Luisa Petrona Branscum, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1493

Luisa Petrona Branscum,
Appellant,

vs.

Justin Dakota Branscum,
Respondent.

Filed April 17, 2023
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-22-755

Alyssa Nguyen, Nguyen Firm, L.L.C., St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Justin Branscum, Chaska, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Appellant petitioned the district court for a harassment restraining order. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2022, Luisa Petrona Branscum petitioned the district court on behalf of
her seven-year -old child for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against her then-
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estranged husband, Justin Dakota Branscum, who is the father of the child. Luisa stated in
the petition that she and Justin were in the process of getting a divorce. Luisa alleged that
Justin used threats to cause their child to falsely claim that Luisa’s boyfriend was abusing
the child. Luisa requested an HRO to protect only the child.
The district court promptly issued an ex parte HRO, which temporarily prohibited
Justin from harassing the child, from having contact with Luisa, and from having contact
with the child except for supervised parenting time. On the following day, Justin requested
a hearing on the petition, which was scheduled for the following week. After a multi-day
hearing on both the HRO petition and a motion for temporary custody in the parties’
dissolution case, the district court filed an order providing for temporary interim relief in
both cases and requesting written arguments from the parties.
After the deadline for filing written arguments, the district court filed a three-page
order. The district court resolved the issues raised by the HRO petition in one paragraph,
as follows:
The Court finds that Ms. Branscum has not met the
statutory burden required for an HRO. The allegations do not
meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 609.748. While the
behavior of Mr. Branscum is concerning, it does not have a
substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of
Ms. Branscum or the minor child. The e x parte HRO is
therefore dismissed.

Luisa appeals. Justin has not filed a responsive brief that complies with the rules
governing the form and service of appellate briefs. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 125.04,
132.04. Nonetheless, we will determine the appeal on the merits. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 142.03.
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DECISION
Luisa argues that, for two reasons, the district court erred by denying her HRO
petition.
I.
Luisa first argues that the district court erred by denying her petition on the ground
that Justin’s conduct did not have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or
privacy of either Luisa or the minor child. She contends that the district court’s finding is
incomplete because it does not consider whether Justin intended to cause a substantial
adverse effect on her or the child’s safety, security, or privacy. Luisa contends that she is
entitled to an HRO if she proved that Justin intended such an effect, even if his conduct did
not have the intended effect. Her argument is based on the statutory definition of
harassment, which includes “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or
gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse
effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1)
(2022) (emphasis added).
Luisa’s argument fails for three reasons. First, she did not file a motion for amended
findings in the district court. If a party believes that the district court has failed to make
adequate findings of fact, “the burden is on the parties to alert the court by a motion for
amended finding[s] under Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02.” Frank v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 336
N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 1983). Such a motion serves to either “eliminate the need for
appellate review” or, “if appellate review is sought,” to “facilitate development of ‘critical
aspects of the record.’” Alpha Real Estate Co. v. Delta Dental Plan, 664 N.W.2d 303, 309
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(Minn. 2003) (discussing motion for new trial) (quoting Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d
200, 201 (Minn. 1986)). If an appellant did not move for amended findings in the district
court, the appellant has forfeited the argument that the district court’s findings are
inadequate and that the appellate court should remand for adequate findings. See Anderson
v. Peterson’s N. Branch Mill, Inc., 503 N.W.2d 517, 518-19 (Minn. App. 1993) (declining
to review adequacy of findings and conclusions of law because appellant did not move for
amended findings); Pacific Mut. Door Co. v. James, 465 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. App.
1991) (same); Love v. Amsler, 441 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Minn. App. 1989) (same), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).
Second, Luisa has not provided this court with a transcript of the evidentiary
hearing. In any appeal, the appellant is responsible for ordering and submitting any
transcripts that are necessary for appellate review. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.02, subd. 1.
If an appellant fail s to submit a transcript, this court cannot consider any arguments that
would require a review of a transcript. See, e.g., Godbout v. Norton, 262 N.W.2d 374, 376
(Minn. 1977); Custom Farm Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 238 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Minn. 1976);
Noltimier v. Noltimier, 157 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1968); Collins v. Waconia Dodge,
Inc., 793 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2011); Fritz v.
Fritz, 390 N.W.2d 924, 925 (Minn. App. 1986). In her brief, Luisa argues that the evidence
would support a conclusion that Justin intended to cause a substantial adverse effect on her
and the child’s safety, security, or privacy. Without a transcript, we are unable to evaluate
that argument and to determine whether it is correct.
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Third, other parts of the district court record indicate that Luisa did not argue to the
district court that Justin intended to cause a substantial adverse effect on her and the child’s
safety, security, or privacy. In the memorandum of law she submitted after the evidentiary
hearing, Luisa argued only that Justin’s conduct actually had a substantial adverse effect
on herself and the child. It appears that the district court rejected that argument. Luisa
cannot establish that the district court erred by not making a finding on a factual issue that
she apparently did not raise.
Thus, Luisa has not established that the district court erred by denying her HRO
petition on the ground that Justin’s conduct did not have a substantial adverse effect on the
safety, security, or privacy of Luisa or the minor child.
II.
Luisa also argues that the district court erred by not drawing an adverse inference
against Justin based on his invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, which he apparently exercised because he had been criminally charged with
a violation of the ex parte temporary HRO.
In support of this argument, Luisa cites Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976),
and argues that, because Justin refused to answer questions related to the HRO, the district
court “should have made adverse inferences in its findings as required in Baxter.” But the
Baxter opinion does not suggest, let alone hold, that a court is required to draw an adverse
inference if a party to a civil matter invokes the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. The Baxter Court held merely that “permitting an adverse inference to be
drawn from an inmate’s silence at his disciplinary proceedings is not, on its face, an invalid
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practice.” Id. at 320; cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612 (1976) (holding that
instruction allowing jury to draw adverse inference in criminal trial violated defendant’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). The Baxter Court’s holding was based
on the premise that, under state law, “an inmate’s silence in and of itself is insufficient to
support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary Board.” 425 U.S. at 317. In another civil
case concerning an assertion of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, this
court stated, “ Drawing adverse inferences from [the respondent’s] refusal to testify in a
civil matter is permitted but not mandatory.” In re Recommendation for Discharge of
Kelvie, 384 N.W.2d 901, 906 (Minn. App. 1986) (emphasis added). To the extent that
Luisa argues that the district court should have exercised its discretion by drawing an
adverse inference, her argument fails because she has not provided the court with a
transcript of the evidentiary hearing, which would be necessary to review the district
court’s exercise of discretion.
Thus, Luisa has not established that the district court erred by not drawing an
adverse inference against Justin based on his invocation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
Affirmed.