inside of it.

PROSECUTOR: When you use the term “rocky,” what do you
mean?

TROOPER BREDSTEN: Like rocks, like the consistency of
it.

PROSECUTOR: Like controlled substance rocks?

TROOPER BREDSTEN: Well, like, yeah, I mean, like, rocks,
or, like, you know, it could be— when you see meth, when it’s
in a large amount, it breaks up like rocks and it’ll look like
rocks from the outside within the bag.

PROSECUTOR: From your vantage point, what was in the
bag, did it appear to be consistent with controlled substances?

TROOPER BREDSTEN: The shape, the way that the contents
of the bag were pushing out, it looked rocky. It looked like
there were numerous rocks on the inside.

In light of this testimony, the district court’s finding that Trooper Bredsten, “[f]rom his
training and experience,” “believed [the rocky shape] could be a large amount of controlled
substances” is clearly erroneous. See Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 502. The only objective
20
evidence in the record as to the condition of the bag is Trooper Bredsten’s testimony. That
testimony establishes that Trooper Bredsten observed a bag that appeared to contain
numerous rocks. There is no testimony or other objective evidence in the record that the
bag Trooper Bredsten observed appeared to contain illegal drugs or appeared consistent
with controlled substances. Indeed, Trooper Bredsten’s own testimony precludes such an
inference because when asked if the rocky bag “appear[ed] to be consistent with controlled
substances,” Trooper Bredsten did not answer affirmatively and instead consistently
described the appearance of the bag only as “rocky.”
Trooper Bredsten offered no testimony that he reasonably inferred, based on his
training and experience, that the rocky appearance of th is bag was consistent with
controlled substances or present, drug-related criminal activity. Instead, Trooper Bredsten
agreed that he was not “certain as to what was in that bag.” Ultimately, we must determine
whether the trooper’s suspicion was “reasonably inferable from what he did see.” Berge
v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 374 N.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Minn. 1985). Because there was no
evidence before the district court that the appearance of the bag that Trooper Bredsten saw
was consistent with controlled substances, and Trooper Bredsten described the bag only as
“rocky,” we conclude that the facts in this record do not objectively support a reasonable
inference that drugs were presently in the vehicle.
Finally, we are not persuaded that Trooper Bredsten’s observation of loose paneling
around the radio formed an objectively reasonable basis to infer that the vehicle contained
drugs. Trooper Bredsten testified generally that he has, in the past, “found some quantities
of meth and paraphernalia and other drugs that have been stashed behind a radio.” While
21
“[w]e are deferential to police officer training and experience and recognize that a trained
officer can properly act on suspicion that would elude an untrained eye,” we must “examine
whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable.” Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 88-89. This
may include consideration of whether the record indicates that law enforcement made “an
assessment based on training or experience that this particular” circumstance supported
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 89.
Here, Trooper Bredsten only provided a general description of the paneling as
“loose.” But he did not testify that, in his experience, the existence of “loose” paneling
was indicative of the presence of illegal drugs, and he did not testify to any objective fact
to indicate that the particular condition of the paneling in this vehicle would afford him a
reasonable basis to infer that drugs might be presently stored in the vehicle. See id. at 86,
88-89 (concluding that police did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to
justify a stop where officer had testified that in his experience a broken window is an
indication a vehicle may have been stolen, or was involved in a theft, and he had been
involved in recovering 10 to 20 stolen cars with broken windows, but the record did not
indicate that there was an assessment of whether “this particular broken window indicated
that the vehicle was stolen”). Trooper Bredsten did not observe or identify any other facts
about the condition of the vehicle that suggested current drug use or drug trafficking, either
objectively or based on his training and experience. See Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 479-80, 487
(agreeing with the district court’s determination that the lived-in appearance of the vehicle
and removal of the center console molding with “‘plastic pieces’” appearing “‘messed
with’” were not indicative of drug-related activity where the record did not include
22
“‘visible signs’” in the vehicle “of drug use or drug trafficking”). Trooper Bredsten also
observed radio heads in the back seat of the vehicle that he agreed were the type of
equipment that could be used to replace a stereo, which would provide an innocent
explanation for the loose paneling around the radio. See Britton , 604 N.W.2d at 88
(considering whether the record contained an indication as to why officer’s experience
supported that a particular observation indicated current criminal activity when there were
also innocent explanations for the observation). Thus, the condition of the paneling around
the radio does not provide reasonable support to infer present, drug-related criminal
activity. See Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 479, 487 (stating that on the record before the supreme
court, “the removal of the vehicle’s center console [was] not indicative of drug- related
activity” justifying a drug-dog sniff despite officer observations that “the vehicle’s center
console molding had been removed” and “‘messed with,’” and that was an “‘indicator[] of
illegal drug trafficking’”).
5

5 To the extent that Lugo ultimately concluded that the officer had reasonable, articulable
suspicion of present, drug-related criminal activity to justify a drug-dog sniff, we note that
unlike here, the totality of the circumstances in Lugo included significant additional
circumstances supporting a reasonable inference that the vehicle presently contained drugs
or was presently being used for drug trafficking. See 887 N.W.2d at 487 (concluding the
officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a drug- dog sniff based on
appellant’s presence at house “known to be connected with controlled substances and that
was under active surveillance,” appellant taking an unusually long time to stop his vehicle
and furtive movements as if trying to hide something after he stopped, officer’s awareness
of appellant’s recent arrest for drug possession, appellant lying about the identity of the car
owner and the actual owner having “previously been arrested for a drug crime and drug
paraphernalia [having] been found in that vehicle,” and appellant stating “‘man just take
me to jail, please’”).
23
We emphasize that this is a close case. Generally, to show reasonable, articulable
suspicion in cases like these, the officer sets forth the factual predicate for an intrusion and
may describe the inferences drawn from those facts based upon their training and
experience. Our review of the record then generally involves deference to the officer’s
training and experience and an evaluation of the record to determine whether the officer’s
inferences and suspicions are reasonably drawn from the objective facts. See Britton, 604
N.W.2d at 86, 88 (accepting th e officer’s suspicion based on his experience as true and
stating we must still “examine whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable”); Lugo,
887 N.W.2d at 479-80, 487 (concluding appearance of vehicle’s interior was not indicative
of drug-related activity despite officer’s testimony that, in his experience, the fact that the
center-console molding had been removed and plastic pieces had been “‘messed with’”
was indicative of drug trafficking because the record did not include “visible signs” of drug
use or drug trafficking in the vehicle and lacked testimony about why a vehicle’s messy
interior was indicative of drug trafficking). While an officer is entitled to draw inferences
that might be reasonably based on the officer’s training and experience, Lugo, 887 N.W.2d
at 487, the “ultimate determinative issue” of our review is whether the officer’s suspicion
“was reasonably inferable from what he did see,” Berge, 374 N.W.2d at 733. See Britton,
604 N.W.2d at 89 (concluding a stop to investigate a stolen vehicle, justified by a broken
window, was not supported by reasonable suspicion where the record did not show “an
assessment based on training or experience that this particular broken window indicated
that the vehicle was stolen,” and the record did not otherwise objectively support
reasonable suspicion).
24
It could be that a different record with facts similar to those in this case may give
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of present, drug-related criminal activity. But
our review of this specific record and the circumstances in this case demonstrates that each
identified fact is independently weak and does little to substantiate an objective ly
reasonable basis to infer that illegal drugs were in the vehicle. The circumstances are also
insufficient in their totality to constitute reasonable, articulable suspicion of present, drug-
related criminal activity. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 490. While some facts may be
consistent with Trooper Bredsten’s experience generally with drug users or traffickers,
these facts, without more, do not form an objective basis to reasonably suspect that drugs
were currently in the vehicle. See Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136 (“We stress that the officer
testified he did not suspect appellants were under the influence of anything, nor did he have
any indication that they were transporting drugs.”). And the remaining circumstances,
though potentially indicative of some general criminal activity, do not provide an
objectively reasonable basis to infer that the vehicle presently contained drugs. See Lugo,
887 N.W.2d at 487 (declining to consider in the totality of the circumstances facts that
“were not indicative of drug-related activity” when reviewing reasonable suspicion for a
drug-dog sniff). Any suggestion that indicia of general criminality is sufficient to support
a drug-dog sniff is the equivalent of authorizing a drug-dog sniff based on an officer’s
hunch. Such a search is plainly illegal. Davis, 732 N.W.2d at 182 (stating that reasonable
suspicion “requires something more than an unarticulated hunch” (quotation omitted)).
We therefore conclude that Trooper Bredsten lacked the required reasonable,
articulable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity to justify the drug-dog sniff of the
25
exterior of the vehicle because the record lacks an objective basis from which an officer
could reasonably infer that drugs may be present in the place he sought to search.6
Reversed.

6 Garding also argues that the drug dog’s positive alert did not provide probable cause to
search the interior of the vehicle because the drug dog could alert to marijuana and
possession of marijuana is no longer illegal in all circumstances. In light of our disposition,
we do not reach this issue.