James Andre Woodard,

1

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A22-1483

Hennepin County Moore, III, J.

James Andre Woodard,

Appellant,

vs.
Filed: August 23, 2023
State of Minnesota, Office of Appellate Courts

Respondent.

________________________

James Andre Woodard, Rush City, Minnesota, pro se.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Anna R. Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying appellant’s
petition for postconviction relief because, even if the facts alleged in the petition were
proven by a preponderance of the evidence, appellant is conclusively entitled to no relief.
Affirmed.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
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O P I N I O N
MOORE, III, Justice.
In this case, we are asked to determine whether the district court erred when it
summarily denied appellant James Andrew Woodard’s request for postconviction relief.
In 2018, Woodard was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for the killing of
Divittin Hoskins. We affirmed Woodard’s conviction on direct appeal. State v. Woodard,
942 N.W.2d 137, 145 (Minn. 2020). In April 2022, Woodard filed a petition in Hennepin
County District Court seeking postconviction relief and an evidentiary hearing, arguing
that in his direct appeal, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of appellate counsel. The district court denied Woodard’s petition without a
hearing. Because we conclude that Woodard is conclusively entitled to no relief even if
the facts alleged in the petition were proven by a preponderance of the evidence at an
evidentiary hearing, we affirm.
FACTS
The facts underlying Woodard’s conviction are not at issue in this appeal.
1 On July
28, 2017, Divittin Hoskins was fatally shot while socializing with friends and family in the
parking lot by his sister’s townhome in North Minneapolis. Hoskins’s children and niece
witnessed the shooting, and the police went to the townhome of Hoskins’s sister to

1 A more complete description of the facts underlying Woodard’s conviction and
sentence can be found in our opinion from Woodard’s direct appeal. See Woodard, 942
N.W.2d at 140–41.
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interview the children. There, police obtained a description of the shooter from Hoskins’s
niece and two of his children.
The day after the shooting, Hoskins’s sister began seeking information from the
community about the shooting and heard that Woodard may have been involved.
Hoskins’s sister looked up Woodard’s profile on Facebook and found a picture and video
of him, which she allowed the child witnesses to view. Two of them identified Woodard
as the man who committed the murder . Hoskins’s sister subsequently reached out to one
of the investigators in the case, who asked Hoskins’s sister to bring the children to forensic
interviews.
Investigators also located surveillance footage of the parking lot where the murder
took place, which shows the assailant hiding along the side of a detached garage next to
the parking lot. The recording reveals a man, later identified as E.R., socializing in the
parking lot before walking over to talk to the shooter for a moment , proceeding through
the parking lot, stopping at the far end of the parking lot to look around, and going back to
the side of the garage. As he walked back to the side of the garage, the shooter withdrew
behind the garage out of view of the camera. E.R. also temporarily disappeared from the
view of the camera behind the garage before returning to the party. The shooter then
reappeared from the back of the garage, pulled out a gun, ran up to where Hoskins was
standing next to four children, and fired a single shot into the back of Hoskins’s head at
close range before turning and fleeing.
During an interview o n July 30, 2017, E.R. eventually identified Woodard as the
shooter after police showed him a series of photographs of individuals police believed were
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at the scene. Based on the identifications of E.R. and the children, police arrested Woodard
on August 1, 2017. He was later charged with first-degree premeditated murder in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185, subdivision (a)(1) (2022).
The jury found Woodard guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, and the district
court sentenced Woodard to life in prison without the possibility of release. Woodard filed
a direct appeal, arguing that the district court erred when it denied his motion to present an
alternative-perpetrator defense and in instructing the jury on the order in which to consider
the charges against him. We affirmed Woodard’s conviction. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at
145.
On April 26, 2022, Woodard filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and requesting an evidentiary hearing.
Specifically, Woodard alleged appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness when appellate counsel failed to raise two claims of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct and two claims of erroneous evidentiary rulings made during his
trial. The unpursued claims of prosecutorial misconduct alleged that the prosecutor
“elicited inadmissible hearsay evidence” while E.R. was on the stand and “failed to disclose
pretrial interview summaries” of the child witnesses. The unraised abuse-of-discretion
claims asserted that the court impermissibly allowed the State to question one of the
investigators about a briefing he received from another officer at the crime scene and
permitted the jury to hear inadmissible testimony of the child witnesses.
Citing Arredondo v. State, 754 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 2008), the district court
applied the standard that an appellate counsel’s performance is not objectively
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unreasonable for not pursing a claim counsel could legitimately conclude would fail.
Applying this rule of law to the facts alleged in Woodard’s petition for postconviction
relief, the court concluded that appellate counsel had good reason not to raise the
prosecutorial misconduct claims because there was no misconduct and that, even if there
had been, there was no prejudice to Woodard. Similarly, the district court reasoned that
appellate counsel was well within the bounds of objective reasonability in deciding not to
argue that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to question one of the
investigators about his scene briefing. And the district court came to the same conclu sion
regarding appellate counsel’s decision not to challenge the admission of the child
testimony. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
A person convicted of a crime is entitled to pursue a petition for postconviction
relief if the conviction violated the person’s constitutional or statutory rights. See Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (1) (2022). The availability of and procedure for postconviction
relief is governed by Minnesota Statutes sections 590.01 to .11 (2022). Section 590.04,
subdivision 1, requires a court to set a hearing on a petition “[u]nless the petition and the
files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no
relief.”
We “review the summary denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of
discretion.” Martin v. State, 969 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. 2022). “A district court abuses
its discretion when ‘it has exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
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based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.’ ” Id. (quoting Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017)).
Woodard argues the district court abused its discretion when it summarily denied
his petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
Although doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing are resolved in favor of
the petitioner, “a postconviction evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner
alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” Rhodes v.
State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016). In his petition for postconviction relief,
Woodard alleges that appellate counsel failed to raise two instances of alleged prosecutorial
misconduct and two instances in which he asserts the district court abused its discretion.
Based on these alleged failures, Woodard claims his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of appellate counsel was violated and he is therefore entitled to a new trial.
Because Woodard’s alleged facts, if taken to be true, present legally insufficient grounds
for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise these four
claims on direct appeal, the district court did not err in denying Woodard relief without an
evidentiary hearing.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner
must “allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the
two prongs of the test announced in Strickland v. Washington.” Zumberge v. State, 937
N.W.2d 406, 413 (Minn. 2019) (citing 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Under the Strickland test,
Woodard must show first that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” and second that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at
688, 694. When determining whether an attorney’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, courts do not second-guess the decision of appellate counsel
not to raise a claim that “appellate counsel could have legitimately concluded would not
prevail.” Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 736 (Minn. 2010).
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that even if Woodard proved his alleged
facts by a preponderance of the evidence, none of his ineffective assistance claims would
have succeeded because appellate counsel could have legitimately concluded that the four
disputed issues would not prevail on appeal. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion
for the district court to summarily deny Woodard’s postconviction petition.
The first claim of prosecutorial misconduct that Woodard claims his appellate
counsel was ineffective for not raising involved an allegation that the prosecutor attempted
to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony of a prior shooting during the State’s direct
examination of E.R. “The prosecutor is an officer of the court charged with the affirmative
obligation to achieve justice and fair adjudication, not merely convictions.” State v. Fields,
730 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 2007) (citation omitted). “[A]ttempting to elicit . . . clearly
inadmissible evidence may constitute misconduct.” Id. (citation omitted). Because
Woodard’s trial counsel objected to this line of questioning (which was sustained by the
district court), to prevail in raising this claim on direct appeal, Woodard’s appellate counsel
would have had to show there was misconduct that likely played a substantial part in
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influencing the jury to convict. See State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 390 & n.8 (Minn.
2007).2
The trial record shows that the prosecutor sought testimony about a prior shooting
to establish Woodard’s motive for shooting Divittin Hoskins. This, however, d oes not
support a claim that the prosecutor was trying to elicit “clearly inadmissible evidence.”
Fields, 730 N.W.2d at 782. Although evidence about motive does not prove any necessary
element of a first-degree-murder charge, it can add credibility to the state’s case, and this
evidence is often admissible. See State v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Minn. 2004).
Nor is every attempt to elicit testimony about a purported prior event necessarily offered
for proof of the matter asserted when elicited for motive purposes. See Arredondo,
754 N.W.2d at 574 (defining hearsay as “an out-of-court statement offered as evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted” (quoting State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504
(Minn. 2006)); see also Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Given these circumstances, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Woodard’s postconviction petition,
because Woodard’s appellate counsel could have legitimately determined that this

2 When defense counsel objects to instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct at
trial, our court “use[s] a two-tiered harmless-error test under which the standard of review
varies based on the seriousness of the misconduct.” State v. Whitson, 876 N.W.2d 297,
304 (Minn. 2016). “In cases involving less serious misconduct, the misconduct will not be
characterized as prejudicial unless it is likely that the misconduct played a substantial part
in influencing the jury to convict.” Steward , 645 N.W.2d at 121. In cases of serious
misconduct, “[w]e will review any objected -to prosecutorial misconduct to determine
whether the misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Dobbins, 725
N.W.2d 492, 506 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because we conclude that any misconduct here would be nonserious, the former standard
applies.
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prosecutorial misconduct claim would not prevail on appeal, and thus Woodard is
conclusively entitled to no relief on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.
The second claim of prosecutorial misconduct that Woodard asserts his appellate
counsel was ineffective for not raising involved an allegation that the prosecutor failed to
disclose pretrial interview summaries of three child witnesses. According to Woodard, his
trial counsel requested the summaries before trial, but the prosecutor did not provide them
until after his trial had already begun, and the testimony of one witness “caught the defense
by surprise” and prejudiced his case. Woodard has not identified any objection at trial
based on this allegation, so appellate counsel would have been required to satisfy the
modified plain-error test to prevail on this claim on direct appeal. See State v. Matthews ,
779 N.W.2d 543, 551 (Minn. 2010) (explaining that, for unobjected -to misconduct, the
court applies a modified plain-error test under which “the defendant has the burden to
demonstrate that the misconduct constitutes (1) error, (2) that was plain” before the burden
“shifts to the State to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial
rights”).
The trial record shows that before trial, Woodard’s trial counsel was already aware
of the substance of the child witnesses’ testimony—in fact, the district court had held an
evidentiary hearing on the issue. And when asked, the State readily obliged the request of
Woodard’s trial counsel and provided the summaries, after which the issue was never
raised again. As the district court correctly pointed out in its order denying the petition for
postconviction relief, “[Woodard]’s counsel wanted basic discovery and he got it,” without
any indication that the State had violated any law in the timing of the disclosure. We
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therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying
the postconviction petition because appellate counsel could have legitimately determined
that the prosecutorial misconduct claim would not prevail on appeal, and therefore
Woodard is conclusively entitled to no postconviction relief on his ineffective assi stance
of appellate counsel claim.
The third claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel alleged by Woodard is
that his appellate counsel should have argued that the district court abused its discretion
when it allowed one of the investigators to testify about inadmissible evidence of a prior
shooting. We have explained that “[e]videntiary errors . . . warrant a new trial only when
the error substantially influences the jury’s decision.” State v. Valtierra, 718 N.W.2d 425,
435 (Minn. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “[a] district
court’s evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State
v. Robertson, 884 N.W.2d 864, 872 (Minn. 2016). As mentioned above, the trial record
shows that the evidence of the prior shooting was elicited as evidence of a possible motive
for Woodard to shoot Divittin Hoskins, not as direct evidence of Woodard’s guilt; this type
of evidence is generally admissible, even though it is not an element of first-degree murder,
because it helps the jury when dealing with circumstantial evidence. See Bolstad,
686 N.W.2d at 541; State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Minn. 1989). Woodard is thus
conclusively entitled to no postconviction relief on his ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim because appellate counsel could have legitimately determined that the claim
that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed one of the investigators to testify
about the prior shooting would not prevail on appeal.
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The fourth claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel raised by Woodard
is that his attorney should have argued that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Woodard’s motion to preclude the child witnesses from testifying at trial because
“[e]nhanced video of the homicide shows their attention was elsewhere,” their testimony
was not credible because their “description of [the] shooter changes,” and their
observations were only “fleeting or limited” and “may have required corroboration.” In
State v. Mosely, however, the appellant similarly argued that identification testimony
should have been excluded because it lacked reliability. 853 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn.
2014). We rejected that argument because we have “repeatedly concluded that the
reliability of identification testimony goes to the weight to be afforded the testimony by the
trier of fact, not to its admissibility.” Id. Likewise, Woodard’s appellate counsel could
have reasonably concluded that this argument would fail on direct appeal because the
district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing testimony that was likely admissible.
Therefore, we conclude that Woodard is conclusively entitled to no relief on his
postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim because appellate counsel could
have legitimately determined that the claim would not prevail on appeal.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that even under the facts as alleged by
Woodard, he is conclusively entitled to no relief on his ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim because appellate counsel could have legitimately concluded the four claims
would not prevail on appeal. Consequently, we hold that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in summarily denying Woodard’s petition for postconviction relief without
an evidentiary hearing.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.