Ahmad Daniel, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1457

Ahmad Daniel,
Relator,

vs.

Honeywell International, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 12, 2023
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 48742828-3

Ahmad Daniel, Minneapolis, Minnesota ( self-represented relator)

Honeywell International, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips , Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Reilly , Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Relator challenges the determination by an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he
is ineligible for unemployment benefits because his refusal to abide by his employer’s
COVID- 19 testing policy constituted disqualifying employment misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
Self-represented relator Ahmad Daniel worked at Honeywell International Inc. from
September 2019 to April 2022. In April 2021, Honeywell implemented a COVID -19
vaccination policy. Relator submitted a request for a religious exemption/accommodation.
Honeywell granted the request and allowed relator to retain his employment without
vaccination “provided [he] strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the
accommodation requirements.” The terms and conditions included nasal or mouth- swab
testing that involved uploading weekly COVID -19 test results to a Honeywell application.
The accommodation stated, “Failure to comply with the test submission mandates for three
consecutive weeks, or five weeks in total, will result in your termination of employment
without severance.”
During March and April of 2022, relator failed to submit any COVID- 19 test results
as required by his accommodation under Honeywell’s policy. Honeywell initially placed
him on unpaid suspension and later discharged him for violating the policy . On April 8,
2022, Honeywell discharged relator for violating its policy.
Relator applied for unemployment benefits with respondent Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) . DEED determined that he was

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ineligible because Honeywel l discharged him for employment misconduct. Relator
appealed the determination and requested a hearing before a ULJ. The ULJ held the
hearing by telephone in June 2022, and only relator testified.
Relator testified that he is Christian, that his religion is “the bible,” that he believes
his “body is the temple of God,” and that he adheres to certain dietary restrictions. Relator
avoids medical treatment and believes that modern physicians are “physicians of no value”
and “have yet to cure anything.” He also believes the law protects him from needing to
test for COVID- 19.
Following the hearing, the ULJ found that relator “feels he should have free choice
to decide whether to take a medical test,” that relator’s testimony was not credible, and that
his refusal to test for COVID -19 was not based on sincerely held religious beliefs . T he
ULJ determined that relator committed employment misconduct by failing to comply with
Honeywell’s reasonable COVID- 19 policy and that he was therefore ineligible for benefits.
Relator requested reconsideration , and the ULJ affirmed . Relator appeals by writ of
certiorari.
DECISION
Relator claims that the ULJ erred by determining that Honeywell discharged him
for employment misconduct, arguing that Honeywell’s COVID- 19 policy requiring him to
get and submit weekly COVID- 19 tests pursuant to his religious exemption from receiving
the COVID- 19 vaccine amounted to “unlawful stipulations” and “required [him] to defy
[his] religious faith.”

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“Whether an employee committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of
fact and law.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006).
“[W]hether the act committed by the employee constitutes employment misconduct is a
question of law, which we review de novo.” Id. But “[w]e view the ULJ’s factual findings
in the light most favorable to the decision” and defer to the ULJ’s credibility
determinations. Id. “[T]his court will not disturb the ULJ’s factual findings when the
evidence substantially sustains them.” Peterson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc ., 753 N.W.2d 771,
774 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 1, 2008).
A person discharged for employment misconduct is ineligible for unemployment
benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2022). “Employment misconduct means any
intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious
violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of
the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2022). “[A]n employee’s decision to violate knowingly a
reasonable policy of the employer is misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644
N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 2002). Generally, “if the request of the employer is reasonable
and does not impose an unreasonable burden on the employee, the employee’s refusal to
abide by the request constitutes misconduct.” Vargas v. N w. Area Found., 673 N.W.2d
200, 206 (Minn. App. 2004) , rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004) . Reasonableness varies
by the circumstances of the case. Sandstrom v. Douglas Mach. Corp., 372 N.W.2d 89, 91
(Minn. App. 1985). But even when the definition of misconduct is satisfied, a decision
denying unemployment benefits may be subject to reversal if it violates constitutional
rights. Minn. S tat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(1) (2022). Unemployment benefits may not be

5
constitutionally denied when an employee’s conduct was based on their sincerely held
religious belief. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).
I. Relator committed employee misconduct by violating Honeywell’s reasonable
COVID-19 policy.

Relator appears to assert that Honeywell’s COVID -19 accommodation policy
requiring submissions of weekly COVID- 19 test results amounted to “unlawful
stipulations” and that he has “legal rights” that protect him from that policy.1 We disagree.
Relator received an exemption from Honeywell’s COVID -19 vaccination policy so
he could continue employment without the vaccine, with certain requirements, including
submissions of weekly test results. The ULJ determined that “Honeywell has the right to
reasonably expect that unvaccinated employees will undergo [and submit] weekly COVID-
19 tests to protect the safety of its workforce.” Relator does not dispute that he failed to
adhere to this policy because he did not test for COVID -19.
Relator does not cite to any caselaw for the proposition that it is unlawful or
unreasonable for an employer to require an employee who is exempt from a COVID- 19
vaccination policy to test for COVID- 19, and we are unaware of any such caselaw .2

1 Relator also asserts several grievances against Honeywell human-resources employees
for their approach to unpaid leave, management of “disciplinary action,” “willful deceit”
including document forging, and overall “target[ing]” behavior towards him. These
arguments are irrelevant to the unemployment -benefits determination at i ssue in this
appeal, so we do not address them . See Minn. Stat. § 268.105 (2022) (requiring this court
to review the ULJ’s eligibility decision); see also Eley v. Southshore Invs ., Inc., 845
N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn. App. 2014) (relying on Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582
(Minn. 1988) and declining to address issues not considered by ULJ ).
2 To the extent that relator argued to the ULJ that (1) the Nuremberg Code , established by
the United States Military Tribunal, “as a standard against which to judge German
scientists who experimented with human subjects,” United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669,

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Moreover, in a nonprecedential opinion, this court concluded that a company policy
requiring a front -desk employee to be vaccinated against COVID -19 was “reasonable
under the circumstances” in part because the employer “mandated the vaccine[] for health
and safety reasons.” Costello v. Fond du Lac Rsrv., No. A22- 0218, 2022 WL 3348567,
*2-3 (Minn. App. Aug. 15, 2022). 3 Moreover, in Sun v. Pepperl & Fuchs, Inc., we
concluded that a COVID- 19 policy was rea sonable and stated, “The employer policy in
this case is more lenient than the policy in Costello because Sun had the option of
complying with the policy in either of two ways: getting vaccinated or getting tested and
wearing a mask.” No. A22- 0472, 2022 WL 17748244, at *1 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2022).
While Costello and Sun are nonprecedential case s with no binding authority, both have
persuasive value. Minn. R. Civ. App. 136.01, subd. 1(c) ; see also City of St. Paul v.
Eldredge, 788 N.W.2d 522, 526- 27 (Minn. App. 2010) (noting that nonprecedential
opinions of court of appeals are not binding authority but may have persuasive value), aff’d,

687 (1987) (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part), protects him from
COVID- 19 testing; (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from
“invasive inquiries” about employee medical status ; and (3) Minn. Stat. § 181.974 (2022),
incorporating the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GIN A), prohibits COVID -
19 diagnostic testing, he did not develop these arguments with citations to law in his brief
to this court. Because prejudicial error is not obvious on mere inspection, these arguments
are forfeited. State v. Mod. Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997).
3 Similarly, in Larson v. Minn. State Coll. Se -Winona, No. A22- 0689, 2023 WL 193984,
at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 17, 2023), the ULJ considered a policy requiring employees to either
get vaccinated or test weekly for COVID -19. Larson objected to both requirements,
asserting religious grounds and seeking accommodations. Id. This court concluded that
the company’s COVID-19 policy was reasonable. Id. In Potter v. St. Joseph’s Med. Ctr. ,
we concluded that a policy “requiring a ll staff not otherwise exempted, to receive the
influenza vaccine” was reasonable based on the company’s aspiration “to have zero
preventable harm for patients and staff” in a healthcare setting. No. A18-0736, 2018 WL
6729836, at *2, *4-5 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2018) (quotation omitted).

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800 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 2011). The employer policy in this case is more lenient than the
policy in Costello and similar to the policy in Sun because relator had the option of
complying with the policy by getting vaccinated or submitting test results.
Finally, submitting COVID -19 test results constituted a minimal burden for relator .
It required him to take a test approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and “be
observed by an authorized telehealth proctor, site designee (if applicable) or other
Company approved individual.” Relator t hen needed to upload the test results to a
company application, which treated COVID- 19 test results as “confidential medical
records.”
Appellant committed employment misconduct by failing to follow Honeywell’s
reasonable COVID- 19 policy.
II. The ULJ did not clearly err by finding that relator’s proffered reasons for
refusing to comply with the COVID -19 testing policy were not based on
sincerely held religious beliefs.

Relator next argues that the ULJ erred by finding that his refusal to test for COVID -
19 was not based on a sincere religious belief. We are not persuaded.
Relator a sserts that Honeywell’s COVID- 19 policy requiring that he get weekly
COVID- 19 tests and submit the results “required [him] to defy [his] religious faith.” He
asserts that he was upholding his religious fa ith “by practicing [his] God given right of
‘control over [his] medical’ by not subjecting Jesus Christ’s temple to forcefully coerced
medical treatments such as weekly PCR and/or rapid antigen test requirements.”
A decision denying unemployment benefits infringes on an applicant’s free-exercise
rights under the First Amendment if it forces the employee to choose between their

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sincerely held religious beliefs and their employment. See Frazee, 489 U.S. at 832; see
also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). Such an
infringement can only be sustained upon demonstration that it is the least restrictive means
to meet a compelling government interest. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. “Only beliefs rooted
in re ligion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, ” and the Supreme Court has
recognized the “difficulty of distinguishing between religious and secular convictions and
in determining whether a professed belief is sincerely held.” Frazee , 489 U.S. at 833
(alteration omitted) (quotation omitted).
Although conduct based on an employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs is
constitutionally protected and cannot be the basis for a denial of unemployment benefits,
this protection does not apply if the conduct is based on secular views instead of religious
beliefs. Id. Whether employment misconduct is based on sincerely held religious beliefs
is a fact issue. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (“The narrow function of a reviewing court in
this context is to determine w hether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner
terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his
religion.”); see also In re Welfare of T.K. , 475 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Minn. App. 1991)
(reviewing a district court fin ding that religious belief was sincerely held for clear error).
The ULJ’s factual findings should not be disturbed if the evidence in the record “reasonably
tends to sustain those findings.” Schmidgall, 644 N.W.2d at 804; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d)(5).
Here, the ULJ conducted extensive questioning of relator, asking probing questions
to determine whether he had sincerely held religious beliefs that prevented him from testing

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for COVID- 19. The ULJ found that relator lacked credibi lity because he provided
inconsistent testimony and he struggled to explain his religious belief s.
The ULJ noted that:
[Relator] seemed to indicate that he could not take a test
because it would contribute to the development of COVID -19
vaccines and that d ata collected from COVID- 19 tests would
be used to infringe on his privacy rights . . . . [Relator] then
testified that if he could be certain taking a test would not
contribute to further vaccine development, his religion would
allow him to take a COVID -19 test. . . . [Relator] further
explained that he still had freedom of choice to refuse taking a
test under his religion. Then later in the hearing, [relator]
claimed that he still could not take a COVID -19 test, even if it
would not help develop vaccines, because the test would
damage his DNA.

This finding is supported by the record documenting relator’s answers to the ULJ’s
questions during the hearing.
Moreover, the ULJ found that relator lacked credibility because he “ seemed to
struggle to recall and explain what he could and could not do under his religion, and why.”
The ULJ further stated that, even though “a person may struggle with a religious belief and
still have a sincerely held religious belief, this is not how [relator] presented.” Ultimately,
the ULJ found that “the credible evidence in the record does not support a finding that
Daniel had a sincerely held religious belief that would have prevented him from undergoing
COVID- 19 testing.” The record supports this finding, particularly bec ause relator
struggled to answer the ULJ’s questions about whether he could be tested for the flu, strep,
and throat cancer, but confirmed that he could seek medical treatment in some situations,
such as a broken bone.

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Because the evidence substantially su pports this credibility determination, “we will
not disturb the ULJ ’s factual findings.” Peterson, 753 N.W.2d at 774; see also Goede v.
Astra Zeneca Pharms., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, No. A22- 1320, slip op. at 2 (Minn. App.
June 12, 2023) (“This court will not disturb a factual finding that an applicant’s vaccine
refusal was based on purely secular reasons, and not sincerely held religious beliefs, if that
finding is supported by substantial evidence .”). We defer to the credibility determinations
of the ULJ gr ounded in record evidence, regardless of the subject matter of the question
presented. See, e.g., Icenhower v. Total Auto., Inc., 845 N.W.2d 849, 855- 57 (Minn. App.
2014) (reviewing record evidence supporting a ULJ’s finding related to dishonesty and
mental illness that amounted to employment misconduct), rev. denied (Minn. July 15,
2014); see also In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 223 (Minn. 2021)
(“When the record reasonably supports the findings at issue on appeal, it is immaterial that
the record might also provide a reasonable basis for inferences and findings to the
contrary.” (quotation omitted)).
Accordingly, the ULJ did not err by determining that relator is ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.