State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1488

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Timothy Robert Steele,
Appellant.

Filed October 23, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-15-3500

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Jessica A. Bierwerth, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson , Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Timothy Robert Steele killed his grandmother by repeatedly hitting her on the head
with a hammer. At trial, he asserted the defense of mental illness. The district court, sitting
as fact -finder, rejected the defense and found him guilty of second-degree intentional
murder. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that Steele knew
that his actions were morally wrong. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Steele has experienced mental-health symptoms since he was 17 years old. He has
been diagnosed with a bipolar type of schizoaffective disorder, severe alcohol-use disorder,
severe methamphetamine-use disorder, and anti-social personality disorder. Steele’ s
symptoms include “impaired thought processes, disorganization, thought blocking,
paranoid delusional ideation, . . . auditory and visual hallucinations,” and both manic and
depressive episodes.
In October 2015, Steele lived with his mother, D.S., and his grandmother, A.S. On
October 15, 2015, while the three were eating dinner together at home, A.S. blew her nose.
Steele was “grossed out” and believed that, by smiling at him, A.S. was “rubbing it in.”
Steele went to his bedroom, where he experienced a sensation of tasting mucus, which
“pushed [him] over the edge.” He found a hammer and walked into A.S.’s bedroom. A.S.
was lying in bed, watching television. Steele asked himself, “Can I really do this?” He
then used the hammer to hit A.S. on the head seven or eight times.
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D.S. heard a noise and asked Steele about it, and he said it was “nothing.” Steele
changed his shirt and walked to a gas station to buy cigarettes and pop. As he walked,
Steele thought to himself that he should “try to run” but decided that he should go home,
rest for a couple hours, and then “fess up and turn [himself] in.” He heard an auditory
hallucination of a voice telling him that he was “the dumbest criminal in the world.”
After Steele returned home from the gas station, he told D.S. that he had killed A.S.
Steele told D.S. that he was feeling suicidal and asked D.S. to buy him a gun. He told D.S.
to not go into A.S.’s bedroom, but D.S. did so to confirm that A.S. was dead. D.S. took
Steele for a drive to calm him down (which had been effective on prior occasions) and to
persuade him to allow her to call the police. During the drive, D.S. and Steele discussed
what might happen next.
When Steele and D.S. returned home, Steele told D.S. that she could call the police.
An officer arrived within minutes and confirmed that A.S. was dead. The officer spoke
with Steele, who remained calm and respectful. Steele confessed that he had killed A.S.
and claimed that voices in his head caused him to do so.
After being arrested, Steele waived his Miranda rights and answered questions
posed to him by officers. He explained that he had experienced mental-health symptoms
in recent months and that he had been feeling depressed and suicidal and was hearing
voices. Steele stated that he “was pushed over the edge.” Steele explained that he believed
that his grandmother was intentionally ruining his clothes and that he was “grossed out”
when she blew her nose at the dinner table. He stated that he had never before thought
about killing A.S. and that “it was more of an impulse.” He explained that he thought that
4
if he could “push [himself] to do something like” killing his grandmother, his mental-health
symptoms would stop.
Four days later, the state charged Steele with second-degree intentional murder, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (Supp. 2015). In January 2016, the district
court suspended the criminal case on the ground that Steele was incompetent to proceed.
See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 6(b). Nearly five years later, after a series of
examinations and competency determinations, the district court found Steele competent to
proceed.
Because Steele asserted the defenses of not guilty and mental illness, the district
court bifurcated the trial so that his not-guilty defense would be determined first and his
mental-illness defense would be determined second. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.02,
subd. 7(a). In May 2021, Steele waived his right to a jury trial. In addition, Steele agreed
that the first phase would be tried based on stipulated evidence. See Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 3. The district court conducted the first phase of trial in November 2021. In
December 2021, the district court filed an order in which it found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Steele is guilty, subject to his mental-illness defense.
The district court conducted the second phase of trial in February and March of
2022. The state called two police officers and D.S. as witnesses. In addition, the state
called Mary Kenning, a clinical psychologist who had examined Steele. Kenning testified
that, at the time he committed the act of killing his grandmother, Steele knew that his
actions were wrong. In the defense case, Steele called Christina Haldaman, a forensic
5
psychologist who also had examined Steele. Haldaman testified that Steele was aware of
the nature of his actions but not aware that they were morally wrong.
In April 2022, the district court filed a 14-page order and memorandum in which it
found Steele guilty. The district court concluded that Steele “failed to prove . . . that at the
time of committing the act . . . [he] did not know the nature of his act, or did not know that
it was morally wrong.” The district court imposed a sentence of 366 months of
imprisonment. Steele appeals.
DECISION
Steele argues that the district court erred by finding him guilty on the ground that
he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time he killed A.S., he did not
know that it was morally wrong to do so.
“A criminal defendant is presumed sane and responsible for his acts” but may avoid
criminal liability by “proving a mental-illness defense by a preponderance of the evidence.”
State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Minn. 2016). In Minnesota, the mental-illness
defense is based on the M’Naghten rule, which has been codified in a statute providing that
a defendant “shall not be excused from criminal liability except upon proof that at the time
of committing the alle ged criminal act the person was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.”
Minn. Stat. § 611.026 (2014); see also Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 867. The supreme court
has explained that “[t]he word ‘wrong’ in this statute is ‘used in the moral sense.’” Roberts,
876 N.W.2d at 868 (quoting State v. Bott, 246 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Minn. 1976)). Accordingly,
“a ‘defendant must know that his act was wrong in a moral sense and not merely know that
6
he has violated a statute.’” Id. (quoting State v. Ulm, 326 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Minn. 1982)).
The defendant bears the burden to prove the mental-illness defense by a preponderance of
the evidence. State v. Odell, 676 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Minn. 2004).
“The application of the mental-illness defense is a question of fact to be resolved by
the factfinder.” Roberts, 876 N.W.2d at 868. Accordingly, “a finding that a defendant
failed to meet his or her burden to prove a mental-illness defense should not be disturbed
unless it is clearly erroneous.” Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if “they are
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Civil Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted). The clear-error standard of review does not permit an appellate
court to engage in fact- finding, reweigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or
reconcile conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.
Rather, because the factfinder has “the primary responsibility
of determining the fact issues ” and the “advantage” of
observing the witnesses in “view of all the circumstances
surrounding the entire proceeding,” an appellate court’s “duty
is fully performed” after it has fairly considered all the
evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably
supports the decision.

Id. at 222 (quoting State ex rel. Peterson v. Bentley, 71 N.W.2d 780 , 786 (Minn. 1955)).
“Broad deference is granted ‘to the fact -finder in determining the appropriate weight to
assign expert psychiatric testimony’” when reviewing a district court’s findings concerning
the mental-illness defense. Odell, 676 N.W.2d at 648-49 (quoting State v. Brom, 463
N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. 1990)).
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In this case, it is undisputed that Steele suffers from a mental illness. In addition,
both expert witnesses—Kenning and Haldaman—testified that Steele understood the
nature of his actions when he killed A.S. Kenning and Haldaman differed as to whether ,
at the time he killed A.S., Steele knew that his actions were morally wrong. The sole issue
on appeal is whether the district court clearly erred by finding that Steele knew that his
actions were morally wrong.
The district court’s finding on that issue is supported by Kenning’s expert testimony.
She testified that Steele’s “actions both before and after” he killed his grandmother
“strongly suggests” that he knew the wrongfulness of his actions. Specifically, she pointed
out that Steele acted surreptitiously in choosing and concealing his weapon, in changing
his clothing before walking to the gas station, in telling his mother not to go into his
grandmother’s bedroom, in expressing sorrow and the desire to kill himself, in discussing
possible penalties with his mother while driving around, and in allowing his mother to call
police. The district court specifically relied on this part of Kenning’s testimony in
explaining its finding that Steele was aware that his actions were morally wrong.
Steele contends that the district court erred for several reasons. For example, he
contends that Kenning wrongly “focused on Steele’s behavior after he killed A.S.” and that
the relevant inquiry is whether he knew that his actions were morally wrong at the time of
the offense. The supreme court has demonstrated that, in determining whether a defendant
knew that his or her actions were morally wrong at the time of the act, it is appropriate to
consider the defendant’s actions immediately following the act. See Roberts, 876 N.W.2d
at 869, 871 (discussing evidence that defendant disposed of blood-stained items and
8
expressed awareness of likelihood of consequences); DeMars v. State, 352 N.W.2d 13, 15-
16 (Minn. 1984) (discussing evidence that defendant expressed sorrow and attempted to
dispose of victim’s body and blood-stained clothing). Steele also contends that Kenning
did not distinguish between the concepts of legal wrong and moral wrong. But the district
court clearly found that Steele was aware that his actions were both legally wrong and
morally wrong. Steele’s remaining contentions challenge other parts of Kenning’ s
testimony that do not necessarily affect her opinion on the disputed issue and are not
reflected in the district court’s order.
Keeping in mind the broad deference that is due to a district court’ s reliance on
expert testimony of this type, see Odell, 676 N.W.2d at 648, we conclude that the district
court did not clearly err by finding that Steele knew that killing A.S. was morally wrong
and, thus, did not clearly err by finding that Steele did not prove his mental-illness defense.
Affirmed.