Olson Property Investments, LLC, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1465

Olson Property Investments, LLC,
Appellant,

vs.

Michael Alexander, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 5, 2023
Reversed and remanded
Bryan, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File Nos. 19AV -CV-20-1479, 19AV-CV-21-1607

Christopher T. Kalla, Douglass E. Turner, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Lisa Hollingsworth, Laura Jelinek, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc ., St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this eviction appeal, appellant -landlord challenges the district court ’s decision
that each party was responsible for their own costs, disbursements, and attorney fees.
Because we are unable to review the district court’s decisions regarding the denial of
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additional statutory costs, disbursements, and attorney fees, and because the district court
erred by not awarding mandatory statutory costs to appellant, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
Respondents Michael Alexander and Pherizia Davis (tenants) lived in an apartment
in Farmington, Minnesota, owned by appellant Olson Property Investments, LLC
(landlord). Th e written lease between the parties provided that “[t]he court may award
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the party who prevails in a lawsuit about the
tenancy.” The lease began on June 1, 2019, ended on July 31, 2020, and allowed for a
month-to-month lease thereafter. Landlord gave tenants notice on May 30, 2020, that the
lease would not be renewed, but tenants did not vacate the property.
In August 2020, landlord filed an eviction complaint against tenants. The district
court declined to issue a summons because of ongoing restrictions on evictions during the
COVID- 19 pandemic. See Emerg. Exec. Ord. No. 20- 79, Modifying the Suspension of
Evictions and Writs of Recovery During the COVID -19 Peacetime Emergency (July 14,
2020). Landlord sought a writ of mandamus from this court compelling the district court
to proceed with the eviction action, which this court denied. Olson Property Investments,
LLC v. Alexander, A20- 1073 (Minn. App. Sept. 1, 2020) (order), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
25, 2020). Landlord then filed an amended complaint in March 2021, which the district
court dismissed without prejudice. Landlord appealed and this court dismissed the appeal
as premature because judgment had not been entered. Olso n Property Investments, LLC v.
Alexander, A21- 0782 (Minn. App. July 20, 2021) (order).
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Landlord filed a second, separate eviction action in September 2021. Tenants
removed the action to federal court, but it was remanded several months later. Landlord
also filed a motion seeking to re -open the initial eviction action and amend the complaint
therein, which the district court granted. Landlord filed a consolidated amended complaint
in both eviction actions in January 2022. This complaint included a reques t for “ all
allowable costs and disbursement[s] and an award of attorney’s fees.”
The district court held an evidentiary hearing in both matters in May 2022 and
subsequently issued an order awarding landlord possession of the apartment and
authorizing entry of judgment and issuance of a writ of recovery. The district court ordered
that “[a]ll parties shall be responsible for their own attorney’s fees as well as their own
costs and disbursements.” Neither party filed any post-judgment motions or an application
for costs and disbursements. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Landlord argues that the district court erred by not awarding it disbursements, costs,
and attorney fees. We address each in turn.
I. Disbursements
Landlord first argues that the district cou rt erred by not awarding it reasonable
disbursements.1 Because the district court did not explain its basis for denying
disbursements, we cannot determine whether the district court abused its discretion.

1 Although landlord requested both disbursements and costs in its January 2022 complaint,
tenants argue that landlord forfeited any costs and disbursements by failing to request them
during or after trial. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that
reviewing courts “generally consider only those issues that . . . were presented and
4
“In every action in a district court, the prevailing party . . . shall be allowed
reasonable disbursements paid or incurred . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 549.04, subd. 1 (2022); see
also Lake Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458,
482 (Minn. App. 2006) (“The prevailing party in a district court action shall be allowed . . .
reasonable disbursements.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 23, 2006). “The
prevailing party in any action is one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and
judgment entered. ” Borchert v. Maloney , 581 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. 1998); see also
Posey v. Fossen , 707 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. App. 2006) (noting that where more than
one party succeeds in part, determining which party prevailed involves “a careful weighing
of the relativ e success of the parties to a lawsuit”) ; Benigni v. C ounty of St. Louis , 585
N.W.2d 51, 54- 55 (Minn. 1998) (affirming determination that , despite grant of summary
judgment, there was no prevailing party in an action).
“We generally review a district court’ s award of costs and disbursements for an
abuse of discretion.” Dukowitz v. Hannon Sec. Servs., 841 N.W.2d 147, 155 (Minn. 2014).
The use of “shall” in section 549.04 means that the duty to award reasonable disbursements
to a prevailing party is mandator y. Id.; see also Quade & Sons Refrigeration, Inc. v.

considered by the trial court” (quota tion omitted)). Under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 54.04, “[a] party seeking to recover costs and disbursements must serve and file
a detailed application for taxation of costs and disbursements” within 45 days of the entry
of judgment. Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(b). Landlord does not dispute that it did not file a n
application. Landlord contends, however, that the judgment entered by the district court
in this case included a deni al of costs and disbursements—before landlord was required to
file the application under rule 54.04. We agree with landlord that, given the timing of the
district court’s denial of costs and disbursements, landlord is not precluded from taking an
appeal from this portion of the judgment without having filed a rule 54 applicat ion.
5
Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 510 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. App. 1994) (“The [district] court
does not have discretion to deny costs and disbursements to the prevailing party.”), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1994). The district court has discretion , however, in determining
what amount of disbursements is reasonable, Quade & Sons Refrigeration, 510 N.W.2d at
260; see also Jonsson v. Ames Constr., Inc., 409 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. App. 1987) , rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1987) , and in determining which party, if any , is the prevailing
party, Benigni, 585 N.W.2d at 54-55.
Landlord argues that it was the prevailing party because the district court granted
the requested relief: it awarded landlord possession of the premises and authorized the
issuance of a writ of recovery. Tenants disagree, arguing that, because of this case’s
“tortuous procedural history,” landlord is not clearly the prevailing party. The district court
did not explicitly state which party, if either party, prevailed. Nor did the district court
explain the basis for denying disbursements . T he district court simply sta ted that “[a]ll
parties shall be responsible for their own . . . disbursements.” Without more, we are unable
to review the decision. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings . On
remand, the parties shall have the opportunity to apply for disbursements consistent with
applicable law.
II. Costs
Landlord also argues that the district court erred by not awarding it mandatory costs.
We agree that the district court erred because Minnesota law requires an award of costs if
it finds in favor of a plaintiff in an eviction action.
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If the district court “finds for the plaintiff” in an eviction action, the district court
“shall tax the costs against the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.345, subd . 1(a) (2022). 2
Here, the parties do not dispute that the district court found “for the plaintiff.” Just as with
disbursements, the district court was required to tax the costs against t he defendant. See
Dukowitz, 841 N.W.2d at 155 (stating that “[t]he use of the word ‘shall’ in a statute . . .
indicates a duty that is mandatory, not one that is optional or discretionary” (quotation
omitted)).
Because section 504B.345—the specific statut e governing costs in an eviction
action—does not specify a specific amount of costs, we look to the general costs statute to
determine the appropriate amount. See Minn. Stat. § 549.02, subd. 1 (2022) (providing
generally for costs “[i]n actions commenced in the district court”). That statute provides
that the following costs “shall be allowed”: (1) $200 “[t]o plaintiff” in actions that involve
more than the recovery of money only, and (2) $5.50 “[t]o the prevailing party” for the cost
of filing a satisfaction of the judgment.3 Id. We conclude that the district court erred by not

2 The parties refer to the general cost statute, Minn. Stat. § 549.02 (2022), without reference
to the more specific provisions regarding costs in an eviction action, Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.345 (2022). We must rely, however, on the more specific statute. See generally
Connexus Energy v. Comm ’r of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Minn. 2015) (noting that,
the more specific statutory provision controls); State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673
n.7 (Minn. 1990) (concluding that this court has “the responsibility . . . to decide cases in
accordance with law,” despite “ counsel’s oversights, lack of research, failure to specify
issues or to cite relevant authorities.” (quotation omitted)).
3 As noted above regarding disbursements, the district cour t shall determine on remand
whether landlord was the prevailing party. The general costs statute distinguishes between
finding in favor of the plaintiff and designating the plaintiff as the prevailing party, and the
applicable amounts to be ordered under this statute may also include an award of $5.50 to
landlord if the district court designates landlord as the prevailing party.
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awarding applicable costs to landlord, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
III. Attorney Fees
Finally, landlord argues that the district court erred by not awarding it attorney fees
based on the fee provision in the parties’ lease.4 Because the district court did not explain
its denial of attorney fees, we are unable to review the district court’s exercise of discretion.
“The general rule in Minnesota is that attorney fees are not recoverable in litigation
unless there is a specific contract permitting or a statute authorizing such recovery.” Dunn
v. Nat ’l Beverage Corp. , 745 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted) .
“[L]eases are contracts to which we apply general principles of contract construction.”
RAM Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rohde , 820 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Minn. 2012). Appellate courts “will not
reverse the district court’s decision on attorney fees absent an abuse of discretion.” Carlson
v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Aug.

4 Tenants argue that landlord forfeited its attorney fees by failing to file a motion for
attorney fees under Minnesota General R ule of Practice 119. That rule provides that “[i]n
any action or proceeding in which an attorney seeks the award, or approval, of attorneys’
fees in the amount of $1,000.00 for the action, or more, application for award or approval
of fees shall be made b y motion.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 119.01. However, rule 119 does
not require strict compliance. Rooney v. Rooney, 782 N.W.2d 572, 577 (Minn. App. 2010)
(“A district court has discretion to strictly enforce or to waive the requirements of rule 119
when considering a motion for attorney fees .”); see also Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814,
826 (Minn. 1999) (affirming award of attorney fees despite party’s failure to file required
affidavits). Landlord does not dispute that it failed to file a rule 119 motion. L andlord
contends, however, that the judgment entered included a denial of attorney fees before
landlord had the opportunity to file a posttrial motion requesting attorney fees. Similar to
our discussion above regarding costs and disbursements, given the t iming of the denial of
attorney fees, landlord is not precluded from taking an appeal from this portion of the
judgment.
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21, 2007). A reviewing court will also reverse a district court’s denial of attorney fees
when it is unable to review the district court’ s exercise of discretion due to lack of an
explanation. See, e.g., Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’ g Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661
(Minn. 1987) (instructing district court to explain attorney fee decision on remand because
supreme court was “unable to determine if there has been any abuse of discretion”).
The lease in this case provided for a discretionary award of reasonable attorney fees
to the prevailing party: “[t]he court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the
party who prevails in a lawsuit about the tenancy.” 5 In such a situation, depending on the
facts, it may have been within the district court’s discretion to either award or deny landlord
attorney fees. We are unable to review the district court’s exercise of that discretion,
however, because the district court did not explain its reasons for denying attorney fees.
Nor can we be sure that the district court’s decision w as not based on a procedural erro r,
erroneous factual findings, or a misinterpretation of the parties’ contract . We therefore
reverse and remand for the district court to provide rationale for its ruling on attorney fees.
Reversed and remanded.

5 Tenants argue that because the parties’ lease had expired at the time of trial, the lease
provision allowing for attorney fees no longer applied. Tenants cite no relevant authority
in support of this proposition, and we are aware of none.