State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A22-1504

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Morayo Surat Hassan,
Appellant.

Filed October 23, 2023
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-9951

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Kristi Nielsen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistan t
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges her conviction for multiple counts of theft by false
representation, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in admitting appellant’s
time sheets into evidence because they were inadmissible hearsay that did not fall under a
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hearsay exception. Because we see no abuse of discretion in the admission of the
timesheets, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Morayo Hassan, now 66, worked three jobs, two of them as a personal
care assistant (PCA) at healthcare-service facilities and one as a live -in home health aide.
For each job, appellant documented the dates and hours she worked on time sheets that she
signed and dated.
The PCA time sheets instructed employees to “[r]eview the completed time sheet
for accuracy before signing” and warned them that “[i]t is a federal crime to provide false
information on PCA billings for Medical Assistance payment. Your signature verifies the
time/services entered above are accurate and the services were performed as specified in
the PCA Care Plan.” As a home health aide, appellant was given directives including “DO
NOT put on your time sheet the hours you did not work for the client” and “DO NOT say
that you are at work or put it on your time sheet that you are at work when you are not at
work.” She signed a statement acknowled ging that prohibited conduct could result in her
suspension or termination.
Between December 1, 2015, and April 4, 2017, appellant reported working the same
hours at more than one job. Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MCFU) investigators executed
search warrants on the care facilities that employed appellant, obtained her time sheets, and
interviewed her. An amended complaint charged her with two counts of theft by false
representation (over $5,000), one count of theft by false representatio n (over $1,000), and
one count of theft by false representation (public funds).
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One investigator’s analysis of the time sheets revealed that, between Feb ruary 22
and April 4, 2017, the care facilities were overpaid $3,569.52, of which appellant received
$2,324.78 (Count 1); between June 14 and December 13, 2016, the care facilities were
overpaid $12,568.04, of which appellant received $8,198.04 (Count 2); between December
29, 2015 and June 1, 2016, the care facilities were overpaid $8,997.56, of which appellant
received $5,878.84 (Count 3); and on December 1, 2015, the care facilities were overpaid
$444.08, of which appellant received $289.90 (Count 4). Thus, the facilities were overpaid
a total of $25,579.20, of which appellant received a total of $16,691.55.
At trial, following the parties’ arguments on the issue, the time sheets were admitted
into evidence as items seized from businesses during the execution of search warrants and
as nonhearsay statements of a party opponent. The jury found appellant guilty on all four
counts. The district court sentenced appellant, “in view of [her] age and lack of criminal
history,” to probation for three year s and to pay restitution “dependent upon probation’s
analysis of [her] ability to pay.”
Appellant challenges her conviction, reiterating her argument that her timesheets
should not have been admitted into evidence.
DECISION
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and we
will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ali, 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). A district court’s admission of physical evide nce will be
affirmed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Daniels , 361 N.W.2d 819,
827 (Minn. 1985). The district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or
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capricious manner, makes clearly erroneous factual findings, or takes an erroneous view of
the law. Thoresen v. State , 965 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Minn. 2021). An appellant must
establish that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203
(Minn. 2003).
The district court determined that the written statements of hours and places worked
on appellant’s PCA timesheets were admissible as statements by a party opponent under
Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (“A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered
against a party and is the party’s own statement, in either an individual or a representative
capacity.”) Appellant herself wrote t he relevant statements on her timesheets: she stated
when and where she worked, and her signature attest ed to the truth of those statements.
When appellant was shown some of the statements, she agreed that she had filled them out
and signed them and that they conflicted, showing her to have worked in more than one
place at a particular time.
On appeal, she argues that (1) she did not acknowledge her signature was on all the
time sheets ; (2) many more timesheets were admitted than those shown to her; (3) the
timesheets were not all signed by the recipient of the care or the recipient’s responsible
party, and the recipients were not called as witnesses; (4) appellant’s ID number was wrong
on some of the timesheets; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors was to make them
inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). But the timesheets were not admitted to
show which patients received the care; they were a dmitted to show that appellant had
reported working at more than one place at one time. None of appellant’s arguments
pertains to the timesheets’ value as evidence of appellant’s reporting that she worked in
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more than one place at one time. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the timesheets. There is no basis to reverse appellant’s convictions.
Affirmed.